

**PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR USING SOFT POWERS FOR
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA TO CONFRONT THE
GROWING IRANIAN REGIONAL THREAT**

Doctoral dissertation
in the field of security studies

Drafted by

B. General Pilot/ Saeed Abdulrahman Alshehri
Saudi Arabia

Under the scientific supervision of
Cpt. dr hab. Marcin Górniewicz, prof. MUT

Warsaw, 2022

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
CHAPTER 1	9
TERMINOLOGY	9
CHAPTER 2	20
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	20
2.1. Area of research.....	20
2.2. Importance of research.....	20
2.3. Main problem situation	21
2.4. Aims of research	21
2.5. Research problems	21
2.6. Methods, techniques and tools	22
2.7. Research limitations	28
2.8. Sources for the research	29
2.9. Remarks on prior studies.....	31
2.10. Contents of the paper	32
CHAPTER 3	33
THE GROWING IRANIAN ROLE IN THE ARAB REGION	33
3.1. Iranian national interests and objectives in the Arab region and the mechanisms for achieving them	35
3.2. Iranian foreign policy orientations in the Middle East	59
3.3. Consequences of Iran's role in the region and the effects of the Iranian nuclear programme for the Arab national security	84
CHAPTER 4	111
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAUDI NATIONAL SECURITY	111
General	111
4.1. The national security dimensions of the KSA and their consequences	112
4.2. The modern international variables and their impact on the security of the KSA	137
4.3. The modern regional differences and their impact on the national security of the KSA.....	170
4.4. Conclusions	193
CHAPTER 5	196
RECOMMENDED STRATEGY AND THE USE OF THE SOFT POWERS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN THE REGION FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY.....	196
General	196

5.1 Soft powers and their role in achieving national security for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	198
5.2. Recommended strategy and the use of soft powers in the economy, as well as the political and military security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.....	221
5.3. The proposed strategy for the use of soft power in the economic, social and cultural fields	245
5.4. Summary.....	265
CONCLUSION	270
RECOMMENDATIONS	275
APPENDICES	277
Annex (A).....	278
Annex (B)	279
Annex (C)	281
Annex (D).....	282
Annex (E)	285
TABLES	289
Table No. (1)	290
Table No. (2)	291
Table No. (3)	292
Table No. (4)	294
MAPS	298
Map No. (1)	299
Map No. (2)	300
Map No. (3)	301
Map No. (4)	302
REFERENCES	303
First: Arabic references	303
A. Books	303
B. Studies, research and scientific theses	305
C. Specialized magazines and periodicals	310
D. Reports, lectures and seminars.....	313
E. Newspapers	313
Secondly: Foreign references	314
Third: International Information Network (Internet).....	314

INTRODUCTION

Soft powers are an important tool for creating and implementing foreign policy and the related cultural and religious trends. It is among the main variables of international relations, as it plays a great role in foreign policies, especially in a time when so much knowledge is readily available for everyone and in light of the technological revolution. Advances in communication made over the last two decades created objective conditions for the control and assessment of policies.

Soft powers are pivotal for the understanding of international actions, as they exert an impact on foreign policy and at the same time provide an intellectual base for executing the state's policy toward other countries. The scientific rationale behind these powers is based upon the critical symbolic context, which employs the means available for the states to influence other countries without resorting to military or economic force, while this approach does not depend on material coercive means. Rather it includes all the material and moral factors that determine the position of a state in the international community and the ability of one party to impose their will on the other party to foster the interests of the strong party.

Soft powers are a new way for states to reach the world, relying on concepts such as youth achievement and moving away from military violence, rather exerting influence through the general population, political and economic efforts, national identity and geographical location.

Saudi Arabia, like the majority of states faces, intertwining inner and outer defies on different levels. These include, but are not limited to difficulties in modernization, which would at the same time preserve national identity, increasing effects of globalization and terrorism at the international level. The regional level is also not free from challenges, including numerous crises resulting from occupation, foreign intrusion, incitement of inner unrest in a way that delays development in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon.

Dangerous defies include the efforts of some regional forces to expand and dominate. These include Iranian goals at the regional and international level and upon Saudi Arabia along with the social, political, economic, military and security dimensions beside Iran the seek to produce nuclear weapons and mass destruction.

Iranian strategy relies on extremist expansion and dominance, which is in conflict with the Saudi vision that is based on peaceful cooperative structures and respect for other states.

Iran is persistent in their efforts to incite more crises by any means, relying on their supporters or opponents.

This trend stems from the growing influences of the twelfth Shiite sect in the Islamic world, coupled with a mobilization of Sunni minority in other countries to secure the fall of ruling systems through exerting pressure. This vision came into light with Khomeini's revolution (1979), which was based on extremist tendencies in the Arab and Islamic world, instead of following the Sunnite example that is a moderate approach, visible e.g. through Saudi Arabia.

Goals pursued by Iran are based on twelfth creed, they are the result of extremist thinking that is directed against the Muslim, resulting in an approach to contradicts that adopted by Saudi Arabia. It is therefore necessary to confront such sentiments with moderate Islamic thinking, which is the ideal way to disclose that the Iranian approach became false at its core. The purpose of this would be to go against these efforts in the Islamic and Arab worlds, following a suitable strategy to counteract these conflicts, namely one based on using soft powers.

Saudi Arabia enjoys the spiritual force that stems from a clear creed, free from myths, with the Quran and Sunni as its cornerstones, supported by application of Islamic law. This country is the cradle of Islam, rich in holy places for pilgrims and guests.

Such an approach would require the coordination of forces and putting them into work as a united force, both internally and externally, as a suitable manner to tackle the challenges. It would be besides the variety and multitude of tools, including the use of the media, educational centers, diplomatic efforts, to the weapon of petrol, relying on the aid of investment funds and employing the arts of psychological warfare.

This soft confrontation against the Iranian malicious efforts is an urgent necessity to secure proper growth of society, as these actions are permanent and manifest through racial desires. The insistence behind this policy concerning the Iranian matter is that Saudi Arabia should play its role through soft powers, which would be the perfect approach in the present time.

It is important to activate these powers in coordination with popular efforts through a short-, medium- and long-term vision for confronting these malicious efforts.

The Middle East is a where international transport routes between Asia, Africa and Europe cross, therefore it is a strategic location, as it overlooks many important water bodies, not to mention its natural sources. It produces a third of the world's output of gas (66%), which

became a competitive asset globally and at the regional levels through the course of decades of wars and the formation of a new world order.

Iran has a salient strategic position, located in the western-most part of the Arab region. Following the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran undertook efforts as part of its nuclear program, seeking to dominate Middle East in order to play a regional role, tapping into the potential created by Arab revolutions and in the abortion of regional crisis and security threats beside application of its strategies in the area

Dangerous elements include the efforts of some regional forces to expand and dominate, like the goals that Iran pursues on the regional and international level, also in its dealings with Saudi Arabia, coupled with the social, political, economic, military and security dimensions, not to mention Iran seeking to produce nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Iranian strategy relies on extremist expansion and dominance, which is in conflict with the Saudi vision that is based on peaceful cooperative structures and respect for other states.

The subject of this paper is to suggest a strategy for applying soft powers in Saudi Arabia to counteract the role of Iran in the region.

When studying Saudi soft powers, which play many varied roles in confronting the challenges brought forward by Iran in the region, one must face a number of research problems and study a number of variables. Results from the efforts are not in parallel to the Iranian role, and this is the problem to be investigated as part of the research to be conducted, seeking a convenient way to exploit these powers to counteract the Iranian role effectively.

The topic of this paper is to seek an answer to the research question and the following supplementary questions

- a. What are the sources of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia?
- b. What are the causes for Iran to direct its efforts against Saudi Arabia?
- c. What are the challenges that Iran puts before Saudi Arabia?
- d. What are the soft powers available to Saudi Arabia?
- e. How could Saudi soft powers be effective against the Iran's role in the region?
- f. What is the suggested strategy for the use of Saudi soft powers and directing them against the Iran's role in the region?

Aims of this paper

- a. Determine the sources of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia?
- b. Reveal the causes behind Iran's attacks on Saudi Arabia?

- c. The nature of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia?
- d. Identify the sources of soft powers that Saudi Arabia has?
- e. Determine the extent to which Saudi soft powers could be effective against Iran's role in the region?
- f. Suggest a strategy for the use of Saudi soft powers against the Iran's great role in the region?

CHAPTER 1

TERMINOLOGY

Arab Region: ⁽¹⁾ The Arab region consists of 22 countries in North Africa and Western Asia and extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean; the Arabic language – with a few exceptions – is the main language in the region.

Arabian Gulf region: ⁽²⁾ It is the geographical region in the southwest of the continent of Asia, which overlooks the Arabian Gulf and covers the eastern parts of the Arabian Peninsula and its states, including all or parts of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Iraq. The Arabic language is the official language of these countries and it has also been spoken by the Arab residents of Ahwaz, which has been a southwestern part of Iran since 1928.

Iranian Islamic Revolution: ⁽³⁾ (in Persian: coup 1357) is a revolution that broke out in 1979, involving different groups of people, and transformed Iran from a monarchy, under the rule of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, who was supported by the United States, eventually to be replaced by the Islamic Republic through a referendum under the religious reference Aya God Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the revolution with the support of many leftist and Islamic organizations and Iranian student movements.

Islamic Shiites doctrine: ⁽⁴⁾ A name given to the second largest sect of Muslims, right after the Sunni sect. Throughout Islamic history, the word "Shi'a" has been applied to many Islamic movements, such as the Shiites of Othman, the Shiites of Muawiyah and others, but the word Shiites alone is considered to denote the Shiites of Ali bin Abi Talib and his followers.

Ancient Persian Empire: ⁽⁵⁾ The Persian Empire or Persia (Persian: Shahنشahi, Iran) is the historical name for the region where the Persian empires and states were built, making up today's Iran. The Persian Empire was located east and north of the Arabian Peninsula. It was founded in 559 BC by Cyrus. The Persian Empire, which is known as the Persian State or the Kasrau State, is one of the greatest and largest countries that dominated the region before the Islamic era, even surpassing the Byzantine Empire in fame and power.

(1) *Facts about the Arab region United Nations Development Program in the Arab States*, 2021, link:<https://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/ar/home/regioninfo.html#>

(2) *Arab countries in the Persian Gulf*, 2021, link: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki>

(3) <https://web.archive.org/web/20171030004152/https://global.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Reza-Shah-Pahlavi>

(4) *The New Encyclopedia Britannica*, Jacob E. Safra, Chairman of the Board, 15th Edition, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1998, ISBN 0-85229-663-0, Vol 10, p. 738

(5) Iran Heritage (2013-08-28). *The Palace of Darius at Susa: The Great Royal Residence of Achaemenid Persia*. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9781848856219

Shah: ⁽⁶⁾ In Persian, Kurdish and Urdu: Shah, and in Turkish: Şah is a Persian word that means "king" in Arabic. The first of the kings of Iran was Cyrus the Great before Islam and the last of them was Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi after Islam.

Soft power: ⁽⁷⁾ It is a concept coined by Joseph Nye of Harvard University to describe the ability to attract and annex without coercion or the use of force as a means of persuasion. More recently the term has been used to influence and change social and public opinion through relatively less transparent channels and pressure through political and non-political organizations. With soft power, "the best propaganda is not propaganda," explaining that, in the information age, "credibility is the rarest resource." Joseph Nye coined the term in his 1990 book *Capability to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. He also developed the concept in his 2004 book entitled "Soft Power: Means of Success in International Politics." The term is currently used on a large scale in international affairs by analysts and politicians. Soft power means that the state has the spiritual and moral strength that it draws through ideas, principles and ethics it embodies and through support in the areas of human rights, infrastructure, culture and art, which leads others to respect and admire this method and then follow its sources.

Geopolitics: ⁽⁸⁾ A traditional term that applies primarily to the influence of geography on politics, as it is the science of studying the influence of the land (land, sea, heights, underground, wealth and location) on politics in contrast to the policy's endeavour to seize these advantages according to a future perspective added to the geopolitics of geostrategy. Over the past century this term has evolved to include broader connotations and it traditionally refers to the links and causal relationships between political power and geographic space. It was first formulated by the Swedish scientist Rudolf Kellen (1864-1922) to denote the study of the impact of geography on politics.

Middle Asia: ⁽⁹⁾ Central Asia, or Inner Asia, or the land beyond the river, as it was known during the period of the Islamic caliphate, is a closed geographical area located in the heart of the Asian continent or the heart of the world. It includes Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, without access to any of the open seas, but its geographical location makes it of great importance.

(6)Shah, 2020, link: "*South Asian Sufis: Devotion, Deviation, and Destiny*"

(7) *Soft Power*, Link: "Joseph Nye Faculty Page." *Faculty Directory. Harvard Kennedy School.*

(8)"*The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics*". *Geopolitics*. 19: 19–39.doi:10.1080/14650045.2013.803192.

(9) Ahmed El Helou, *Central Asian countries or the Five States Studies and Research*, Army Journal, Issue (329), Lebanon, 2012, link: <https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/>

Pragmatism: ⁽¹⁰⁾ A philosophy that encourages people to “look for ways and do the things that do” to help them achieve their desired goals. The origin is a Greek word meaning work.

Exporting the Islamic Revolution: ⁽¹¹⁾ Actions taken by a revolutionary government that is victorious in one country to promote similar revolutions in independent territories or in other countries, as a manifestation of revolutionary internationalism of a certain kind. The term exporting the revolution appeared in Iran, following the success of the Islamic Iranian Revolution, led by Khomeini at the heart of the monarchy, under the administration of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, trying to make Iran a religious state. This term is based on working for revolutions similar to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in all countries with authoritarian regimes.

Sustainable development: ⁽¹²⁾ Process of developing land, cities, communities and businesses, provided that they meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

Veto: ⁽¹³⁾ It is a Latin word that means "I forbid". It is a right (used by a state official for example) to unilaterally stop an official act.

Horn of Africa countries: ⁽¹⁴⁾ Refers to a head-shaped section that protrudes from the land, the sea-shaped skyscraper. The horn divides the water body into two halves: the northern part of it is the Red Sea and the southern part is the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the Horn of Africa geographically includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. However, some geographers have expanded the area covered by this term to include Kenya and Sudan.

Geostrategy: ⁽¹⁵⁾ The term geostrategy consists of two parts: (Geo) meaning land and (Strategy) meaning strategy, whereas strategy here does not refer to the old concept of military planning in the field of application. Rather, in its contemporary concept, it transcends military action to work in all aspects of planning in its practical or applied framework. In other words, geostrategy combines two meanings, namely land and strategy, to produce a third meaning. It is defined as the political, economic and military planning that is concerned with the natural

(10) *What is pragmatics, definition, clarification and opinions*, 2016, link:<https://www.lazemtefham.com/2016/02/what-is-pragmatism-definition.html>

(11) *Revolution and World Politics*", by Fred Halliday (1999) ISBN 0-8223-2464

(12) <https://web.archive.org/web/20191220060230/https://psh.techlib.cz/skos/PSH974>

(13) Spitzer, Robert J. (1988). *The presidential veto: touchstone of the American presidency*. SUNY Press. .ISBN 978-0-88706-802-7.

(14) J. D. Fage, Roland Oliver, Roland Anthony Oliver, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, (Cambridge University Press: 1977), p.190

(15) Jawad Salih Mahdi Al-Nomani, *TA geographical assessment of the Iraqi National Security Strategy for the year 2007-2010*, 2020, p. 11. Link :<https://almerja.com/reading.php?idm=139699>

environment in terms of its use in analysing or understanding economic and political problems of an international character.

Regional power: ⁽¹⁶⁾ A term used to describe a nation that has power inside a geographical area

<https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%AC%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A7>.

Countries that exercise unparalleled influence within a region of the world hold regional hegemony.

Imam's Shi'ismy "The Ja'far Doctrine": ⁽¹⁷⁾ The Twelver Shiites, the Imami or the Jaafari, are an Islamic religious sect and usually the word Shiite, if said without additional specification, refers to the Twelver, because they are the largest sect in terms of the number of followers among other Shiite sects. Those who were called by this name are called to distinguish them from other Shiite sects, such as the Zaydis and the Ismailis. Members of this sect believe that the Prophet Muhammad had nominated twelve imams as caliphs after him and the doctrine of the Imamate was the main difference between this sect and the rest of the Islamic sects.

Arabic Union: ⁽¹⁸⁾ In its contemporary concept, this represents the belief that the Arab people are one people united by language, culture, history, geography and interests, as well as that one Arab state will be established to unite the Arabs within its borders from the ocean to the Gulf. In the modern era, this idea was embodied by ideologies such as the Nasserite movement and the Baathist movement, which were most common in the Arab world, especially in the mid-twentieth century until the end of the seventies, which was marked by the establishment of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria and witnessed many other attempts at unification. Arab nationalism gained a new wave of popularity as a result of the Arab Spring revolutions and the emergence of an Arab popular current, calling for Arab unity led by the people.

Paramilitary Forces (Revolutionary Guards and Basij): ⁽¹⁹⁾ one of branches of the Iranian Armed Forces that was founded after the Iranian Islamic Revolution by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It refers to the official name "Mobilization forces" for the poor and vulnerable, they are popular paramilitary forces made up of male and female civilian volunteers.

(16) Joachim Betz, Ian Taylor, *"The Rise of (New) Regional Powers in Asia, Africa, Latin America..."*, German Overseas Institute & University of St. Andrews, May 2007.

(17) *The pretext to the classifications of Shiites*. Agha Buzurg al-Tahrani, printed in Beirut, Lebanon, 1403 AH / 1983, Dar al-Adwaa Publications.

(18) Abdulaziz Al-Douri, *The Historical Roots of Arab Nationalism*, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2008, p. 24.

(19) Iranian Revolutionary Guards, 2021 link: staff, writer. "How was IRGC founded?". Tasnim news Agency. 2017.

Irregular warfare: ⁽²⁰⁾ Hostilities between two parties with different characteristics and adopting different fighting methods. The general population is at the core of irregular warfare. In this context, irregular forces seek to gain the support of the population and create an environment for them to achieve victory. This makes the regular forces face great challenges in managing hostilities, which are usually met within cities inhabited by the general population, especially if the social fabric is diverse, filled with sectarian affiliations and doctrinal connections. A different policy is not necessarily in line with the directions of the government.

Ballistic missiles: ⁽²¹⁾ A missile that follows a curved or semi-orbital trajectory, which is also called ballistic trajectory – a trajectory that is affected exclusively by gravity and air friction, fluid resistance.

Military manoeuvres: ⁽²²⁾ a military term used to describe the field movements of military forces on the battlefield.

during wartime: An expression used to indicate a strategy based on starting a war with a mobile, fast and sudden attack. It confuses the enemy and causes significant losses without the enemy being aware of the attack in advance.

during peace time: Military exercises conducted by several allied countries or individual countries, using their various military forces to develop their effectiveness, enhance their field skills and reinforce military ties between the participating countries.

Military alliances: ⁽²³⁾ A military alliance is founded between two or more states. The alliance is established for war or to confront the influence of one or several countries. Such treaties are divided into defensive and offensive. Usually, a military alliance contains treaties and non-military clauses.

Wilayat al-Faqih: ⁽²⁴⁾ An old jurisprudential term in Twelver Shiite jurisprudence, in use since the beginning of the great occultation of the Twelfth Imam in the Twelver Shiites, the Awaited Mahdi, where the jurists consider it the guardianship and governance of the jurisprudent who combines the conditions of the fatwa and the religious reference expressed by the mujtahid in the legal rulings for the time of absence of the Imam Al-Hujjah. The Wali al-Faqih deputizes for the absent imam in leading the nation, managing its affairs, carrying out the tasks of the Islamic government and establishing the rule of God on Earth.

(20) Amira Abdawi, *Irregular War: A New Challenge for Regular Armies*, Journal of Legal and Political Sciences, No. 11, 2020, p. 454. Link :<https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/article/133819>

(21) Zaloga, Steven (2003). *V-2 Ballistic Missile 1942–52*. Reading: Osprey Publishing.. ISBN 978-1-84176-541-9.

(22) Martin van Creveld, Kenneth S Brower, Steven L Canby. "Air power and maneuver warfare" Military Training, 2017,

(23) Tucker, Robert; Hendrickson, David C. (1992). *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose*. Council on Foreign Relations. P 64–65.

(24) Wilayat al-Faqih, "Islamic Creed: The Meaning of Wilayat al-Faqih," 2018. www.almaaref.org.

Hard power: ⁽²⁵⁾ The use of military and economic force to influence the behaviour or interests of other political entities. Often this kind of power is more aggressive, more effective and yields quick results when one political entity imposes it on another political entity that has less military or economic power.

Middle East: ⁽²⁶⁾ A political division that includes the Arab countries in the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent region, from Iraq in the east to Egypt in the west, in addition to three non-Arab countries, namely Iran, Turkey and Cyprus. The Middle East region overlooks the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. It includes the most important international straits – Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab Strait and Suez Canal.

Militia: ⁽²⁷⁾ An army that is usually formed by irregular forces recruiting from citizens, who usually operate in a guerrilla style, in contrast to regular army combatants, professional soldiers.

Justice and Development Party: ⁽²⁸⁾ It is a Turkish political party that describes itself as following a moderate path, not anti-Western, adopting market capitalism and seeking Turkey's accession to the European Union. Some say that it has Islamic roots and a secular Islamic orientation, but it denies that it is an "Islamic party" and is keen not to use religious slogans in its political speeches. The party claims to be a conservative party.

Arab Spring revolutions: ⁽²⁹⁾ A tidal wave of revolutions and protests in various parts of the world by,

https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9 sparked off in many Arab countries; its period was known as the Spring of the Arab Revolutions. Among the reasons for these sudden protests were the spread of bribery, economic stagnation and poor living conditions, in addition to political restrictions and generally poor conditions in Arab countries. These protests spread very quickly in most Arab countries and included the outbreak of battles between security forces and protesters, in some cases resulting in deaths of citizens and security officers. These

(25) Daryl Copeland (Feb 2, 2010). "Hard Power Vs. Soft Power". The Mark.

(26) Beaumont, Peter; Blake, Gerald H; Wagstaff, J. Malcolm (1988). *The Middle East: A Geographical Study*. David Fulton. ISBN 0-470-21040-0.

(27) Fields, William S.; Hardy, David T. (Spring 1992). "The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History". *Military Law Review*. Charles II demobilized the army, keeping only troops that he felt would be loyal to the new regime...Charles's "select" militia was composed only of a small part of the population

(28) Justice and Development Party (Turkey)2021 link: *The Victory of Islamists in Turkey*, Graham Fuller, Al-Maarifa, Al Jazeera Net, October 3, 2004.

(29) *Arab Spring Revolutions, Europe is hesitant about its position on the Arab protests*, 2012.

revolutions were characterized by the emergence of an Arab chant that became famous in all Arab countries, which is: "The people want to overthrow the regime".

Diplomatic relations:⁽³⁰⁾ Systems and means of communication between the member states of the international community, used as means for conducting negotiations between nations.

Sadrist Movement:⁽³¹⁾ A political and religious current that follows the Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. The movement has representatives in the Iraqi parliament, Nassar Al-Rubaie being among the most prominent of them. Their president is in Parliament and representatives of the current hold 6 ministries in the former Iraqi government headed by al-Rubaie. Represent Mahdi Army Even indirectly, the military wing of the Sadrist movement stood against the American forces and their policies and rejected the government's agreements with America.

GCC:⁽³²⁾ A regional political, economic, military and security organization Arabic Made up of six Arab countries overlooking the Arabian Gulf. It constitutes a majority of the Arabian Peninsula, including the Kingdom Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain.

Theocratic system:⁽³³⁾ Theocracy is defined as "the rule of the clergy, religious government, or religious rule." The word theocracy is made up of two combined Greek words: Theo, meaning religion, and crates, meaning rule. Accordingly, theocracy is returning state power to God, as there are multiple implementations of theocracy. The first theory regards rulers as gods, the second theory considers the rulers to be representatives of God, while the third theory says that the rulers are God's successors on Earth. Within the framework of all these theories it is strictly forbidden to oppose the rulers or violate their orders.

Hizballah:⁽³⁴⁾ Hizballa is a group Shiite Islamic Armed and political party based in Lebanon the ward military Hezbollah is the Council of Jihad, Its political wing is a party Loyalty block to the resistance In the Lebanese Parliament .

Logistics⁽³⁵⁾ It is the art and science of managing the flow of goods, energy, information (and supply) and other resources, such as products, services, foodstuffs, clothing, medical materials and even human beings from the area of production to the area of consumption.

(30) Ronald Peter Barston, *Modern diplomacy*, Pearson Education, 2006, p. 1

(31) Ghazi, Yasir & Arango, Tim (October 28, 2012). "Iraqi Sects Join Battle in Syria on Both Sides". New York Times. N.Y. Times A1.

(32) GCC. www.mofa.gov.bh.

(33) Hisham Shaaban, *Islamic Theocracy, Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research*, 2021, link: <https://www.mominoun.com/articles/7390>

(34) Jamail, Dahr (20 July 2006). "Hezbollah's transformation". Asia Times

(35) <https://www.argaam.com/ar/article/articledetail/id/564900>

Political Islam:⁽³⁶⁾ This term emerged recently due to the isolation of the religious poles in the Islamic world of politics. It may refer to a wide range of individuals or groups who advocate the formation of the state and society according to their understanding of Islamic principles. It may also refer to the wide-ranging activities of individuals and organizations to support transforming the state and society as a whole on the basis of a reference from Islamic laws.

Smart power:⁽³⁷⁾ One of the terms related to international relations. The term refers to a combination of hard power and soft power strategies. It is a method that emphasizes the necessity to have a strong army but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels to expand the parties' influence and establish the legitimacy of their actions.

Houthis in Yemen:⁽³⁸⁾ (Ansar Allah movement). It was called the Believing Youth Movement and is an armed political-religious movement based in the city of Saada.<https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86> It became known in the media and politically as the Houthis, after its founder Badr Al-Din Al-Houthi, the religious guide of the group.

Alawite sect:⁽³⁹⁾ The Alawites are attributed to Ali bin Abi Talib, as they appointed him as their imam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. A Muslim sect of the Twelver Ja`fari Shiites, distinguished from the rest of the Twelver sects by their belief in rational evidence. Most of them live in Syria and in the northern Syrian provinces and the Alexandretta Brigade, which is now located in Turkey.

Asymmetric war:⁽⁴⁰⁾ A war between two factions, whose military power and strategy differs. This happens when you meet regular army professional vs An insurgency move or resistance movement NS. Such wars take place in the form of. It is based on unconventional strategies of war, so that the weaker party tries to use certain strategies to balance its quantitative and qualitative weaknesses.

(36) Kramer, Gudrun. "Political Islam." In *Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim World*. Vol. 6. Edited by Richard C. Martin, 536–540. New York: Macmillan, 2004. via Encyclopedia.com

(37) *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (PDF). Center for Strategic and International Studies.

(38) "Deaths in Yemeni mosque blast". al-Jazeera English. May 2 2008.

(39) Alawites (a sect), Martin Kramer, "Syria's Alawites and Shi'ism", a chapter from the book "Shiism, Resistance and Revolution", 2018.

(40) Tomes, Robert (Spring 2004). "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" (PDF). Parameters. US Army War College.

National Security:⁽⁴¹⁾ The idea to protect citizens and individuals present on the territory of a state; consists in using security means to maintain proper daily life, free from any crises that lead to causing damage to the human and material fabric of society.

Extremism and ideological extremism:⁽⁴²⁾ Exaggeration in understanding of a doctrine, belief, philosophy or thought. Exaggeration into fanaticism in that understanding and its transformation into a rule governing the behaviour of the individual or group. Also the rush to try to impose this understanding and orientation on others by all means, including through violence and coercion.

Self security system (Self Security):⁽⁴³⁾ First step to achieve national security and the most important one, as the state seeks to achieve its national security relying only on its own strengths and capabilities, which achieves the highest levels. Independence and protection for national security, without the interference of external elements, enemies or allies. This model requires that the state secures the appropriate amount for its national security requirements, with its effort, and its own opinion, only, which is difficult to achieve, except by a superpower, or a major regional power.

Belt and Road Project:⁽⁴⁴⁾ It is a Chinese initiative built on the ruins of the Silk Road from the 19th century. Its purpose was to connect China with the world and to be the largest infrastructure project in human history. An attempt to reinforce regional connectivity and embrace a brighter future.

Silk Road:⁽⁴⁵⁾ A group of interconnected roads that were used by caravans and ships, passing through southern Asia, linking Chan, which was known as Chang'an in China, with Antioch in Turkey, in addition to other sites, whose influence extended to Korea and Japan. The Silk Road had a great impact on the prosperity of many ancient civilizations, such as the Chinese, Egyptian, Indian and Roman civilizations, so that it laid the foundations for the modern era.

NATO:⁽⁴⁶⁾ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an international military organization established in 1949 on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in

(41) Majd Khader, *Defining National Security*, topic, 2016. Link :<https://mawdoo3.com>

(42) Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*" (1999) ISBN 0-8223-2464

(43) *A fighter from the desert, Foundations and Principles of National Security*, 2021, link: http://www.moqatil.com/openshare/Behoth/Askria6/OsosAmnWat/sec21.doc_cvt.htm

(44) Bendazzi, Giannalberto. *Twice the First. Boca Raton : Taylor & Francis*, CRC Press, 2018. Translation of: *Due volte l'oceano.*: CRC Press. P 69-73. ISBN 9781315149004

(45) Paul Halsall (2000) [1998]. Jerome S. Arkenberg. "*East Asian History Sourcebook: Chinese Accounts of Rome, Byzantium and the Middle East, c. 91 B.C.E. – 1643 C.E.*" *Fordham.edu*

(46) NATO, "*What is NATO*". *NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, May 26, 2017*

Washington on April 4, 1949. NATO constitutes a system of collective defence in which member states agree to mutual defence in response to any attack by external parties.

European Union:⁽⁴⁷⁾ It is an international association of European countries that includes 27 countries, the last of which was Croatia, which joined on July 1, 2013. It was established based on an agreement known as the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1991, but many of its ideas exist since the fifties of the last century. One of the most important principles of the European Union is the transfer of the powers of nation states to European international institutions. Many activities, the most important of which is the fact that it is a single market with a single currency, the euro, which was adopted by 19 countries out of the 28 members, and it also has a common agricultural policy and a unified fishing policy.

Fourth generation wars:⁽⁴⁸⁾ A war in which one of the main participants is not a state, but a violent non-state actor. Fourth-generation wars often occur in conflicts involving failed states and civil wars, particularly in conflicts involving non-state actors, intractable ethnic or religious issues, or significant traditional military disparities.

Globalisation:⁽⁴⁹⁾ It means to make something worldwide or make something universal in its scope or application. The process of interaction and integration between individuals, companies and governments around the world.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS):⁽⁵⁰⁾ An extremist organization initially known under the name "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant", ISIS for short. The organization adopts the Salafi-jihadi ideology. Its members aim to restore the "Islamic Caliphate and implement Sharia law".

Virtual community:⁽⁵¹⁾ said about a social network. A group of people who interact with each other using a medium of communication that overcomes all geographical and political barriers. One of the most common types of virtual communities is social networking, which includes communities on the Internet.

Money laundering:⁽⁵²⁾ An economic crime that aims to give legal legitimacy to prohibited funds for the purpose of their possession, disposal, management, preservation, exchange, deposit, investment, transfer or manipulation of their value if they are obtained from crimes such as the cultivation and manufacture of narcotic plants or gems and narcotic substances, as well as importing and exporting them. Trafficking in them, hijacking means of

(47) European Union 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)

(48) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html>

(49) Colonel Mike Capstick, *Canadian Military Journal "Book Review" July 2008.*

(50) *NAFTA at 10". Economic Policy Institute*

(51) <https://p.dw.com/p/1DslR>

(52) Benkler, Yochai (2006). *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (PDF).*

transportation, detaining persons, committing terrorist crimes and financing them, fraud, breach of trust, debauchery and prostitution, trafficking and smuggling antiquities, felonies and misdemeanours harmful to the security of the state from outside and inside, bribery, embezzlement and aggression against public money, treachery, as well as crimes against coins and forgeries. Counterfeiting.

National Strategy:⁽⁵³⁾ A process through which strategic analysis and strategic choice are determined, also concerned with identifying alternatives and meant to identify interrelationships between the interim strategic goals and other short-term goals. It also refers to the interrelationship between legislation and strategic policies in order to achieve integration between all parties, which makes all efforts put into a specific direction which is to achieve the set goals in the best way and at the best cost. Which leads to raising the general level of the state.

Planning a national strategy:⁽⁵⁴⁾ Long-term planning that takes into account all external and internal variables, identifies all target segments and sectors in addition to competition methods.

(53) *Definition of the National Strategy*, Al-Morsal, 2019, the link: <https://www.almrsal.com/post/873419>

(54) Ghada Al-Halqiqa, *The Concept of Strategic Planning*, 2018, link: / <https://mawdoo3.com>

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1. Area of research

The research area adopted focuses on establishing an effective methodology for the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East. Two main manners of interaction between countries can be distinguished: through hard power and soft power. The latter way of exerting influence is still a relatively recent phenomenon in international relations. As a result, this area of study still requires research and exploration, both to understand its essence, methodology and to determine the possible benefits.

2.2. Importance of research

The importance of this research lies in the theoretical scientific dimension and the practical dimension.

A. Academic scientific importance

1. This study covers a vital topic that arises in the political and academic circles of strategic importance at the international, local and regional levels.
2. It contributes to accumulating scientific knowledge with the provision of the study in the Arab library.
3. It also opens up new research avenues and will constitute a call for more scientific studies.
4. It will arouse interest in the pertinent intellectual aspects, as consideration comes before action, particularly in the strategic field.

B. Practical scientific importance

The paper's importance in this aspect stems from the results and recommendations of this study, which will be applied to the topic of activating Saudi soft powers to confront Iran's role in the Middle East. This would in turn reinforce Saudi national security, ensure safety for the society, preserve identity through specific programs and tools, along with precise planning and execution to solve this crucial problem over subsequent stages in the short, medium and long term.

2.3. Main problem situation

Nowadays, the supreme value is to support a stable and safe international environment. This issue is of particular importance in the Middle East, where there is a mosaic of various, often conflicting interests. Key factors can also be identified that may destabilize the entire region, not only at the regional level, but also in strategic terms. From Riyadh's perspective, one such factor is the current government in Tehran. The problematic situation, therefore, concerns an attempt to obtain the answer to the question of how to counteract such attempts to destabilize peace in the Middle East. In Riyadh, more and more attention is drawn to the possibility of exerting a soft impact on the respective components of the international system in this region. Therefore, the problem approach adopted in this dissertation focuses on the potential benefits that may result from the use of "soft power" towards Iran to maintain peace in this part of the world. Possible manners of building soft power influence the methodology to be adopted to achieve the fundamental goal of regional security and stability.

2.4. Aims of research

As part of the approach to the problem situation, the following aims were considered:

- a. Determine the sources of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia
- b. Reveal the causes behind Iran's attacks on Saudi Arabia
- c. Determine the nature of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia
- d. Identify the sources of soft powers that Saudi Arabia has
- e. Determine the extent to which Saudi soft powers could be effective against Iran's role in the region
- f. Suggest a strategy for the use of Saudi soft powers against the Iran's great role in the region.

2.5. Research problems

The main research problem has been formulated in the following manner:

How could the soft power of Saudi Arabia be used to confront the growing Iranian regional threat?

To answer the above main research question, the following detailed questions were considered:

- a. What are the sources of the challenges Iran poses to Saudi Arabia?
- b. What are the causes behind Iran directing its efforts against Saudi Arabia?
- c. What are the challenges that Iran poses for Saudi Arabia?
- d. What are the soft powers available to Saudi Arabia?
- e. How could Saudi soft powers be effectively used to counteract Iran's role in the region?
- f. What is the suggested strategy for the use of Saudi soft powers and directing them against Iran's role in the region?

2.6. Methods, techniques and tools

The word "curriculum" means the way of thinking that researchers follow to clarify the mystery behind certain phenomena or problems. They follow established theories to approach reality according to different types of scientific research. These approaches regulate the order of tasks and the subsequent explanation of the reasons. In most cases, no single method is used for carrying out scientific research. Researchers strive to make the most of these approaches and overcome the related negative aspects, while at the same time maximizing the positives by relying on more than one method.

This means that political sciences and social sciences are not characterized by unilateralism, but rather by the systematic integration resulting from a methodological pluralism.

The methodology applied for the study behind this paper relied on making use of several approaches or theoretical frameworks to determine scientific responses to the studied problem. Hence, the study was performed using the following:

1. **Descriptive approach:** this approach was used to identify the Iranian role in the Arab region.
2. **Analytical approach:** this approach was used to study contemporary international and regional variables and their impact on Saudi national security.
3. **Deductive approach:** this approach was used to determine the proposed strategy for using the soft power of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in various fields.

Descriptive method

The descriptive method⁽⁵⁵⁾ was defined as a research method used in research in all branches of the humanities. It is the approach that describes the subject as it is, without introducing variables or studying factors behind the changes that occur. It studies the “what”, but does not address the “how”. Therefore, descriptive research often begins with questions such as “what is it” or “is it”. In most cases, descriptive studies precede analytical or experimental studies. Experimental research is the supportive or main method of anthropological research. Under this approach, the researcher may begin to gather information from the field and convert them into reports to be used at the stage of data analysis. Data collection is carried out according to methodologies such as the comparative methodology, historical methodology or functional methodology.

Descriptive method steps:

- a. Determine the research topic and collect the relevant data.
- b. Formulate the research topic in the form of a question or a number of questions.
- c. Establish hypotheses as an initial solution to the research topic and manage research with the aim to test the solutions developed.
- d. Studying test samples, in addition to providing a detailed explanation of the sample size and the method for determining it. Researchers identify research tools that help them collect data and information, such as questionnaires, interviews, tests, and observation, depending on the nature of the problem.
- e. Start collecting the required data in accurate and organized ways.
- f. Output and interpret results and draw generalized conclusions.

The descriptive method is fake:

The descriptive method is particularly important for social studies and has been relied upon in all early-stage studies in various disciplines of the humanities, such as history, politics, economy and sociology. The importance of this methodology was proven by the fact that it was used to identify many ancient civilizations, human cultures and societies. It also worked when extending knowledge about the foundations of research. This methodology was the first step towards experimental and analytical research.

Features of the descriptive method

- a. The researcher's experiences and expertise do not affect the results of the research.

(55) The Scientific Research Portal, *Descriptive method in scientific research* link: <https://www.sciegate.com/blog>

- b. Enhances the spirit of participation between the researcher and the respondent by holding several interviews to collect information related to the research problem in a direct manner and focusing on the extent of the reflection and impact of the phenomenon on the respondents.
- c. The descriptive approach helps to develop the researcher's skills and experiences and improve their ability to tackle problems and find solutions and alternatives easily.
- d. It is one of the important and successful methods for collecting quantitative and numerical data.

Analytical method

Analytical method ⁽⁵⁶⁾ is based on dividing phenomena or research problems into their primary underlying elements. The purpose is to facilitate the research process and to identify the reasons that led to its emergence. This method is used in conjunction with other scientific methods.

Types of analytical methods ⁽⁵⁷⁾

The analytical method is not used in isolation from other approaches. It is therefore associated with many other scientific methods. In the following, an explanation of the most important types of the analytical method will be provided:

- a. Descriptive analytical method:

The steps of the analytical descriptive approach assume monitoring the phenomenon under study and then the researcher proceeds to describe it based on the information and data initially available. They then formulate questions or hypotheses for scientific research, after which they delve into the study and identify the causes of the problem, analyse the results and develop solutions through the researcher's vision.

- b. Analytical comparative method:

The need for the comparative-analytical approach emerged in countries at various stages of development. It was concluded that there are phenomena and problems that vary in severity between countries. This method is used to compare the problems in

(56) *The Analytical Approach, on a Scholarship in Academic Studies and Consultations*, 2017. Link: <https://mobt3ath.com/dets.php?page=506&title=>

(57) *Analytical method*, reference mentioned previously. Link := <https://mobt3ath.com/dets.php?page=506&title=>

more than one country and benefits from the resolutions adopted by the developed countries through careful analysis.

c. Analytical philosophical method:

The analytical philosophical method is considered the most appropriate method for explaining moral phenomena. These include the concepts of justice, faith, beauty, existence, good and evil. This contributes to finding the most appropriate explanations in this type of scientific studies.

d. Exploratory analytical approach:

The exploratory analytical approach is used if a researcher wants to create an invention. This approach is based on trial and error.

Main features of the analytical method

The analytical method, like any scientific method, relies on several basic ideas. These are represented in three axes:

a. deconstruction (interpretation)

This axis is represented in the presentation of scientific studies with an explanation seeking interpretations. This is done by retrieving the basic elements and understanding the causes, which helps to clarify the phenomena.

b. calendar (cash)

This part is important in the case of previous studies similar to the scientific research carried out by the researcher, which are then evaluated in the correct scientific manner, weaknesses are clarified and corrected on the basis of sound scientific foundations.

c. synthesis (conclusion)

It is represented in the synthesis of concepts and results. This may be called the deduction stage, where the entire material or parts of it are used to draw generalizations.

Steps of the analytical method

Whichever scientific method is used in conjunction with the analytical method, it is used as an aid in verifying conclusions or research conclusions, as some call it. We can summarize the steps of the analytical method as below:

a. Answer research questions or explain hypotheses

Any scientific research requires the development of research questions that are worded in simple terms, such as “How do”, “What” etc. Hypotheses may be

formulated, showing the relationship between two variables. In addition to the possibility of drafting questions and hypotheses, the ruling on this is the research objectives, which are related to the end results. The analytical method contributes to organizing and arranging data to answer questions or explain hypotheses.

b. Formulating results

At a later stage, after clarifying answers to the research questions, as well as explaining the connection between the variables and presenting their relationship, the analytical method comes to assist the researcher in formulating the conclusion.

Scientific research tools for the analytical method ⁽⁵⁸⁾

Scientific research tools are related to the direct analytical method. They help collect raw data from study samples (responders), where such data is called direct or (real-time) information sources, unlike indirect (historical) information sources, which consist of other sources, references, articles etc. This is the backbone of research and scientific analysis of different types of data. One of the most important research tools commonly used are the questionnaire and the interview. The use of each type depends on the quality of the study.

Relationship between the descriptive method and the analytical method

The descriptive approach is at the forefront of all scientific curricula and hardly any scientific research can do without it, regardless of its actual nature. It is mainly concerned with how the phenomenon occurs in nature. The approach consists in formulating relationships in the form of research questions or new hypotheses, while the analytical method helps achieve more accurate results at the end of the research. Problems are broken down into fragments, divided into smaller chunks and an analysis is performed, delving deeper into the interpretation. The foundations of the analytical method complement the procedures of the descriptive method or other scientific methods.

Deductive method

The deductive approach ⁽⁵⁹⁾ is based on moving from the general study of a particular phenomenon down to its constituent parts.

Deductive method concept

The concept of deduction can be defined as a set of mental procedures that start from general and progress to specific methodology. Another definition would state that the

(58) *Analytical method*, previous reference. Link: <https://mobt3ath.com/dets.php?page=506&title>

(59) Madahi Muhammad, *Lectures on the Scientific Research Methodology Scale*. Link: <HTTP://fecg.univ-bouira.dz/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/>

methodological, deductive, descending method relies on analysing “every part” to achieve a certain knowledge about the phenomenon under study.

Characteristics of the deductive method ⁽⁶⁰⁾

What are the distinguishing features of the deductive method?

It relies on individual analysis, where every phenomenon is studied from the start, without getting distracted by the whole nor the individual parts.

The deductive method is an idealistic philosophical method, as it studies the phenomenon as it ought to be and not as it is in reality.

The deductive method is characterized by its great tendency towards logic. It is a form of logic, as the researcher, through this approach, begins from a general statement or a specific hypothesis and then identifies the possibility of applying this hypothesis to reach certain results. In this approach, the researcher uses observational thinking to verify the validity of the theories he is studying.

Steps of the deductive method

To ensure that the deductive method is correct, the researcher must go through it according to the following set of steps:

a. introduction

The introduction is one of the most important and prominent elements of the deductive approach, where the researcher should start their introduction by mentioning the Muslim elements. The introduction serves as a prelude to the new information that the researcher is trying to establish.

b. proposal

It is the second step of the deductive method and through it, the researcher provides information by dividing the main rule into a set of sub-rules. Then they collect answers to the questions asked to reach the core of the matter.

c. deduction

It is the third step of the deductive approach. Through it, the researcher arranges the answers that they formulated to reach the core. In this case, the researcher has moved from a tangible matter to a moral matter.

d. application and review

(60) *The deductive approach, the human resources management code*. Link: https://grhumaines.blogspot.com/2018/09/blog-post_24.html

This step is the last step of the deductive method, through which the researcher applies the findings that he made to ensure the reliability and validity of their study.

Tools for the deductive method ⁽⁶¹⁾

There is a set of tools for the deductive approach, the most important and prominent of these tools being:

a. measurement

Measurement is one of the most important and prominent tools of the deductive method. Qiyas is defined as a logical scientific approach that proceeds from a set of accepted premises to a hypothetical result, the correctness of which is not sure, because measurement is an outcome.

b. mental experimentation

It means that a person performs all the assumptions and investigations internally, should they be unable to perform them outside their mind.

c. composition

It is one of the important tools of the deductive method. It is defined as a process that starts from the correct issue to extracting the results in a sound and correct manner.

Features of the deductive method

Anything that applies to a member of the group will apply automatically to the rest of the group. Thus, we see that the deductive method is one of the most important and prominent methods in scientific research.

2.7. Research limitations

This research has the following limits

a. Subjective limits.

(61) *The deductive approach*, reference mentioned previously. Link: https://grhumaines.blogspot.com/2018/09/blog-post_24.html

Study of the nature of the Iranian threat, its strategic elements, combined with the identification of the soft powers available for Saudi Arabia and how to make the perfect use of them to counteract the Iranian role.

b. Temporal limits.

This paper covers the period from 1979 until present day, as the Iranians deny any ties with Khomeini's revolution and its spread.

2.8. Sources for the research

a. Literature sources

General academic tools (scientific books – prior studies and research – periodicals – pamphlets and brochures - encyclopaedias).

b. Field sources

(personal interviews – telephone calls – Internet – visits – military correspondence).

Prior studies and books:

a. The study of Sultan ben Fahd ben Abd Allah Ben Farhan Al Seoud in “Strategic vision of Saudi soft powers to face the challenges of the Iranian threat”, Riyadh 2014, with the following results.

1. There are many factors behind the Iranian challenges that result from the beliefs of the Shiite sect and had it not been for this way of thinking about soft powers, confronting these challenges would be hard.
2. The Iranian agenda considers Saudi Arabia's moderate Islamic symbolism to be a dangerous enemy.
3. Saudi Arabia used various means to deal with these efforts in the past and even though Saudi soft powers played their role, more extensive work is required.
4. Reinforcing national unity to help consolidate elements of the Saudi society into a coherent society based upon the balance of rights and duties.
5. Provide quantitative and qualitative support from the human factor for these powers.
6. Create and perfect the skills necessary to manage and employ soft powers.
7. Support the media in Islamic states and the military minorities in the west.
8. Seek the support of local Shiite leaders who are ready to cooperate to control any unrest in Shiite areas.

- b. The study of Al Kahtany entitled “Strategy for the use of soft powers to support the application of hard powers in managing the terrorist crisis in Saudi Arabia”, Arab Naef University for Security Studies, Riyadh 2010, with the following results.
 - 1. Suggest a strategy for exploiting this terrorist crisis in Saudi Arabia, with general policies in the field of religion, youth upbringing, politics, media and security for the unified reference of fatwa, moderation, tolerance, free dialogue and acceptance of others’ opinions.
 - 2. Reinforce the values of a feeling of belonging, citizenship, national dialogue, surveillance of the Internet, conscious use of the Internet, media credibility and limiting rumours.
- c. Study of Iyad Khalaf Omar El Keoud in “Strategic soft power and its role in achieving the US policy goals in Arab region”, middle east university 2016, with the following results:
 - 1. Soft powers lead to dangerous results no less often than the application of military force or economic pressure means, if the purpose of employing soft powers is to change the political systems and replace it with new patterns.
 - 2. Work should be done to promote national awareness of how to deal with the subsequent waves of globalization and to provide support in areas where the state’s shortcomings are most visible, through fighting against societal problems such as unemployment, poverty, low education and illiteracy.
 - 3. To emphasize that the identity of a state stems from the united identity of the sons of a society, regardless of their different sects, who are united in the pursuit of social economic, political, and cultural identity.
- d. Study of Aly Tarek El zebeidy in “Iranian soft powers in the Middle East”, Arab Democratic Center Cairo 2019, which formulates the following recommendations:
 - 1. Iranian intrusion into the Arab region must be stopped, as it leads to a spread of terrorism and formation of armed regional groups that pose a threat to the societal cohesion in the Arab nation.
 - 2. Self interest is a crucial factor for the foreign policy of great countries, like Iran, as we should note that any contradiction between Iranian interests and those of its allies leads to evasion of its obligations.
- e. Study of Aly Galal Mawad in “Concept of soft power and foreign policyanalysis”, Center of Strategic Studies, Alexandria 2018, with the following important results:

1. Suggest a flexibility framework and one for building an ability to assimilate different patterns of exercising soft powers.
 2. Soft powers are among the important aspects to be considered when studying international relations, including an identification of the dimensions of each perspective in the analysis of soft powers, focusing on the causes and circumstances of resorting to such powers, the main tools and fields of application of these powers.
 3. Soft powers are continuous at the regional and international level, along with the expectations concerning future trends for the development of such powers at the theoretical and practical level.
 4. There are certain complicated aspect to the application of such powers that would correspond with the nature of the individual conflict and the intricacies of regional and international actions, as well as the acceleration of changes caused by many factors.
- f. Study of Feisal Ben Ateq El Aklaby in “Strategic role of soft powers in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia”, Riyadh 2019, with the following important results:
1. Interest in soft powers in Saudi Arabia should be boosted through scientific research, focused on the study of effects caused by any strategic action taken both internally and externally.
 2. Promoting the soft powers of Saudi Arabia through media conferences, meetings and joint projects with other states.
 3. Maintaining the image of Saudi Arabia as the main supporter of Islamic matters and the focus on the 2030 vision goals, along with the assessment of results.

2.9. Remarks on prior studies

As this study explores a two-dimensional subject, namely that of the Saudi soft powers and the Iranian role in the region, it is necessary to review prior studies to identify any similarities and dissimilarities between prior studies and this study. Prior studies reported many important results that constitute the starting point for this study, including, but not limited to the results concerning the Iranian threat and the Saudi soft powers. Taking as its point of departure the assessment of prior studies, this study begins with a suggestion of a strategy for using soft powers to confront Iran’s role in the region.

New achievements of this research

To suggest a strategy for Saudi Arabia using soft powers to confront Iran's role in the Middle East.

2.10. Contents of the paper

To answer the research questions in a comprehensive way, so as to achieve the goals of the study set out in the introduction, the paper includes three chapters, a general summary and recommendations.

CHAPTER 3

THE GROWING IRANIAN ROLE IN THE ARAB REGION

The Arab region overlooks the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea. It is considered one of the regions with most tensions in the world because of its economic and strategic importance and crossing interests of major countries.

It was the theatre of more than ten wars, which makes it difficult to guess whether wars in this region will ever come to an end.

Starting from the middle of the last century, the Arab region was the place on Earth most vulnerable to turmoil and instability, as greedy global economic interests contributed to huge stockpiles and production of oil and natural gas.

In addition to the various policies pursued in fuelling all this, the Arab Gulf region also occupies a prominent position in strategic studies drafted during the past and current decades.

Iran considers the non-Arab Islamic states as a fundamental element in the strategy of the Arab Gulf region, based on its geographical location, population, conventional and supra-traditional military capabilities, and nuclear ambitions, which pushed it to encircle the Arab countries through a Shiite belt to the north and south.

The Houthis in Yemen are trying to seize power in pockets between Shiite outposts that Iran created in several Arab countries, such as Bahrain, to attempt to use and direct them according to their own interests and goals.

Iran is exploiting its geographic importance and its growing military and nuclear capabilities as mechanisms to manage conflict and impose status quo in the Arab region. Its continued occupation of the three Emirati islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, Abu Musa) since 1971 is the best proof of this.

Iran affirms its right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful purposes based on Article 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and believes that the United States of America wants to deprive it from this right and from advancing in scientific and technical fields to thwart the revolutionary Islamic regime.

Iran also affirms the ban on manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. From the religious legal point of view, it links its scientific ability with economic and political ability, because a country that does not shift towards reliance on nuclear energy will face a fundamental problem. Nuclear energy, from the Iranian point of view, is a real-life need in this context.

Therefore, Iran insists on pursuing its nuclear program, regardless of the pressures or threats.

In its endeavours to play a leading role in the affairs of the Arab region, Iran adopts a strategic choice based on its possession of nuclear technology and the development of its military capabilities following the declaration of the Islamic Republic. Through this trend, Iran is trying to find for itself a major role in the Middle East region to become a regional state with areas of influence allowing it to achieve a number of goals. The dominant one among these is imposing reality and extending Iranian hegemony into the world in general and the Middle East region in particular, including especially the Arab Gulf states.

Iran is a country with ambitions to have a fundamental role in the security of the Arab region at the same level as the participation of the Arab countries bordering the West Bank of the Arab Gulf region.

Iran wants to build its forces and obtain deterrent weapons to secure its existence against any external aggression, but it is going against the trends of the global system in this field.

Recognition of Iran as a nuclear power in the region, even if a peaceful one, makes the Arab Gulf region an arena for competition and conflict between Arab and Gulf powers on the one hand and Iran on the other.

In light of the deal that was concluded between Iran and the United States of America, the detailed provisions of began to become clear after the Iranian nuclear agreement of July 14, 2015.

This was followed by the Iranian release of American prisoners, which was matched by the release of Iranian assets by the United States of America and Western countries, directly threatening Arab national security, all of that despite the unilateral withdrawal of the US from this agreement.

Iran possesses elements of power and uses these elements to reinforce its regional role, as it seeks to take a political and strategic approach with the aim to become not only a regional power in the region as a whole, but to play a very ambitious role and become a major global power, which is what other major powers are trying to limit.

Iran interferes in the affairs of the region's countries according to its interests and goals only, which prompted it to adopt contradictory policies. There was a time when it supported the revolutions and protests that were witnessed by some Arab countries who saw that they were inspired by the Islamic ideological revolution. The Syrian regime was able to deal with it. It also refused to organize demonstrations in Iraq, as the Deputy Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic issued a fatwa prohibiting demonstrations.

Iran currently supports the Houthis in their efforts to overthrow the legitimate authorities in Yemen and demanding rights for the Shiite minorities in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, while all of this only follows Iran's overarching goals and interests.

Iran exploits its workers as the sponsor of the Shiite Islamic sect at the regional and global level., The demographic factor represented by the presence of large Iranian communities in the Middle East region can be used to achieve their goals. This has clear and influential repercussions on national security in the Gulf, which requires the affected countries to adopt a unified role to confront Iranian interference in the Gulf region to achieve their national security.

This chapter is covered in three subchapters and a summary as follows:

Subchapter 3.1: Iranian national interests and objectives in the Arab region and the mechanisms for achieving them

Subchapter 3.2: Iranian foreign policy orientations in the Middle East

Subchapter 3.3: Consequences of Iran's role in the region and the effects of the Iranian nuclear programme for the Arab national security.

Chapter three summary.

3.1. Iranian national interests and objectives in the Arab region and the mechanisms for achieving them

In general:

Iranian policy, through its leaders after the fall of the Shah's regime in 1979, was based on a religious base structured according to the will of the Shiite sect. It is from here that the influence of the new leadership began to be reflected on Iran's foreign and security policy orientations. This was the reason why its perception of security in the Arab region was a reflection of its political thought based on the sect. As part of its strategy for the Arab region it considers itself as the only Islamic state in the world and therefore the rest of the countries should follow it. In their own view, Iranians are the guardians of Islam.⁽⁶²⁾

Iran is trying to restore the glories of the ancient Persian empire by playing the power and leadership card in the Arab region to achieve strategic and geopolitical gains⁽⁶³⁾ regionally

(62) Husam al-Din Shehata, *Iranian Shiite Expansion*, Office of Future Studies for Printing and Publishing, Cairo, 2012, p. 43.

(63) **Geopolitical:** This expression is derived from two words (geo), which in Greek means land, and the word (political) means the foreign policy of the state, meaning that the word geopolitical means the relationship between politics and geography, especially concerning politics and foreign relations concerning the various local, regional, continental and international dimensions of the state.

and internationally in the mid- and long-term. The expansionist imperial approach adopted by the decision-making circles in Tehran does not change with the change of governments and presidents, but rather creates a national project that transcends every difference or political bidding.⁽⁶⁴⁾

In its dealings with the countries of the region, the Iranian strategy is based on national and sectarian foundations stemming from the Shiite doctrine that Iran adopts and which seeks to export it to the countries of the region by force. This applies especially to the neighbouring countries, which gives rise to legitimate and justified doubts in those countries about Iranian intentions. Iran is trying to make the religious dimension in its strategies towards the countries of the region fit to exploit certain social strata to achieve this.

Iran is undoubtedly one of the main forces in the balance of power equation in the region that cannot be overlooked, especially when it comes to the vital circle that includes the Arab Gulf and Central Asia regions. In connection with the capabilities it enjoys from the comprehensive powers, starting with its geographical location, through its human resources, economic potential, dynamism and effectiveness of its political system, up to its ability to develop its military capabilities in their traditional and super-traditional dimensions.⁽⁶⁵⁾

The modern state of Iran is the legitimate heir to the ancient Persian empires that prevailed before Islam and which extended up to the Nile River through Palestine in some historical periods, which makes the current Iranian leadership want to renew the ambitions of the ancient empire by activating the (Persian) historical role in dominating the Middle East region under the banner of Islam.

The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Arab region is no longer characterized by confrontation and reliance on idealistic principles as it was during the Iraq / Iran war. This position was necessary to consolidate the Islamic revolution and establish the authority of the new ruling elite of fundamentalists. Today, Iran's policy is characterized by moderation and pragmatism dedicated to achieving regional stability and the peaceful resolution of regional disputes.

From its point of view, Iran's policy in the Arab region is based on national interests more than intellectual considerations.

(64) *The Magana Encyclopaedia of the Desert, the Growing Iranian Role, and Its Impact on Arab National Security*, Riyadh, 2010 Edition p.10.

(65) **Pragmatism**: It is a philosophical term intended to subject all behaviours and issues to reason before deciding on them.

Iran has realized its complete inability to radically change the political map of the region and to export its revolution abroad. Having realized this, the Iranian government has begun to rebuild the Iranian economy.

Achieving this goal requires stabilizing the foundations in the region, improving political relations and expanding trade relations with its Arab neighbours, especially with the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, in light of its continued adherence to threatening policies, possession of parts of the Arab countries and launching hostile media campaigns and others.

Assumptions of the Iranian national security stem from several foundations, the most important of which are:⁽⁶⁶⁾

- A. Superpowers are working to impose their hegemony and domination not only in the region, but also on the international system as a whole.
- B. Iran is forced to live in a constantly hostile environment, so it has no other options but to rely on military force to confront this environment, in addition to having a limited margin for external manoeuvring between some major countries to protect its security interests.
- C. Iran has a strategic depth and borders that can be defended due to the presence of some natural barriers surrounding it.
- D. Iran believes that it is responsible for establishing the global Islamic order and the inevitability of exporting the Islamic revolution to all parts of the world, with precedence over the first Arab regional neighboring countries.

Iranian policies seek to achieve its main interests and objectives for Iranian national security by:⁽⁶⁷⁾

- A. Following the policy of filling the strategic void in the Gulf, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.
- B. To adopt a policy of preparing for the possibility of a military confrontation with the international or regional powers or together within the framework of the (American – European) strategic alliance involved in enhancing the security of the Gulf alongside some regional powers.
- C. Following the policy of sustainable development and independent economic recovery.

(66) Abd Rabu Nassar, *National Security from the Iranian Point of View*, Ruaa House for Publishing and Distribution, Abu Dhabi, 2013, p. 26.

(67) Abd Rabbu Nassar, *National Security from the Iranian Point of View*, Ruaa House for Publishing and Distribution, Abu Dhabi, 2013, p. 26.

- D. Preserving the values and principles of the Islamic Revolution domestically and spreading them abroad.

Iranian interests and goals according to the Iranian national security concept:

- A. Protecting and securing the Iranian regime in line with the values and principles of the Islamic Revolution and striving to spread the Shiite regime abroad.
- B. Enhancing its international and regional standing and the need to be involved in managing the world's affairs.
- C. Achieving economic prosperity and ensuring sustainable development.
- D. It seeks to impose its vital security interests using means that may be used to confront international hostilities, regardless of the security interests of others.
- E. Weakening the countries of the region to impose their own interests and protect themselves from the emergence of any other Arab regional power that would oppose them or contradict them.
- F. Supporting opposing Sunni political parties and movements in the Arab and Islamic countries, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan – Palestinian militant factions - Al Qaeda, despite the intellectual differences between them and the regime in Iran.
- G. The religious leadership in Iran seeks to export its revolution by force and its religious system of rule to the rest of the Islamic countries and to make its Shiite sect the dominant one over other Islamic sects.
- H. That Iran is the strongest in political, military and economic terms in the Arab region and even the most influential in managing regional issues and influencing global issues.
- I. Preserving the survival and growth of the religious regime in Iran and eliminating any domestic opposition that threatens this system and confronting forcefully the forces opposing the regime abroad.
- J. Possessing the capabilities to defend the state and secure its interests, as it always considers its religious and cultural interests and values exposed to constant threats.
- K. Supporting the Palestinian cause and outbidding the Arab countries in this support, as well as supporting Hamas as the core of a Shiite Islamic state in Palestine and Lebanon.
- L. Building common economic, military and nuclear interests with Russia and China to obtain their political and military support for Iran in its struggle against the United States and European countries and to exploit the right of veto enjoyed by the two countries to prevent the issuance of international resolutions by the Security Council against Iran.
- M. Securing the capacity to defend the state and secure its interests in various fields.

- N. Protecting the country from isolation imposed by the major powers due to its nuclear program and on its head the United States of America.
- O. Enhancing Iran's regional position and investing in its international relations to meet technological, economic and human development needs.
- P. Control of maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz - Red Sea - Bab al-Mandab - Horn of Africa.

The main points of the Iranian movement to achieve its strategic objectives:

The Iranian leadership moves within the framework of the above-mentioned objectives through the following **key points**:

- A. Tightening the domestic grip of the ruling religious regime and eliminating internal opposition forces represented by reformists and dissidents within the classes of intellectuals and students, as well as the ethnic and sectarian separatist forces in Iran's border provinces (Khuzestan, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and Ahwaz).
- B. Supporting and strengthening the influence of the Shiites in Arab and Islamic countries, pushing them to revolt against the existing governments and trying to establish pro-Iranian regimes.
- C. Holding and developing military capacity and other capacities (conventional – super conventional), taking into consideration that nuclear capacity is a means of dealing with external risks and threats on the one hand, while achieving balance with the regional powers, whether this be Israel or West Asia (Pakistan - India) on the other hand.
- D. Establishing a network of international relations based primarily on economic interests, which is especially evident in its relationship with Russia through the exploitation of the Russian nuclear program to build nuclear reactors.

Iran is also strengthening its relationship with China by providing for their oil demand in return for concluding many arms deals with China. Iran aims to consolidate its relationship with Russia and China to build common interests between them (economic - military - nuclear) to support Iran in its pursuit of the set goals.

Iran's agenda is also to exploit the right of veto that the two countries have to prevent the issuance of international resolutions by the Security Council against Iran, taking advantage of their desire and rejection of American influence and hegemony over world affairs.

- E. Establishing a network of relations with the forces opposing the West, especially the United States of America, both in Asia, especially with North Korea, as well as in South

America, in particular with Venezuela. This is done in addition to extending the network of relations with Asian and African countries by investing in affiliation with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Iranian investments.

F. Imposing itself as a basic figure in the equation of many files affecting the security of the region and adopting policies that intersect with the trends of regional and international powers to emphasize the importance of their role in preserving the climate of regional stability or using them as papers and lines to counter any attempts of external intervention against the Iranian regime through the following:

1. Entering the circle of (Arab / Israeli) conflict through the formation of militia and a resistance front in a strategic alliance with Syria, strengthening the role and capabilities of Hezbollah in the Lebanese arena, as well as attracting Palestinian resistance organizations, especially the Islamic (Hamas – Islamic Jihad) and resistance movements to Fatah.
2. Maintaining a presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan by investing in the wrong international policies (bringing down the anti-Iranian regimes, such as Saddam's regime in Iraq and dismantling its military power and that of the Taliban in Afghanistan). This allowed Iran to pursue a policy of filling the vacuum, where it excels in doing so, also supporting the establishment of regimes based on sectarian and sectarian foundations. It contributed to strengthening the status of sectarian parties that owe allegiance to Iran, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution, the Dawa Party and Muqtada al-Sadr's organization in Iraq.
3. Employing the Iranian status as the largest gathering of Shiites in the region through the process of ideological polarization of the Shiite elements present in the region, especially in the Gulf countries. This is employed in favor of implementing a Persian agenda that seeks to disrupt the situation in the region to achieve its objectives.
4. Seeking to conclude several agreements with the countries of the Horn of Africa.

Iran seeks to achieve its interests and goals in the region through many fields represented in:⁽⁶⁸⁾

A. Political Planner:

1. Strengthening Iran's position within its regional framework, especially the Arab Gulf region and Central Asia through:
 - (A) Establishing a Gulf security system for the region as a whole that would be compatible with its interests and goals.
 - (B) Forcibly exporting the Iranian state model to the countries of the region.
 - (C) Forming a strong regional bloc from the Islamic world in the long run, with Iran as its center.
 - (D) Creating forces loyal to them within the countries of the region. Their goal is not limited to only this, but rather they are working to get those forces effectively involved in decision-making within the countries of the region, so that they can threaten the regime at any time the elites may try to threaten the interests of the Shiite forces or the interests of the Iranian state. It helps Iran to become a major player and gives it real leverage and the ability to impose its will or at the very least force the countries of the region to take Iran's interests seriously.
2. Achieving balance with the active Arab, Islamic and Western powers through the following:⁽⁶⁹⁾
 - (A) Utilizing its geostrategic and geopolitical position and the comprehensive capabilities of the state to obtain an influential role in the heart of the region and the Islamic world.
 - (B) Laying the foundations for new relations with Western powers and the United States of America based on mutual interests, in a way that contributes to playing a role commensurate with their regional weight.

B. Economic Plan:

Enhancing the state's economic capacity and developing its technological capabilities to ensure support for the home front and its cohesion. This also includes maximizing its comprehensive capabilities in all fields to counter the negative effects of international sanctions and economic isolation imposed on Iran by the United States of America.

(68) Abdullah Masoud, *The Iranian / Gulf Conflict*, Al-Fayrouz Abadi Library for Publishing and Distribution, Riyadh, 2013, p. 36.

(69) Adel Masoud, *Comprehensive Forces between Theory and Practice*, National Defense College, Cairo, 2008, p. 43.

C. The military plan:

Possessing military power in its traditional and over-traditional dimensions that would meet the needs of achieving Iranian national security goals. Its importance is based on confronting any external or internal threats, through achieving balance with regional powers and elements of positive participation in determining the future of any security arrangements in its vital field and the ability to assist its strategic allies in the region (Hamas – Hezbollah – Houthis – Syria – Iraq).

D. Iranian nuclear scheme:

Despite the cancellation of the Iranian nuclear agreement with the major powers (5 + 1) and reaching a settlement on 14 July 2015, there insistence on the part of Iranian on possessing nuclear capabilities, which is perceived as their main goal that increases their position at the regional and international levels.

E. Shiite sectarian scheme:

To attract the Arab Shiites and consider the project as Shiites and empowering them, but they will not deviate from the national project. Sunni Muslims are not allowed to build mosques and they are not allowed to build a mosque in Tehran even though their number exceeds a million people in the capital alone.

Iran seeks to provoke unrest against the ruling regime in the region by providing unlimited material support in addition to the political cover that it provides in all its forms. They seek to export the Islamic revolution to Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to benefit from those emerging religious currents or trying to create them, especially those that embrace the Shiite doctrine.

Iran aims to besiege the Arab region by weakening the region's powers. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 facilitated Iran's move forward in achieving its expansionist ambitions after the displacement of Iraq as a regional power and the emergence of Iran as the single regional power. The occupation of Iraq is like a new regional crisis for the region's balance of power.

Iran is pursuing its national interests in the region by expansion and by extending bridges of cooperation to work together to disperse the Arab political and strategic thought and prevent it from building a unified Arab strategy in the field of regional defense and security.⁽⁷⁰⁾

(70) Salem Farhan, *The Iranian Penetration into Yemen, Happy Yemen*, Sanaa, 2014, p.9.

Iran is pursuing a policy of weakening the Arab countries along multiple paths:⁽⁷¹⁾

- A. Weakening political systems by dispersing their energy by opening a front of conflict with them, keeping them away from solving development issues and inciting society by exploiting its internal problems and allying with its enemies even if they are enemies of Iran to weaken the regime and strengthen the movement.
- B. Working to disperse the energy of the active political forces in society by confronting them or isolating them from the conflict or trying to use their power to serve the causes of the Shiite movement.
- C. Inciting conflict in the community that is based on sectarianism and allows for the screening process within the community; it aims to weaken loyalty to the state so that sectarianism is the basis and to turn the state into a tool that sects run through their leaders through sedition.
- D. Iran is working to transform the Shiite movements affiliated with it intellectually into tools through which it threatens the interests of Arab countries and international powers if its interests in the region are not understood and its most important function is military and security. This supports its position and reinforces their chances in a confrontation.

Iran's plans in the region assume not only to become the only power in the Arab region, but also to be a major and effective power at the international level by means of:⁽⁷²⁾

- A. Controlling waterways and straits (Strait of Hormuz – Strait of Bab al-Mandab – Red Sea).
- B. Controlling energy sources in the region.
- C. Emergence of Shiite governments in the region that would be subordinate to Tehran or governments at least loyal to it.
- D. Striving to spread Imami Shi'ism, the Jaafari school of thought.

The Iranian vision of Arab nationalism:

- A. Iranians believe that the concept of Arab unity is synonymous with Arab nationalism and that Arab unity is the ideological approach to Arab nationalism or its primary goal along two axes:

(71) Abdullah bin Modath Al-Dossari, *Iran, heir to the Persian Empire*, Okaz Newspaper, Riyadh, 2013, p.16.

(72) Abdullah bin Mudath Al-Dossary, Reference mentioned previously, P.13

1. Independence of the Arab world
 2. Union of all its parts in one country
- B. Iran considers Arab nationalism as aimed at competing with Iranian (Persian) nationalism due to the historical past of the two sides (Persian - Arab).
- C. Iran believes that the Arab countries are enemies of Persian nationalism due to the refusal of many Arabs to enter the Shiite sect with its extremist ideas, which depart from the general context of the pure and tolerant Islamic religion. This represents a conflict between the Iranian (Persian) ideas and ideologies and affects Iran's interests and goals in the region.

Iran is always keen to find a position in the Arab Gulf region or areas of interest for it to use its capabilities to influence decision-makers in some countries to achieve Iranian goals and interests based on its strength and elements of its comprehensive strength as mechanisms for its movement and include elements of power overall.

F. Economic capacity:

1. Iran's economy is the third-largest economy in the Middle East region and the twenty-ninth in the world according to United Nations estimates for the year 2015, reaching 343.9 billion dollars in 2015. Iran's economy depends largely on the export of oil and gas. Iran is one of the few major economies that did not suffer directly from the global financial crisis.
2. Iran provides significant financial support to every influential figure who binds themselves to serve their revolutionary tendencies through the Iranian financial aid fund that is supplied from oil revenues.
3. Iran uses its economic ties and the aid it provides to the afflicted countries to export Shiite ideology and promote the Iranian model.

G. Availability of human resources:

Iran has many technical and scientific specialists capable of managing the national economy in its various fields. Its cooperation with Russia, China, Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia represents a goal to build many economic fields that support the Iranian economy and break the cycles of siege and isolation imposed on it by the West.

H. Cultural and civilizational capabilities of Iran:

a) Language:

The Persian language is a key element in attracting other nations, given that it has entered into the synthesis of many other languages prevalent today in the world, such as Turkish, Hindi, Urdu, Armenian, Georgian, Swahili and others. There is currently not a large number of languages around the world that would be devoid of Persian influences.

b) Civilizational dimension:

Iran is working to invest in what it says is a civilization dating back 3000 years, with a rich history and experience in influencing neighbouring regions. Its history spans a period extending from the time of the Achaemenes through the Sassanid's and others who established an empire stretching from Hellespont (western Turkey today) to north India and from Egypt to the middle of Asia.

c) Tourism:

Iran is classified as one of the ten best tourist countries in terms of history and archaeological sites. It attracts about 3.8 million tourists annually according to statistics from 2016 (the vast majority of them are for religious tourism, only 20 thousand of them are not tourists for religious reasons), with plans to attract 20 million by the year 2050.

d) Iran's media capabilities⁽⁷³⁾:

- (1) Iran has a media empire that is the largest in the region and one of the largest in Asia and the world. It is the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Agency, a government institution personally supervised by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which controls the media policies of all television stations and radio broadcasts in the country, ensuring that they remain in line with the directions of the state.
- (2) Iran possesses 12 radio and 9 television local and satellite channels, as well as more than 70 newspapers and periodicals. The Iranian media policy works to oppose the counter-currents of Shiite Islamic principles and philosophies hostile to the Wilayat al-Faqih, highlighting the threat they pose to the Iranian society, and work to consolidate Persian traditions as a basis for protecting Iran's national

(73) Zayan Farsi, *International Institute for Iranian Studies*, 2020, p. 5.

security. Iranian media are characterized by continuous development and pursuit of international technology in the field of media.

- (3) Iran uses traditional media outlets in all its means (written – audio – visual) because of the importance of these media in spreading the doctrine, spreading cultures and propagating innocent ideas and trends.
- (4) Iran has formed the Supreme Council for Media, the Islamic Media Organization, and the Islamic Media Coordination Council mainly to export the Iranian revolution abroad.

I. Iranian political capabilities: ⁽⁷⁴⁾

- (1) Iran has a hybrid political system - the deaf expression - that shapes the concept of "religious democracy" as a unique model that can be the source of Iranian soft powers because it presents a new perspective on this subject as an alternative to the traditional systems known in the world.
- (2) Iran uses its embassies and diplomatic missions abroad to promote the slogan of the Islamic Revolution, which is the model and the first to be applied in all countries of the world. This is done by supporting movements and organizations by all possible means to ensure their loyalty to their ideology and beliefs

J. Iran's foreign diplomatic capabilities:

- (1) Iran has possessed great diplomatic capabilities since the Islamic conquest of the Persian Empire and then the domination of foreign colonialism.
- (2) In the sixteenth century there was a cooperation in the region between Arab and Iranian rulers and communication channels to coordinate and confront this colonialism were set up.
- (3) Iran's foreign policy represents a major source of soft power for Iran, especially as it pretends to carry lofty values (human rights - democracy - freedom) so that it becomes influential in its regional and international circles.

(74) Bin Aisha Muhammad Al-Amin, *Iranian Soft Power and Lessons Learned from the Iranian Experience*, Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic and Political Studies, 2015, p. 11.

K. Oil and natural gas reserves: ⁽⁷⁵⁾

- (1) The Iranian oil reserve⁽⁷⁶⁾ represents the fourth global reserve, right after those of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Canada. The size of this reserve is between 10-11% of the global reserve and the natural gas reserve represents 33.6 trillion cubic meters, constituting approximately 17.9% of the total global reserve. This makes it the second global reserve of natural gas, right after the Russian Federation, which is the most important factor contributing to the comprehensive strength of Iran
- (2) The oil potential of the Islamic Republic of Iran provides the opportunity to use its energy wealth for achieving its national security, interests and goals **through**:
 - a. Iran's dependence on its oil and gas wealth in rapprochement with countries and establishing strategic relations with them.
 - b. Iran's reliance on its strategies on the use of its economic potential to finance powers associated with it politically and ideologically or even its clients in the Arab region, to achieve its aspirations and rearrange political systems.
 - c. Iran's use of oil in the political and media debate on the issue of Palestine, in support of its effective presence in the region, and to gain political support from the Arab people, despite the embarrassment that this entails for the Arab countries that rely on oil.
 - d. Iran is working to use oil to reform its foreign policy and support this policy, as it has always been keen to exert positive and negative pressure through to get out of its political isolation, while breaking the American economic blockade by pushing international companies, including American companies, to invest in the Iranian energy sector. This is in addition to brandishing the oil weapon in the face of those who stand against its nuclear efforts. Indirectly, we find that oil sales provide Iran with hard currency through which it can buy military technology. As well as the means to buy advanced weaponry systems and to achieve political

(75) Fadlallah Al-Saadawi, *Iran Despite the Siege*, The Green House for Printing and Advertising, Sultanate of Oman, 2015 AD, pg. 22.

(76) Fadlallah Al-Saadawi, *Iran Despite the Siege*, The Green House for Printing and Advertising, Sultanate of Oman, 2015 AD, pg. 22.

- gains, such as its oil agreement with the Russian Federation, which made it a strong political ally to withstand American pressure in favor of Iran.
- e. Iran is working to implement its strategies in the Arab region, using the leverage oil gives it, such as its oil agreements with Syria and Lebanon, in addition to using oil to document its foreign policy towards different countries, such as its oil agreement with Turkey and with India. It has also worked to achieve reconciliation with some countries whose relations with it have been strained because of oil, such as its oil agreement with Pakistan and with Armenia – all of this is within the framework of Iran's national security interests.

Iran's policies to achieve its national interests and goals in the region through:⁽⁷⁷⁾

- A. Building alliances with the forces opposing the Sunni Arab regimes in the region and advocating for the oppressed there, similar to building an alliance of resistance and militia in the region and cooperating with the anti-US forces
- B. Building interests with international powers and regional parties, whether to mobilize support for their interests and goals or to form centers to threaten and thwart projects that target their security.
- C. Forming centers surrounding the region to be used in weakening the Arab actors in the region, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- D. Establishing organizations under the slogan of cooperation with the vulnerable, including the Shiites and the missionaries, to support Iranian activities.
- E. Using regional organizations, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Shanghai Group and the Economic Cooperation Group, AICO, as tools to achieve their interests and goals in the Gulf region in general.

Iran seeks to provoke the currents against the ruling regime in the region by providing unlimited material support in addition to the political cover that it gives them in all its forms. They seek to export the Islamic revolution to Arab and Gulf countries in particular and to benefit from those emerging religious currents or trying to establish them in particular that embrace the Shiite sect.

(77) Abdullah bin Modath Al-Dossari, *Iran, the successor to the Persian Empire*, reference mentioned previously, p. 13.

The objective of the Iranian military strategy (military capabilities):

- A. Protecting Iran's presence and its religious system of government, as well as its efforts to expand its influence in the Gulf region and the rest of its vital sphere in the western, central, and southern regions. This also includes securing the advance of its capabilities in all fields, protecting its external political and strategic alliances and preventing its enemies from creating situations that threaten Iranian domestic and foreign security. This includes preventive efforts, based on conventional and super-conventional military deterrent force - especially on land and at sea - with high credibility that deters Iran's enemies from attacking it while preparing to launch preventive and pre-emptive strikes inside and outside Iran that eliminate the sources of the threat before it occurs. And as soon as warning him.
- B. Iran continues to build paramilitary forces (Revolutionary Guards and Basij) to repel and destroy the hostilities surrounding it through attrition operations, by adopting guerrilla fighting methods and special operations (assassinations/bombings/suicide operations) and what is called irregular warfare (Asymmetric Warfare), which depends on ideological considerations/martyrdom and jihad to compensate for the lack of combat competence.

Iranian non-traditional abilities and capabilities: ⁽⁷⁸⁾

- A. The Iranian missile program began in the mid-seventies in cooperation with Israel during a project called Operation flower, striving to produce the missile Areha-2. The program stopped in 1979 after the fall of the Shah.
- B. At the beginning of the first Gulf War, Iran acquired surface-to-surface missiles (Scud-B) from Libya and Syria to counter the Iraqi missile strikes.
- C. Iran signed a military agreement with North Korea during 1985 to supply Iran with complete Scud-B missiles with the estimated quantity being 150-200 missiles, apart from the transfer of technologies for the production and development of these missiles.
- D. By the end of the year 1988, Iran succeeded in using reverse engineering in producing a new missile called Al-Oqab 130 with a range of 130 km.

(78) Talal Atris, *The Regional Dimension of the Iranian Nuclear File*, Al-Rafidain Foundation, Baghdad, 2013, p. 2.

- E. Iranian-Korean cooperation to implement the Shahab program continued by transferring technology to manufacture the Korean missile Nod Wong-1 and producing the missile Shahab-3 after the introduction of development with Russian technologies. On July 15, 2000, the flight test of this missile succeeded, its range reaching (1300) km and being able to carry a warhead weighing 800 kg.
- F. Iran did not stop at the production and development of surface/surface missiles. On July 15, 2000, the Iranian Minister of Defence stated that a larger missile (Shahab-4) was being manufactured as a vehicle to launch satellites to invade space.
- G. Iran is one of the most active countries in seeking to possess technologies that can be used in its nuclear weapons program. During 1999 Iran obtained from Russia, China, and North Korea the largest part of practical experience and techniques necessary for manufacturing surface/surface ballistic missiles, such as Shahab 5. Its range is more than (5000) km and Shahab 6 is an intercontinental missile, its range reaching (10,000) km. It poses a threat to the United States, as it may hit its shores. Half a ton of explosives with a range of 259 km and works on solid fuel, which gives it speed in its launch.
- H. Tor M-1 is the pinnacle of the Iranian missile system, a Russian-made missile that belongs to the fifth generation of anti-aircraft missile weapons and can confront both aircraft and mobile missiles. This system can also detect up to 48 targets such as aircrafts, helicopters, anti-radar missiles, or winged missiles at the same time. It is also able to track and hit two targets simultaneously at different altitudes, ranging from twenty meters to six thousand meters, from a distance of between 1-12 kilometres.
- I. The missile KH-58, known to the West as "ILTER" AS-11, entered service in the Iranian air force in 2014. The range of this missile reaches 120 km and when it is launched from a MIG-25MP aircraft a Mach 2.35, its range reaches 200 km. As for the weight of this missile, it reaches 640 kg at launch, 149 kg of which are the weight of the warhead. It is launched at a hypersonic speed by about 3.6 times as this missile can travel a distance of 1234 meters per second. This weapon is able to destroy radar groups of the famous American "Patriot" air defence system (160 km) at a maximum range of 2-2.5 minutes.

Growing Iranian interest in developing ballistic missile capabilities prompted the United States of America to intensify its pressure on Russia, China, and North Korea to stop their

cooperation with Iran in the missile and nuclear fields, especially with the global trend to make missiles a weapon of the first era.

When it comes to missiles, the process of developing Iranian armaments has witnessed many stages, especially in the field of long-range missiles, as well as the development of a heavy satellite launch device.

The accelerating and growing Iranian missile program posed a threat to regional stability in the Middle East and a cause for concern in neighbouring and distant countries alike, especially considering what happened to the Houthis towards the Kingdom now. It is the regional missile force, as well as hints that North Korean technology has been transferred to Iran to assist with its nuclear program.

Iran's military mechanisms to achieve its national interests and goals:

Iran is pursuing certain military practices to achieve its interests in the region, as follows:

A. Deterrence Policy: ⁽⁷⁹⁾

- (1) Iran follows a policy of deterrence to prevent or neutralize specific threats or dangers and remove them from the realm of direct action and the realm of actual implementation. This is achieved by confronting them with a counter or counter-threats or dangers equal or greater in size and impact. Iran uses it to achieve its interests and goals in the region, in the face of threats and changes in technologies and advanced military technology.
- (2) Iran's leaders see the need to enhance their capabilities in the nuclear field and consider it an indispensable right and seek to develop their long-range strategic missiles to meet the challenges and dangers that may face them from the United States or any other country in the region neighbouring Iran. Iran's defence policy, developing offensive capabilities against any state that might attack it and striving to preserve the national interests of the state and adapt them to its advantage.
- (3) Iran is working to establish many military manoeuvres (land-sea-air) in the Gulf region, not only to raise its combat and military capabilities, but to send a clear message to the neighbouring countries and the international community as a whole. This message is to present its military capabilities and the extent of their

(79) Muin Abdul Hakim, *Iran and Reaching the Stage of Strategic Deterrence*, Center for Islamic Unity, Riyadh, 2015 AD - P.43.

development, causing the neighbouring countries some anxiety. What is decisive for the geographical concern caused by Iran is the enormous potential that Iran enjoys, which prompted some Gulf countries to choose the American umbrella to protect them from the Iranian threat and other countries from the Gulf went to obtain a minimum of nuclear capabilities.

- (4) Iran communicates continuously and takes up serious efforts to strengthen its ability to absorb any joint or individual US-Israeli military strike and its ability to retaliate in a few minutes by launching tens of thousands of missiles at all American and Israeli interests in the region. This type of serious deterrence means that America is convinced that Iran has capabilities⁽⁸⁰⁾ that could destroy all American and Israeli interests in the region, if the US or even Israel launched a joint military strike against Iran. This made the major countries in the world resort to diplomatic methods and channels in settling the Iranian nuclear program.

B. The policy of military alliances - as one of Iran's strategic tools to achieve its interests and goals

Military alliances are an integral and parallel part of the Iranian armament policy, as part of pursuing its desire to achieve a decisive and quick victory in any of the confrontations that Iran may enter in the future. Iran knows that wars usually go on without alliances and last for a long time, up to several years, What the author learned is that entering into military alliances helps to shorten the period of war, as the allied countries with military industries will find themselves committed not to sell weapons to the hostile party, but rather seek to tighten the siege on it. Exchange of intelligence information between such partners will develop the capabilities of the military services and enhance their security expertise. Treating this as the point of departure, Iran has established some military alliances with some forces, the most important of which are as follows:

The Iranian / Russian alliance: ⁽⁸¹⁾

Iran has been a major market for Russian weapons since the start of military cooperation between the two countries in 1989, as Russia affirms Iran's right to enhance its military capabilities, and Iran and Russia cooperate in the intelligence and security field. Russia, unlike the United States and Europe, does not see Iran is a sponsor of terrorism.

(80) Muin Abdul Hakim, *Iran and Reaching the Stage of Strategic Deterrence*, Center for Islamic Unity, Riyadh, 2015 AD - P.43.

(81)Nourhan Al-Sheikh, Mahsoub Alliance, *The Journal of International Politics*, Issue No. (196), 2014, p. 20.

The Iranian / Indian alliance:

Iran's ideological relations with India have been characterized by continuous growth through joint maritime exercises and the exchange of modern technologies in the field of military industrialization.

The Iranian / Eritrean Alliance: ⁽⁸²⁾

Iran has recently attempted excessive efforts to establish good relationships with Eritrea, as Iran's eyes are turned to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, seeking to control the most important maritime ports in the world (the Strait of Hormuz - Bab al-Mandab Strait). This is especially true as Iran is looking towards the island of Hanish al-Kabir, a Yemeni island at the entrance to the Red Sea. This land remained the subject of a conflict between Yemen and Eritrea for a long time and the International Court returned it to Yemen in 1997.

Iran is currently working to support Eritrea indirectly by supporting the Houthis in Yemen and supplying them with all the means to support efforts to fragment the state's forces in Yemen and preoccupy it with other internal problems that would allow Eritrea to storm the strait of Bab al-Mandab.

Religious dimension as one of Iran's mechanisms to achieve its national interests and goals: ⁽⁸³⁾

- A. Since the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran, this country has adopted the export of its ideas, values, and creed through propaganda and direct contact with the Islamic opposition and Shiite forces in the world. They have succeeded in forming groups affiliated with it in most of the countries where Shiites are present. Exporting ideology and then abandoning its official adoption by state institutions and transferring the mission to civil institutions inside Iran that carry out the process of coordination with Shiite forces, whether they are political forces or Shiite religious references that are carried out under the auspices of the Wali al-Faqih and under the supervision of my intelligence. The religious dimension it is employed to achieve this purpose.
- B. Shiites constitute 15-20% among Muslims in the world and more than a third of these are concentrated in Iran alone. Iran is the center of attraction for these people, not only

(82) Jamal Mazloum, *The Iranian-Eritrean Alliance and Arab Security*, Yemen, 2014, p. 12.

(83) Moein Abdel Hakim, *Iran and the Reaching the Stage of Strategic Deterrence*, previously mentioned reference, p. 43.

at the sectarian level, but also at the political level, considering that politics and religion are represented in Wali al-Faqih, the Supreme Leader. He represents a formidable soft power in the form of his followers scattered not only inside Iran but also beyond. These people voluntarily serve the interests of the innocent state due to the nature of the religious relationship that binds them to the subordination of the Wali al-Faqih for the religious-political connection

- C. Iran exploits the Shiite minorities in the Islamic world, in general, to exercise pressure on the ruling regimes and escalate their demands and rights to achieve their goals of destabilizing security, stirring up riots and depleting countries economically and politically to enable Tehran to exert pressure on them and dominate their decisions or to divert attention from what is happening, whether in Iran itself or one of the centers of its movement (Syria – Iraq – Bahrain – Yemen – Lebanon).

The means of implementing the Iranian strategy:

Contemporary reading of the Iranian strategy in the Middle East indicates that it is based on a mixture of hard and soft power. However, the distinctive pattern to be seen in recent times indicates its increasing tendency towards employing more soft power and this trend reveals the failure of previous experience in employing hard power, especially after the Islamic Revolution in 1357 AD. It was also transformed by the lessons learned from the war with Iraq.

Employing Iranian soft powers:

Legitimizing its foreign policy and imparting a moral and ethical dimension, which is seen through the following:

- A. The nuclear program:

If Iran used its soft powers to reinforce the philosophy of international legitimacy or, as it suggested, to do so and to work within its framework by affirming its right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, they would be aware that departure of its soft powers from the framework of international legitimacy may reduce the attractiveness of its policies. The foreign ministry is viewed as being aggressive and thus it benefited from the Iraqi lesson in 1990 when it did not use its soft powers well within the framework of international legitimacy and relied on hard power.

- B. Revolutionary rhetoric against America and the West:

Through this type of speech Iran was able to win large sectors of public opinion in its favor, especially at the regional level. This also allowed them to exploit the

sensitivity of this base towards the United States of America and the West and employed it as part of its endeavor to enhance its soft power in the region.

C. The Palestinian issue:

By speaking to support the Palestinian cause, it aims to win over large sectors of the public in its favor and to attract the streets to create an appropriate environment to accept the Iranian regional role through this and through working to reach the heart of the Sunni world.

D. Political Shiism:

Shiism is used in the framework of Iran's foreign relations on a large scale and it is an important element to generate Iranian soft power at the level of the Shiite incubator that is loyal to the Wali al-Faqih, at a minimum to serve the Iranian project in the region. The concept of using Shiism in foreign policy is old. But it has become more effective after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Shiism entered the realm of power and politics in the Middle East. This led to reinforcing the role and influence of Iran. The Shiite element led to the transformation of Iraq into a country that is friendly and allied with Iran and gave it an effective and decisive presence in the issues of Iraq, Lebanon, and the Near East in general.

It is noted that Iran's regional allies are mainly political movements and not states, while in a region where states dominate the political situation, at first glance this Iranian strategy seems to be a losing strategy. However in practical terms Iran is successfully implementing its strategy, while it is difficult for Iran's allies to bring down the US-allied regimes in the region. Iran feels comfortable with the growing strength of these allies on the one hand, and on the other hand, with their ability to protect and fortify Iran through various methods in the face of American and international pressures.

Iran's tendency to adopt more strict positions towards efforts to settle its nuclear file after Ahmadinejad took office, such as the resumption of some activities related to uranium enrichment in the "Isfahan" complex in August 2005, and continuing to develop its nuclear program by achieving the nuclear fuel cycle, as well as the announcement on its success in enriching uranium at rates of 3–5% at the Natanz facility in April 2006. To confirm its right to possess nuclear technology despite European and American warnings, its nuclear program could escalate within the Security Council and the issuance of Security Council Resolutions No. 1595-19, which condemned Iran and imposed specific sanctions against its nuclear and missile programs. Iran's disregard for those threats and the sanctions imposed on it, and the continuation of international sanctions with Resolutions No. "1747-1803-1929".

In addition to the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States of America and the European Union, the Arab Gulf states fear that Iran's agreement with the powers of the 5 + 1 group on Iran's nuclear program will enhance the latter's regional role and encourage it to reach for its regional ambitions. The tension in these relations is not limited to the issue of Iran's nuclear program only, but goes beyond that and has primarily political reasons.

Iran has consistently affirmed its endeavor to develop its nuclear capabilities, despite the international sanctions it has signed and the difficulties encountered in implementing it. Iran, to achieve its goals in the region, follows its constant feeling of an external threat that has not stopped since the victory of its revolution in 1979. The first Gulf War, which tasted bitterly, had the greatest impact on consolidating this feeling and provoking ongoing Israeli threats to strike the Iranian nuclear program and the threats put forward by the Americans.

Thus, to consolidate the Iranian leadership's conviction that they possess a deterrent and a force that would be effective in responding to sources of threat is what delays the outbreak of the war. Infrastructure, and nothing else, and then the West notifies that Iran has different cards to play with, and then negotiates them to achieve its interests in the region.

It has become clear that the most prominent dangers and threats that plague the Middle East region are Iranian incursion and expansion in the region. This concept has expanded widely in the political, media, intellectual, security and military communities.

Iran intervenes blatantly and openly in the internal affairs of the Gulf states. Armed cells and organizations have also become the asymmetric war arm of Iran, after working to tear its societies apart by using demographic warfare.⁽⁸⁴⁾ This fulfills the dream of the Iranian empire by using Arab fuel obtained through fraud and perhaps the most prominent dangers of this threat, which has become a real challenge, are the following⁽⁸⁵⁾:

A. Ghostly system:

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the Basij forces⁽⁸⁶⁾ carry out the tasks of exporting the revolution by using terrorist operations in deep Arab countries, aiming to militarize Arab societies.

(84) **Demographic war:** It is a type of war called a war of beliefs and ideas that takes place through a soft division of societies into sects, denominations, and sects to facilitate infiltration into them under flimsy justifications, including the support of the sect and the protection of the vulnerable to achieve its true goals.

(85) Ashraf Sweilem, *Arab Security between Iran and the West*, Al Siyasa Al Dawliya, Cairo, 2015, p. 38.

(86) **Basij Forces:** They are paramilitary forces consisting of male and female civilian volunteers and serve as an auxiliary force and participate in activities such as internal security, providing social services, and organizing public religious ceremonies, and the Basij follows the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which in turn follows the authority of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. In Iran, the Basij forces are known for their loyalty to the leader of the Islamic revolution, and the Basij forces also include groups of clerics and their followers.

B. Military system:

Iran has an arsenal of conventional weapons, missiles army regulars. It also developed its weapons and changed its doctrine to eastern armaments, that allow the supply of weapons and the acquisition of advanced warfare technology from the countries of the eastern camp, such as Russia and China. In the light of the recent nuclear agreement between the West and Iran, which is recognized by a nuclear state and the lifting of the economic blockade. This allowed Iran to develop its weapons and indeed ballistic missiles with a range allowing them to reach Saudi Arabia have been developed, which is a political message confirming that Iran's political goal is the Arab world, not Israel, as we see it in the slogans. Perhaps the recent events in Jerusalem and the Russian-Israeli agreement in Syria confirm the falsehood of these slogans and reveal their intentions.

C. Intelligence system:

The Iranian intelligence services use multiple arms to target the unity of nations and disperse them by using ghostly terrorist operations attributed to organizations that run them remotely. Investigation justifications for taking up an intervention to achieve a bridgehead within the Arab countries and their societies, as well as to emerge as a fighter of terrorism, as happened in Syria and Iraq.

D. Ideological system:

He notes the sectarian Iranian infusion based on the principle of hatred for the Arabs, burning their history and distorting the Islamic message according to the principle of 'reverse engineering' or what is called drilling under the wall by destroying the basic pillars of the Islamic religion and making them open to insult, disapproval and hatred to create a state of aversion and conflict in addition to abuse Regulator Arabism and Islam.

E. Media system:

It is noted that the impact of this system is widely spread, as studies confirm the existence of 350 means of communication used by Iran against the Arab world in general and the Gulf in particular - and perhaps there are approximately 65 satellite channels that infuse hatred, sectarian poisons and hostility against Arabs. Those satellite channels are hosted on Arab servers without any treatment and there is also an army electronic message that broadcasts its poisons on social media, as well as several writers and media professionals who promote the Iranian role in their articles and books.

F. Iranian nuclear:

It has become difficult to talk about regional security or international peace and security after the recent nuclear agreement that allowed Iran to possess nuclear without deterrence. This places the Arab world in a weak position, especially the neighboring Gulf countries that can no longer achieve a military balance with Iran, in addition to the risks of nuclear leakage, as well as those resulting from the mere possession of weapons. There is no unified vision on the horizon on how to resolve this threat in light of the refusal of the US to reject this nuclear agreement.

G. Corresponding force (Sectarian Militias):

Iran no longer hides its power from the irregular terrorist sectarian militias, but rather openly declares its leadership and is fighting with these in Iraq and Syria in an internationally supported manner under the justification of (fighting terrorism) When counting the number of extremist asymmetric organizations present in the fixed Gulf borders that reach 68 armed organizations full of hatred for states and societies, these organizations are managed remotely, which leads to maritime chaos and creates unrest in the international corridors bordering the Arab Gulf states.

The main goal that the Iranian regime seeks to achieve lies in fulfilling the dream of regional leadership and participating in world affairs. This is supposed to be achieved by working to create arms in the joints of the Arab world and power centers in it, as well as by using Shiite minorities and the nuclear deterrence policy as mechanisms to implement its goals.

Iran deals politically with the countries of the region in a manner that relies on bullying or luring, using the logic of force and hinting through war agents, which are the Shiite groups that it uses to interfere in the affairs of the region's countries and destabilize the ruling regimes in them.⁽⁸⁷⁾

Iran, through its interference in the affairs of the countries of the region, seeks to alter the balance of strategic power in the region, redraw its map according to its interests and objectives and spread the Shiite doctrine, thus threatening the interests of the major countries in the region, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. From its viewpoint, it is considered to be the sponsor of Sunni Islam, which threatens entering the region in a clash that may develop into a war between the countries of the Arab region.

(87) Muhammad Suleiman Al-Zaidi, *The Decision Makers in Iran*, Dar Al-Quds, Riyadh, 2014, p. 16.

Iranian interests in the Middle East region lie in Iran's endeavors to promote itself to a major power with its prestigious international status, directed especially towards the Islamic world and especially to the heart of the security vacuum, consolidating its influence and proving its superiority over the countries of the region.

Iran is pursuing its national interests in the Middle East region through expansion and by extending bridges of cooperation with it to work to disperse Arab political and strategic thought and prevent it from building a unified Arab strategy in the field of regional defense and security (Arab Gulf security – the Red Sea - the Strait of Hormuz).⁽⁸⁸⁾

3.2. Iranian foreign policy orientations in the Middle East

Iran has played major roles in the region since the dawn of history. Considering its geographical location, the advantage it has over the neighboring countries in the region in terms of the availability of various sources of wealth, as well as the difficulty of defeating them militarily in its lands due to the ruggedness of the terrain.

Such geographical conditions make it suitable for the defense of a large number of natural sites and the contribute to Iran's geographical advantages concerning global transportation on land and sea.

Iranian trends and objectives have benefitted greatly from regional and international events that occurred during the recent period, highlighting the importance of Iran's influential role in many of the issues raised in the region. Iran is also trying to ensure that they are not overlooked in any future arrangements to rebalance regional powers, especially with their strict insistence on their right to possess nuclear capabilities and use them for peaceful purposes.

Throughout history, Iran has been an active state in its region. Perhaps the most important contribution that Iran has made in contemporary history and that has affected the region is the Iranian Islamic revolution, which was based on a religious approach and works to integrate faith into politics without a break between them. This was the reason for which Iran was transformed from the region's policeman on which the United States relies to one of the evil countries in the world from the American point of view.

Then the situation changed after the success of nuclear negotiations and reaching a comprehensive agreement between Tehran and the 5 + 1 group, according to which Iran and

(88) Salem Farhan, *The Iranian Infiltration in Yemen*, Previous Reference, p. 9.

the International Agency Atomic Energy would work together to accelerate the pace of bilateral cooperation between them to address all issues existing between them.

There are several decision-making institutions in Iran, which reflects negatively on Iran's foreign positions and policies. The political decision-making process in the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on interactions between the constitution and several official institutions, which include the following:

- A. Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts for the Leader.
- B. Council of Ministers.
- C. National Security Council.
- D. Presidency of the Republic.
- E. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Determinants of Iranian foreign policy: ⁽⁸⁹⁾

- A. Preserving the principles and ideologies of the Islamic Revolution.
- B. Openness to the outside world.
- C. Supporting and developing Iranian military capabilities and trying to develop nuclear capabilities.
- D. Rejection of foreign presence in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries or Iraq.
- E. Standing against the aggressive Israeli policy.
- F. Ensuring the security of the oil route through the Strait of Hormuz.
- G. Holding super conventional capabilities.

Pillars of Iranian foreign policy:

- A. Iran's foreign policy is based on several basic pillars, the most important of which are the following:
- B. Extreme sensitivity to foreign influence and presence, especially American, in the region.
- C. Foreign policy independence is the only guarantee for achieving Iranian national interests.
- D. Considering the security of the Arab Gulf is the responsibility of the countries bordering on it and Iran appoints itself the policemen of the Gulf region, entrusted with maintaining security there.
- E. Supporting armed groups and movements in different regions of the world.

(89) Abdullah Muhammad al-Gharib, *a fighter from the desert, the growing Iranian role, and its impact on Arab national security*, Riyadh, 2010 edition, p.10.

- F. Considering the Iranian revolutionary tide is the first to be applied in all Islamic countries instead of the Arab system, thus achieving regional leadership for Iran.

Patterns of external Iranian policy: ⁽⁹⁰⁾

A. Active Kinetic Imperial Expansion Mode:

- (1) It is a pattern that stands in contrast to the isolationist pattern, and includes several features:
- a. Broad Gulf participation.
 - b. Engaging in regional and international politics.
 - c. Expansion, control and interference in internal affairs.
 - d. Perseverance in moving towards the goal despite difficulties.
 - e. Vanity and obstinacy.
 - f. Combining recklessness and arrogance, caution and balance.
- (2) The diversity of these contradictory features is attributed to the diversity of domestic political life, which includes extremist and moderate tendencies and therefore we find that Iran always speaks with two voices. This pattern is consistent with Iran's political philosophy as indicated by Wilayat al-Faqih.
- (3) Active participation in international organizations, especially with mediating powers such as (China-Russia) and independence from the United States.

B. The pattern of impartiality or neutrality:

It is the refusal to enter into alliances that support the umbrella of a superpower and this pattern is characterized by features that include:

- (1) Self-centeredness or in other words the extreme centralization that characterizes Iran's vision of the world.
- (2) Exaggeration with self-sufficiency, ego power and self-inflatedness.
- (3) Cultural differentiation.

Objectives of Iran's foreign policy ⁽⁹¹⁾:

- A. Preserving the national independence of the state and protecting Iran's national security from all threats, whether internal or external.

(90) Shaher Al-Wazzani, *Iranian Extension: Rights or Ambitions*, Al-Waha Center for Security and Strategic Studies, Kuwait, 2015, p. 35.

(91) Husam al-Din Shehata, *Iranian penetration in the Gulf*, Abu Dhabi Studies Center, Emirates, 2014, p. 22.

- B. Its constant endeavor to implement the Iranian revolutionary model in all countries of the region, by exporting the Iranian revolution to all neighboring countries.
- C. Possessing effective tools to exert pressure that allow it to move freely outside its borders, which contribute to increasing its influence in the Middle East to support its regional situation.
- D. Spreading the Shiite doctrine within Arab and Islamic countries in the context of their keenness to find a popular base for them in these countries.
- E. Building confidence with the Gulf States by establishing dialogue and mutual understanding, and trying to change previous perceptions of the system.
- F. Establishing effective trade relations with the countries of the region to solve the problems that their economy suffers from.

The main directions of the Iberian foreign policy⁽⁹²⁾:

- A. Establishing a long-term national security plan to achieve a program of an active and positive foreign policy. Expanding the scope of the role assigned to Iran regarding the formation of balances in the region. Preparing foreign policy areas to enhance stability and development and harmonize all state institutions and agencies to unify the decision-making process related to foreign policy. Establishing balanced relationships with global markets in terms of capital investment and seeking to secure the country's defense needs. Striving to reduce tension in the regional and international arena, as well as to contribute to resolving regional disputes and peacekeeping. Developing international cooperation to prevent the formation of a unipolar system and active participation in international organizations to secure the interests of Iran and developing countries. Supporting friendly relations with neighboring countries and striving for rapprochement, documenting security efforts and regional cooperation to counter the influence of the new world order and the presence of foreign forces in the region. Reinforcing relations with other countries based on mutual respect and common interests by presenting a correct and realistic vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Supporting the rights of the Palestinians, preserving the Islamic identity of Jerusalem, documenting and respecting

(92) Nevin Abdel-Moneim Massad, *Decision Making in Iran and Arab-Iranian Relations*, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2002, p. 283.

international rights, independence and sovereignty of states and defending the rights of Muslim minorities away from their indirect relations with Israel.

Objectives of Iran foreign policy at the regional level:

- A. Preserving the national independence of the state and protecting Iran's national security from all threats, whether internal or external.
- B. Continuing the policy of exporting the revolution in the context of its desire to apply its revolutionary model to the countries of the region and in a way that increases Iran's hegemony over them.
- C. Focusing heavily during this period on spreading the Shiite doctrine within Arab and Islamic countries in the context of Iran's unyielding efforts to create a popular base for it in these countries.
- D. Through extending the Shiite scope of influence, Iran wishes to establish a security belt around the region.
- E. Working to support its regional position by obtaining effective tools to exert pressure that allow it to move freely outside its borders, which contributes to increasing its influence in the Middle East region, where border, sectarian and ideological disputes are increasing between the countries of the region.
- F. Focusing on confidence-building processes with Gulf states by establishing dialogue and mutual understanding and trying to change past perceptions of the regime.
- G. Shifting focus to dealing with economic priorities during the current stage in light of the problems that the Iranian economy suffers from.

Iran's relationships with the countries that engage in confrontation with Israel varied between forming a coalition to competitive relations, in addition to being penetrative and penetrating relations through Lebanon and Palestine. It is natural that penetration reveals areas of weakness, shortcomings or gaps inherent in the entire Arab entity.

Arab countries refrain from certain tools using based on the existing divergence between the strategies declared by Iran on the one hand and Arab countries on the other hand, while Iranian strategies are based on armed resistance. Arab strategies are based on negotiating foundations based on their recognition that peace is a strategic choice, hence the Iranian penetration of the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas through supporting resistance activities financially, which is the spending that consists in providing money on the one hand and military equipment, personnel, expertise and military on the other hand. These activities are not limited

to this but also include Iranian penetration of the Syrian ally. By providing Iran with patterns of conventional and unconventional armaments that Syria needs.

The most influential factors in drawing Iranian foreign policies towards neighboring countries:⁽⁹³⁾

The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on abstaining from any type of authoritarianism or submission. This means reserving complete independence and territorial integrity of the country, defending the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment against hegemonic powers and establishing peaceful relationships with non-warring countries. The most influencing factors in Iran's foreign policy towards neighboring countries are as follows:

- A. The Iranian political system is characterized by multipolarity that affects the foreign policy system and it has the right to express its views or make decisions.
- B. The Supreme Leader holds the highest position in making major decisions.
- C. Velayat al-Faqih is one of the most important sources of Iranian foreign policy.
- D. The authority of the Wali al-Faqih has no limits, just as the constitution does not define his authority nor restrict his authority.

Iran is implementing its national interests in the region by means of expansion that focuses on extending bridges of cooperation so that it works to disperse Arab political and strategic thought and prevent it from creating a unified Arab strategy in the field of regional defense and security.⁽⁹⁴⁾

Iran looks at the Arab Gulf region from two different perspectives. One is the standpoint of Persian identity based on Shiite identity. The other is a perception of the region's countries as an economic exchange area that creates a market for marketing its products. This is why it seeks to destabilize the regime in the countries of the region to penetrate their affairs and control them.

Iran envisages itself preparing for an important historical stage in its path, with a view of the awaiting economic growth and comprehensive civilizational prosperity. They also see signs of dismantling the blockade that deprived the country of many opportunities. It has provided a model for the people of the world in transforming threats into opportunities through its advanced and independent economic structure.⁽⁹⁵⁾

(93) Muhammad Suleiman Al-Zaidi, *decision-makers in Iran*, reference mentioned previously, p. 16.

(94) Salem Farhan, *The Iranian Infiltration in Yemen*, reference mentioned previously, p.9.

(95) Adel Masoud, *The Comprehensive Forces of the State between Theory and Practice*, reference mentioned previously, p. 43.

Iranian/Israeli relations:⁽⁹⁶⁾

Iran was the main source of Israeli oil exports, reaching a point where Iran was the main supplier of Israeli oil during the wars of 1967 and 1973. As part of this, Pahlavi Iran supplied more than (90%) of Israel's oil needs, and in return Israel took the initiative to export industrial products and weapons to Iran. Iran has also benefited from Israeli influence in its agricultural and industrial projects, such as the Qazvin agricultural and industrial project, while Israeli capital owners have invested in several mixed banks and Iranian production facilities, as well as services companies. After the success of the Islamic revolution, relationships with the Zionist regime were cut off and the former embassy was transferred to this.

The regime was to harbor the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization and it was evident that the Islamic revolution placed the Palestinian issue at the core of its goals. Before the start of the imposed war, relationships with the Palestine Liberation Organization and hostilities towards Israel were moving parallel in one direction., Iran's opposition to Israel continued by supporting the Palestinian cause despite the tense relationships between Iran and the Palestine Liberation Organization that resulted from Iran's support for Iraq in the war. In the meantime, Iranian foreign policy orientations towards Israel changed completely.

Iran seeks to be the dominant power in the regional equation and if it is not able to do so, then its words must be heard in everything that is happening in the region, especially concerning Gulf security. In these efforts it is moving from a purely strategic approach that focuses on achieving the goals of Iranian politics, as it always seeks. Considering Iran's skills in managing crises to create alliances that serve their main goal in achieving the dominant regional role, we treat this as the foundation for understanding their support for the Islamic resistance in Palestine and Lebanon and even their support for the American invasion of Iraq. This led to making American forces in Iraq a hostage to Iran in the event of any American or Israeli attack on Iran. We also understand their relentless pursuit of the political involvement of the Shiite communities in the Gulf, which is what happened in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain and other Gulf countries, as well as Syria.

(96) Amir Muhammad Haji Yusef, *Iranian-Israeli relations, are they hostility or cooperation in secret*, Al-Rasid Center, Tehran, 2014, p. 31.

Iranian / Turkish relationships: ⁽⁹⁷⁾

The Iranian / Turkish relationships are of special importance to the Arab countries because the two countries form a belt in the Middle East region. As Iran occupies a geographically vast area of the Arab region and Turkey has the same geographical reality, the two countries share historical and religious aspects with the neighboring Arab countries, this creates the basis for forming Iranian / Turkish relationships in their political and strategic framework. These relationships have witnessed stages that we can call the "ebb and flow" since approximately 500 years ago. Modern-age struggle between the two countries began over influence in the Arab world through a specific ideology that each side pursues separately, carrying with it two different projects. These are namely the Iranian Safavid project on the one hand and the Ottoman Turkish project on the other hand. The struggle for influence and competition between the two projects has continued from that time to this moment, even if its expression varied throughout history.

The rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey in November 2002 was a strong impulse to improve bilateral relationships between the two countries, especially with the party's foreign policy based on zeroing out problems and establishing economic interdependence with neighboring countries through trade exchange. This development was much welcomed in Iran.

On the other hand, the occupation of Iraq led to a redistribution of the regional balance of power in general and between Iran and Turkey in particular. The factors behind this included the collapse of the former Iraqi regime and the domination of Shiite political parties over the Iraqi government and parliament, as well as the emergence of the Kurds' role in northern Iraq and the central authority in Baghdad. All of these led to an increase of Iranian influence in Iraq and this coincides with the emergence of new threats to Turkish national security.

The most important sources of concern about the future of the bilateral relationships between Iran and Turkey can be seen to run along the following main axes and issues that represent the fundamental differences between them:

A. Security and strategic axis:

Despite the difference in its international and regional stances and policies when compared to those of Tehran, Ankara adheres to its security agreement signed with Tehran.

(97) Khanfar al-Kaabi, *Iranian / Turkish relations, and the map of influence in the Arab world*, reference mentioned previously, p. 15.

Under this agreement the territories of the two countries shall be free from the presence of their opponents and in this context the two countries cooperate on issues such as fighting the Kurdish parties. Turkey has had a security and political role in the recent past during their establishment. Their role was that of a mediator at the level of the Iranian nuclear file, seeking to resolve it, so that Iran does not turn into a new arena of conflict, as Iraq has witnessed. What motivated Ankara in this was fear for Turkish interests and national security.

B. Economic axis: ⁽⁹⁸⁾

Turkey maintains huge commercial relationships with Iran. Specialized economic centers indicate that Turkey aspires to raise the level of its cooperation on the commercial, economic and industrial levels with its eastern neighbor to include the fields of oil, gas, and trade. If we take into account the distinguished geographical location of Turkey, which is considered a corridor to Europe and a consumer of the energy provided by Iranian oil and gas, Turkey was an important outlet for Iran because of the sanctions that were imposed on it. The direct geographical proximity between the two countries resulted in a decrease in transportation and insurance costs for the movement of goods and individuals between them.

C. Iraqi issue: ⁽⁹⁹⁾

- (1) Iraq represents the core of the Iranian / Turkish dispute in terms of political ideology as well as strategy, as Tehran seeks to extend its influence among the Shiites to take control of matters and those who support Iran seek to marginalize the Sunnis who are more comfortable with the a dominant Turkish role rather than Iranian. Turkey is trying to satisfy the Iraqi Kurds, as they constitute a protective shield against the Safavid tide in this country and continues in its efforts to allow them to form a local government that they aspire to.
- (2) The future of Iraq has become unclear after the departure of foreign forces, while Turkish / Iranian relations have also become complicated due to the goals of both parties in Iraq. Iran is trying to establish a Shiite state that derives its legitimacy from the religious seminaries in Qom and Najaf, while Turkey seeks to take over the affairs of a coalition government that includes all strata of the Iraqi society.

(98) Khanfar al-Kaabi, *Iranian / Turkish relations, and the map of influence in the Arab world*, previous reference, p. 15.

(99) Sharif Mabrouk, *Turkish / Iranian Relations from Convergence to Competition*, Al-Ahram Center for Studies, 2014, p. 13.

D. Syrian issue:

In light of the events of the revolution, Syria has turned into a pivotal issue that highlighted the extent of confusion in decision-making due to the previous relationships of the surrounding countries with the Syrian regime. The same applies for Iran, which supports the regime in Syria extensively, trying to exploit the current situation in Syria for its benefit.

The difference in the Iranian and Turkish vision of the Syrian scene has to do with the strategic axes and the conflict in the region. Iran believes that overthrowing the Syrian regime constitutes a severe blow to its strategy and its long-term alliance with Damascus and therefore declares that the downfall of the Syrian regime is a red line. It is clear that Tehran is counting that a security solution will enable the regime to overcome its crisis.

E. Lebanese and Palestinian issue:

In recent years Turkey has been trying to reinforce its relations with all Arab countries and to use Arab issues to appear as a major player in the region, since these are considered the first issues of the Islamic world. From this standpoint, Turkey has established a foothold in these countries because of its positions on the issues at hand, which made this country in a state of the state. Intense competition with Iran and its open relationships with Israel caused confusion among all the factions and movements in Lebanon and Palestine.

F. Libyan case:

The Arab revolutions revealed the true face of various countries. In this aspect the Iranian / Turkish stances differ as to what is happening in the Arab region in the public sphere. There is a fluidity of these positions, as they adapt to the circumstances and the data on the events. Turkey has allowed NATO forces to strike Gaddafi's sites even though it is considered the most relevant ally of the former regime. But Tehran has been confused as to its positions, revolving in a vicious circle. On the one hand, it was describing the opponents of Gaddafi, supported by Western governments, as revolutionaries, while on the other hand, it denounced the military intervention in Libya and called it great aggression and folly.

G. Dealing with the Arab Gulf states:

One of the most important reasons for Tehran to transform its view of Ankara from that of a close friend to one of a rival opponent is the divergent development of Turkish / Arab relations, especially with the Arab Gulf states. One of the most differences behind this was that concerning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is the country most adversarial to Tehran's

regional expansionist policies., Arab Gulf states were and are still looking at Tehran's regional policies with suspicion due to the sectarian approach taken by Tehran towards these countries., When it comes to the crisis of the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Pearl Square protests, Turkey did not express its opposition to the entry of Gulf forces into this country. This caused further isolation for Iran and their position due to the Turkish trend towards supporting the position of countries Arabia in the Gulf.

It is my belief that Turkish / Iranian relationships are characterized by competition and cooperation at the same time. At times this cooperation is apparent and competition is implicit, while at other times competition is apparent and cooperation is implicit., It is also clear that the base of common interests that govern Turkish / Iranian relationships began to extend once again after it dwindled down due to the crisis.

Each party is keen on achieving a kind of balance in its regional and international policies to invest it in the best way. It will also not be greatly affected by the Syrian crisis, given the size of the interests and vital issues that link the two countries, and it remains for the absence of Arabs and Arab powers from the regional and even international arenas. It allowed for the emergence of other powerful forces in the region and at the expense of their interests.

To achieve its goals, Iran relies on several means, ranging from soft power and lending military support to the Afghan allies, hence the policies adopted by Hassan Rouhani towards the Afghan regime. The Iranian regime's means to achieve its goals are divided into three levels:

A. Political speech:

This level depends on the president's motivation for the Afghan regime to rapprochement by adopting a friendly political discourse that relies on converging interests. It invokes the cultural and geographical component as a basis for rapprochement and cooperation.

B. Soft powers:

One of the priorities of Iranian policy-makers towards Afghanistan is to form an economic sphere of influence that would allow spreading Iran's influence on the one hand and to make Afghanistan a path allowing for the land transport of Iranian goods to the rest of Central Asia on the other hand.

C. Supporting some Afghan factions:

For achieving its interests in Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic relies on the support of several militias and militant factions to maintain the balance of internal power, acting through the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iranian / Afghan relations: ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Afghanistan was historically part of Iranian territory and in the nineteenth century Britain sought to separate Afghanistan from Iran, wishing to turn it into a buffer zone between itself and India, due to Britain's fear of the Russians threatening India via Afghanistan.

Iran's foreign policy towards Afghanistan during the era of President Hassan Rouhani, which coincides with the withdrawal of the international coalition forces, is centered around four key points:

- A. Reinforcing cooperation with Hamid Karzai and his successor.
- B. Active participation in the Afghan reconstruction process to form "spheres of influence".
- C. Iran's attempt to divert decision-making in the Afghan regime away from American influence.
- D. Cooperating with the Afghan government to control the border areas.

Iran's attitudes towards Arab countries:

The historical relationships between the Arab countries and Iran went through several stages before and after the Islamic Revolution. Iran holds an important position in the Middle East, as it is one of the largest Islamic countries, especially in the Islamic East, while the Arabs constitute the weight of the Islamic world. From the general perspective, Iran has three main allies in the Arab world: Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The countries it has the most tense relations in the region are the Arab Gulf states.

The Arab Gulf states fear that Iran's "nuclear" agreement will enhance the latter's regional role and encourages it to achieve its regional ambitions, while tension in these relationships is not limited to the issue of this program. The nuclear issue only goes beyond it, but its underlying factors are political and ideological issues, with many aspects giving cause

(100) Tamer Badawi, *Iranian expansion in Afghanistan between the American withdrawal and the available alternatives*, Institute for Arab Studies, 2014, p. 54.

for concern, including the issue of the occupied UAE islands and what these countries describe as Iran's interference in their internal affairs.

Iran's regional political trends:

Iran's foreign policy is partly based on the Iranian constitution, which stipulates an external role for Iran that is to combat injustice and abolish the authoritarian regimes in the world, protect the legitimate struggle and struggles of the oppressed, defend the rights of Muslims in the world and expel all forms of colonialism completely. It also covers preventing foreign influence and abolishing alliances and agreements that lead to the domination of foreigners. All this means creating justifications for Iranian policy within its scope pertaining to external action, trying to provide it with constitutional legitimacy. The Iranian plan, which comes to an end with the end of 2020, stipulates the necessity for building Iranian society to achieve the first and not the second place in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus region.

Therefore, they view the Iranian nuclear program as a technological shift that will lead Iran to regional leadership. Iran's regional policy is a pragmatic policy aimed at extending its regional influence, while maintaining close ties to its relative strength in the region and avoiding confrontations or a chaotic uprising.

The core of Iran's regional policy is focused on the following concerns: ⁽¹⁰¹⁾

- A. Extending regional hegemony within its sphere of influence, especially in the political, economic and cultural aspects.
- B. Shifting the regional balance of power in favor of Iran's supremacy and weakening its competitors in a drive to achieve hegemony over all the countries of the region, as well as to be the main hub and player in leading the region and resolving its regional issues.
- C. Investing American and Arab mistakes in regional issues, and creating a state of security vacuum to enhance the Iranian position and status through political, economic and security means.
- D. Expelling Western influence from the Middle East, filling the vacuum with Iranian influence and securing joint efforts with regional allies to prepare the regional political stage for the next stage of Iran's vision, which assumes the inevitability of expelling foreign presence.

(101) Defense Magazine, *Al-Ahram Foundation Building*, Issue 269, December 2008, p.63.

- E. Encouraging radical Islamic forces⁽¹⁰²⁾, and inciting them against the ruling regimes to create new alliances, and do or not agree with them, to support their regional influence.
- F. Penetration of societies at the popular level through economic and cultural, as well as social means and using political means and methods to maximize their influence. This includes shaping public opinion to carry hostility towards Israel.
- G. Searching for new allies and establishing close bonds with some of the political parties or forces in the region that are reliable and relying on them in one way or another to distribute roles in the context of confronting the threats of the coming period, especially those from the United States and Israel.

Political influence:

Iran possesses extensive political influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza to varying degrees. This represents a microcosm of its wider regional policy and some cases of influence can be viewed as an indicator of a separate bilateral relationship based on mutual beneficial interest. Iran's approach that consists in imposing influence begins with auxiliary economic investments as an entry point for social and cultural investments, the result of which are political investments to expand Iranian influence.

Iran has strong political relationships with the ruling and influential political forces in the political arena in Iraq, especially the Shiite forces, such as the Islamic Supreme Council, the Dawa Party and the Sadrist movement. It has an influential role in shaping political balances in Iraq in a way that ensures that Iran maintains influence on internal Iraqi affairs, including decision-making capacity. Its goal is to shape the strategy for Iraq, as adopted by Tehran or at least obtaining Tehran's approval.

Iran has an extensive influence on Syrian matters. We find that there is a strategic alliance with Iran that is based on intertwined and complementing interests and overcoming differences. Parties to this alliance regard each other as parties able to provide a complementary strategic depth to confront common threats. Iran used to see Syria as the front line where the defense of the Islamic nation would play out and a crossing to Lebanon and Palestine.

Iran also has political influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah, as well as to a lesser extent with some Christian, Sunni, Druze and secular currents that form the Lebanese

(102) **Islamic Radicalism:** "It means demanding basic freedoms and democracy based on religious leadership and radical parties in some countries are usually represented by the political and right-wing extremist wings or parties with an extremist religious view, whether they are Islamic, Christian, Jewish or Hindu."

opposition bloc. The policies of that block are affected by the policy of Hezbollah as the largest opposition force. Therefore, we find that the relationships with the Lebanese opposition goes beyond sectarian ties of the Shiites in Iran and Lebanon.

Iran also influences the Palestinian arena, with its relationships with Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, as well as the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, despite the Sunni-Shiite ideological differences. As the relationship here is governed by interests and mutual benefit, the common interest is focused on confronting American-Israeli hostility.

Military and security influence:

In Iranian politics, military and security influence represents a means to achieve goals that consist in building new regional alliances or reinforcing other existing ties to parties that share the same challenges and threats. Here the interest factor prevails over the ideology factor and the main entry point for the spread of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements outside Iranian lands in hot spots to determine influence.

Iranian military and security influence in Iraq has played an important role in threatening the American forces and forcing them to consider withdrawing from Iraq, as well as another role in igniting sectarian strife. Iran has official ties with the Iraqi government through several defense and security memoranda of understanding. It also supports the Shiite and Sunni militias with money, weapons, and training.

The Iranian / Syrian military relations are based on Iran's awareness of the strategic importance of its cooperation with Syria to confront common threats and the Syrian regime's need for Iranian support to confront its current crisis. Iran provides military support to Syria through the transfer of weapons and direct combat involvement on the part of the Revolutionary Guard Corps that is present in Syria.

Economic influence:

Economic factors represent one of the pillars for the expansion of Iranian influence in the region, in connection with its financial and oil reserves and economic capacity that cannot be underestimated. This is in addition to Iran's other motives to weaken the economic blockade imposed onto it and circumvent it by opening new commercial markets or indirect import through allies that would allow it to obtain access to products or technology that is prohibited to be exported to Iran.

The Iraqi economy depends heavily on Iranian imports and financial aid is provided for the Iraqi government and political parties, the amount of which is estimated at billions of

dollars. This comes in addition to other unknown imports that come through religious references and billions more covering illegal trade exchange, including smuggling. The Syrian economy is increasingly dependent on Iranian funding, support and joint projects with direct Iranian investments, in addition to providing unlimited and undeclared economic support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran also provides financial support to Hamas to support the alliance.[1]¹⁰³

Cultural and social influence:

Cultural and social ties between Iran and the Shiite communities in the region sometimes rise to the level of Iranian influence. The problem that worries Israel, the United States and even the Arab countries is that in the event of a war with Iran, they would use their military and security influence, among others in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. There are certain Shiite currents in all Arab countries that reject Iranian influence, some of them receive Iranian support, while some others reject it. In other cases links are limited to different religious references and Iran contributes greatly to the establishment of scientific and religious schools and social, cultural, and medical centers in the Shiite areas of the region, as the Shiite community has an influential presence in all Gulf countries.

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council believe that relations with Iran are related to specific issues, namely:

- A. Matters related to the sea and Gulf waters, as well as issues related to international corridors and freedom of navigation, along with struggling to end Iran's occupation of the UAE islands to achieve good neighborly relations with the GCC states.
- B. The need to differentiate between the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the security of navigation in the Gulf, given that Iran is a state overlooking the other side of the Gulf.
- C. Military imbalance in the region and Iran's trend towards building a nuclear military capability are among the most important reasons contributing to the potential of military conflicts erupting in the region. They also impact the pattern of armed struggle against the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that may take different courses according to the circumstances and complexities of the situation that may spark off conflict and escalate it into circles of various size.

(103) Defense magazine, *The Al-Ahram Al-Arabiya Foundation Building*, reference mentioned previously, p. 65.

Iranian / Saudi relations:

It seems that the Islamic Revolution in Iran constituted an obsession that contributed to tensions in the relationships of the Islamic Republic of Iran with most Arab countries, including the Gulf in particular.

- A. The curve of Saudi-Iranian political tension has not proceeded at a uniform pace since the dissolution of diplomatic relationships between the two countries at the beginning of 2016, which resulted from Iranian persistence in implementing its expansion plans in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Bahrain.
- B. The Iranian authorities talk about their efforts to resolve their differences with the Arab Gulf states, as the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman during March 1997, speaking of Iran's desire to work out their differences with the Arab Gulf states.
- C. Iranian moves are limited to words, not action nor execution, if its plans and movement of its militias towards the target countries are stopped and the security of the Arab Gulf is secured. This is what the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia rejects, as the Kingdom has become completely convinced that Iran has no real intention to stop its actions beyond mere words.
- D. Saudi Arabia's clear support for the Iraqi government in its war with Iran.
- E. The apparent Iranian fear of Saudi / American relations.
- F. Saudis fear the idea of exporting the revolution to Arab countries.
- G. The recent Iranian intervention in Iraq after the fall of the "Saddam Hussein" regime, as well as withdrawal of American forces to support and finance the Shiite movement at the expense of the Sunni community.
- H. Sending the Peninsula Shield forces to Bahrain to support the State of Bahrain in facing the unrest incited by the opposition in Bahrain, where Iran considered this intervention a clear threat to it and the factions loyal to it in Bahrain.

In Iraq, severe criticism incited by Iran has erupted towards the regional role that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia plays when it supports its political opponents, including its attempts to prevent its allies from controlling decision-making centers in Baghdad, especially after the legislative elections on March 7, 2020.

This criticism escalated when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received a large number of Iraqi delegations to discuss the crisis connected with forming the Iraqi government, including those of the Sadrist movement and the Islamic Supreme Council. ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Saudi / Iranian relations are currently marked by great tension, accompanied by the severance of diplomatic relations between them. After Saudi Arabia executed 47 people, including the Shiite opposition cleric Nimr al-Nimr, the Saudi embassy in Iran was attacked, which prompted Saudi Arabia to expel the Iranian ambassador from its lands. This may prompt many Gulf and Arab countries to follow suit and expel their ambassadors as well, while many observers confirm that the Arab world and Iran are on the brink of a Sectarian war.

The Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated, in an interview with Saudi TV on May 2, 2017, that Iran wants to control the Islamic world. In response to that Prince Muhammad bin Salman asked: 'How can an understanding with them be achieved? Iran's logic is that the expected Mahdi will come and they must prepare the fertile environment for his emergence by controlling the Islamic world'. He explained that "a major goal of the Iranian regime [is] to reach the Qibla of Muslims, and we will not wait until the battle comes to Saudi Arabia, but we will work so that the battle is taken to them in Iran". Moreover, Mohammed bin Salman pointed out that "Iranian extremist ideology prevents dialogue with Tehran".

Iranian / Qatari relations: ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

Qatar has taken a balanced approach in its relationships with Iran since the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution until today. Doha remained the Gulf capital with the closest ties to Tehran. Qatar achieved a balance between its relations with Iran and the requirements of membership of the Gulf Cooperation Council and their relations did not reach the level of tension that happened with some other Gulf countries. However there were some heated tensions at some points. Due to the Gulf bias of Iraq in its war with Iran, Doha was the first Gulf capital to break the boycott of Iran.

Qatar and Iran share North Field gas, which is the largest gas field in the world and Western companies provide Qatar with the technology that helps it freeze the extracted gas and convert it into exportable liquefied gas. It has prevented such technology from reaching Iran, preventing competition to Qatar's exploitation of its share of gas in the North Field due to the international sanctions imposed on it.

(104) Bakinam Al-Sharqawi, *The Iranian Approach to Asia, Possibilities and Challenges*, Middle East Papers, The National Center for Middle Eastern Studies, No. 36, Cairo, 2009, p. 190.

(105) Abd Rabbu Nassar, *Iranian National Security, and Relations with Arab Countries*, reference mentioned previously p. 26.

Iranian / Bahraini relations:

The Iranian-Bahraini relationships have a very special nature that stems from the historical background between the two countries and the nature of the sectarian formation of each of them, as about (65%) of the total population of Bahrain are adherents of the Shiite sect, which represents the prevailing sect in Iran.

The roots of Iranian interference in Bahrain's internal affairs⁽¹⁰⁶⁾:

- A. The relationship between Iran and Bahrain has colonial roots on the Iranian side, as Bahrain was subject to Persian rule for a number of years, during which a population of Shiites in Bahrain was formed, dating back to the days of the Carmatian state (899-1076), then the Ayyunid state (1076-1244). The Shiites of the region were embracing the Ismaili creed, then they gradually converted to the Twelver belief, so that for them Iran achieved the status of the mother state, which represents the Shiites in a vast ocean of countries. This is the expression used in the Shiite literature to describe the Sunnis and the Shiite community in Bahrain is strongly bound via social ties with Iranian Shiites, mainly through marriage to Iranian women.
- B. After the success of the Khomeini revolution, the situation in Bahrain was fully reversed and the Shiites went out in demonstrations in support of the new rule. Shiites sent popular delegations and their scholars to present their congratulations to the new rulers. Iran began to stage coup attempts to overthrow the Sunni rule in Bahrain since the beginning of the eighties.
- C. The issue in Bahrain has ancient roots and therefore it is necessary to address the historical factors to understand the motivations of Iran in its dealings with the Kingdom of Bahrain. Bahraini-Iranian relations date back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the Safavid state ruled Bahrain for intermittent periods starting from 1607 until the year 1783 and thus Iran still sees Bahrain as part of the empire of Iran. This view was continued until the year 1969, when the United Nations conducted a referendum for the Bahraini people, who voted for their independence from Iran, Britain ended its colonization of Bahrain and Bahrain declared its independence in August 1971.

(106) Khairallah Hussein Khairallah, *Iranian targets in the Arabian Gulf*, Dtaa Center, Kuwait, 2015, p. 24.

- D. Iran has a long history of plots aimed at undermining internal stability in the Kingdom of Bahrain. Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, Tehran's leaders have considered that its revolution embodies the aspirations of all Shiites in the entire Middle East. Therefore, Tehran's authorities have always sought to delegate the legitimacy of their regime. By promoting an ideology, Sunni Al Khalifa in the Kingdom of Bahrain aims to empower the Shiites to grow their influence and expand in the entire Middle East region.
- E. Throughout the eighties and nineties of the previous century, relationships between the two countries weathered some heavy storms, as Iran made multiple threats against the Kingdom of Bahrain since December 1981. At that time the so-called Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain tried to overthrow the regime in Manama and this group of Bahraini Shiites were trained by Iran.

At the same time, they were planning to attack the communications services network and the Kingdom of Bahrain International Airport, in addition to assassinating senior members of the ruling Al Khalifa family. During the chaos that was supposed to prevail in the Kingdom of Bahrain following the implementation of those sabotage operations and assassinations, Iran would implement the second plan and rush to send its army to establish a theocratic regime led by the mullahs on the same terms as the mullahs that are now ruling Iran. These plans failed.

- F. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Kingdom of Bahrain concluded security and military agreements with major powers (United States of America – Britain – France), according to which the headquarters of the American Fifth Fleet was located in the Kingdom of Bahrain, specifically in Mina Salman since 1995. This was perceived by Iran as a provocation, which spurred it to intensify efforts to execute their plot against the Kingdom of Bahrain. Iran began to train Bahraini Shiite fighters. In another, more dangerous step, Tehran authorities created a military wing for Hezbollah in Bahrain, which led the coup attempt in the kingdom in June 1996, but the Bahraini authorities at that time succeeded in thwarting that coup plot, as they preempted the conspirators and arrested dozens of suspects.

Bahrain's Hezbollah and its role in destabilizing the government in Bahrain: ⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

(107) Saad Muhammad bin Nami, *The New Iranian Role in the Gulf*, Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Kuwait, 2015, p. 31.

- A. In 1996 security services in Bahrain revealed the existence of a secret organization called Bahraini Hezbollah, which was the support of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, based in Tehran. Its purpose was to overthrow the rule of the Al Khalifa in Bahrain and it carried out several assassinations against some intelligence officers in Bahrain. Their activities included smuggling weapons into the country and plotting a coup, all made possible by the military training they received at the hands of Iranian soldiers in Tehran.
- B. The party carried out several sabotage operations in Bahrain, using weapons that were remnants of the Iraqi army, smuggled by the Lebanese Hezbollah, all in coordination with the Iranian intelligence. Efforts were made to smuggle weapons by sea directly to the Bahraini Hezbollah and Iran provided military training for Hezbollah members. The training included the use of weapons, explosives and self-defense, how to collect and communicate information, collect and secure confidential papers and how to forge them. as the Iranian intelligence supported and mobilized the elections to vote for the Shiite leaders loyal to it in the two seas.
- C. Hezbollah in Bahrain is the most active in the Gulf countries and works in all fields (military, political, and charitable). It even took advantage of the wave of Arab Spring revolutions that toppled some regimes, when it tried to incite a revolution in Bahrain to overthrow the rule of the Al Khalifa, backed by Iran financially, in the media and logistically. ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Iranian / Emirati Relations: ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

- A. Since the UAE achieved independence in 1971, Iranian-Emirati relations have enjoyed a steady pace in managing differences between the two countries, which served to exclude the possibility of any conflict arising between them. This was in addition to the reduction of Tehran's internal interference in Emirati affairs, in contrast to the nature of its relations with neighboring countries. This was all despite of Iran seizing control of the three Emirati islands a few days before the declaration of the UAE's independence from British protection.
- B. The UAE islands are important due to their strategic location in the Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Arabian Gulf, which allows them to exercise control over the

(108) Hisham Bashir, *the Growing Iranian Role in the Arab Region*, Arab Center for Research and Studies, Manama, 2014, p. 26.

(109) Randa Moussa, *Emirati-Iranian Relations*, Barq Center for Research and Studies, Cairo, 2017, p. 10.

Arabian Gulf, which is an important body of water and navigation corridor, in addition to its oil and mineral wealth. However the relationship between the two countries did not reach a rupture point nor any apparent collision, rather the path of relations between them followed the requirements of commercial economic interests. The matter of the islands constituted a controversial issue that was postponed for later.

- C. The policy of the UAE works towards neutrality in most of Iran's conflicts in the region. When the Iranian nuclear deal was announced between Tehran and the major powers, UAE was among the first countries to welcome the historic agreement to lift sanctions against Tehran and it even presented itself as an effective partner to Iran.
- D. Economic relationships and trade exchange are the reason for flexibility in dealings between the two countries, which gave great importance to preserving the friendship implicit in relations with Iran, given the support it provided to the Iranian economy.

Iranian / Egyptian Relations: ⁽¹¹⁰⁾

The Egyptian / Iranian relationships are among the most complex and intertwined. Egypt and Iran are two important countries in the Islamic world, with extensive history and rich civilization, they bear regional and international weight and they are the two regional poles that have a great influence on the developments of events and issues in the Middle East region.

Relationships between Egypt and Iran in the modern era have taken a bend, oscillating between tension at times and apathy at other times, and have not witnessed a major stage of stability.

Since 2011, many local factors have occurred that affected Iranian relationships. Some of these factors pertain to Iran, but most of these factors concern the development of the local Egyptian situation:

- A. The "25th January 2011 Revolution": Iran's position was clear and frank, as it welcomed the events of the revolution and expressed their positive stance from the beginning. It is clear that over the years Iran is seeking to improve relationships with Egypt and since it was unable to achieve this before the January 25 revolution, it welcomed the revolution and the coup against the Mubarak regime, hoping that a new regime would come and would enable it to improve mutual relationships.

(110) Dalal Mahmoud, *Egyptian-Iranian relations from the period 2011 and 2016*, Arab Democratic Center, 2016, p. 12.

- B. Rise of the current of political Islam in Egypt.
- C. The events of the 30th June Revolution in 2013: The Egyptian government believed that the relationship with Iran passes through the Arabian Gulf and that the security of Egypt is inseparable from the security of the Gulf. Gulf relations were supposed to be reflected here, meaning that any improvement in Iranian-Gulf relations will lead to an improvement in Egyptian-Iranian relations.

External factors affecting the Egyptian / Iranian relations since January 2011:

A. Arab Gulf security:

Because the security of the Gulf is an important matter for Egypt and one of the priorities of the Egyptian foreign policy, considering the developments of relationships between the two countries, it can be said that the issue of Gulf security for Egypt was one of the obstacles to improving relationships.

B. Syrian crisis:

Iran is trying to take advantage of all the capabilities and opportunities available to preserve the Syrian Ba'athist regime. Consequently, over the past years, it was part of the Syrian crisis, and without Iran's help, Bashar al-Assad could not have held to power until now.

C. Nuclear agreement with the major countries (5 + 1):

It can be said that the Iranian nuclear agreement is in line with the orientations of the Egyptian foreign policy, but so far there has been no improvement in relationships between the two countries. In this context, the issue of Arab Gulf security may represent an obstacle to the development of positive relationships. Beneficially, apart from that Egypt will not allow any forces to extend their influence over the Arab world and threaten its security and stability in cooperation with its Arab brothers. It also cannot isolate itself from its decision or ignore its repercussions on the national security that is related to the security of the Arab Gulf, the Red Sea and the Middle East.

- D. Looking at the relationships between the two countries since January 2011, we find that we have witnessed internal and external changes in Egyptian and Iranian bilateral reactions regarding these variables. However, there has been no development regarding the establishment of full Egyptian-Iranian diplomatic

relations, despite the occurrence of events that would support this., These included changing the regime in Egypt after the January 55 revolution. However, there are obstacles to establishing full diplomatic relations, such as Gulf security, the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese Hezbollah and others.

Iranian / Palestinian relations: ⁽¹¹¹⁾

Iranian / Palestinian relations witnessed a state of sympathy and solidarity, with a lot of volatility in the relationships between the different segments of Iranian society, since the beginning of the Iranian revolution until now. However, this situation escalated during the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement " Hamas " to power supported by Iran. Thus, the features of the Iranian movement on the Palestinian arena.

Relations between Iran and Hamas:

- A. Relations range from rapprochement to divergence, but they did not break or stop even when the leaders of Hamas, which were based in Damascus, took a stance against Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian conflict. The military wing of the movement and the relationships between Iran and Hamas are excellent and have returned to its previous era. Hamas is replacing its Arab incubator with close relations with Tehran, based on perpetuating the division and keeping away from interfering in any electoral process in the Gaza Strip. ⁽¹¹²⁾
- B. In the face of regional and international developments, the growing American position against Hamas, the emergence of the Qatar crisis and its support for terrorism, Hamas saw that Tehran's path is more compatible with their own than their Arab incubator. At the time, the incubator was working hard on internal reconciliation to restore cohesion between the two parts of Palestine, Gaza and the West Bank, while Iran was perpetuating division. They paid Hamas for not signing the reconciliation and supplied the brigades with weapons to ensure their absolute loyalty.
- C. The strong relationship between Iran and Hamas in Gaza reveals that the conflict in the region is a struggle for influence and survival that is dressed as a sectarian struggle, because Hamas believes that reconciliation is the beginning of the road to its end.

(111) Muhammad Abd Al-Salam, *Gray Issues*, Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 16.

(112) Khaled Al-Asma'i, *Hamas raises doubts about its relations with Iran*, Al-Ahram, Cairo, 2017, p. 5.

- D. Iran continues to support the Palestinian cause and support the steadfastness of the Palestinians as they are the front line of the resistance.

Iranian strategy raises a lot of controversy inside and outside the region due to the way it deals with the changes in this region, where strategies of the great powers intersect and which has not known stability since the times of nuclear strategic balance achieved between the United States and the former Soviet Union after the Second World War. Even today Iran, under its geostrategic position, population weight, imperial legacy and military power, has been an important factor to these variables, so it is necessary to shed some light on the Iranian strategy in this region in terms of its objectives, means of implementation and the most important results:

- A. Iran as a community with a united identity and power.
- B. Islam.
- C. Persia as a source of historical and national pride.

It is my belief that the Iranian leaders of all directions, whether they are Persian nationalists or Islamic conservatives, regardless of the difference in their positions and political views, share a unified vision of the nature of the security threats that threaten Iran and the measures that must be taken to protect ideological interests. This was the case during the time of the Shah and continued with the rule of the clerics, where Iran assumes that this dominant role is their natural right in the Gulf and in the whole Middle East. Arguments to support this include the fact that it is considered a large country in terms of population, with military strength and the oldest civilization, as well as on the grounds that it is a scientifically and technologically advanced country. The region that Iran aspires to extend its hegemony over reaches beyond the Gulf - it extends from Afghanistan, through to the Gulf and over the entire Middle East. Since Iran considers itself a dominant regional power, it expects to be consulted in all regional issues without exception. Hence, the strategic document entitled Iran 2025 came to confirm this trend in the Iranian strategy

This document outlined Iran's strategic position for the period between 2005-2025 and is considered the most important strategic document. It laid down a roadmap for the future dimension of the Iranian role in the region for the aforementioned period and that vision was based on achieving two main objectives. These were namely that Iran should be a growing power in the Middle East and for it to be an influential international power in all global issues. In order to achieve this, Iran has outlined the features that constitute the cornerstones of its strategic and military thinking, which is based on the need to confirm Iran's dominant regional role in the Gulf and beyond the Gulf, as well as the need to enhance Iran's capabilities to defend in the face of any military aggression. To achieve this, Iran's leaders seek to gain independence

and self-reliance in strategic and tactical terms, especially in the military fields. This is the source of their keenness to possess nuclear technology and perhaps the ability to possess nuclear weapons.

3.3. Consequences of Iran's role in the region and the effects of the Iranian nuclear programme for the Arab national security

Impact on Arab national security:

Security is an innate human need, therefore it has been the goal of all religions, beliefs and philosophies, remaining remained a basic requirement for all races and states throughout the ages. This is because it represents one of the basic pillars in the establishment and continuation of the state and societies. It is also a concept that includes multiple elements necessary for building the state, so that the absence of one of these elements incites a state to seek alternative and effective means to ensure its national security⁽¹¹³⁾.

In linguistic terms, security is the antithesis of fear and it means reassurance and the absence of the feeling of danger and coercion⁽¹¹⁴⁾, and the fulfilment of the conditions necessary for that feeling.

National security was and still is the issue that preoccupies nations and governments, regardless of the size of their power in the various fields. Providing security in proportion to its relevance is a hallmark of the success of a state's foreign policy and the ability of its specialized agencies to achieve the set goals on the premise that foreign political goals are determined according to security considerations.

The development of the concept of national security and its components at the Arab, regional and international levels, where the Gulf countries realized this development and their vision of national security, is not only limited to military capabilities to repel aggression or achieve a sense of security. This is also consistent and compatible with their actual need for security and what is in place in different countries of the world. The issue of securing one's country from the inside and protecting them from any external threats in a way that guarantees

(113) Micheal Dillon, *Politics of Security, Towards a political philosophy of continental thought*, London and New York, Routledge, 1st published, 2005, p.121.

(114) Izzat Abdel Wahid, *A theoretical consolidation of the constituents and policies of national security*, Al-Siyasa Al-Dawlia Journal, Issue (197), 2014, p. 32.

its peoples a stable life is what provides them with the reasons for the rise, growth and expression of their identity among the nations and the exercise of their freedom to exploit their human energies and their mineral and natural resources to reach the achievement of their goals of progress, prosperity and peace. In this sense it expanded their concept of security beyond the military aspect, which is based on a comprehensive strategic view that reflects the aspirations of their people to achieve national security in all its economic, social, political, cultural and military dimensions.

Absolute (complete) national security is an imaginary concept, considering that security is always incomplete (relative). This allows flexibility in strategic planning for security and attempts to improve security levels and expand its scope to the level of comprehensive Arab national security that secures all the activities of the state's political, diplomatic, economic and social forces. This includes military aspects, whether at the national, regional or global level, to protect against all threats and in light of the contemporary international circumstances and environment, national security in the economic field is considered the top of security priorities.¹¹⁵

National security is based on the following three circles:

A. First circle:

defining the different elements and levels of the concept of national security, which includes organization and practice.

B. Second circle:

defining the state's obligations to provide material and moral protection for the individual first and then for society.

C. Third circle:

defining relations within the framework of the national interests of the state.

The term Arab National Security is frequently repeated in Arab writings, but with different concepts and perceptions behind it and sometimes without real understanding or awareness of the meaning or content of this term. To understand this term, we must first disassemble it to know what it contains in terms of basic vocabulary and once we understand the meaning, actual contents and significance of each word separately, this may be

(115) Jihad Al-Tamah, *Arab National Security, Available Mechanisms and Means*, Al-Furat Center for Studies, Iraq, 2015, p. 124.

reconstructed again and joined together to understand the meaning and connotation of the term as a whole.

If we take a brief look at the term Arab national security, we will immediately discover that it consists of three keywords, namely security, nationalism, and Arabism.

A. Security:

In its most simplistic definitions, it is a concept that refers to a general feeling of reassurance, resulting from a belief in the ability to face all kinds of risks or threats and to control all the resources and mechanisms that are capable of facing these risks and threats. This is done either by relying on one's own resources and personal capabilities or on the resources and capabilities of others, allies and friends, and all those who wish to extend a helping hand. This means that in order to grasp the various dimensions of this concept, we have to define a set of elements:

- (1) Level of analysis and security discussed: In terms of the security of a person, the security of a family, the security of a tribe, a sect's security, a community's security, a ruling regime's security, a state's security, a nation's security ... etc.
- (2) Sources of security threats – are they internal or external sources and are they of a military, economic, social, cultural or intellectual nature ... etc.
- (3) The tools, means and mechanisms of achieving security and whether they depend on the means and capabilities that can be obtained locally or require entering into alliances or regional or international coalitions ... etc.

B. Nationalism:

It is a concept that refers to a feeling of belonging to a specific human group, linked by common ties that may be due to common ethnic origin, language and culture or common history and interests. This creates the feeling that the group has a special identity that distinguishes it from other people that share all or some of these features.

C. Arabism:

It is the intellectual, ideological or political current that believes that the Arab people – despite their dispersion, division and subordination to different states and political

authorities - belong to one nation and thus have the right to form their unified (national) state, because their future is one and their destiny is one.

It is clear from the foregoing that Arab national security is a term referring to the security of Arab people and the security of Arab countries as tools and not to the security of a specific Arab people or the security of a specific Arab state, or more precisely, it is a term that refers to everything that would allow to achieve the security of the Arab nation.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

The concept of Arab national security must take into account linking the concept to interests and their intertwining with states that affect and are affected by our national security, setting limits for Qatari sovereignty, determining criteria for the present and potential future dangers, considering how to transform Qatari forces into national capabilities and identifying the agencies that would handle political national security, as well as economic, social, cultural and scientific affairs.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

A comprehensive concept of Arab national security must take into account the following:⁽¹¹⁸⁾

- A. The concept is linked to the balance of interests and their intertwining with states that influence and are affected by their national security.
- B. Determining a link with Qatari security and determining what the next risk criteria would be.
- C. Identify the limits of national sovereignty within the concept of national security.
- D. Determining how to transform Qatari forces into national capabilities.
- E. Defining the bodies that would handle political national security, as well as economic, social, cultural and scientific affairs.

Arab national security is a definition and concept that includes the outcome of the national security of all Arab countries, as well as the interaction between security in that region and security in neighboring regions, where some of these elements are intertwined.

Arab national security is defined as the ability of the Arab nation to defend its security and rights, maintain its independence and sovereignty over its territory and develop Arab capabilities in various political, economic, cultural, and social fields based on their military and diplomatic capabilities. It also takes into account the national security needs of each country,

(116) Mustafa Othman Ismail, *Arab National Security*, Madbouly Library, 2009, p. 33.

(117) Hisham Mahmoud Al-Aqdahi, *National Security Challenges (Historical, Political)*, University Youth Foundation, Alexandria, 2010, p. 24.

(118) Mustafa Othman Ismail, *Arab National Security*, previous reference, p. 35.

the available capabilities and the internal, regional and international variables that influence the national interests of the state.

Requirements of Arab national security that the Arab regimes must meet by controlling their internal and external policies and their bilateral and multilateral relations, include:⁽¹¹⁹⁾

- A. to be integral and based on unity and cooperation.
- B. to be realistic in terms of deterrence and the extension of sovereignty to the Arab countries.
- C. to obtain the resources and tools necessary to achieve it.
- D. to uphold the values of Islamic and human civilization.

The most important requirements for achieving Arab national security are:

- A. Extent of availability and possession of the political will.
- B. Defining what national Arab interests are.
- C. Identifying the nature of the threats and challenges facing the Arab countries.
- D. Taking the decision whether there is a real enemy, an imaginary enemy or a potential third party.
- E. Formulating potential alliances to achieve Arab national security.
- F. Defining requirements and comparing them with what can be applied and achieved.
- G. Laying out a comprehensive map of the Arab national security theory.

There is no doubt that there are many positive and negative factors that must be taken into account when formulating a comprehensive map for Arab national security theory, including:

- A. The expansion of the Arab states and the number of 22 states.
- B. Countries in the geographical neighborhood and the multiplicity of their interests and their intersection in some cases.
- C. Taking into account the international and regional dimension that governs the actual presence on Arab land.
- D. Variation in the internal political situation of the Arab countries.
- E. Variation in the economic situation of the Arab countries concerned with the theory of national security.
- F. Different types of intra-Arab alliances and the extent of their negative or positive impact.
- G. Effect of agreements concluded by some Arab countries.

(119) Mahmoud Al-Mounir, *Arab National Security and Future Prospects*, Cairo, 2016, p. 5.

- H. Deep penetration to which Arab national security was exposed.
- I. Taking into consideration the sectarian dimension and its extensions, as well as the dialogue between the Sunnis, the movements and political currents and their effects on Arab national security.

Continued efforts by the Iranian regime to assume a regional position in the Middle East and to obtain support for the export of revolutionary thought and the Shiite tide are among the most prominent threats facing the Arab region in general and the Gulf states in particular at the current stage. Iran's relationship has been linked to extremist activity.

Since its revolution in 1979, which called for the export of Imam Khomeini's thought to all Arab and Islamic countries, as the Iranian Constitution provides for support and support for the vulnerable on Earth, efforts have been made to reinforce its relationships with many extremist organizations by providing material and moral support. This contributed to spreading Iran's ideas among some countries in the region, despite the differences in the politics of their regimes.

There is no doubt that the recent period has witnessed an escalation of Iranian trends and goals at the regional level, which may negatively affect the national security of the Arab region, especially with Tehran's success in employing regional and international conditions to serve their interests in the region, as well as their exploitation of the repercussions resulting from US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Another factor here is the stalemate in the settlement process of the Palestinian issue, as well as Iranian regional moves that exert much negative impact on Arab national security, the most prominent of which are the following:

- A. Tehran's continued support for Shiite elements loyal to it in the countries of the region, wishing to become a separate entity with a political role and to assume leadership positions in countries, as is happening in Iraq. The purpose behind this is not the emergence of a strong Iraqi state that might threaten its national security, as well as continuing its negative policy in Iraq to maintain instability there. This is done in order to retain many means of exerting pressure against the American will regarding its nuclear program, which translates into negative repercussions for Arab national security.
- B. Iran's endeavor to exclude Egypt from any security arrangements in the Gulf security system, given its weight in the region, which is secured by means of other parties withdrawing in this system and limiting it to the countries bordering the Gulf. This is especially true in the context of some Western countries hinting to Iran that they will not object to giving it a role Akbar in Gulf security in return for responding

positively to the demands of the international community regarding the nuclear issue. European incentives provided to Iran by the European Troika countries indicated that Iran would be given priority in any security arrangements in the region.

Iran's wanting to have nuclear weapons is the main goal for its position at the regional and international levels:

- A. The confidence and courage that gives it the ability to deal with Western powers, especially the United States of America, where it may invest in maintaining such a conflict with the major powers to support the Iranian regime's continued existence and justify its unity and cohesion.
- B. Providing alternative energy sources apart from oil, as well as allowing them to export this technology at a future stage to countries aspiring for the nuclear field.

Following negotiations on Iran's nuclear file, which lasted twelve years since the year 2004 and took the form of intermittent rounds, there is sometimes progress between the negotiating parties, and another Saddam, followed by postponement and disagreement over some files between Iran and the West, but an agreement was reached between the two parties (Iranian / Western) on the fourteenth. From July 2015, which Iran made many gains, including:

- A. Recognition of Iran as a nuclear power internationally.
- B. Release of the executives' bank balances.
- C. Limited acceptance of Iran's missile program.
- D. Lifting economic sanctions imposed on Iran, which opens the way for Western countries to pump investments to Iran.
- E. Removing it from the list of countries supporting terrorism, allowing it freedom of movement in the region after lifting sanctions and lifting the American and Western security umbrella from the region, supporting militant and terrorist groups and interfering in the affairs of the geographical neighborhood countries, especially the Arab Gulf states.
- F. By announcing the principles of the agreement on Iran's nuclear program between Tehran and Washington, its Western allies, Washington gave the Iranians a promise that they could integrate into the global system and be recognized as a rising power. The condition was for Teheran to abide by the existing international policy and move towards more openness in its foreign policy.

The implications of the American and Western recognition of Iranian nuclear power:

A. Threatening regional stability:

There is no doubt that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would affect the stability of the region from two angles:

- (1) Confirmation of the existing imbalance of power, as geopolitical facts indicate that the current Iranian power, should it wish to exercise its power, would have its path blocked neither to the north nor to the east. In the east there are the major Asian nuclear powers India, Pakistan and China while in the north there is Russia. Thus the potential for expansion available for Iran is in the west.
- (2) The potential for a military conflict between Iran and Israel, which would have implications for the region, especially since this alternative is not excluded, that may lead to an escalation of violence from Israel and the neighboring countries (Syria and Lebanon). The Arab Gulf states, based on the use of surface-to-surface missiles, see the possibility that the expected confrontation between Iran, Israel and the United States, its ally, would turn into a regional war, the consequences of which are many, including the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz. This would impede the flow of Gulf oil to Western countries and the United States, which would negatively affect the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that mainly depend on oil as an important source of national income. Alternatively, Iran may target US interests in the region, whether they are companies, factories or even individuals.

B. Difficulty in working out a common formula for Gulf security:

Iran's insistence on possessing nuclear weapons would impede the possibility of reaching a future security formula for Gulf security for several reasons:

- (1) The possibility of a nuclear race starting not only in the Gulf region, but also in the entire Arab region, where Arab countries would strive to enter the nuclear club. This was confirmed by the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, who said 'If Iran is armed with nuclear weapons, it will be like a nightmare for Middle Eastern countries that are already suffering from insecurity and instability'.
- (2) The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in their endeavor to establish a common security formula in the Gulf, must obtain binding international guarantees from the international community regarding cultural-building

measures with regional parties, including Iran. The first of these requirements is not to threaten the security of these countries, whether by possessing nuclear weapons or by other means.

- (3) Iran's possession of nuclear technology would undermine all the steps taken by the Gulf and Iranian parties to achieve good neighbor relationships, enhancing confidence and mutual benefits. This would lead to the creation of a security and regional system based on several foundations, the foremost of which would be the abandonment of force and the resolution of all outstanding issues through dialogue and negotiation.

Iran's possession of nuclear weapons represents a step back in relationships that are already tense as a result of Iran's insistence on occupying the three Emirati islands and considering the issue an internal Iranian matter despite it being one of the most important issues on the agenda of the annual Gulf summits.

C. Dangerous and direct environmental impacts of the Iranian nuclear program on the region:

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are most exposed to suffering direct damage as a result of innocent nuclear facilities, as the Bushehr reactor, which constitutes one of the most important facilities of the Iranian nuclear project. This facility is located 280 km from Kuwait City and the reactor mainly depends on technologies imported from Russia that do not include elements that would guarantee nuclear safety. In this context, the Gulf countries are exposed to danger if a leak occurs and there is certain historical evidence of such dangers, including the Chernobyl accident in 1986. On the other hand Iran, in its attempt to get rid of nuclear waste, may turn to the disposal of heavy water into the Gulf, which would create a pollution crisis for all countries in the region, resulting from the leakage of radioactive nuclear materials into the Gulf waters, the effects of which would last for decades.

D. Dilemma of the Gulf states in the event of a war due to the Iranian nuclear program:

This effect is one of the most important repercussions of Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, as all indications confirm that the United States will not back down from the use of force against any potential nuclear power that may threaten its interests in an area that is so important due to its oil reserves.

The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council will face a real dilemma when faced with the potential war against Iran. Whereas if the Gulf states had a definite interest in getting rid of the former Iraqi regime (Saddam Hussein's regime), regardless of whether some of them declared that openly while others did not, matters seem different when it concerns the Iranian case. It is difficult to predict the results of this action, whether it would be a preemptive strike or continuous military operations, as the six Gulf states will not be immune to the repercussions of such actions.

Implications of the signing the Iranian nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers on Arab national security:

- A. Iran and the major countries (5 + 1) signed an agreement to legalize the Iranian nuclear program on July 14, 2015, following American and Western guarantees that were imposed on Iran not to develop Iranian nuclear capabilities, which represents a dangerous variable in the region. The Arab countries and especially the Gulf states, as the beneficiary of this agreement, is the Iranian side, which has been officially recognized as having nuclear capabilities that can be used militarily. Therefore, the Iranian nuclear program will remain one of the most important threats facing Arab countries in general and the Arab Gulf states in particular, placing Arab countries in a state of exposure and threatening Arab national security, at the same time distorting the strategic balance in the region.
- B. The Iranian threat is considered a permanent threat to the nature of the root and historical differences between Arabs and Persians., Despite the recent Geneva Agreement signed between Iran and the major powers (5 + 1) which, on the face of it, limits Iran's nuclear capabilities, constant caution must be maintained. Iran continues, with its Persian inclination, to pursue its nuclear orientations, its encouragement of religious extremism and its incitement of Shiite groups against governments, which represent a constant threat to the security of the region. It poses a direct threat due to the geographical and geopolitical situation of Iran in the region, in the context of its huge military potential and full readiness to use it if circumstances require it. The Gulf region and its continued control over the three Emirati tractions and its support for armed groups in Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.

- C. The Iranian nuclear program, although it is peaceful on its face, may lead to the imposition of hegemony over the Gulf states, as Iran seeks to claim a distinguished regional role.
- D. Iran is seeking regional expansion by building a circle around it. When plotted against a map, Iranian moves indicate that the countries that have been impacted share something that is an ideological interest to Iran, namely the presence of a Shiite population, such as Yemen and Bahrain. It might also be about the presence of Shiite pressure centers, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen or influential Shiite governmental elements, such as Alawites in Syria, in addition to the Shiite presence in Iraq.
- E. The main goal that the Iranian regime seeks to achieve lies in fulfilling the dream of regional leadership and participating in managing the world's affairs by working to find arms in the region's joints and power centers, as well as using Shiite minorities and the nuclear deterrence policy to limit the capacity of Arab and foreign forces in the region. These forces aim to achieve the great Shiite Islamic project.
- F. Iran seeks to export the Islamic Iranian revolution in various ways to the countries of its geographical neighborhood in the Arab Gulf region, exploiting the Shiite minorities present in the Gulf countries to achieve this by stirring up unrest and exporting terrorism to sow internal tension and destabilize the ruling systems in the Gulf countries. This is to be achieved by spreading the spirit of discord Sectarianism and racism in the Gulf society, all of which affects the security of the Arab Gulf region.
- G. Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities threaten vital installations in the Gulf countries due to their ability to reach all such targets. This negatively affects the security of the countries of the region as a whole, imposing the requirement to secure vital targets in the region and preparing to respond and confront missiles after they are launched towards Arab targets or destroy their remote bases before they are launched. Moreover, the nuclear program has multiple negative effects in the field of the balance of power in the region, such as increasing spending to acquire equivalent weapons (arms race) and preparing the countries of the region to withstand nuclear strikes in addition to the presence of chemical or biological weapons in Iran, which affects the balance and outweighs the possibility of Iranian aggression on neighboring countries.

- H. The presence of a Shehab 3 missile, which has a range of 1300 km and can reach the heart of Israel directly, threatens to ignite the region and Iran is currently conducting final tests on Shehab 4 missiles, with a range of up to 2000 km.
- I. Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would make it assume an international status, just like Pakistan and India.
- J. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Arab region creates a race and competition to obtain it, invoking the use of nuclear technology primarily in the peaceful field (power generation) as a way to achieve deterrence.
- K. Iran's future aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons may increase the bearing and influence of Iran on the tools of the movement loyal to it within the various tracks of the peace process in the Middle East. This is represented by the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Syrian regime, as well as the Houthi intervention in the current Yemeni crisis and the current negotiations on power-sharing, which affects the role that the countries of the Arab region play in bringing about the peace process there.
- L. The chances for recovering balanced relations between the countries of the Arab region and Iran on an equal basis, especially with the difference in the balance of power tipping in favor of Iran and Iran's resulting failure to respond to the demands of the legitimate countries of the region to re-establish these relations, such as freeing the Arab region of nuclear weapons and not threatening or interfering with internal affairs.
- M. The possibility of Iran resorting to exploiting its nuclear technology to extort Arab countries and impose more control on them and the waters of the Arabian Gulf, especially with the possibility of a decline in US military support and support for these countries.

The Iranian nuclear agreement with the major powers (5 + 1) is part of a new US strategy to deal with Iran, which focuses on the inevitability of an alliance with Iran and the Shiite organizations loyal to it in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen in the face of terrorist organizations with Sunni affiliations. An element of this is the withdrawal of the United States of America from the region and his refusal to return things to the previous status.

Lifting sanctions on Iran and releasing its assets will allow Tehran to spend more money on terrorism, as lifting sanctions will make the sources of financing its terrorist activities more concentrated, especially with the presence of more than one open front that Iran may exploit ferociously to expand in the region.

The impact of the growing Iranian role on the unity of the Arab ranks:

- A. The Iranian nuclear agreement between Iran and the major powers has contributed to giving greater freedom to Iranian moves in the region in light of its recognition as a nuclear power by the major powers, which puts pressure on Arab national security to address these Iranian moves.
- B. The growing Iranian role will weaken any role the Arab League has to play in intervening to try to converge views between countries on some Arab issues, especially concerning developments in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. This limits the drive of Arab region countries to increase the role of the Arab League in general. Especially since Iran is successful in attracting members from within the League, which reduces the ability of the Secretary-General to restore the status of the Arab League in the future.

The growing regional Iranian influence gives rise to many negative repercussions on Arab national security, in addition to being a diminution of the Arab role, especially considering the direction of the major powers. This includes especially the United States of America pursuing a policy of dialogue with Tehran as one of the active powers in the region and a major party in resolving some issues. Vital Arabic, which requires the necessity of effective action in the field of containing Iranian aspirations and goals.

Iran's success in overcoming international pressure and imposing a new reality will lead to more threats to Arab national security, as follows:

The possibility of Iran resorting to its possession of nuclear weapons and using it to blackmail the Gulf countries and impose more control over them and the waters of the Arabian Gulf, especially with the possibility of a decline in US military support and support for these countries.

Marginalizing the Arab role in rebuilding the Iraqi regime once again and stopping the Shiite tide and the Khomeinist revolution in the Middle East in general, as well as in the Arab region in particular, which represents a major threat to Arab national security.

The limited opportunities for solving the problem of the Emirati islands occupied by Iran (Abu Musa - Greater Tunb - Lesser Tunb) will decline even further, while not ruling out Iran's tendency to expand its maritime spheres of influence in the Gulf, especially around the Strait of Hormuz, which may lead to the marginalization of the Arab role in this region in general.

The existence of two nuclear states (Iran - Israel) that directly impact the security of the Arab region affects the weight of the Arab position regionally and internationally, which may

have negative effects on internal stability, especially with the Arab people not accepting this situation.

The possibility of Tehran activating its foreign policy with non-Arab Islamic countries (Pakistan as the second Islamic country to possess nuclear weapons, right after Turkey) This negatively affects the shape of Arab foreign policy towards those countries.

Iran's regional and international influence has increased in the region, as it represents the policeman of the Gulf region. This is similar to the situation during the era of the former Shah of Iran, but a greater role is played here at the expense of the Arab role, especially with the international actors taking into account the Iranian bearing and influence in any future security arrangements.

Reflection of the growing Iranian role on the unity of the Arab ranks.

In the same context, the growing regional role of Iran has negative effects on Arab's unity, which can be explained as follows:

- A. The Iranian regime's refusal to establish any Arab grouping or alliance related to issues affecting its national security without taking a prominent role in it for itself and its success in thwarting the group of countries of the Damascus Declaration, which was formed after 1992; this also includes addition of both Egypt and Syria to the Gulf states.
- B. Weakening any role to be played by the Arab League in intervening to try to bridge the gap between the views that individual countries have on some Arab issues, especially concerning developments in the situation in Iraq and Lebanon, which limits the orientations of the Arab region's countries to activate the role of the Arab League in general. This is especially true since Iran's success in attracting members from within the League reduces the ability of the Secretary-General to restore the status of the Arab League in the future.
- C. Iran's success in signing many agreements with some Arab countries, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and the Emirates may contribute to obstructing any Arab efforts that might be made to try to take specific positions against the cyber trends seeking to possess a nuclear weapon in the future. This is especially true with the state's tendency to secure its national security according to its own perspective.

Positive influences on Iranian policy in the Middle East:

Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency by opening its nuclear facilities to the periodic inspections carried out by the agency is one of the most positive effects exerted on the executive policy so far. It included signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in addition to the Additional Protocol attached to the Treaty. This imposes the requirement not to seek to possess nuclear weapons, to allow international inspectors to inspect its nuclear facilities without advance notice, to disclose uranium enrichment programs and to present a list of its nuclear imports. With signing this agreement, Iran is seeking to obtain cover for obtaining peaceful nuclear technology under the umbrella of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Options for disciplining the Iranian nuclear policy:

Some of the results that will be obtained through nuclear capabilities can be summarized in the following points:

- a. The nuclear deterrent will provide Iran with the ability to compete with other regional powers, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, whose conventional and unconventional military capabilities are growing significantly. After this it will remove the great burden of sanctions from the shoulders of the Iranian economy. Continuation of the race in the conventional arms sector, especially with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
- b. The nuclear deterrent provides Iran with a high degree of security, in a way that makes it easy for Iran to expand to the west, which is the easy way for Iran, as it is surrounded by nuclear powers from other sides.
- c. The announcement of Iran's possession of a nuclear deterrent capability would create a new climate in which a war would be destructive and dangerous and could not be tolerated, thus putting an end to US or Israeli influence and extremism in the region.

The possibility of striking a balance with the nuclear powers in the region

Iran has its objective reasons for seeking to build a deterrent capacity represented by nuclear weapons, namely to preserve its revolutionary project and its conservative ideology and even making that a reason for its regional rise to power, although some believe that the issue of the Iranian nuclear program may move towards.

Bargaining with the United States of America, in pursuit of a regional role to be recognized by the West and the issue of timing in highlighting the nuclear project, is an impulse for the Iranians to proceed with their project. This is done in the context of the United States of

America is going through a state of strategic dizziness resulting from its mistakes in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon.

Another factor here is support provided in Somalia to of the Ethiopian government against the Sharia courts, which pushed the cyber policy towards exploiting these loopholes in pursuit of the Iranian nuclear program and achieving the maximum possible balance with the nuclear powers in the region, represented in Israel.

The most important pending problems between the two countries can be summarized as being confined to two battles:

- (1) Battle for possession of power: the attempt to prevent Iran from any possibility that might lead to the development of its military, especially nuclear, capabilities.
- (2) Battle of knowledge: represented by teaching Iran according to the belief prevalent among some countries, political currents and various developing countries that possessing knowledge and controlling development mechanisms is conditional on their dependence on the West and only possible within narrow limits.

Negative effects of Iranian policy: the potential Iranian threat to the security of the Arab region:

- A. The problem at the current stage is that the Iranian threat - from the point of view of major Arab countries - this time is not merely a threat to the interests or security of states in the easily perceivable sense, but rather it has become a reality. Iran, according to certain estimates, is taking over Iraq and supports its influence in some Arab countries, such as Lebanon, based on political forces linked to it and penetrates strongly into internal Palestinian affairs. They consider their ability to annoy its neighboring countries internally as a strength and seek to possess nuclear weapons that would be of concern to the countries of the region. Iran also presents itself as a great regional power that has a perception regarding the state of the territory that may be negotiated with the United States of America.
- B. Whoever follows the events of the region shall find that there are grounds for all of that, as there is specific information about

The extent to which Iranian influences have reached inside Iraq and other perceptions regarding the rush to reinforcing strategic relations between Syria and Iran, as well as Iran's development of Hezbollah's capabilities in Lebanon and the establishment of relations with forces inside Yemen., Apart from this, the issue of the Iranian nuclear program appeared as if

an international crisis would be unfolding in the arena of the Middle East. This is in the context of meetings and contacts related to its administrations taking place between Iran and various Western parties and it seemed that the roles of Russia and China in dealing with it were more influential than the roles of the region's parties. The frameworks developed for solving this were based on calculations related to the interests of major countries and only labelled "international security". It also seemed that the parties of the region, at the same time, are apparently not interested in what is going on and that they do not have connections or "formulas" based on their assessments of the impact of this issue on the security of the region.

Direct threats to the security of the Arab Gulf states:

There is no doubt that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons would affect the stability of the Gulf region from two angles:

- A. First: Consolidating the existing imbalance of power, as the geopolitical facts indicate that the current Iranian power, if it were to move, its path would not be north or the east, as in the east there are the major Asian nuclear powers India, Pakistan, and China, and in the north there is Russia. Hence the potential expansion available to Iran is in the west.
- B. Second: the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and the parties concerned with the nuclear issue, bearing implications for the region.

Possible nuclear blackmail policy for Arab countries

- A. A potential policy of blackmail is represented in the political statements accompanying Iran's nuclear activities, which do not include any indication that what has been accomplished in Iran is a civilian nuclear program related to the mere production of electricity. There is a tumultuous state of political propaganda regarding Iran's transformation into a major nuclear power, represented by processes of enrichment and an unconventional rush towards a declared desire to exercise the role of a so-called 'regional superpower' that works to confront the evil forces in the world, while correcting historical errors, standing in the face of tyranny and trying to push the United States of America to recognize Iran in that capacity.
- B. This policy of blackmail did not stop with the issue of political statements, but rather pursued actual practices in the territory of the region, represented by a continuous series of military maneuvers, testing missile weapons and severe

interference in the internal affairs of some Arab countries without coordination with other parties or taking into account their interests. In addition to direct action inside Iraq and Syria, which is where Arab concerns about Iran's nuclear capabilities stem from, this moved beyond being a defensive threat to being a threat to political stability within states.

Worst case scenario for Arab countries:

There is a real concern among many people. The dangers of Iran's possession of nuclear weapons are numerous, including those for Arab governments, given that the matter is related to the strategic balance at the level of the Arab region in general, and the Gulf region in particular. Should Iran have nuclear weapons, it would confirm that the Arabs alone do not possess these weapons. And that they are now exposed to nuclear threats, not a single nuclear threat, since there is inequality for some between the dangers of a nuclear Israel and a nuclear Iran, without Arabs possessing the same weapons, which makes and in front of regional control.

The potential for an American / Iranian war in the region

A. Direct targeting of the security of the Arab Gulf states:

- (1) Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon represents the other side of the coin to the aspirations of the Iranians for a major role in this region, but rather to the fact that the nuclear armament of any country in the world is associated with an imbalance of power and a revival of the phenomenon of terrorism.
- (2) Iran's possession of nuclear capabilities in the military field causes anxiety and instability in this region, despite all the kind media messages that Tehran is keen to send to the capitals of the countries of this region, intensified the higher the level of mutual challenges between it and the United States of America.
- (3) When Arabs in general and the people of the Gulf in particular hear about threats and threatening statements from some Iranian religious and political leadership, they have every right to be tempted and worried about the possibility of Iran possessing nuclear weapons. They have every right to feel that they are threatened by the massive investments in their countries, their economic prosperity and also their security, independence, and stability.

B. The threat of strategic objectives in the Arab Gulf region:

We have to define the strategic objectives in the Gulf region that can be confined to the main cities, airports, desalination plants and transportation routes, as well as population centers and dams. Then this has to be compared to Iran's missile capabilities, where we

will find out that all of these targets fall within the range of these missiles and thus Iran has become able to threaten any of these targets and hit them seriously.

C. Targeting oil fields in the Gulf region:

The other strategic objective are the oil fields or oil carriers and tankers, while what distinguishes this goal from other strategic goals is that their impact on the global economy is greater. Targeting these can change the course of affairs in the regional and international arena and it may incite other countries to interfere in the conflict and complicate matters even further, leading to the development of the crisis and changing the situation from regional to global. This would make it a global war, which is what Iran is seeking and even betting on.

Indirect targeting of the Arab Gulf states:

A. Targeting American bases in the Gulf region:

Iran is much more than a potential nuclear power. It is a country with a wide production base and a history of concealing its activities, dating back to the days of the Shah. Even if the United States of America were able to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program for some time, it would require a repeated bombing plan to completely disrupt the Iranian effort. It is much easier to conceal biological weapons programs than nuclear weapons programs and Iran can respond with a counter-bombardment of the interests of the United States of America and its allies in the Gulf.

B. Targeting waterways in the Gulf region:

The targeting of waterways in the Gulf region is one of the most prominent cards that Iran possesses should their nuclear facilities be targeted. This is possible through its control over the Strait of Hormuz, which is called the international shipping hotspot, as it is one of the most important international sea lanes for oil tankers and the effect of that on the international economy and the rise in oil prices to unpredictable levels, as well as impact on navigation.

Environmental influences on the lifestyle of peoples in the Gulf region:

The spread of nuclear capabilities has led to the emergence of environmental impacts, such as those resulting from poorly designed or poorly managed power plants and the problem of the disposal of nuclear waste in a manner that posed problems. This also includes problems with smuggling materials related to nuclear accidents or nuclear pollution or its seizure and trafficking in nuclear weapons. This is all in addition to the possible repercussions of political

or regional instability across the world caused by international and internal armed conflicts in connection with the prejudice to nuclear facilities.

Potential Problems of Nuclear Accidents:

The proliferation of nuclear capabilities leads to the emergence of risks that go beyond the risk of acquiring nuclear weapons and present additional dimensions that can be identified as follows:

A. Political risks:

Related to the political tensions and pressures that may lead to the state of concern about the possibility of countries possessing nuclear capabilities towards the production of nuclear weapons.

B. Military risks:

Related to the nature of nuclear facilities as vital targets, which may pose serious possibilities for attacking nuclear reactors in case of war or acute tensions.

C. Environmental Risks:

Related to a set of problems that could result from the proliferation of nuclear installations in a particular area, such as leakage of nuclear radiation from reactors and facilities, or publicly or secretly burying nuclear waste or transporting it in unsafe conditions.

Waste and water problems in the Gulf region:

A. Fish wealth:

There is no doubt that the Gulf countries are primarily oil-producing, but fishing is a great source of livelihood for their individuals, especially those who live in coastal areas, in addition to the fact that there are companies that carry out such work, and all the Gulf Arab states believe that they must protect and preserve the fish wealth.

B. Navigation traffic:

The Arabian Gulf is one of the most famous waterways in the world, and any disruption to the navigation movement in it affects the global economy, and due to this position, the Gulf countries give it most of their attention and even consider it a national goal that must be preserved, and in the event of any nuclear pollution, maritime navigation in it will stop.

C. The beaches of cities bordering the western coast of the Gulf:

These beaches are not far from the Iranian nuclear reactors, but some are closer to the Bushehr reactor than Tehran itself, and this increases the concern of the Gulf states and their fears that any pollution of the Gulf waters will lead to the lives of the residents of these coastal cities.

D. Desalination plants:

All Arab Gulf states are among the world's poorest water countries, and therefore they depend on the desalination of seawater greatly. Polluting seawater means paralyzing this energy and afflicting its countries with a water disaster.

E. Public life:

There is no doubt that the nuclear leakage will be transmitted through the winds, depending on its speed and direction, which makes its effects not limited to seawater, but will have other effects on humans from death to congenital deformities, and other bad effects.

CONCLUSION

Iran sees itself as an influential regional power with its responsibilities towards maintaining security and stability in the Gulf region, as well as having a role in assisting the Islamic liberation movements at the world level and the need to confront the foreign presence in the region and also to confront the threats surrounding it. It must also be involved in security arrangements not only in the region but in the entire world.

Iran is a pivotal country due to its own capabilities, the most important of which is its geographical location and its growing military and economic capabilities, which is what it relies on in playing a leading role in the region (the Gulf policeman) in order to maintain security and stability in accordance with its interests and goals.

The main directions of Iranian foreign policy:

- A. Develop a long-term plan for Iran's national security.
- B. Expand the scope of the specific role of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- C. Creating areas of Iranian foreign policy.
- D. Establishing balanced relations with global markets.

Iranian interests and goals in the Arab region, according to the Iranian national security concept, focus on the following:

- a) Protect and secure the Iranian regime.

- b) Strengthening Iran's regional position and involving it in managing the affairs of the region.
- c) achieve prosperity economy and comprehensive development.
- d) Possessing the capabilities of defending Iran and securing its interests.

Iranian strategic goals:

- a) political goal:
Strengthening Iran's position within its regional framework and export the Iranian state model to the countries of the region Especially the Arab Gulf region and Central Asia.
- b) economic goal:
Strengthening the economic capacity Iran and the development of its technological capabilities to ensure the support and cohesion of the home front and to maximize its comprehensive capabilities.
- c) Security target and the military:
Needs to achieve national security goals. Iran possess conventional and super traditional military power to establish an Iranian security regime in the Arab region in accordance with its interests and objectives.
- d) Iran's nuclear target to obtain nuclear technology and possessing nuclear capabilities as a main goal for it, even if it was apparently peaceful after the July 14, 2015 nuclear agreement or after its cancellation.
- e) Targeting attracting Shiites in the Arab region and establishing a large state on a Shiite basis with the aim of forming a strong Shiite bloc in the long run.

Pillars of Iranian National Strategy

The Shiite religious dimension - the mixture of religion and security - Iran's dominance of the Persian Gulf - the international dimension of Iranian security - the integrity of its borders, interests, and religious and cultural values - the necessity for the availability of elements of the regional security project - economic security).

Iran's foreign policy goals at the regional level.

- a) Preserving the national independence of the state and protecting Iran's national security
- b) Continuing the policy of exporting the revolution

- c) Focus on spreading the Shiite sect within the Arab and Islamic countries aimed at strengthening its regional standing by owning leverage tools - the focus on operations Building trust With Countries Gulf
- d) direction to me deal with priorities the economical During stage current in Shade the problems that the Iranian economy suffers.

Iran aims to block The Gulf region to weaken it through the fragmentation of the military and economic capabilities of Iraq through the Iranian contribution to the occupation of Iraq by the United States of America made it easier for Iran to move forward. By achieving its expansionist ambitions after the removal of Iraq as a regional power and the emergence of Iran as a regional power. The region and the occupation of Iraq created a new regional crisis for the region and made a glitch in the balance of power in the region.

Impose Iran itself as one of the main actors in the region and even uniquely the role of the main player in many hotbeds of conflict, through a tight expansion strategy based on controlling the centers and locations of regional powers to serve their interests and achieve their major goals, and Yemen is the most important and newer Theaters of Iranian influence Controversial, and subject to objection and reservation by regional powers during the last period, against the background of Tehran's entry and tangible weight on the line of the Yemeni crisis by supporting the Houthi rebellion.

Iran's mechanisms to achieve its interests and objectives in the Arab Gulf region

Seeking Iran to achieve its interests and objectives in the Arab Gulf region through several mechanisms, namely:

- a) The location and the nature of the land.
- b) Population and its diversity.
- c) Economic capacity, industrial base and abundance of arable land.
- d) Availability of human cadres.
- e) Oil and natural gas.
- f) The cultural, civilizational, and cultural courses.
- g) Iranian political and diplomatic courses.
- h) Iranian oil policy: It uses it to offer temptations to the West and the United States.
- i) The use of religious belief and Shiite hotbeds according to their interests.
- j) The use of Iran's military mechanisms of (Deterrence Policy - Military Alliance Policy)

Turkish / Iranian relations are characterized by competition and cooperation at the same time, sometimes cooperation is apparent. And competition is tacit. On the other hand, competition is apparent and cooperation is tacit, and it is clear that the base of common interests that govern Turkish/Iranian relations has begun to advance again. After it receded due to the impact of the Syrian crisis, as each party is keen on some kind of balance in its regional and international policies to invest it in the best way, and it will not be affected much. On the Syrian crisis, the size of the interests and vital issues that link between them.

The Iranian / Iraqi relations were associated with patterns of cooperation that helped them because Iraq after 1990 did not pose a Serious threat. Iran, the siege that took place in Iraq was influence. However, this bilateral relationship continued to be in crisis, and the cooperation between Iraq and Iran was not able to cancel the outcomes of a long historical experience characterized by the reality of mutual distrust and fear between the two countries and the sharp contradiction in their interests, each of which continued to see the other within. Or explicitly the main reason behind his problems and the main source of his threat.

For Iranian / Saudi relations (it seems that the Islamic revolution in Iran was an obsession. Contributed to the tension of Iran's relations with most Arab countries, including the Gulf in particular, and Saudi Arabia had a share of those tensions, due to the clear Saudi support for the Iraqi government in its war with Iran

- a) the clear Iranian fear of Saudi / American relations
- b) Saudi fear of the idea of Exporting the revolution to Arab countries
- c) Iranian intervention in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, and the withdrawal of US forces to support and finance the Shiite movement at the expense of the Sunni sect
- d) Sending Peninsula Shield forces to Bahrain in mid-2012
- e) severing diplomatic relations between them, especially.

After Saudi Arabia executed 47 people. Among them is the Shiite opposition cleric "Nimr al-Nimr", which is on the following lines that was exposed to the Saudi embassy in Iran, which prompted Saudi Arabia to expel the Iranian ambassador from its territory).

Hezbollah has many strengths for Iran, which are represented in (there is a great influence on the part of Iran on Hezbollah, which it sponsors in Lebanon - the close ideological link between the party and the current ruling elite in Iran - it is clear from the developments of the Iranian nuclear file that Tehran chose confrontation through fronts external, starting with Iraq and all the way to Lebanon).

Reflects the rapprochement between Iran and Hamas according to the Iranian vision, the first of the indications is (Iran sees the alliance with Hamas as a new card by virtue of the common Islamic trends on the one hand, and the common position on the American role in the region – the clarity of Iranian coordination with Hamas to a high degree – Iran’s assertion of support for Hamas so that it can confront Israel, America and Europe).

The reflection of the Iranian regional role on countries Region:

Attempting to build a regional bloc or alliance with a far political and economic dimension about the Arab system – Fill in the blank strategy in Iraq after the American withdrawal – Leading the regional system of the Arab Gulf with its security, political and economic arrangements without Egyptian participation – Establishing centers for Shiite gatherings – Attracting some Arab parties – Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz – Iranian aspirations to establish a major Shiite state in the region.

There is no doubt that Iran’s continued support for terrorism and extremism in the region represents one of the most important threats to Arab national security, which can be reviewed in (Tehran continues to support extremist groups in the Gulf region in order not to provoke the governments of the countries of the region against them - their retention of some leaders of al-Qaeda elements on their soil after their escape from Afghanistan in favor of that it will target American and British interests in the region - the presence of some contacts with Islamic groups in some countries in the region).

Negative Effects of Iranian Policy in Arab region:

(Prospects of the Iranian threat to the security of the Arab region – direct threats to the security of the Arab Gulf states - the potential policy of nuclear blackmail for Arab countries – possibilities outbreak war American/Iranian in the region – Direct targeting of the security of the Arab Gulf states "Threat of strategic objectives and oil fields in the Gulf region – targeting not direct for countries Arabian Gulf" It will target US bases and waterways in the Gulf region” – Environmental impacts on the lifestyle of peoples in the Gulf region – Potential problems of nuclear accidents – Waste problems and water in a Gulf area).

The gains achieved by Iran from the nuclear agreement with the major powers:

Recognize it as a force nuclear weapons, lifting economic sanctions, obtaining foreign investments, releasing their bank balances, in addition to removing them from the list of countries supporting terrorism

The repercussions of the American and Western recognition of Iran's nuclear power on the Persian Gulf region:

- A. Threatening regional stability in the Gulf region.
- B. The difficulty of reaching a common formula for Gulf security.
- C. The serious and direct environmental effects of the Iranian nuclear program on the region.
- D. Gulf states get into trouble in the event of a war over the Iranian nuclear file.

The impact of the growing Iranian role in the Arab region:

- A. Expose the Arab countries to a state of exposure as a result of raising the American security umbrella.
- B. A permanent threat due to the radical dispute between the Arabs and the Persians, and a real threat due to the capabilities of Iranian missiles to reach the important Gulf installations in the region.
- C. It allows Iran the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of Arab countries from a standpoint of force.
- D. It gives Iran the possibility of more regional expansion in the Arab countries such as (Syria – Iraq – Yemen – Lebanon).
- E. It will help Iran to export terrorism to sow internal tension and destabilize the regimes in the Gulf states by spreading the spirit of sectarian and racist strife in the Gulf society, all of which affects the security of the Arab Gulf region and the Arab national security as a whole.
- F. Influencing the field of balance of power and entering the region into an arms race

The problem of the current stage is that the Iranian threat is not just a threat to the interests or security of states in the understandable sense but has become a reality. Iran, according to the facts, is taking over Iraq and supporting its influence in some Arab countries such as Syria and Lebanon, based on political forces linked to it and penetrating strongly in the Palestinian issue. It considers its ability to annoy its neighbors internally as a card of power and seeks to acquire nuclear weapons of concern to the countries of the region, and it presents itself as a regional superpower that has a vision of the state of the region that can be negotiated with the United States of America.

Iran's goals in the Middle East represent a real danger to the Arab national security as a whole because it affects all Arab countries without exception and in all fields, the most

important of which is the military, economic and ideological field, which requires Arab countries' attention to those Iranian goals and mobilization of efforts to confront this Iranian tide.

The danger of Iran will not only stop by announcing the suspension of its nuclear program, but the intentions of the Iranian regime must be cleared for this purpose, otherwise the Iranian nuclear concern for the Gulf and Arab countries will remain for a long time.

The prominent regional position of Iran, in addition to the geographical proximity to the Arab region and the sharing of its borders and its nuclear file, which has become the talk of the hour. Since the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been seeking to achieve its influence and influence in the Middle East region and spread its ideology, and its endeavor to exercise a prominent regional role in the Middle East through its positions on the revolutions He played a leading role in regional crises and deterred the security threats that the region witnessed. Iran has influenced the Middle East by preparing the Iranian project to export its revolution and Iranian strategies.

CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SAUDI NATIONAL SECURITY

General

The Middle East region witnessed another set of regional variables, which were also characterized by the same features in terms of the speed, intensity and accumulation of their interactions. These may be more severe and more influential on the entire region, as the division of Sudan, the repercussions of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, attempts to divide Iraq and the existing crises in Syria, Yemen and Libya, the strategic imbalance in the region, the repercussions of the Iranian nuclear agreement with the major powers in 2015, the Arab-Qatari crisis in 2017 and the recent Lebanese crisis, which are among the most prominent regional variables that still reflect their repercussions on the Arab region.

During the current period, the Arab region is seeing many variables, some of which are related to the successive internal developments witnessed by a number of countries on the one hand, while others are related to the interference of many different powers, especially regional ones (Iran and Turkey) and the conflict of interests and goals among them on the other hand. This matter would have far-reaching effects on stability, security and the future of relations, whether with regard to the Arab countries among themselves or with regard to their external orientations.⁽¹²⁰⁾ Often these changes have their repercussions and impact on the dimensions of the strategic position in terms of collective national security.

There are many challenges and threats facing the Kingdom, and their interactions are intertwined with global and regional variables on the one hand, and with the different global political systems on the other hand. Democracy within the framework of the Greater Middle East, by seeking to change the political and economic reality in the region instead of preserving its stability, then the war on terrorism (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, and finally the new strategy announced by US President Donald Trump in October 2017, which came to reject all Iranian ways to obtain a nuclear weapon, focus on curtailing the Iranian government's destabilizing influence and support terrorism and militants, as well as focus on reinforcing traditional and regional US alliances against Iranian hegemony in the region.

(120) Hussein Ali Behairy, *Regional Variables*, International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram, 2014, p. 5.

Regional and international interests converge on the issue of security of the Arab Gulf and the related issues of international and regional strategic balance. These aspects are of an international or regional nature.

There is no doubt that the development process and its future in the Kingdom are affected by the international and regional environment and its variables, especially with regard to the directions of the American strategy in the Arab Gulf region, the phenomenon of international terrorism and its repercussions on the region, in addition to the crisis of the global capitalist system and the entry of the global economy into stages of stagnation and depression, as well as the issue of price fluctuations. Oil is one more variable in the equation, in addition to regional variables such as the Arab-Israeli issue, the American-Iranian conflict, the repercussions of the Arab revolutions or the so-called Arab Spring, the security situation in Iraq, the Syrian crisis, the Lebanese political situation, Operation Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope in Yemen, as well as the Arab-Qatari crisis, in addition to promoting sectarian thought, which can be a tool to threaten security and not development.

Perhaps the most dangerous crisis provoked in the Arab Gulf region is the so-called Sunni-Shiite conflict, which aims to disrupt the security of Gulf societies and increase the need to rely on the United States of America in the face of the new enemy. On the one hand, some of these enemies have openly declared themselves, while others have not, reaching understandings in secret despite the apparent hostility.¹²¹⁾

The fourth chapter is divided into three subchapters and a summary as follows:

4.1 National security dimensions of the KSA and their consequences

4.2 Modern international variables and their impact on the security of the KSA

4.3 Modern regional differences and their impact on the security of the KSA

4.4 Conclusions

4.1. The national security dimensions of the KSA and their consequences

The issue of security and state stability have been of primary interest and the desired goal of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since its establishment. Throughout its modern history, the Kingdom has faced many risks, threats and challenges at all levels, whether internal, regional or international, which directly or indirectly touched its national security, unity and

(121) Ali Abdul-Hussein Abdullah, *Security of the Arab Gulf in light of international and regional changes*, Raslan Foundation for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Damascus, 2017.

sovereignty of its territories. The Kingdom was aware of these dangers and did not concede or be lenient in what might prejudice its security or stability. It was and still is keen on regional and international cooperation to enhance global security and peace.⁽¹²²⁾

The concept of national security for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not different from the rest of the world, but it remains a unique concept with a set of characteristics that make it an example of sanctity for various considerations. From a geostrategic point of view, it is an area that connects three major continents, where interests converge and others contradict, wills clash and others intersect, while its regional environment is witness to the most international issues in our contemporary world. The Kingdom possesses great investment capabilities and generates a large part of the world's oil, the most important economic commodity in the world, which makes it the target of international and regional ambitions, vulnerable to interference in its affairs and threatening its national security. In a region riven by sectarian strife and sectarian rivalries, fueled by the ferocity and violence of the phenomenon of terrorism and the rise of some political Islam groups and armed terrorist organizations, the expansionist ambitions of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime in Iran on the one hand and the strategic objectives of the Zionist entity on the other hand, there are also emergent internal threats. There are also challenges to Saudi national security, the most important of which is comprehensive and sustainable development, which is one of the most important functions of the state, which can only flourish under the umbrella of a stable security system. The expansionist ambitions of the Wilayat al-Faqih regime in Iran can be overlooked on the one hand, with the strategic objectives of the Zionist entity on the other hand. At the internal level there are also threats and challenges to Saudi national security, the most important of which are comprehensive and sustainable development, which is one of the most important functions of the state that can only flourish under the umbrella of the stable security system.⁽¹²³⁾

A wave of extremism and ideological extremism emerged, constituting one of the most serious threats to the Saudi national security. These dilemmas could threaten the national security of the Kingdom in the event of its inflation at a high rate, if we consider that the majority of the Kingdom's population is young.⁽¹²⁴⁾

Since the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, took power in the Kingdom, he has adopted a new development vision that keeps pace with the

(122) Al-Luhaidan, Abdullah bin Fahd, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Terrorism, Ghaina for Studies and Media*, Riyadh, 1424, p. 88.

(123) Khalaf, Jassim Muhammad, *The Arab Gulf States and the Sanctity of Their National Security in the Age of Globalization*, Kalimat Publishing and Distribution House, Kuwait, 2016, p. 10.

(124) General Authority for Statistics website, on 25/11/2020. Statsgov.sa

global goals to achieve sustainable development for humanity by 2030, according to the United Nations Development Program. Its approval and implementation is primarily in the interest of the national security issue of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Despite all the security steps and programs undertaken by the Kingdom to reinforce its security system, the problem of national security remains a dynamic, real-life problem that is not subject to stagnation and changes with changes to the data and circumstances that countries are going through.⁽¹²⁵⁾

Given the importance of the Arab region to global strategies, issues of national security in its multiple dimensions have become of special interest to the conflicting world powers, especially their economic aspects. Therefore, Saudi national security in particular constitutes an axis of focus for global attention in terms of the crucial issues in the region and the world. For decades, it has been a major focus in drafting global security strategies. Saudi national security constitutes an important research focus. Research centers have concentrated their efforts on forecasting its long-term future in view of the Western strategies until 2030, according to the reports of energy research centers, where this is an aspect that is decisive for the growing dependence on Gulf oil and in view of the Kingdom's reserves, which are the largest in the world on the other hand.⁽¹²⁶⁾

Security and stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the qualitative weight it constitutes at the regional and global level is an important and vital factor for the stability of the global security system. This makes the issue of national security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital issue, worthy of addressing by researchers to explore its depths and keep pace with the increasing dynamics of events and their developments in the regional and international arenas. Vision 2030 is considered a pivotal national transformation program that makes the Kingdom face challenges related to the future of its national security in all its various dimensions and leads to a decisive conclusion that: The Kingdom is facing a special security situation in the strategic sense, which is what this study seeks to investigate, as it requires research, analysis and foresight to ensure national security and its dimensions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the light of the 2030 vision.

The concept of national security was perceived as the military force at the disposal of the state to achieve deterrence to confront any aggression and for many years this concept was reduced to its military angle, relying on the belief that military force is the mirror that reflects the national security of the state.

(125) Al-Shaqha, Fahd Beh Muhammad, *National Security Comprehensive Perception*, Center for Studies and Research, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2004, p. 7.

(126) Bashir, Mohamed Morsi, *The Future of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the Introduction to National Security and Political Reform*, Wafed Cultural House, Publishers, Algeria, 2013, p. 15.

Subsequent world events had a major role in changing and developing the concept of national security, in addition to the development of security theories in international and regional relations. Although studies of national security and national security are recent and were limited to military aspects, as it was believed that security issues are related to the security services only, but it emerged the need to extend the depth of the study into this concept to touch all aspects of life.

National security is linked first and foremost to the concept of an independent state in the modern era. Therefore, the various definitions of national security given by jurists revolve around protecting the entity of the state, considering that the protection of the state entity does not depend on the amount of military power, but rather is the sum of all economic, political and social components.⁽¹²⁷⁾

The events of September 11, 2001 and the global war on terrorism that followed, the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the so-called Arab Spring and the resulting chaos in the Arab region led to an imbalance of the concept at times and its expansion and comprehensiveness at other times. National security of the state became linked to multiple factors. Some of them affect internal affairs, including those that affect the regional or international affairs. Instead, the disruption of national security in an individual country affects all the countries of the region politically, economically and even intellectually. The events that Iraq has experienced since its occupation by the American forces in 2003, in addition to the outbreak of the revolution in Syria, the disruption in internal security, the advent of armed militias and the resulting security problems that afflicted the entire Arab region, even reaching the countries of Europe and America, are evidence of the dynamism of the concept and its rapid development. They also prove that no country is able to achieve its security on its own without intersecting with the national security of other countries.⁽¹²⁸⁾

The modern concept of national security has become a concept that touches all the security dimensions of the national state and its various ramifications, starting with nodal or (spiritual) security, human security, political security, economic security and military security, passing through water, environmental and collective security and ending with intellectual security, tourism security, industrial and electronic security.

All development steps and comprehensive development programs undertaken by states must serve the interests of their national security and the neighbor relations between states and

(127) Riyadh bin Muhammad Al-Shehri, *A Foresight Vision for National Security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Light of Vision 2030*, Naif University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2018, p. 34.

(128) Khalaf, Jassim Muhammad, *The Arab Gulf States and the Sanctity of the Value of Their National Security and the Age of Globalization*, previous reference, p. 41.

international and regional relations are governed by the concepts of national security, which strives to protect national interests, resources and gains, secure borders, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of decision-making. The concept of national security extends further to the identity, civilization and history of any nation, as it may force the state to drag its forces to lands outside its borders, either to defend common interests or to wage preemptive wars that prevent threat from reaching its borders and striking its entity and sovereignty of its lands.

The concept of contemporary national security is characterized by many features and characteristics that are inseparable from it. In fact, it may be dependent on them in one way or another. Jassim Khalaf mentioned eight characteristics that are inherent and accompanying the concept of contemporary national security, which are: ⁽¹²⁹⁾

- A. This refers to a comprehensive concept that touches all dimensions of human life and interests, as it is an influential and vital player in politics, economy, health, education and military power, which makes security the first and essential function of the state. It can be said that national security is a holistic concept that aims to protect the state's gains and wealth, being holistic in its approach, which assumes that the protection of national identity and the integrity of the social fabric is an integral part of the reality of its nature and the essence of its functions.
- B. Integration. It is pointed out that the concept of national security is an integrative, not a competitive concept that relies on the principle of integration between all components of the state and its institutions, because focusing on a particular component at the expense of the other leads to a breach of comprehensive security. National security is the epitome of the integrative interaction between internal, regional and international factors, which has become an inevitable necessity in light of globalization and rapid technological developments, a change in the shape of societies and their fusion, coupled with savage growth of the phenomenon of terrorism at the global level.
- C. Relativity. One of the characteristics of the concept of national security is that it is a relative entity. There is no security in the absolute sense, whether at the individual level or at the collective level. Sometimes security reaches ideal levels and at other times it may decline as a result of some economic or political changes or security events. Relativity of national security means that it is

(129) Khalaf, Jassim, *The Arab Gulf States and the Sanctity of the Value of Their National Security in the Age of Globalization*, previous reference, p. 30.

affected by the ideology that directs the system of government in the state and may be reflected in its components and strategies. No state, no matter how great its strength and whatever its capabilities, can claim complete confidence in its national security.⁽¹³⁰⁾

- D. Balance. National security requires striking a balance between its various dimensions. This balance does not require equality between dimensions as much as it requires arranging priorities and giving each dimension its appropriate weight according to threats, risks and future visions. This balance is struck at the level of foreign policies and internal security policies, so fighting terrorism requires internal efforts, as well as external, regional and international coordination with the relevant organizations. This balance, as Joseph Nye sees it, also extends to tangible (physical) security expressed quantitatively and between invisible security, moral (conscious) or discretionary, which makes society live in an emotional state of security without interfering with its freedoms or practices. Finally, a balance is struck between soft power and hard power and managing them in perfect harmony to serve each other in order to achieve national security goals.
- E. Politicization: It may be one of the most important characteristics of the concept of national security in the era of globalization. It is a concept subject to politicization, as well as political and ideological exploitation, so it can be used for political purposes with the aim of changing ruling regimes or imposing projects on countries. It can also be reduced ideologically to imposing guardianship or partisan or parliamentary participation, as in the case of the so-called Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthi group in Yemen. Politicization indicates that it is a loose and broad concept that aims to control a territory or occupy countries and invade them under the pretext of defending the national or national security of the great powers, as in the case of the American invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq in 2003, where the argument of protecting national security became a pretext for launching and justifying wars, says Barry. Buzan: "Decision makers have found that the concept of national security has become a useful issue", in a clear reference to the

(130) Al-Shaqha, Fahd bin Muhammad, *National Security, comprehensive conception*, previous reference, p. 6.

politicization of the concept, which opposes the sanctity of the value of contemporary national security.

- F. Dynamism: The concept of national security is characterized by rapid development and change, as it is renewed from one stage to another, which means that it is dynamic, non-static, not subject to stagnation. It is not possible to consider security as a phenomenon that is achieved only once, nor to consider it an achievement that the state achieves and remains stable on. It is rather a vital concept, renewed from the inside and outside, which is affected by the events and developments that surround it.
- G. The concept of national security is subject to the principles of strategy, plans, and future visions set by decision-makers. It is a futuristic concept that takes into account all the immediate and future threats that could pose a threat or a challenge to national security. The 2030 vision adopted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is nothing but the best proof of that. It is nothing but a strategic goal that consists in enhancing Saudi national security and supporting its strength. The concept strategy means that the principle of competitiveness is present with the developments of events, which puts decision-makers and strategists in front of a great challenge when risks and threats surmount. Terrorism, for example, was and still is one of the most important threats. During its peak in 2003-2005 the Saudi government worked on programs and plans at all levels to confront the wave of terrorism that threatened the security and stability of the Kingdom.

Based on the foregoing, the extent of the concept of national security becomes clear, as does the extent of its importance and its influential role in the development and stability of the state. The concept of national security, with its characteristics and features, requires building a comprehensive strategy that outlines the features of threats and dangers that threaten the security of the state. It also requires the development of preventive policies for threats before they can occur. Developing plans to address and deal with this according to the size and effects, provided that this strategy has flexible characteristics that allow maneuvering as required by the current interest, which is considered the success of the entire national security system.

Saudi national security is a set of measures and means taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia within the limits of its comprehensive capabilities to preserve its entity and national interests in the present and future, in light of various international, regional and local changes.

It is considered Security the National Saudi pillar intrinsic Sensitive, depends on her the Arab kingdom Saudi Arabia with her effort and ability subjectivity, from Yes Governorate On its stability its security and prosperity, addition to me Confront With firmness and courage for every thought oblique, and all enemy A stalker, and a hater of this country, its people, its security and stability.

The Kingdom's balanced policy was and still is based on protecting its lands, interests, people and creed. It was, is and will remain, God willing, a paragon of security, guarded by God's care and protected by the arms of his sons behind his political leadership, to the extent that achieves the goal and in a manner that achieves the objectives of national security, in an integrated manner, up to achieving regional security at the level of the region and then global security as per its comprehensive concept.¹³¹⁾

The foundations of Saudi national security and its constants are as follows:

- A. Protecting the Islamic faith. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia takes utmost care in protecting the Islamic faith and places it among its first security priorities. This is in addition to the fact that the Kingdom was originally based on correcting the doctrinal conditions after it was marred by many impurities of polytheism, ignorance, backwardness and division that prevailed in the Arabian Peninsula.
- B. Preserving the independence and sovereignty of the state over all its dependencies from any internal and external threats. Modern armed forces have been prepared for this with four branches: land forces, air forces, naval forces, and air defense. This is in addition to the contributions made by the National Guard, Public Security Forces and Internal Security Forces, as well as border guards to protect and maintain the home front.
- C. Providing the means to secure prosperity and well-being for the Saudi citizens, through development plans aimed at serving the citizens in all the fields related to health, education and training, as well as creating job opportunities for them.
- D. Regional cooperation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, together with the countries of the Arab Gulf region, established the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which came as a response to the hopes and aspirations of these peoples and to enhance their regional security.
- E. Unity of the Arab ranks. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia always seeks to consolidate the Arab ranks and work for their unity by resolving Arab-Arab

(131) Ali bin Helhoul Al-Ruwaili, *Saudi National Security, Strategic Horizons with a Future Vision*, Riyadh, 2010, p. 86.

differences and finding collective cooperation aimed at achieving Arab national security.

- F. Islamic cooperation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia cares about and cares for the affairs of Muslim minorities in the world, which has made the Kingdom enjoy a high spiritual position in the hearts of all Muslims.
- G. International cooperation. The Kingdom maintains distinguished relations with all countries of the world, based on mutual respect and refraining from interference in internal affairs. It also contributes to global peace and security by combating terrorism, ensuring energy savings and price stability, supporting poor countries and working hard in solving common issues.

National security objectives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

The supreme goal of national security is to protect the internal values of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, preserve its entity and its right to exist.¹³²⁾

- A. Preserving the five necessities (preserving the debt – preserving the soul – preserving the mind – preserving honor – preserving money) for everyone who lives in the Kingdom and protecting the national will by various means that achieve this goal.
- B. Spreading a sense of security, stability and tranquility in a way that achieves the security of the homeland and the security of the Saudi citizen, so that the threat to either of them is eliminated.
- C. Striving to achieve prosperity by achieving security, freedom, adequate production capacity and social justice.

These goals in their entirety include all the goals that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve, as well as all aspects of activity in the state from the political, economic, social and military aspects, while these goals include the activity of the state.

Pillars of Saudi national security:⁽¹³³⁾

The goal that governments and states seek is to create a mixture of security and physical security that is reflected in a security environment that makes society live at its best in terms of security, economy, politics, values and beliefs. Saudi national security rests on several pillars, the most important of which are:

- A. Islamic Sharia arbitration:

(132) *Pillars of National Security*, Intellectual Security Network, Riyadh, 2013, p. 2.

(133) *The pillars of national security*, previous reference, p. 3.

Since its establishment, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has pursued adherence to Islam as a way of life, providing evidence that Islam is a religion and a state. It allowed to achieve harmony and unity among the people of this country, which could not have been done except by means of Islam and believing in the solidity of this principle. This approach allowed to deal with international forces with realism and confidence. The rule preparing for His authority stems from the Book of God Almighty and the Sunnah of His Messenger, may God's prayers and peace be upon him, and they are the governing principles for all the kingdom's systems, just as the kingdom protects the belief of Islam and implements its law, enjoins what is right and forbids what is wrong and performs the duty of calling to God.

- B. Stability of the political system. Undoubtedly, the turmoil, security and political instability negatively affect the national security and rupture its very fabric. The wise Saudi policy based on the forces of God's solid law has resulted in political stability that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys, as well as stability of the political system, which is one of the most important pillars of Saudi national security.
- C. Developing security institutions, which are institutions concerned with maintaining security, establishing public peace and maintaining truth and justice, based on that after God Almighty on the hands of their sons.
- D. Cooperation of Saudi citizens: security authorities expect citizens to make an effort to protect themselves and their property against criminal activity and to provide the security authorities with assistance and the available information that helps prevent crime before it occurs and to control crime after its occurrence.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia national security components:

National security consists of several dimensions and basic components, while the strength of each of these varies according to the characteristics of the state. States are distinguished by the strength of a specific component against the remaining components. The state and its capabilities on this basis, as well as components of Saudi national security through the following main components:

a. ideological component: ⁽¹³⁴⁾

- (1) It is considered one of the most important components, while also being the main axis on which all other components in the Saudi society depend. Therefore, all articles and paragraphs of the Basic Law of Governance

(134) Muhammad bin Humaid Al-Thaqafi, *Saudi National Security in the Age of Globalization*, 2012, p. 21.

issued in 1412 AH stem from Islamic Sharia and there are no articles of the system that contradict Islamic Sharia.

- (2) The Basic Law of Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is characterized by a number of characteristics that confirm the connection of all its articles and paragraphs with Islamic law. These characteristics include the concern for the application of Islamic law in various aspects of life, as well as the protection of faith and sanctities, and among its characteristics are also the consolidation of social, geographical and intellectual unity and the achievement of Security and stability for the individual and society.
- (3) The religious system in Islamic societies is the dominant pattern over all forms of social structures, whether it be the security, educational, family or even political system. This is what is happening in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through what is applied on the ground and through the many articles and paragraphs included in the Basic Law of Governance.

b. Political component:

- (1) It is considered the basic element that determines how to organize and manage the state's forces and resources. It is twofold: an internal policy for managing society and overcoming its problems, as well as a foreign policy for managing the state's sources of power to influence the international community and the policies of other states to achieve the interests of the state.
- (2) It is a group of overlapping, interrelated and interacting elements, the interactions of which lead to the formation of a solid political base that contributes to achieving the national security of the state. This also includes distance from unrest and turmoil, complementing the strong affiliation with the state and its political system, which enhances national unity in society.
- (3) The demands of the political component in relation to domestic policy revolve around its stability within the framework of constitutional legitimacy and directing competition for internal forces and political trends in the interest of the nation.
- (4) The elements of this component revolve around the framework of internal politics, which is to identify the trends, values, and ideas that

dominate the political life in the state, the extent of the strength of interest groups or centers of power, as well as their influence on various popular anecdotes and organizations, identifying the declared goals and deducing undeclared goals.

- (5) The political system in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is distinguished and the Saudi society itself is one of the features that distinguishes it from many systems, the most important of which is the unity of belief and the establishment of the system of governance within this scope. This is evident from many articles and paragraphs, especially articles 6, 7, 8. One of the articles of the system and one of the characteristics of Saudi society, is the establishment of its moral system in accordance with Islamic law.
- (6) The political component of Saudi society is also characterized by the ability to harmonize factors of growth and change while preserving the constants of belief, in order to maintain the cohesion of the social structure of Saudi society and the cohesion of its members.

c. Economic component: ⁽¹³⁵⁾

- (1) It is one of the most important components and the economic capacity of the state adds political weight at the regional and global levels, while economic integration with other countries within the framework of a regional or international organization leads to the great return of this power, which at the same time achieves the collective security of that group.
- (2) A strong economic component represents an important and vital pillar of the military and security force in the state. Not only this, but it also goes beyond securing self-sufficiency in needs and transforming military industries, to secure the equipment and weapons needed to maintain military force and to arrange the money needed to buy what is missing from the external market, which strengthens of that force.
- (3) Economic and military forces benefit the political force positively and thus the state's capacity increases as a result of the support provided by each force to the other, taking advantage of the great potentials of economic power. Economic

(135) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, p. 2. Link : http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Askria6/OsosAmnWat/sec13.doc_cvt.htm

power is described as one of the variables that may be used to build and develop steadily, without regard to the basic components, from natural sources.

- (4) The economic component is based on the five main economic elements: agriculture, industry and mining (natural resources), trade and capital of financial and banking institutions.
- d. Military component: This is represented in the military power at the command of the state:

(1) It is seen as one of the most important factors of power, as it constitutes a protective shield to protect the state and preserve its social, political and economic capabilities. Rather, it constitutes a preventive deterrent against greedy enemies.

(2) The military component of the state is estimated and depends on many factors, the most important of which are:

- i. The size and composition of the military forces, as larger the size of the armed forces helps to form a strong deterrent and an effective factor for protecting the national security of the Kingdom.
- ii. The organization and armament of the forces and the type of weapons they possess in terms of their effectiveness in deterrence, attack and defense.
- iii. The ability of the military forces to move and maneuver.
- iv. The ability of the forces to mobilize sufficient manpower and machinery for the required locations and mobilize it as soon as possible.
- v. Production of advanced military vehicles and the necessary spare parts for them.
- vi. Combat experience, proper planning and management of military operations.

(3) The military component in the state is one of the most effective dimensions of national security and weakness in this component is never allowed, because that weakness leads to the collapse of the state's national security.

(4) This component is closely related to the rest of the dimensions of national security.

- (5) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has spared no effort in spending on this vital ingredient, believing in its importance and vitality.
- e. Social component⁽¹³⁶⁾ This concept attaches great importance to the social component of national security, where what is required are good preparations on the part of the citizen to secure himself and others. Reinforcing this aspect and removing weaknesses that enemies can exploit to threaten the national security of a country.
- f. Geopolitical rectifier⁽¹³⁷⁾ This component consists in using geographical facts from a political perspective, taking into account the interests of others, those pursuing the same goals and affected by the political exploitation of the geographical situation. Natural resources and their distribution and proximity to the borders, regions and facilities of vital importance, vital industrial objectives, land and sea ports, extent of natural protection provided for the borders and coasts of the state and the importance of the state's location in relation to states with vital interests in the region.

Factors affecting the direction and crystallization of Saudi national security:

- A. Internal determinants. This includes the geographical location, area, terrain and climate, which are the basic elements in the formation of the political geography of the state, which directly affect the Saudi national security and this effect is achieved through determining the state's ability to secure the Kingdom and then determining its international status. State options.
- (1) Geographical location of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
 - (2) Natural resources.
 - (3) Human determinants that constitute an important component of building a military force capable of achieving its goals.
 - (4) Personal determinants of the decision maker, because leadership plays an important role in the external decision-making process.
 - (5) Societal determinants include several elements, the most important of which are the characteristics of the national personality, public opinion and civil society.

(136) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, previous reference, p. 2.

(137) Muhammad bin Humaid Al-Thaqafi, *Saudi National Security in the Age of Globalization*, (previous reference), p. 31.

- (6) Political determinants, which are the nature of the kingdom's political system, which plays an influential role in Saudi national security.
- (7) Military determinants: The state possesses a huge military arsenal and highly qualified military leaders, in addition to having advanced military technology.

B. External determinants

Terrorism is a growing threat across borders. The variable of terrorism has increasingly begun to exert influence in the context of Saudi national security and is exerting pressure at three levels: local, regional and international.

- a) Foreign military presence in the Arab Gulf region.
- b) Sectarian conflicts and instability in Yemen.
- c) Religious extremism is the independent variable component in the climate of terrorism.
- d) The Arab-Israeli conflict and the excessive defense of Israel by the United States at the expense of the Palestinian cause and the Arabs.
- e) Sectarian disintegration and sectarian conflict – sectarian conflict in Iraq and Yemen.
- f) Imbalance of power in the region.
- g) Nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction. The Iranian nuclear program, Israeli nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent.
- h) Regional instability and the emergence of a failed state.
- i) The ambitions of foreign powers with military presence in the region to secure oil deposits.
- j) The non-Arab regional states sought to achieve superiority in terms of military balance and obtain nuclear deterrent to deter Arab states and impose leadership on them.
- k) The foreign danger associated with the export of advanced weapons technology to the Arab countries in order to maintain the qualitative advantage of Israel.

Requirements to achieve national security for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:⁽¹³⁸⁾

- A. Availability and ownership of political administration.
- B. Determining the nature of Arab national interests.
- C. Determining the nature of the threats and the real investigations facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- D. Decision as to whether there is a real enemy, an imaginary one or a third potential enemy.
- E. Formulating possible alliances that would allow to achieve Saudi national security.
- F. Defining requirements and comparing them with what can be applied and achieved.
- G. Laying out a comprehensive map of the Saudi national security theory.
- H. Obtaining the ability to deter and extend the sovereignty of the state.
- I. Integrated and based on unity and cooperation.
- J. Associated with the values of Islamic and human civilization.
- K. Realistic, logical and applicable.
- L. Instilled with the values of Islamic and human civilization.
- M. Having the resources and tools to achieve national security.

Security levels:

a) First level: Internal security:

It is concerned with the citizen's state, one of stability and tranquility, and the absence of a threat to their existence and survival. It is also known as individual security. There are two aspects to this, one of which is material, covering the basic areas of security for the citizen, and the second aspect is moral (psychological), fulfilling the psychological needs of the human being by recognizing their existence and benefit to the society in which they live. This activity and role are important for the community and society, granting a distinguished position in the community in appreciation.¹³⁹⁾

b) Second level: National security:

National security is to ensure the state's security from within, with the ability to ward off external threats, in order to achieve a secure and stable life within the framework of the state's borders and its political obligations.

(138) Muhammad bin Humaid Al-Thaqafi, *Saudi National Security in the Age of Globalization*, previous reference, p. 32.

(139) *Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert*, National Security, Riyadh, 2012, p. 12.

c) Third level: sub-regional security:⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

This level is concerned with safeguarding the security requirements of a specific number of countries within the framework of common interests, whether that is through security arrangements only or a complete organization.

d) Fourth level: regional security:

It reflects a policy pursued by a group of countries from one region and seeking to fully coordinate all their capabilities and forces to achieve its stability and security in the region's surroundings in a way that deters foreign interference from outside the region and the neighboring countries threatening it.

e) Fifth level: international security:

It is based on international principles and foundations, as well as the need for states to take into account international security considerations while making decisions to solve their problems with others, regardless of the state's different orientations or the greatness of its political, military or economic powers.

National security objectives in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:⁽¹⁴¹⁾

The ultimate goal of national security is to protect the internal values of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, preserve its entity and its right to exist. This primary goal is represented in the foundations and goals that include:

- a. Maintaining the Five Necessities⁽¹⁴²⁾ For everyone who lives in the homeland and the security of the citizen so that the threat to any of them is alleviated.
- b. Prosperity is achieved by achieving security, freedom, adequate production capacity and social justice.
- c. These goals in their entirety include all the goals that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve, as well as all aspects of activity in the state from the political, economic, social and military aspects, while these goals include the activity of the state.

Pillars of the Saudi national security include:

- A. Rule of Islamic law.
- B. Political system stability.
- C. Development of security institutions.
- D. Citizen cooperation.

(140) *Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert*, National Security, previous reference, p. 13.

(141) *Pillars of National Security, Intellectual Security Network*, Intellectual Security Library, first edition, 2013, p. 2 .

(142) **The five necessities are:** (preserving the religion – preserving the soul – preserving the mind – preserving honor – preserving money).

E. Taking care of the Saudi economy and fighting poverty.

National security is an essential pillar upon which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relies with its own effort and ability in order to maintain its stability, security and prosperity, in addition to confronting with firmness and courage every deviant thought and every enemy lurking and pouring out their hate on this country, its people, its security and stability, its people and its creed.

Pillars of Saudi national security from a political point of view:

- A. The Saudi system of government represents a model of hereditary monarchy with the Al Saud family in power, according to the system of government. The king and ministers represent the executive authority responsible for drawing up and implementing the general policy of the state. They act in addition to the Shura Council and an independent judicial system. The system of government in the Kingdom is based on solid political principles, such as the rule of law, defining competencies and authorities, justice and equality for citizens, respect for human rights, achieving national unity, overcoming tribal strife and other principles that lead to stability of government.
- B. The Saudi leadership believes that it is necessary to develop governance institutions and activate civil society institutions, considering that good governance is based on interaction between the official state institutions represented in the government, private sector institutions and then civil society institutions.
- C. At the external level, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia pursues a moderate foreign policy based on establishing balanced international relations based on respect for international legitimacy, refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of countries, resolving disputes by peaceful means and respecting international treaties and covenants. The Kingdom believes in following the policy of dialogue with the world and has a pivotal role at the Arab, Islamic, regional and international levels.
- D. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the first Arab countries founding the United Nations and one of the active members of its international organizations. It is also a founding member of the League of Arab States and an active member of its institutions. It is also one of the founders of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and a supporter of its various activities around the world. The Gulf Cooperation Council was also established in 1981 with Saudi support. The Kingdom plays a key role in the Gulf scale as the largest Gulf country and this was evident in

its extensive efforts towards the return of legitimacy to Kuwait, whether by diplomatic action or by its participation in military action, as well as reinstating peace in Bahrain.

- E. Saudi domestic policy and foreign policy are based on clear basic axes that aim to achieve the public interest and to ensure an effective role at the regional, Arab, Islamic and international levels.¹⁴³⁾

Pillars of Saudi national security from an economic point of view:

- A. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia follows a free economic system based on market economy, freedom of competition, freedom of ownership and economic openness to the world, with interest in developing rational economic policies that enable the state to make optimal use of its economic resources to achieve a large economic growth rate and rapid GDP growth rates.
- B. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies a prominent economic position due to the strength of its economy and this is crystallized in its presence as one of the members of the Economic Group of Twenty, which represents the twenty strongest economies in the world.
- C. The Kingdom believes that taking care of the nation's economy and achieving a high standard of living for citizens is one of the most important national goals. Fighting poverty and facilitating ways of life for citizens are among the most important axes that ensure security and stability.
- D. The Saudi economy is based on the petroleum sector, the agricultural sector, and manufacturing industries, while oil trade is a mainstay in Saudi trade. Political leadership in the Kingdom also believes that the application of an efficient economic system, coupled with rational and fair economic policies that achieve a decent life for citizens are among the most important pillars of Saudi national security.

Pillars of Saudi national security in terms of security:

In this regard, the Kingdom is based on two axes:

- (1) First axis:⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

Raising the level of service provided by security institutions to citizens in order to achieve the link between the citizen and their security services.

(143) Abdullah Al-Qaba, *Saudi Foreign Policy*, Riyadh, first edition, 2009, p. 20.

(144) Izzat Murad, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Combating Terrorism*, previous reference, p. 26.

Qualifying the security officers, giving them scientific, moral and professional preparation and setting the necessary training programs to raise the level of their skills and abilities to face different situations.

Preparing workers in the various security services to use modern technologies and equipment, which help them to perform tasks accurately and skilfully.

Subjecting security forces to continuous training through scientific and advanced training programs.

(2) Second axis:

It is related to the defensive military capabilities, which is the force that protects the security of the country, its borders and its sovereignty by preparing and adopting advanced methods that secure country and the people. Achieving peace requires the availability of the deterrent force that maintain this peace and stability. This also involves coordination between the security services of the Ministry of Interior and the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense. There are joint plans, exchange of information, distribution of security tasks between them and joint training.

Pillars of Saudi national security from a social point of view:

- A. The state believes that the family is the foundation and nucleus of society, while family disintegration is one of the causes that aid in terrorism. Article 9 of the Basic Law of Governance states that “the family is the nucleus of Saudi society” and its members are brought up on the basis of the Islamic faith and what it requires of loyalty and obedience to God and His Messenger. Those in authority deserve respect for the system and its implementation, love and pride in the homeland and its glorious history.
- B. Article 27 of the Basic Law of Governance states that “The state guarantees the right of the citizen and their family in cases of emergency, sickness, disability and old age, supports the social security system and encourages institutions and individuals to contribute to charitable works.”⁽¹⁴⁵⁾
- C. Social security is also linked to achieving national unity and social cohesion, which is achieved in the Kingdom under the leadership of the founder King Abdul Aziz Al Saud (may God have mercy on him), when he unified the parts of the Kingdom and eliminated causes of division, fragmentation and conflicts and called for unification on the basis of Islamic Sharia, as well as implementation of the principles of justice

(145) *The Basic Law of Governance* issued by Royal Decree No. (1/90) dated 27/8/1412 AH.

and equality. He established security and provided equal opportunities, as well as made the call to religion and one nation instead of tribal strife. The events that the Kingdom went through demonstrated the solidity of unity and the strength of the social fabric in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which achieves citizens' cooperation with the security services to confront terrorism and prevent crimes before they occur. Thus, cohesion is the most important pillar of Saudi national security⁽¹⁴⁶⁾.

The decision of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Majesty King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, to reorganize the National Security Council came as a new step within the mission of the leadership in the Kingdom to improve security and political decision-making mechanisms and processes. This decision comes in the context of restructuring and developing state institutions in response to changes in the international environment. Reactivation of institutions specialized in national security, such as the Council, is an important issue for a large and important country like the Kingdom. The Kingdom's security and diplomatic policy revolve in several circles, all of which are of paramount importance for regional and international stability and security. The Kingdom has never been a marginal country. Therefore, it becomes necessary to fill this role effectively.

The main role of the National Security Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is to support the decision-making process in both domestic and foreign policies, and although the name indicates that the Council will be interested in the security aspect, the experiences of other countries indicate that security and diplomacy cannot be separated, and that the concept of security is broader and more comprehensive than purely security issues and is the main determinant of the stability and development of any country.

The National Security Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the main platform for political decision making, which helps take care of national security and foreign and internal policy with the help of advisors and members of the Council. This allows to develop an effective mechanism to create coordination between the various state agencies and its sovereign institutions, with the aim of setting and drawing an effective policy at the the internal and external levels and therefore the task of the Council is primarily advisory and not executive.

Among the tasks of the National Council of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is to provide a comprehensive vision of the interests of the state and an assessment of the dangers and challenges it faces. For this purpose, it will develop the necessary strategies to give the state flexibility and the ability to deal with changes in the internal and external environments, as well

(146) *The Basic Law of Governance* issued by Royal Decree No. (1/90) dated 27/8/1412 AH.

as coordination between the relevant state institutions and decision-makers. It will act as a link between the decision-making institutions and the decision-making body.

Means of achieving national security⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

The state's capabilities have limits when it comes to dealing with threats to national security and according to those limits, the state is linked with others, who have common interests with it, to establish a group (alliance - treaty - organization) through which it can reinforce the security dimensions and support its capabilities to be able to deter and address risks. There are three examples of the means for achieving national security, each of which needs specific capabilities, whereby any of them is chosen based on a comparison with the forces threatening national security to find the appropriate capabilities to confront them, provided that the capabilities of those forces and the means of achieving national security available are as follows:

i. Self Security System:

The first and most important degree to achieve national security, as the state seeks to achieve its national security by relying only on its own forces and capabilities, which achieves the highest degrees of independence and protection for national security, without the interference of external elements, whether they are enemies or allies, and this model requires that the state secure the appropriate amount. Securing its national security by its own effort and capabilities only is difficult to achieve for anyone except a superpower or a major regional country backed by a superpower. The degree of success of the state in achieving its national security through that strategy depends on three factors:

The state's ability to achieve self-sufficiency, in all its requirements and needs.

The nature of the system in force in the state and the pattern of power distribution prevailing in it.

The relative strength of its comprehensive forces when compared to other countries and the adoption of this security strategy to achieve national security (self-security) leads to the isolation and aggression of the state.

ii. Regional national security system:

The next degree to achieving national security is resorted to when the state's resources, forces and self-capabilities fail to meet the requirements of its national security, and they often fall short. Several countries have common interests, as they coordinate security

(147) Ali bin Hilhoul Al-Ruwaili, *The Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its Impact on Achieving Arab National Security*, 2009 edition, p. 86.

policies among themselves, to pool their forces in a way that prepares them for balance or relative superiority against other forces that conflict with them in security interests. This system achieves its security by achieving a balance in the power relations that prevail in the regional system, in which the state is located. It is vital and important to achieve stability and security for the region.

iii. Collective security system:

The highest level security systems to achieve national security with an integrated system that covers all dimensions of national security. This system aims to achieve security through the commitment of all states to participate in securing all states through the movements and decisions of the entire international community against any state that threatens the existing system or tries to use force on its own initiative.

This system is based on a basic political principle that states respect the sovereignty of each state over its territory and borders, end all forms of conflict between member states in a single organization and maintain the existing political situation.

National security protection means: ⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

The sources for securing national security internally differ from those in the external field, so the state determines means of protection for national security internally and externally, while some means may work in both areas together. What is meant by means of protection for national security is what the state uses in terms of means and tools to define the concept of national security and inform the political leadership in a timely manner regarding events affecting national security, as well as the measures taken to address such events, directly or indirectly in the internal and external spheres.

Means of protecting national security internally:

States usually establish special approaches to protect their national security internally and they include theoretical academic tools, scientific and practical elements, as follows:

A. Research and information centers:

Such as the academic and scientific form of the internal means of protection for national security. the need for these emerged as a result of modern scientific and technical development, which created the need for an accurate definition of the foundations, principles and concepts of security. Close cooperation between pure thought and the movement implementing measures

(148) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, National Security, previous reference, p. 3.

to achieve national security is important, combining theoretical scientific research in an academic framework and experience field applications. These institutions aim to:

- i. Conducting research studies on all dimensions of national security at all levels, fields and departments to specialize in a one of its dimensions or inclusive of every dimension (according to its direct dependency).
- ii. An integrated assessment of the phenomenon of national security and the existing problem (or that may occur in the future), and related to current (future) events through daily and accurate follow-up of the course of things that affect national security.
- iii. Drafting a unified and appropriate intellectual framework for an integrated security policy.
- iv. Providing advice on situations and events that threaten national security.

B. Security and intelligence services:

The main governmental and official means on which the political leadership depends in making and preparing decisions related to national security. These agencies perform security tasks covertly, indirectly and informally, where the state cannot carry out these tasks officially or publicly and they affect the security of the state directly.

C. National security councils:

These councils receive the available information on the situations affecting the security of the state, rearrange it, collate it in a logical manner, analyze it, develop a dynamic model and forecast the possibilities of the reactions of the counter forces to this movement and the appropriate measures for each possible reaction and its side effects so that the political leadership can take the right decision in a timely manner and prepare for estimated reactions.

D. Special societal systems:⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

This covers a set of specialized security policies for the dimensions of national security that the state aims to achieve and protect its security in the following manners:

- i. politically:
The state shall develop a comprehensive policy that includes awareness, achieving political cohesion and measures to prevent others from obtaining information about the reality of the political situation.
- ii. economically:

(149) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, National Security, previous reference, p. 5.

Follow well-thought-out economic policies and economic development plans that are designed to achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency appropriate for the national goals and get rid of economic dependence in a way that protects the national economy from threats or artificial economic shocks.

iii. socially:

Work to increase the social cohesion of the state (integration of minorities, sects and classes) and to preserve the principles and values of society and its national and religious heritage.

Means of protecting national security externally⁽¹⁵⁰⁾:

One of the objectives of the state's foreign policy that seeks to subordinate the will of others is implementing three basic operations, each of which, when identified, is linked to national security, as follows:

- A. Formulating foreign policy (defining the goals of the state and its connection to national security).
- B. Foreign policy decision-making.
- C. Implementation of foreign policy, which is the most important process in relation to the means of protecting national security externally, through several of their tools:

i. diplomatic tools:

The main tools in foreign policy, through which the state achieves political and national goals in peacetime and manages crises to avoid war or gradual escalation controlled to the extent that it achieves the goal or brings the crisis to the stage of war at the most appropriate time. Diplomatic tools also works using several methods, including negotiations and discussions. Mediation is accepted from the center of power and also relies on military force to lend credibility to its actions within the framework of international legitimacy to achieve national goals and objectives or to deter sources of threats to national security. Skillful diplomatic work prepares the ground for gathering of regional and international powers by exploiting good foreign relations to support the national cause, which helps prepare society international community to accept appropriate solutions in the interest of national security.

ii. military tools:

(150) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, National Security, previous reference, p. 6.

- A. The state's possession of adequate military capabilities to achieve the goal by deterring others from threatening the state's national security without using that tool. Therefore, the military tool is an element of support for political force and economic force and their respective tools, used in order to achieve national security goals.
- B. The military tool is used as an alternative when other tools fail, especially the political and economic tools, provided that the use of the military tool begins with moral deterrence.
- C. Using the military tool is planned in a calculated escalation that gradually builds up the military force to be used in successive steps until it reaches the final size and strength in the decision to reach armed conflict.¹⁵¹⁾
- D. Decision to use armed forces, i.e. to reach its extent by escalation. It is necessary to ensure that the military tool is capable of achieving the expected success when used (protecting national security), as failure leads to dire consequences that reflect negatively on the objectives of national security and instead of protecting it, exposes it to risk.

4.2. The modern international variables and their impact on the security of the KSA

The world has witnessed rapid-paced transformations since the beginnings of this decade, without this implying the emergence of a new world order, the post-World War II world that witnessed the birth of a new world order, which was based on bipolarity between the United States of America and Western European countries on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on the other hand. With the end of the millennium the socialist bloc disintegrated, socialist and capitalist polarization disappeared and patterns of economic competition and trade wars emerged between the major countries as an alternative to ideological competition.⁽¹⁵²⁾

In its battle with the United States of America, China used capitalist tools even though it is governed by the communist party, as it competed with it to open new commercial, technological and other markets. There is no doubt that the world of the third millennium has

(151) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, previous reference, p. 7.

(152) Ramez Salah Abdulelah Al-Shishi *The impact of the BRICS bloc on American hegemony*, College of Politics and Economics, Suez University, Arab Democratic Center, 2021, p. 1. Link: <https://democraticac.de/?p=74738>

not settled on a multipolar system, as it settled for decades of the bipolar system. The third millennium is about competition with China, which is promoting a system closer to state capitalism and relies on a centralized system of government that considers liberal democracy fragile, deepening division within societies and open to rapid achievement.

This new international environment in 2020 witnessed many transformations revealed by the Corona pandemic and China's strong presence on the international scene, despite its accusation of being the source of the virus.

The escalation of the division and the new polarization between the liberal and leftist forces and the nationalist and populist currents of Yemen has become a major urgency in addition to what happened in 2020, especially with the end of the rule of former US President Trump.

The return of inclusive American politics inside and outside the United States of America often comes within the agenda of the American Democratic Party and it is consistent with the prevailing way of thinking within the party, which says “yes we can”, meaning that they accept immigrants of different nationalities, races, and religions and integrate them into the American model that is able to absorb them and make them American citizens.

Achieving collective security for a group of countries is difficult and extremely complex and therefore requires conscious and carefully calculated dealing with regional and international variables. Errors in estimation and calculation will have serious implications and perhaps this is what drives the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to seek consensus and building common grounds between their peoples first and between the countries secondly. This is done in order to build an effective policy in dealing with the major countries, especially the United States of America, to reduce the severity of the risks they face. Given the limited ability of some Gulf Cooperation Council countries to secure and protect their capabilities, it is imperative to preserve the benefits achieved by the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf during its course at all the political, economic, military, social and cultural levels in light of regional and international circumstances and changes. This also encompasses the ability to prevent or repel regional and international threats towards the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and overcome all kinds of challenges that impede the development process.

The current global system is considered a unipolar system, but it is not subject to the hegemony of a single state, but rather is subject to the hegemony of an entire system, which is the capitalist system that is expressed by the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Japan and the Pacific countries. This system is led by the United States of America and the capitalist system is governed by a network of organizations and institutions such as the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Energy Agency, World Trade Organization, International Bank and Fund and the G8 Summit. This is all in addition to an extensive network of markets and other economic organizations and therefore the nature of the contemporary world order crystallizes in the hegemony that carries pluralism within it. But it is a pluralism governed by stable rules and includes the possibility of using military force against other parties that it considers a threat to its interests.⁽¹⁵³⁾

The concept of absolute sovereignty of states has changed following external intervention, when controlling internal affairs of a state or a state with an impact on collective security became an acceptable matter for the international community in connection with the development of the concepts of international peace and security approved by the Security Council statement on January 31, 1992. These include terrorism, extremism, human rights and democracy, environmental pollution, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the marketing of advanced weapons systems. Most of these are issues that are directly related to the future of security arrangements and the concern that this raises as a result of the double standards by which international powers deal with these issues, which ensures Israeli superiority in all fields. On top of that there is the tendency of international forces to restore protectionist policies⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ in international trade, the latest of which is US President Donald Trump's imposition of additional taxes on his country's imports, after withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾

Centuries ago, the Arabian Gulf occupied an important place for the interests of the European powers. At first, the sea routes around the Arabian Peninsula and later the short sea routes between Europe and the Indian subcontinent that pass through the Suez Canal, confirmed that multiple European powers would always stay on top of developments in the region, though these forces were sometimes satisfied with the role of observers only, most of the time they may interfere in the affairs of the region to ensure that things are going in line with their interests.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

(153) Amira Rashid, *Reducing Opportunities and Growing Problems and Challenges*, Opinions on the Gulf, Gulf Research Center, Issue (123), 2017. Link :

https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4238:2017-09-24-11-20-53&catid=3249&Itemid=172

(154) **Protectionism** is an economic policy that restricts trade between countries through several measures, such as raising customs duties on imported goods and determining their quantities, as well as taking other measures that would reduce imports and prevent foreigners from "taking possession" of local markets and companies:

Paul, Bairoch. *Economy and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. United States of America. (1993). P. 47.

(155) **Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement** It includes 12 countries bordering the Pacific Ocean in the Americas and Asia (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam), the agreement aims to remove trade barriers in the region and reduce or eliminate tariffs but the administration of former US President Obama did not submit it to Congress for ratification.

(156) Mahmoud Ramadan, *International Interests in the Arab Gulf Region*, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 2017, p. 30.

The emergence of issues that represent threats and challenges to states (such as issues of water, food security, energy, climate change, disarmament, terrorism, extremism and poverty), as well as the emergence of international non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations and multinational companies, in addition to the reformulation of international law to accommodate the successive international changes in the field of international humanitarian, international economic and international criminal law.

Change in the international system and centers of world power

Change in the global system is one of the most prominent phenomena that obstruct the paths and interactions of the international system, through its impact on its structure and interactive structure, as well as the performance of its units. The change movement is directed towards creating a new international “change movement”, adopted by the global powers wishing to bring about change, in an effort to guarantee their interests and objectives, as well as to express their capabilities and the extent of their influence in managing and directing international interactions.

As the state of decline in the role and status of the United States of America led to a kind of vacuum that allowed for more instability and a decline in international security, especially in Asia and the Middle East, and this decline reinforced the growth of the Russian and Chinese roles to influence the management of international crises according to their interests, which restricted the American influence from dominating international affairs and managing their interactions.

Change in the international system is a necessary movement, necessitated by international interactions and imposed by goals, interests and aspirations, as well as the nature of local and international conditions, developments and other strategic variables. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the phenomenon of change has acquired a vital dimension in international politics, according to the rapid change witnessed by the international system. Other factors include a complex picture in its structure, the nature of its interactions and the performance of its units.

The phenomenon of change in the policies and interactions of the international system, as well as its structure, has not been interrupted since its formation, due to the change in the strategies of global powers, as well as the capabilities they contain that push them to strategic performance different from the previous one and more in line with the aspirations and goals of

those forces. Because of this change is considered an essential feature of the international system.⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

Change in the international system must involve motives that make up its movement, otherwise it is a chaotic and illegitimate change that wastes time and drains resources, causing many problems.

a. Geopolitical variables.

Here, the political leader seeks to assert their position by monitoring the political changes in the international system and seizing opportunities that enable to assert position or restore position to change towards an issue, as happened in the Russian position on the Syrian crisis, where the Federation was able to employ this crisis as an element of pressure against the American hegemony. The aim behind this was to restore its international position, to employ that field in formulating its national strategy and determining its national goals, which is “the causal relationship between power politics and geographic space, and the extent of the ability of decision makers.”⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ It is also known as “the study of the impact of political behavior on changing the geographical dimensions of the state”, as the geopolitical view of a country is related to its ability to be an effective player in the most extensive area of the world subject to its influence and control, while geopolitical variables are all factors and political phenomena affecting the behavior and performance of the international system and the nature of their interactions with each other.

b. Economic variables.

It is the result of international economic imbalances and it constitutes indicators of a comprehensive crisis that constitutes stimulus for change. Globalization is considered one of the factors that bring about change and it is the mainstay of sudden changes that affect the political, technological and military fields and social phenomena as the first external factors of change.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

c. Intellectual – cultural variables.

(157) Khader Misbah Ismail, *Change Management, Challenges and Strategies for Contemporary Managers*, Amman, Dar Al-Hamid, 2011, pp. 94-93.

(158) Turki Ibrahim Sultan, *The Engineering of Change: The Radical Change of the Art of Management - Methodology and Application*, Cairo, Dar Al Maaref, 1996, p. 20.

(159) Julian Reynolds, Julian Fode, *Political Geography of the International Monetary Fund Latin America Europe, Research Centres*, (Working Paper, 2007), p.7

It is related to the development of national knowledge and ideas that seek to restore its previous role, such as Russia and Turkey, or build a new global role, such as China and India.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

d. Social variables.

Social variables produce a positive impetus for change. Among the most prominent of those variables that affect the power of states are the number of people, workforce percentage, human development level, education, rate of spread of diseases, as well as the patriotic spirit of the society.⁽¹⁶¹⁾

There are three issues of varying importance to these major powers in relation to the Arab Gulf region, which are the guarantee of oil imports, political reforms and human development, while the American policy towards the region, until not so long ago, was governed by the need to guarantee oil imports at low prices and in accordance with its requirements.

Influential international political changes:

American trends

- A. The United States of America follows a consistent approach in its foreign policies despite the change of presidents and decision makers, which is to move according to the higher interests and objectives of the state, using for this purpose its huge political, economic and military capabilities that directly contribute to the formulation of its foreign policies. The American administration works by employing its power and strategy aims to achieve its vital interests through its strategic advantages, as all American interests and goals stem from its main goal of ensuring and affirming hegemony over the world as a whole.
- B. The United States of America justified its interests in the region by having a number of strategic goals that require its intervention in the affairs of the countries of the region, to preserve them and adapt events and circumstances and direct them in accordance with its interests and objectives. Incorrect policies followed by the United States of America affected both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Syria, which was a major reason for the decline in its influence. This spurred the American administration to pay close attention to the way it dealt

(160) William Nassar, *Russia as a Great Power*, The Arab Journal of Political Science, No. 20, 2008, pp. 31-30.

(161) Serge Raynal, Project Management "*Strategic Approach to Change*" 3,1st edition.

with conflicts and crises in the region and try to arrange its conditions and improve its image and return again to sit on top of the world order.

American political and strategic thought

- A. The American strategic direction is mainly related to the decisions of numerous successive American administrations, especially after World War II, with the development of the international strategy in the United States of America, and this is considered one of the basic constants in American foreign policy. The Cold War phase has added a new dangerous dimension to the policy. The US State Department cannot be ignored, despite the American strategic thought's reluctance between indulging or cautiously dealing with international affairs. There were two main poles, the United States of America and the Soviet Union (formerly), when the importance of competition increased in the era of nuclear parity between the two great powers.⁽¹⁶²⁾
- B. Therefore, the American strategy in the Arab region is based on fixed principles and goals, being reformulated according to international and regional changes and some detailed aspects of how to ensure stability of the region, whether through direct military intervention or what is known as preventive war. This latter strategy consists in striking regimes and movements and everything that threatens the security and stability of the region, whether they were political regimes or liberation movements⁽¹⁶³⁾.

Features of American strategic thinking⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

- A. Preserving American interests. The United States of America believes that it must remain in a position of power and domination, as well as control the strategic locations in the world. This also includes much wealth, including oil and the rest of the necessary raw materials, and these interests are preserved, through tangible material power, the extended network of relations and ready-made alternatives and proposals for solving complex problems that other large entities are unable to face.

(162) Adel Amer, *American Strategy towards the Arab World*, Arab-European Institute for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2014, p. 25.

(163) Fawaz Gerges, *The Constant and the Changing in the Politics of the United States of America*, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2014, p. 84.

(164) Abdul Qadir Muhammad Fahmy, *The Political and Strategic Thought of the United States*, Dar Al-Shorouk for Publishing and Distribution, Oman, 2014, p. 48.

- B. Filling in the blanks quickly. It is one of the most prominent features of American strategic thought, until the United States of America gained the upper hand in this matter and the transformation of American strategic thinking into behavior, theories, culture and programs that are difficult for others to resist, unless there are clear goals and precise, bold and fair programs, for example the media vacuum that was created after the Gulf War, that void that all the Arab media could not fill, so the American news station (CNN) filled it.
- C. Protecting its allies (Israel). Israel has interest centers inside the United States of America, through which it can influence American decision-makers. This includes heavy Jewish presence in the United States of America, in addition to the Jewish lobby and what it represents as a pressure card on the American administration. This ensures that the United States of America considers Israel as part of American national security and it works to protect its interests and ensure its economic and military superiority. In addition to the political umbrella that the United States gives to decision makers in Israel and ignores its practices towards the Palestinian issue, taking advantage of it to implement its expansionist policies as its long arm in the region.

The American strategy in the region is based on the transition from force to persuasion and from military intervention to negotiations, as well as the role of the United States of America in the Arab region as an important player despite the restrictions imposed on its role due to the existing tensions in the region.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

The United States of America deals with countries according to its interests and objectives and those of its allies and friends, especially the economic and military interests, as that region (the Arab region) has the largest consumption rate of American and European products. This is supplemented by the arms deals that take place between these players and that is why the United States of America confronts and deters any aggression or external or internal threat that would threaten the interests of the United States of America, its allies or friends within that Arab region.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

(165) Amr Abdel-Moaty, *The Arab revolutions, their future and their impact on American politics*, International Politics magazine, Al-Ahram, No. (198), October 2014, p. 171.

(166) Samir Ibrahim Mohamed, *The Impact of Neo-Conservative Ideas on American Foreign Policy*, International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram 2014, p. 24.

American politics

- A. The fact that the United States of America fought the second and third Gulf Wars was due to its keenness to protect its traditional sources of oil (the liberation of Kuwait in 1991) and its expansion with new oil sources (the invasion of Iraq in 2003). This was despite the fact that the oil factor dictates that the United States of America maintain a policy of stability in the region. However, the two Gulf Wars reflected a major shift in the tactics of American policy towards the Arab region, which derived its components from the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. It relies heavily on the assumption that the United States of America are in a unique position to lead the world, those components that allowed it to define the meaning and limits of stability in the Arab region
- B. The events of September 11, 2001 gave the United States an opportunity or justification to achieve its goals by using means without limits or restrictions in light of the stabilization of the previous components. They also allowed to develop its strategies for controlling the Arab region, entering that region and imposing more control by overthrowing Arab regimes and weakening its armies. There is also another task that must be completed, which is to complete the siege of Russia and control of the Black Sea oil. The beginning was the alleged war against terrorism in Afghanistan, when the administration of former US President Bush (father) issued a statement on the national security strategy. This strategy is based on resorting to preventive war, so the attention of American policy turned to portraying Islamic fundamentalistic “terrorism” as a threat not only to the interests of the United States of America, but to Western democratic values in general, thus defining the features of the new strategic stimulus. Where the goals of American foreign policy in the Arab region do not go beyond maintaining Israel’s political, military and economic supremacy, they include direct control of the most important energy sources in the world represented by Gulf oil, as the largest stock of global oil, and redrawing the map of political forces in the Arab region.
- C. The US administration has transformed the strategic environment in the Arab region, especially after the Arab revolutions or the so-called Arab Spring, by

formulating its dealings with the countries of the region in a different way (restructuring) and the subsequent change in US policy.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

- D. American foreign policy underwent major transformations in the second term of former President Barack Obama, most notably the Asian Pivot, according to which the East Asian region becomes the first priority region for American policy globally, especially as it witnesses the unprecedented rise of China, and its expansion in the Sea region. Southern China threatens the strategic balance in the region with countries such as Japan and Australia, a balance that has represented the United States of America as its mainstay since the end of World War II. Increasing disputes in that region of the Pacific Ocean naturally threaten the United States of America, not militarily and strategically, as they consider the Pacific Ocean as a regional arena, but also economically, especially since China is its first economic partner, and countries such as Japan, Australia and the ASEAN Group represent important pillars of the global economy. America's turn towards East Asia entailed a partial withdrawal from the Arab region, especially Gulf oil.
- E. The changes, whether related to the situation in the region or to the directions of the United States of America, imposed a change in Washington's foreign policy approach and the shift from intensive to flexible engagement. Handling the region selectively and not adopting a comprehensive strategy, as well as paying attention to the countries of the region playing a central role in dealing with the region's issues and crises directly and not relying on the American role, leading to changing the strategic environment and paving the way for transforming the pattern of relations with Iran from being a state of hostility towards becoming a state of cooperation and then moving to a different level that includes normal relations in the long term⁽¹⁶⁸⁾. This is evident in the interview given by the former US President Obama, which was published in the New York Times on April 5, 2015, where he called on the Arab countries to deal with the Syrian crisis and not to rely on the United States of America and this was also clear at that time with insistence. Americans were not involved in the 2015 Iranian nuclear

(167) Hossam Ibrahim, *American policy toward the Middle East after the nuclear agreement with Iran*, the Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2015, p. 5.

(168) Ahmed Abdulaziz Al-Hussan, *Prospects of the New American Strategy*, Rawabet Center for Strategic Studies, United Arab Emirates, 2015, p. 64.

agreement, despite the shortcomings and concessions, which prompted some Arab countries to reformulate their alliances with other international powers.

- F. And the position of the United States towards the parties obstructing the settlement process in Yemen raised a lot of ambiguity, during the period preceding the military intervention led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The armed Houthi group, which turned against the political process, took military action and the United States was satisfied with condemning those actions⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ Indeed, the former US President (Obama), in the wake of the Houthi coup against the legitimate President Hadi, considered that the fight against terrorism in Yemen is in the American interest and the Houthi movement can contribute to securing it.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ The American position towards the Yemeni events can be explained in light of the transformations that was introduced into the American strategy during the administration of President Obama, which is to reduce Washington's regional involvement in the region and to avoid direct intervention in conflicts.⁽¹⁷¹⁾ Washington has been avoiding taking any unilateral measures against the Yemeni parties obstructing the settlement process, with the exception of its drone attacks against Al-Qaeda, which, according to what is known as the Obama Doctrine, are not considered conflicts within the legal framework of the war.⁽¹⁷²⁾
- G. The features inherent in reformulating the approach to dealing with the region also appeared at the beginning of the era of US President Donald Trump and moved to serve American interests by directing a military strike on the military airports of the Syrian regime, despite the Russian objections, and then declaring a new strategy towards Iran (October 2017). It seems the US are more inclined towards confrontation, as it was described that they would avoid the mistakes that occurred previously with the American administration, with the aim of pushing Tehran to change its behavior in the region and the most important thing that came in as an element of the new strategy is the rejection of all Iranian ways to obtain a nuclear weapon and focus on limiting the impact of the Iranian

(169) Nasser Muhammad Al-Taweel, *The Future of Yemen after the Houthis Take Control of Power in Sana'a*, Political Papers, Beirut, Center for Thought Industry for Studies and Research, 2015, p. 10.

(170) Al Jazeera Center for Studies, *Resignation of Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, Risks and Alternatives, Assessment of Position*, January 28, 2015. <http://studies.aljazeera.net/positionestimate/2015/01/2015128103150929915>

(171) Muhammad Abbas Naji, *New Balances: The Possible Regional Repercussions of the American Withdrawal from the Region*, Arab Center for Research and Studies, March 11, 2015. <http://www.acrseg.org/12282>

(172) Osama Abu Rashid, *is the United States of America drifting into a new ground war in the Middle East?* Policy Analysis, Doha, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, October 2014, pg 4.

government with regard to destabilizing and supporting terrorism and militants. Other goals included establishing a bridge from Iran to Syria and Lebanon, as well as focusing on reinforcing the United States' traditional and regional alliances against Iranian hegemony in the region⁽¹⁷³⁾. Then President Trump announced in a speech at the White House (May 8, 2018) his country's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran and stated that the agreement did not and will not secure peace in the Middle East. He also expressed his belief that if the agreement continues, "a nuclear arms race will start in the region" and vowed that Washington would impose the highest level of economic sanctions on the Iranian regime.

- H. The highest goal that the United States of America can aspire to is to be the first among the major powers (Russia – China – European Union) and this is confirmed by the Egyptian thinker and writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in his book (*The Gulf War, Illusions of Strength and Weakness*). In his work Heikal emphasized that what it appeared after the end of the Cold War and it was not a new world order, but rather an arrangement used by an old world order to reconfirms a cycle in light of great changes. A state of multipolarity is being built and includes both (Russia and China) and with it an increasing number of countries that are achieving high levels of economic growth, technical and military progress and political influence (such as India, Brazil, South Africa) and other countries from different regions.

Russian sentiments in the Persian Gulf region

- A. The Russian approach to the Arab region was one in which Russia did not seek merely to achieve political gains or be able to exercise a security or military role to compete with the strong American role in the region. Russia was rather working for a strategic, economic and technical partnership that would enable direct economic benefits for Russia, Therefore, Russian interests in the region were linked to countries with oil sectors to focus on energy sources and thus Russia had common interests with the Arab countries that it had to preserve. Mutual interests between Russia and the countries of the region witnessed a clear growth and Moscow was able to rebuild its relations with a large number of Arab

(173) *Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy*, Issued on : October 13, 2017.
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/>

countries in the field of energy, especially the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. With time, the energy sector has become the core of the Arab-Russian partnership and Russian interests are linked to three main sectors in the region, namely: energy (oil and gas), technical cooperation in the industrial and development fields and the military field (weapons).

- B. Russian strategic foundations for the importance of the Arab Gulf region: ⁽¹⁷⁴⁾
- a. Arabian Gulf strategic location.
 - b. Competition with the United States in the Arab Gulf region.
 - c. Hitting American interests in the Arab Gulf region.
 - d. Pivoting with some US allies in the Gulf region.
 - e. Russia's global position, as it seeks by all means to show its role as a superpower for all skeptics, enemies and friends.
 - f. The Gulf region is Sunni and the vast majority of Russian Muslims are Sunni.
- C. The events and developments that took place in the world and the region confirmed the growing Russian (political and diplomatic) role in these events. The Russian role became clear through the Syrian crisis, as it succeeded in saving the regime (Bashar al-Assad) from an imminent American military strike, which almost toppled it from authority or weakening in the face of the armed opposition, as it stood in opposition to the American desire and its objection to a Security Council resolution to launch a military strike on Syria, in addition to the initiative put forward by Russia to dismantle and put the Syrian chemical arsenal under international control in September 2013. This meant sending many messages that were not only meant for the United States, but for the international community as a whole. ⁽¹⁷⁵⁾
- D. Approval of the Russian Parliament granted in September 2015 for the request of the Russian President (Putin) to allow the use of the Russian armed forces abroad constituted an important variable in Russian trends, given the use of military force in its conflicts with the major countries in the Middle East. Four years after the beginning of the Syrian crisis and under the heading of "War on Terror", Russian military operations in Syria began on September 30, 2015 with

(174) Ali Ziyad Al-Ali, *Russian Strategy in the Arabian Gulf*, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Abu Dhabi, 2017, p. 20.

(175) Amani Zahran, *The Awakening of the Russian Bear After a Deep Perseverance*, The Anglo-Egyptian Library, Cairo, 2014, p. 34.

air strikes, amid protests and American and Western protests and objections (France, Britain, Germany), as well as amid regional support (for Iran) in addition to China. The Russian President Vladimir Putin described the Russian intervention in Syria as “the only way in the war on international terrorism”. Coordination and joint cooperation was later reached between the two sides (Russian and American) on flights over Syria, which became the focus of the major power struggle.

Russian political and strategic thought

- A. Russia has geopolitical goals in the region, which includes the Near East, the Middle East, the Arab world, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Islamic republics in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Together, these regions constitute the vital scope of Russian interests and from a strategic and military perspective Russia needs to reduce the size of potential threats on its southern borders. This prompts it to establish a partnership with the Islamic and Arab world and this helps solve the Chechen problem and thus secure more internal stability in Russia. It also supports achieving the economic goals and the commercial and military partnership between Russia and the oil-rich countries of the region, so Russia has tried to constantly exist in this region to control it and prevent the United States of America from remaining alone.
- B. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has witnessed a process of restructuring, according to which it has become more realistic, measuring its movements and trends by the size of its power and by the extent to which these movements and trends achieve the benefit of the Russian national interests. This is evident from the statement of Russian President Putin, when he stressed that "the world is changing rapidly and the paths of globalization hide various dangers, while the economic crises and shocks that are taking place in regions of the world encourage some of them to solve their problems at the expense of others by using means of military pressure, and therefore the emergence of destructive forces in some regions of the world threatens the security of peoples, as well as the countries that try to export democracy, and do

not hesitate to violate international law and the sovereignty of states, for this reason remain allies of these forces”.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

- C. The Middle East region is one of those regions that are witnessing very complex and dangerous political, economic, security, social, sectarian, ethnic and religious tremors, as there are many sensitive files that take an international character and have their extensions and ramifications. It ignores the interactions and conflicts in a strategic dimension, being in contact with issues related to the future of humanity in general, the fate of many countries and the international balance of power more specifically.
- D. Three basic interests can be identified that determine the pattern of Russian behavior in the Middle East, which are:
 - 1. Military political interest. This is achieved by strategically exhausting the United States of America by competing with them in the region, by luring it into riots in more than one arena and the Middle East is one of them. This stems from the Russian leadership’s realization that when the time comes to recalculate the balance of global power, despite knowing Moscow is fully aware that it cannot equalize the economic or military power of the United States anytime soon, so it can refuse to remain as a global power of the second category and insist on the need to reshape the global balance of power. Russia seeks to exploit the US military failures in the Middle East, especially Iraq, to increase its gains and influence in the region. This is in support of its allies Iran and Syria on the one hand, and the reinforcing Russian rapprochement with the countries of the region at the expense of the United States on the other hand and the limitation of the large American economic and commercial presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In light of the unilateral American project in the world in general, and in the Middle East in particular, Moscow realized that the Iraqi quagmire would not be any easier than the Afghan quagmire in which the Soviet Union fell in the eighties of the twentieth century. American singularity will leave a political and global vacuum in the map of the new world order,

(176) Izzat Saeed Al-Sayed, *Russian Politics and Middle East Security...Between Terrorism and Iran*, International Politics Magazine, August 30, 2015: <http://www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsQ/5466.aspx>

allowing it to return once again to the international and Middle Eastern arena, but this time with a stronger presence.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾

2. Economic interest. In the era of President Putin, Russia succeeded in reconciling its economic objectives in the region with its strategic interest. The nature of Russian dealings with the countries of the region is currently different from what it was in previous periods, which depended mainly on the ideological element that was often superior to the economic logic.
3. Security interest: It can be said that politics of the Russian Foreign Ministry stems from a vision based on one of its pillars, which attaches importance to the geographical and strategic value of the Middle East region. This region represents the forefront in the ladder of global concerns and that no global system can be formed away from that strategic region, because it represents the heart of the world, where it is decided. It is the centers of international balances and powers, while it represents a fulcrum and a political lever for any potential role of any American, Russian or European power.

Foundations of Russian strategic influence in the Arab Gulf region:⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

- A. Iranian nuclear file. Russia has supported Iran from the beginning and still insists on this approach, even after reaching the Geneva (5+1) agreement on the Iranian nuclear file.
- B. Oil and gas. The Arab Gulf region is one of the most important areas of energy concentration, as its exports constitute a large proportion of global consumption. The mainstay of the Russian economy depends largely on the export of oil and gas and therefore the core of Russian interest in the region is based on direct and indirect coordination with the role of the exporter of petroleum in order to maintain oil prices and preventing them from falling.
- C. Syrian crisis. Unlike the rest of the Arab transformation countries, it is considered the fastest in determining the Russian position towards it. It did not

(177) Nourhan Al-Sheikh, *A Calculated Alliance: Determinants of Compatibility between Iran and Russia*, International Politics Journal, Issue 196, Cairo, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, April 2014, p.90.

(178) Ali Ziyad Al-Ali, *The Russian Strategy in the Arabian Gulf*, aforementioned reference, p. 20.

wait for the results and repercussions of the Arab change movements. Instead, Russia took the initiative to announce its support for the Syrian government.

- D. Russian positions on the Middle East issues.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ This concerns its internal affairs as much as it relates to Russia's vision of the region and its system of interests in it. At the internal Russian level, it is apprehensive about the rise of Islamic movements, fearing that this will be reflected in the separatist regions in Russia.

See researcher Russia, with its capabilities, political legacy, and current orientations, qualifies to occupy a prominent place in the map of forming the new world. Russia works with caution and tries not to lose any of the parties. For example, Moscow supports Tehran, while trying not to antagonize the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It also supports Damascus, taking into account that this does not raise the concern of other Arab countries.

Chinese trends

- A. Friendly relationships between China and the Arab countries go back to ancient times, where the ancient Silk Road closely linked China with the Arab countries and left a precious heritage that embodies the glory and splendor of the Chinese and Arab civilizations. Considering the needs of its economy of oil and gas and securing other economic requirements, as well as political ambitions, China uses various means to achieve its strategic goals, starting with investments and diplomatic efforts and ending with arms deals.
- B. The Middle East region was never a focus of interest in the Chinese strategy, as it is today, and the countries of the region, on their part, did not view China as a reliable international player. The limited and marginal Chinese role remained limited to trade and cultural exchanges. Beijing did not seek to have an actual presence or to establish areas of influence in the region, like other international powers did.
- C. The emergence of “energy security” as one of the most important pillars of national security that ensures the continuation of the Chinese economy in rotation. Accordingly, China’s interest in the Arab region has become greater than before, but without active involvement in its issues, taking into account the foundations that govern its foreign policy because it is the most important source of energy in the world. It is also one of the most important consumer markets and it can now be said that the balance of trade exchange with any country is the only measure of the level of development of relations

(179) Ali Ziyad Al-Ali, previous reference, p. 21.

with others from the Chinese point of view. Economic relations have dominated most of China's movements and diplomatic behavior in the Arab region, confirming the top priority of this relationship for decision makers in China. ⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

China's political position

- A. Despite China's support for a historical settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was deliberately staying away from entering into the details of this process. Bias one against the other. ⁽¹⁸¹⁾
- B. Chinese foreign policy required silence regarding the events of the so-called Arab Spring in the beginning and it refused to recognize these events as revolutions. China stands with the regimes, whatever they are, as long as they are in power, and then withdraws from them to support the opposition and agree with it when this opposition moves to power. This was not a new situation. During the events of the Iranian revolution, China was siding with the Shah and took a negative stance towards the revolution. With the success of the Iranian revolution in overthrowing the Shah's regime, China began to open its doors to the nascent Iranian revolution, then it became the largest supplier of weapons to Iran in its war against Iraq. This war presented its stand on neutrality and an equal distance from the two conflicting sides, demanding that both stop the war and settle disputes through dialogue and negotiation.
- C. The Chinese position regarding the events of the so-called Arab Spring at its inception was silent, fearing the contagion of these events spreading to China, which is prepared for it by virtue of the continued control of the Communist Party of China over the course of political, economic, social and cultural life, the stifling of freedoms, widespread corruption, as well as the misdistribution of wealth and income. This is the explanation that was reinforced in the measures taken by the Chinese government at the level of banning Internet materials, such as the phrase Jasmine flower, the symbol of the Tunisian revolution and Egypt. But when the opposition succeeded in Tunisia and Egypt, China sought to improve its image with them, so it gave Tunisia a financial gift of 40 million yuan and received an industrial unions delefagation from Egypt. China included

(180) Izzat Shahro, *China and the Middle East: Features of a New Approach*, Al Jazeera Center for Political and Strategic Studies reports, June 2012, p. 30.

(181) Hanan Kandil, *China, a new model for a rising power*, Journal of International Politics, Cairo, No. 173, 2008, p. 19.

representatives of companies and financing institutions in this delegation, to show the desire for economic cooperation between the two countries.

Chinese interests and goals:

- A. Economic considerations are one of the main and important determinants in the formulation of regional and international relations in the Arab region, as this region is a model for the overlapping of political and economic relations and the employment of the economic dimension to achieve political gains, and to create a network of interests and financial and economic alliances, which are used in the processes of directing, and influencing political decision of some countries.
- B. The Arabian Gulf region is the main source of oil and gas for China for a long time, as the Gulf countries supply China with 65% of its necessary needs of oil and gas, and the major Chinese deals in the fields of oil and gas with both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar are an essential element in the Chinese moves in the region.
- C. China is aware of the strategic importance of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which are the closest in terms of transportation routes, compared to Latin American countries and African countries. Therefore, energy supply remains a strategic issue and even national security in the first place, given the importance of development plans for the internal policies of the Chinese government, which explains China's policies towards the Arab Gulf region, as it considered that work must be done to achieve a safe environment for the areas where there are sources and routes for the passage of oil, by adopting neutral stances towards the crises that occur in the region, to the effect of which is the necessity of settling these crises by peaceful means and excluding the military option, in addition to In addition, China's proposal for specific frameworks on energy security.⁽¹⁸²⁾
- D. The Chinese interest was initially focused on the internal economic and political situation, but after the Chinese economy reached an advanced stage that placed it in the ranks of the major countries in terms of income figures, savings, foreign reserves of hard currency and international trade, the Chinese military force must

(182) Ashraf Muhammad Kishk, *The Chinese Strategy towards the Countries of Iran and the Arab Gulf: The Dilemma of Achieving Balance between Interests and Principles*, Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, p. 30.

keep pace with the economic situation that needs reinforcing Military, despite the priority of the diplomatic tool in achieving China's national goals and interests, there has become a firm conviction among China's leaders that the military tool has become a pivotal mechanism in playing a major role in supporting and affirming China's national goals and interests. Chinese interests and goals in the Arab region in the security and military field lie in cooperating with the countries of the region in their need for advanced military technology, developing and developing Arab-Chinese military cooperation and supporting military manufacturing and joint manufacturing of weapons and spare parts to benefit from the Arab market to dispose of their products within the framework of mutual relations⁽¹⁸³⁾ .

- E. China's position towards the Syrian crisis and its objection to the United States' attempts to obtain a Security Council resolution to strike Syria constituted the culmination of Chinese power in the face of American arrogance, in addition to China and the United States entering the stage of silent military competition in the Arab region. The United States was not satisfied with its presence only. In the waters of the Arabian Gulf, it even sent (60%) of its naval forces to the Pacific Ocean as a deterrent message directed to the Chinese military force, and it also provided more advanced weapons to its allies in the Asian region (nearing China) to increase the readiness of those countries in the event of any military confrontation A future agreement with Beijing, which China has met with its significant increase in its military presence in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, which represents an effort by both powers (the United States, China) to preserve their interests in the region.

Chinese political thought⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

- A. a policy of balance between regional adversaries like the balance between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the balance between the Arabs and Israel, and it seems that China's lack of direct or clear bias from the conflicting parties keeps it the opportunity to play the role of mediator, and at the same time preserves its interests and investments in the region, thus widening

(183) *Review of Military Exchanges between China and Arab Countries*, November 1, 2010, People's Daily website: <http://arabic.people.com.cn/31660/7184029.html>

(184) Walid Abdel Hai, *Cautious Engagement: Does Politics Restrict Balance China's role in the Middle East?* International Politics Journal, issue 15, January 2017, p. 20.

the gap between the conflicting parties, especially Saudi Arabia. And Iran will have harmful consequences for China, as the war will inevitably lead to a return to the rise in oil prices, given the importance of the two countries in global production, and the war in the region will increase arms sales in the region, which is in the interest of the United States of America more than China and could reduce exchange Trade in the region, which China considers a fertile market for Chinese products.

- B. Reliance on diplomacy: By sending envoys to communicate with the parties to the conflict without appearing as a third party in international settlements, which is noted in its non-participation in the International Quartet for a settlement in the Middle East, and only sending envoys to reach with the parties within narrow limits or hosting the opposition without holding international meetings.
- C. Undermining the Russian role This is in situations in which China senses strategic risks to its interests, which has been clarified in the Syrian case, and from religious movements, a position of Chinese-Russian rapprochement from the dangers of terrorism and the so-called political Islam on their interests in the region or the transmission of terrorism to their lands through the Middle East.
- D. The Belt and Road Project⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ The Belt and Road Initiative represents a revival of the idea of the ancient Silk Road that connected China with the outside world two thousand years ago, but the new initiative has many features and dimensions that are larger and broader than the old Silk Road, and the Silk Road refers to a group of land roads that linked the eastern region Asia in the Mediterranean through Central Asia, but it was not known precisely the main path of this road, and China seeks to achieve a set of goals as follows:
 - a. Benefit from the growth of global trade.
 - b. Strengthening the position of the Chinese yuan in the world.
 - c. development of the Chinese economy.
 - d. Strengthening the position of communications technology companies.
 - e. Strengthening the Chinese presence in the Eurasia region.
 - f. Expand the external role of China.
 - g. Ensure the stability of the power supply.

(185) Ali Salah, *The Belt and Road Project. How China Connects Its Economy to the Outside World*, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 2018.

EU Directions

- A. After the European countries, during the previous colonial stages, occupied the first place in political, economic and military power, and controlled the rights and destinies of many of the countries that colonized them, including the strategically important Arab Gulf states, which colonized them and extended their influence in them from the beginning, and formed political and economic relations. With it later today, it does not have the same power and influence due to the emergence of the strength and influence of the American role in the region. Given the increasing importance of the Arab Gulf region, specifically the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the European Union seeks and exerts great efforts to restore the role of European countries or to obtain a distinguished role for it in its relations with The GCC states, based on the strategic importance of these countries first, with which the achievement of European interests is linked second, and to ensure a clear, effective and influential European role in the region, Thirdly, it is trying to parallel or approximate the American role. In order to establish European rapprochement relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, it is natural for the European Union to set a specific policy towards the GCC countries to achieve its goals on the one hand and to achieve the GCC countries' benefit from that policy, and the goals on the other hand.
- B. Foreign policy has become of great importance to the European Union. More than 70% of European citizens want the European Union to play a greater role in international affairs, and today there is a strong desire and strong demand for a common European foreign policy, and everyone inside and outside the Union and among politicians recognize it. And the peoples of the inevitability that if Europe wants to be influential in the world, it must mobilize its resources to build a common foreign policy, and despite the birth of the European Union more than half a century ago, and this union expanded from six countries to 27 countries, to include nearly 500 million people. As well as the presence of 1.3 billion people in 80 countries linked to the Union in various forms such as aid, foreign investment, trade and money, and a third of the world's population lives in the European sphere in an area subject to European influence. Statistics confirm that the European Union is responsible for a quarter of the economic output in the world. It also represents the largest single buyer of goods from developing countries in the world, and is the largest unrivalled donor of aid. In

light of all these factors, the real geopolitical weight of the European Union arises.

The interests of the European Union in the Arab Gulf region

The European behavior with the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially after the nineties of the twentieth century, reflects the European interests and objectives in the region, if the European behavior prevailed in the non-conflictive cooperative character, which is evident through the diplomatic contacts and the pursuit of expanding cooperative relations politically, economically, culturally, security and militarily⁽¹⁸⁶⁾Based on this, on the opportunity of the European Union to play a distinguished role in the Arab Gulf region, as one of the major trading partners of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, then this will be part of the political and military activity of the European Union at the global level, and it has a large and clear role in the security of the Arab Gulf.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ thus fulfilling European interests and objectives in the region and at the same time realizing the interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council in its dealings with Europe.

The intense European dependence in the fields of economy and energy are the most important pillars and interests that strengthen the European Union's relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as the European Union relies heavily on energy supplies obtained from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which will at the same time be a popular and important market for European exports. There have been vital interests in the Arab Gulf region since ancient times, and these interests increased after the emergence of oil as a strategic commodity. European interests in the Arabian Gulf region are summarized as follows:

A. In the political field

Establishing the (Euro-Mediterranean) Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations and exploring the possibility of conducting an intercultural dialogue at the level of the Middle East and with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, in addition to supporting interfaith dialogue and exchanging experiences regarding minority rights, activating civil society organizations and combating terrorism.

Play an active role in the efforts exerted to establish a just and comprehensive peace in the international community to achieve stability and development, develop human resources and advance the core values related to democracy and human rights.

(186) Kamal Aziz Al-Rawi, *Saudi Arabia and the security of the Arab Gulf in light of the new situation*, aforementioned reference, pp. 80-81.

(187) Dhafer Muhammad Al-Ajmi, *The security of the Arab Gulf, its development and problems from the perspective of regional and international relations*, aforementioned reference, p. 604.

Deepening the political dialogue with the Arab countries individually and with the League of Arab States so that it focuses on supporting the rule of law and good governance, with special attention to respecting human rights.

B. In the economic field: ⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

Since regional conflicts in the Middle East in general and the Gulf region in particular have an indirect impact on the European continent, this continent considers that finding just solutions to the problems related to the region is very important, especially in the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Liberalizing trade between the participating countries (Euro-Mediterranean) and trade in agricultural products and trade in services, reaching a free trade agreement with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and establishing a common economic market.

Supporting regional integration among the countries of the southern Mediterranean and encouraging related initiatives with the aim of reaching a regional trade agreement by linking the (Euro-Mediterranean) free trade agreements with the trade agreement between the European Union and the GCC countries.

Expanding the scope of trade and economic cooperation in the neighboring regions, especially the Mediterranean region, securing interests, especially with regard to energy and petroleum resources, and ensuring their flow at reasonable prices.

Activating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement and supporting the gradual liberalization of trade in all fields in accordance with the provisions of the Barcelona Declaration (1995).

Choosing the region as a major area in which the European Union works to play an active and vital role in confronting the American hegemony, and to increase the attraction of investors to build a broad investment market.

C. In the military and security field:

The growing military capabilities of the European Union to put pressure on the United States.

Strengthening military cooperation in addressing global security challenges such as terrorism and crime the organization drug smuggling and illegal immigration, as well as conflict prevention and crisis management, while seeking a peaceful settlement of all existing disputes and conflicts.

(188) Nawar Muhammad Rabie Al-Khairy, *The Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union, The Path of Relationships and the Limits of Cooperation Areas*, International Studies, No. (40), p. 36.

Britain's separation from the European Union:

- A. Britain's exit from the European Union imposed itself on global events, as what happened represents the biggest setback the European Union has witnessed since its founding. No member state has ever withdrew before, as Britain's exit from the European Union represents a loss of about The economy of the union, and more military and global influence, as global stock markets lost more than (2) trillion dollars of their value, and the loss of American stocks amounted to about (830) billion dollars, in addition to a loss of (657) billion dollars from the (Standard Indexes) index. And more than (400) billion dollars from the global financial sector, while oil prices recorded a significant decline of about (5%), and the pound sterling fell against the US dollar to its lowest level in (30) years.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾
- B. The European Union now needs to bridge the British exit gap, which is represented by seven billion euros in its annual budget of 145 billion euros. A country in the European Union, after two years of negotiations, with the legal status of the country in the European Union during this period remaining the same, i.e. remaining part of the European Union and bound for the duration of the negotiations by the laws of the European Union (theoretically) but it will be excluded from the consultations related to the terms of withdrawal.
- C. In the event that the two parties do not reach an agreement between them, it can resort to relying on the laws of the World Trade Organization, but provided that the 161 member states of the organization agree, in addition to depriving them of entering the single European market, after leaving the European Union.
- D. The British exit from the European Union will strengthen the Anglo-American alliance, and preserving the role of the European Union in the world will become expected on the continuation of the Franco-German alliance as a locomotive for the European Union, and it is certain that the Corona pandemic has deepened the divisions of the European Union or at least indicated that it is in major crises The priority is the national sovereignty of each country, and that the ability of the European Union to influence as a unified political force on the international arena is still delayed, even if its economic impact is significant.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

(189) Marwa Hassan Hussein, Mr. Shukri, *The Beginning of the End for the European Union*, Al-Akhbar Newspaper, No. (20035) for the year 65, Cairo, on June 26, 2106, p. 7.

(190) Muhammad Ahmed, *Reading in the Transformations of the International Strategic Environment*, previous reference, p. 27.

- E. The European Union will remain a major economic power and the second largest trade market after China, which is expected to continue despite the recession that hit the European economies, including the German economy.
- F. And - sees the researcher The impact of Britain's exit from the European Union has not yet appeared, and the Gulf relations with the European Union will not be affected during the coming period, and will remain the same with Britain, although there are new measures that will be applied between them, unlike what was happening at the time of Britain's presence in the European Union.

NATO

- A. NATO ascended to enter into the balance of power calculations in the Arab Gulf region and even in the Middle East, as a result of the tasks assigned to it at the NATO Conference held in the American city of Istanbul in 2004 (Istanbul Initiative, ICI) and the extension of its missions towards the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf , which is considered a change in the Arab Gulf region, where the interests of the (NATO) alliance came in the Arabian Gulf region due to its strategic importance in an attempt to formulate role the future of the Alliance and its contribution to the security arrangements in the region, and linking interests Economic and political and oil between Countries alliance and countries Council Cooperation for countries Arabian Gulf.
- B. The strategic direction of NATO towards the Arab Gulf region revolves around two axes: the first: NATO and the processes of reform and internal change in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, by opening offices for it to monitor reform, meaning that it plays the role of guardian over it and encourages the GCC countries to adopt the values of the Western political and cultural model to create the political and cultural environment, which helps the penetration of Western values and culture into societies The conservative Gulf region, and thus paves the way indirectly for the integration of Israel into the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East, which is a strategic goal for the United States of America and Israel. As for the second axis It is the development of the strategic concept of NATO by not restricting the alliance's movements and activating its role in the crises that occur in the region Without seek refuge to me resolution from the board international security.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

(191) Ali Abdel Sadiq, *NATO and the Greater Middle East, International Politics*, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 163, January 2006, pp. 160-161.

Reducing the role of the United Nations and other international organizations

The decline in the strength and effectiveness of the international organization represented by the United Nations and its mechanisms and institutions, after the increased control of international powers, especially the United States of America, over the United Nations and work to reformulate its principles and employ its mechanisms and decisions to support policies related to the interests of major powers. This framework highlights the following: ⁽¹⁹²⁾

- A. The limited effectiveness of the collective security system within the United Nations towards providing solutions to crucial issues in the region, compared to its selective policies that issue decisions that contribute to the worsening of the situation in the region and the establishment of new rules under the umbrella of humanitarian intervention and the fight against terrorism that transcend the principles of national sovereignty and the privacy of traditions, religions and customs for peoples, which is what Highlighted by the decisions related to the Palestinian issue.
- B. The transformation of the UN Security Council and the right to use the veto into an umbrella, whether to barter in managing interests between international parties or protect the interests of allies and disturb the balance of power in the different regions in accordance with the international interest, which is reflected in the pattern of international voting, especially the American one, in favor of Israeli positions and barter between Western powers. With Russia and China regarding the decisions related to Iran and Syria and the international resolutions targeting North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, in return for ignoring any action towards Israeli programs.
- C. Employing the Human Rights Council on the one hand, and using universal jurisdiction on the other hand, as a tool to interfere in the internal affairs of countries and put pressure on the regimes instead of using them as tools to achieve justice and find just solutions to address issues and crises, which is evident in the decisions of the Sudanese President from the Criminal Court.
- D. Continuing to develop the concepts of threats to international peace and security. In 1993, the statement of the UN Security Council defined these threats to include, in addition to armed conflict, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the environment, human rights and the non-proliferation of democracy.

(192) Abdul Rahman Al-Hawari, *International Challenges and Their Implications for Arab National Security*, Nasser Higher Military Academy, National Defense College, November 2007, p. 31.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, priority was given in the face of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The phenomenon of international alliances

The world witnessed a kind of stability and consensus after the end of the Cold War and turned to development and cooperation, but because of power politics that raise fears and conflicts that threaten security, and expose the economies of the land and the environment to great risks in addition to the strategic needs and interests of countries, all of this pushed every country in the world To search for a strategic ally, the major powers themselves were not excluded from this situation. The United States of America seeks alliance with the European Union, cooperation with the Russian Federation, and compatibility with China. China has also recorded new advances in cooperation with other major powers, and it is one of the most prominent of these alliances, but it takes A form of cooperation and consensus.⁽¹⁹³⁾

Influential international security and military changes:

The United States of America deliberately disturbs the military balances in the Arab Gulf region, as most countries import weapons from the United States of America, and from other sources, and from here the United States controls the types of weapons, their quantity, the degree of technological development and their armament system to ensure their control over the balance mechanisms, which serves Direct American interests or one of its allies such as Israel, and its recent successes, led by (Trump) in concluding major military deals with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, are estimated at more than (600) billion dollars for the year 2017.

The international system faces a dilemma in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and the dilemma is related to the situation of the nuclear states that possessed those weapons after reaching the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. The treaty does not legally recognize what is based on the ground, such as: (Pakistan, India, and Israel) except with the presence of five nuclear states, the states that actually possessed weapons until 1968, and they are the permanent members of the Security Council (America, Britain, Russia, France, China). To the treaty, such as South Africa, and other countries that have abandoned their nuclear programs, such as: (Brazil and Argentina), and the current dilemma is the countries that have already possessed nuclear weapons, whether declared or undeclared, such as Israel, or with suspended situations such as North Korea, or countries seeking to acquire

(193) Muhammad Gharbi, *Al-Wajeez in the History of Contemporary International Relations*, Top Press, third edition, 2007, pg. 403.

weapons nuclear like Iran, The fact that Israel remains a nuclear state means the imbalance in the Middle East region, and leads to an increase in the successive race to acquire nuclear weapons, which is what Iran is seeking despite the nuclear agreement.

The pursuit of the proliferation of nuclear programs and capabilities for peaceful (civilian) purposes leads to the emergence of the most important risks:⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

- A. political risks Related to political tensions and pressures that could lead to a state of international and regional anxiety (what is described as peaceful and considered by another country as military).
- B. military risks It relates to the nature of peaceful nuclear facilities as vital targets that are vulnerable to attack in the event of war.
- C. environmental risks Such as the leakage of nuclear radiation from reactors and facilities, or the burial or transportation of nuclear waste and everything related to nuclear accidents.
- D. Other external dimensions to prevent and obstruct countries from establishing nuclear projects, through intelligence and military intervention in all stages of project construction.

Fourth generation wars:

- A. International relations have witnessed many wars that differ in their nature and the nature of their parties, which led to the existence of different types of wars, and they can be classified according to two criteria: (the scope of the war – the temporal development).
- B. The fourth generation wars are called asymmetric wars or asymmetric wars, and they are those wars that depend on a type of rebellion in which irregular forces use all technological means, or that war that is forced, and works to fail the state and then impose a new reality that takes into account the interests America, and the state is destabilized.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾
- C. These wars do not aim to destroy the military institution or eliminate the capacity of the state, but aim to exhaust the power of the enemy state and the slow erosion of its will in order to force it to carry out what the force that uses this type of war wants, and it also aims to thwart the state through operations Slow

(194) Mohamed Abdel Salam, *Gray Problems, Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo*, The Strategic Report 2011, p. 16.

(195) Zainab Hosni Ezzedine, *The Impact of Fourth Generation Wars on Arab National Security*, Arab Democratic Center, Cairo, 2017, p. 10.

implementation in hostile countries so that there is a part of the land of that country did not fall under its control.

The ballistic missile program in North Korea is considered one of the most advanced systems and poses threats to global security, and the last five years (2014-2018) witnessed an unprecedented speed of tests for new missiles with a longer range, and naval launches from submarines, and among the most prominent of these developments is what it has done North Korea from the test of the ballistic missile Wasong-14, in July 2017, an intercontinental ballistic missile, which has the possibility of its ability to reach the territory of the United States of America)¹⁹⁶⁾ These missile tests are considered one of the most important international variables affecting the world, and the world may witness a frantic race between the forces that own the elements, means and tools of power and nuclear deterrence from single-stage (nuclear fission) represented by nuclear bombs, to two-stage (nuclear fission as an initial stage, then fusion Nuclear as a second stage in order to cause emissions with huge damaging capabilities) represented in the so-called (hydrogen bombs), and although North Korea detonated a small hydrogen device in one of the experiments, it resulted in an earthquake measuring 5.1 degrees on the scale. The Geological Survey of the United States of America, where the leaders of the Group of Seven condemned North Korea's test, and demanded it abide by United Nations Security Council resolutions, and halt nuclear and missile tests and other provocative actions.

see researcher In light of the monopoly of the major powers on nuclear weapons alone, and since all countries are working to protect their national security in light of conflict and technological and nuclear competition, it is natural for North Korea, through its ballistic missile program and these experiments, to provoke fear and terror in the entire world, not the United States of America Only, as these experiments represent a huge technological and qualitative leap in nuclear weapons systems, where the (hydrogen) bomb represents the most dangerous systems of mass destruction.

Influential international economic variables:

Globalization in the economic field

Globalization has become one of the most important issues on the global intellectual scene since the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, and globalization came initially in the field of economy, and as a result of the scientific and technological revolution that represented a wide and new shift for the development of global

(196) *Beauty Nazi, her secrets and ways rename it. This is amazing she missiles Korea North Arabic*, 2017, pg. Link : <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2017/08/29/>

capitalism, and more precisely, globalization came with the transformation of the pattern of national capitalism. To a more comprehensive and broader type, leading to transcontinental capitalism, where the national economy is no longer governed by the state alone, which poses a challenge to the Gulf and Arab national economy. Their activity was previously governed by the borders of the national state to which they belong. In the era of globalization, economic activity has become linked to free financial and industrial groups, where limited activity has turned into a wide activity through multinational companies and institutions, and requires that these companies not become disguised economic colonialism.⁽¹⁹⁷⁾

see researcher: That globalization is considered an explicit threat rather than an economic system, where the domination of capitalism on the global economy and its international institutions, and the supremacy of liberal culture over other cultures, making it in the position of subordinate to it.

Energy price fluctuations:

- A. The price of oil is exposed to fluctuations in the global oil markets, and this is due to the so-called (market fundamentals) represented by the interaction between supply and demand, in addition to the strength of the US dollar and the impact of the activity of speculators in the markets, as the analyzes link the decline in the price of crude and the abundance of supply in Oil markets, especially from outside the oil-exporting countries (OPEC), where oil prices in the global markets in 2014 witnessed a steady decline, as the price of Brent crude was in the range of 110 dollars per barrel, but it declined in the first days of January 2015 to below fifty And a report by the International Monetary Fund stated that the abundance of supplies contributed 60% of the decline, specifically the so-called shale oil boom in the United States of America, and the Energy Organization reports during that period that global oil stocks in America reached their highest levels, and energy security became two correlates, The first is to secure supplies as a requirement for consuming countries, and the second is to secure demand as a requirement for producing countries so that they can spend on investments as the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and it is

(197) Mahmoud Mohieldin, "Manifestations and Effects of Globalization in the Economic Field," a research paper, a symposium on globalization and its effects on Egyptian national security, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2002, p. 63.

considered the most beneficiaries of low energy prices (the United States of America, China, France, India, Japan, Turkey and the Eurozone).⁽¹⁹⁸⁾

- B. Over the past decades, the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf have played a pivotal role in stabilizing the global energy market. This role is a result of the huge reserves of oil and natural gas that the Arab Gulf countries possess, as well as their keenness to stabilize their prices, as the budgets of the GCC countries are largely linked to oil revenues.

see researcher The nature of the energy policy of the countries of the region, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which aims to achieve stability in the global energy market by developing a set of mechanisms, has helped these countries to play a positive role in facing the many crises that the global energy market has witnessed since the seventies. horn twenty even Now, through its role in balancing global supply and demand

Influential international social variables:

A. American war of ideas

The American demands for the Arab countries escalated from time to time to carry out comprehensive political and social reforms, foremost of which is changing the school curricula, since those curricula, from Washington's point of view, help spread the culture of terrorism. It also demanded respect for human rights and the establishment of civil society organizations that defend these rights.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ In order to control the Arab mind, the American and Western strategy in general has used important pillars to launch during the past three decades, we can mention them (the Ford Foundation, the RAND Corporation, the Social Sciences Research Council and the Middle East Committee, the US Agency for Development, and the Initiative for Peace and Cooperation in the East The Middle East), in addition to the establishment of an interconnected network between American and Zionist research institutes and centers in order to penetrate scientific research in various fields, in order to spread American Western ideas to the Gulf and Arab minds.

B. Environment and international relations:

Environmental issues imposed the necessity of building international (human) relations in which people join hands for their common interests and review the major multilateral environmental agreements, for example the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone

(198) Ali El-Din Hilal, *Renewed Importance: In Criticism of the Middle East Retreat Thesis*, Al-Siyasah Al-Dawlaiya Journal, Cairo, No. 203, December 31, 2015, p. 9.

(199) Nashwa Al-Hofi, *Cyberspace and the Israeli Army's Strategy*, Al-Watan Egyptian Newspaper, Issue 1233, Cairo, September 14, 2015, p. 12.

Layer in 1985, then the United Nations Convention on Climate Change in 1992 and then the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and other agreements on the environment, and interest began to politicize environmental and nature issues in the form of developing systems and institutions to control the environment and concluding global agreements on them, and the emergence of new international actors concerned with environmental issues and many environmental and non-governmental organizations to play a global role in order to preserve the environment. Under the claim of sovereignty, countries can stand up to the demands of global civil society organizations about preserving the environment. Environmental problems impose ideas about joint global cooperation that transcend the borders of the state, its sovereignty and the limits of its power. ⁽²⁰⁰⁾

NS- Interest in knowledge and science to confront environmental disasters and the emergence of the concept of sustainable development through competitions that took place around the environment and the economy and achieving a balance between economic development, social development and environmental protection. The international organization for environmental affairs, and international cooperation to confront issues of environmental pollution, climate changes and their effects on the economies of countries, and the environmental conditions of non-polluting food and industrial products and commodities, and thus pose future challenges that must be taken into account when making the general policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

Climate Variables:

- A. The scientist (Edward Wilson), professor at Harvard University, refers to all the crises that the global economy is experiencing at the present time mainly related to the environment, and this is not limited to the problem of climate change and pollution, but also the problems of lack of water resources and food, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries are heading to develop a strategy development facing the challenges of climate and environmental changes and heading towards Renewable energy and increased investment in this direction futuristic to achieve sustainable development⁽²⁰¹⁾
- B. Global warming and global warming lead to a lack of water resources and an increase in soil salinity in the coastal areas on the Arabian Gulf, and poses

(200) Ammar Ali Hassan, *Environment and International Relations, International Politics*, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 63, Cairo, April 2008, p. 88.

(201) Muhammad Riyad, *Strategic Transformations, A New World, Transcending the Inevitable, Will Man Redefine Geography Issues and Its Conflicts*, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 200, April 2015, pp. 12-14.

a threat to economic and agricultural activity, such as the lack of water and food in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, which requires the development of new varieties of agricultural crops that can withstand the scarcity Water and high levels of salinity, and the danger here to the infrastructure, and the necessity of planning cities, roads, water networks and power plants to adapt to climate changes, in addition to improving the management of integrated water resources, searching for new resources and developing water desalination technology in the GCC countries, which mainly suffer from a lack of Water Resources. ⁽²⁰²⁾

Corona pandemic:⁽²⁰³⁾

The Corona pandemic opened the door to reviewing many economic priorities and revealed gaps in the liberal policies followed in developed countries, and opened the door to reviewing health systems, especially in light of the attempts of many countries to employ any success they achieve in facing the pandemic in favor of the success of their model and political and economic experience.

4.3. The modern regional differences and their impact on the national security of the KSA

The Arab region witnessed a popular movement with new specifications in Arab countries that resulted in the birth of a new regime in two countries, Sudan and Algeria, and its regional and international effects are still continuing in the other two countries, Lebanon and Iraq.

Iran and Turkey, despite the pressure exerted by the United States of America and other European countries on it and the conception of various tools throughout 2020, their performance did not witness any radical transformation, except with regard to the clarity of opportunities for change from within the Turkish system, which allows (despite restrictions) to exist Strong and political currents capable at any moment to present an integrated political alternative to the project of Erdogan and his party.⁽²⁰⁴⁾

It has become clear that the Middle East is on the verge of potentially catastrophic developments in light of the interaction of international and regional variables, which may

(202) Mustafa Kamal, *The Arab World and Facing the Challenges of Climate Change, International Politics*, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 179, Cairo, January 2010, p. 45.

(203) Muhammad Ahmad, *Reading in the Transformations of the International Strategic Environment, Political Strategic Report*, International Institute for Iranian Studies, Rasanah, 2020, p. 26.

(204) *Annual Strategic Report 2020*, International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah).

directly affect Arab and Gulf collective security, and the national security of each individual country, and given the international and regional changes that have occurred so far, it is easy to notice. Most of them, if not all, were the embodiment of the relations of action and reaction between the global powers each other, as it can be noted that they were characterized by three main characteristics, as the first feature is the speed, intensity and accumulation of the interaction of these variables, and secondly, that the variable that occurs in any part of the the region affects all its parts positively or negatively, and thirdly, the phenomenon of interdependence, as these variables overlap with each other and interact with each other.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has contributed a great role in its Arab and regional surroundings, through its standing with the brotherly Arab countries, where it supported the sister Arab Republic of Egypt, after the revolution of June 30, 2013 (politically and economically), and it continues to do so until the brothers in Egypt can overcome All the threats and challenges facing them, and just as the Gulf role is clear in supporting legitimacy in Yemen, after the coup of the Houthi group against legitimacy, through the important Gulf support represented in the Gulf initiative and then the Operation Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope, which aims to save Yemen and protect the Yemeni people from Slip into dangerous armed conflicts that threaten their security and stability, in addition to the multi-track Gulf role, especially the economic role and financial support in the field of development and humanitarian aid, and in the field of relief and disasters.

The deteriorating security situation in Iraq, the political instability in it, the Iranian expansion in the region, the Yemeni crisis, the conflict in Syria, and the instability in Lebanon, in addition to the Qatari crisis, the Turkish military presence on its soil, the Libyan crisis, and the Israeli role in the Arab region, all of that and more. It will leave implications for the security of the Arabian Gulf region

The Middle East is witnessing a sensitive stage at all levels. There are political crises that afflict countries, and the spread of terrorist groups in several regions. It is possible to talk about Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State (ISIS), Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and members of the Revolutionary Guards and their leaders in both Syria and Lebanon. The Houthi group in Yemen, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear program, and the region is witnessing an Arab-Islamic alliance consisting of (the Gulf Cooperation Council countries excluding Sudan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Malaysia) to confront the serious challenges that Yemen is witnessing after the attempt to organize Al-Houthi and the supporters of the ousted president undermine his legitimacy in the country and control large areas of Yemen, in addition to the outbreak of the Qatari crisis on June 5, 2017, when four Arab

countries (Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Bahrain, and Egypt) cut diplomatic relations with Doha and imposed economic sanctions on it for its support and financing of terrorism.

The Arab Gulf region has grabbed the largest portion of international and regional attention for many decades, because it contains more than (65%) of the world's oil reserves, and (40%) of natural gas reserves, meaning that it maintains the largest global stock of energy, which is the backbone of The economic life and military power of the countries of the world, as well as the importance of its location for maritime traffic, as it represents a meeting point between East and West, and for this reason the security of the Arabian Gulf is one of the important strategic issues in international politics.⁽²⁰⁵⁾

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is exposed to a set of regional variables that affect national security, and regional variables mean that they are the set of variables experienced by the Middle East in general, and the Arab Gulf region in particular, which are among the factors affecting the issue of national security, by being worked on Consolidating the imbalance in the regional system, which has been subjected to major repercussions, reaching the point of the collapse of the regional balance, with Iraq's exit from the equation of power distribution in this region, which in turn led to Iran's dominance of the Arab Gulf region. Due to its many factors that show its superiority over the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, whether in terms of area or population, or its superiority in conventional military capabilities, to which the potential nuclear military capabilities will be added, as the main objective of Iran's possession of nuclear weapons is based on deterring any Western intervention in general. And the US, especially in any conflict in the Arab Gulf region, in order to achieve absolute Iranian hegemony, which leads to continued instability in the region.

Influential regional political variables:

The Arabian Gulf region (a turbulent regional environment)

- A. There are many parties and conflicting visions And with the multiplicity of visions conflicting interests and embodied regional relations in the Arab Gulf region already and the reaction to each other⁽²⁰⁶⁾ Hence, the Gulf Cooperation Council faces a turbulent regional environment of a conflict nature, which increases the burdens of this role. The challenges and dangers faced by the countries of the Arab Gulf region cannot be separated from each other, for example, the growth of extremist

(205) *A report on the security of the Arab Gulf after the Iraq war*, the Diplomatic Center for Strategic Studies, Kuwait, No. 8, 2004, p. 2.

(206) Mustafa Kamel Muhammad, *Regional and International Variables, a research paper*, aforementioned reference, 2016, p. 3.

groups and terrorism cannot be separated from the situation. The security situation in Iraq, or the current events in Syria, and the Iranian attempts to expand in neighboring countries cannot be separated from the US policy towards the region after the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).

- B. There are many regional and international parties concerned with the Arab Gulf region and their competition for influence. There is Iran, which seeks to turn into a regional power, and wants to translate this power into political influence not only in the Arab Gulf region, but also in the Middle East, in addition to the United States' attempt to monopolize influence in the region, in addition to Russia, China and many other countries. European countries who are trying to penetrate in one way or another to the Arab Gulf region.
- C. The current reality indicates that the regional variables overlap with local variables to the extent that separating them becomes difficult if not impossible. Salman, the Crown Prince in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in June 2017, with his modern reformist thought, and his efforts in the war against corruption within the Kingdom, which affected a group of princes and senior businessmen, and his strong relationship with decision-making institutions in the world, and maintaining balance in times when the region is exposed to storms And many wars, including the differences in the Arab arena over the Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan files. As for the second event, it is the Gulf Arab crisis with the State of Qatar, and the support of both (Iran and Turkey) for it, and the resulting presence of Turkish forces in the military base in a country Qatar, as for the regional event: It is the rebellion of the Houthi group and ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who turned into agents of Iran and turned against legitimacy, and Yemen is on the verge of partition, threatening the Gulf national security in general and Saudi security in particular, which led to the building of an international coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Decisive Storm). Restoring Hope), to restore Yemeni legitimacy and bring about political and security stability in the Republic of Yemen. ⁽²⁰⁷⁾
- D. In addition to that, the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the Russian intervention in the Syrian war, the tensions between (Turkey and Russia) that accompanied the downing of the Russian warplane, the Iranian nuclear agreement with major powers, and the events of the attack on the Saudi embassy in

(207) Mansour Saeed Al-Sarhani, *The proposed strategy for developing Egyptian relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in light of international and regional changes*, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2017, p. 33.

Iran and its attendants Of severing relations with some countries and withdrawing their ambassadors from Iran, as well as the issue of international terrorism, which Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi warned that “terrorism will cross borders if it is not confronted with all severity and decisiveness.” This is evidenced by the terrorist acts that occurred in some other countries (France, Turkey, Belgium and the states). United States), in addition to the continuation of the (Arab-Israeli) conflict.

Turkish policy in the region:

- A. Work to limit the division of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially after the outbreak of the Qatar crisis on June 5, 2017, in a way that works to prevent the crystallization of a united Gulf front towards Ankara.
- B. Developing strategic-Qatari relations, especially in light of the mutual consensus between them towards supporting branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, inaugurating relations with armed non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations and extremist armed militias, interfering in the internal affairs of Arab countries and searching for a regional power In the face of adversary countries, as well as their negative role in trying to thwart efforts to reach a solution to the Libyan crisis.
- C. Turkey’s desire to enhance economic cooperation with the Arab Gulf states, especially in the sectors of tourism, health, medical tourism, transportation, communications, information technology and agriculture, which represents the importance of Ankara after the intensification of its economic problems, following the decline in the value of the national currency, and the increase in the rate of inflation, Poverty, unemployment, as well as the Turkish public budget deficit, in a way that helps to restore the Turkish economy, which has been negatively affected. ⁽²⁰⁸⁾ In several respects, it is linked to the deterioration of Turkey's relations with some countries of the region due to its interventionist policy in the affairs of several countries, which is the opposite of the policy of minimizing the problems it was posing after the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2003.
- D. Obtaining Gulf financial support in the face of the refugee crisis, considering that Turkey is one of the main countries receiving Syrian refugees.

(208) Muhammad Ezz Al-Arab, *Turkish Policy towards Iran and the Arab Gulf States*, International Politics Magazine, Cairo No. 219, January 2020, p. 150 - p. 152.

- E. Consolidation of the Turkish military presence in the Arabian Gulf region, as Turkey had military bases in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Qatar, and it was trying to establish a presence in Sudan through the independence of Suakin Island.
- F. Employment of Turkey led to a number of Gulf Cooperation Council countries losing confidence in the United States of America as a strategic ally.
- G. The Turkish vision of the Iranian-Gulf differences Turkey is trying to employ the differences between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in different forms, involving contradiction and duplication, as follows:⁽²⁰⁹⁾
 - a. Whitewashing Iran's behavior in its Saudi crises, especially after the escalation of Iran's targeting of oil tankers and commercial trucks in the Arab Gulf region.
 - b. Avoid antagonizing Iran, which is consistent with the policy of the Sultanate of Oman not to engage in direct confrontation with Iran.
 - c. Hosting Iranian Brotherhood meetings to harm Saudi national security.
 - d. Creating new balances in the face of Iran's expansion, as Ankara seeks to formulate understandings based on some Arab Gulf states to balance the role, or rather Iranian expansion in Syria, Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Ansar Allah al-Houthi militia in Yemen, especially since some of these countries Its national security is exposed to Iranian threats. Perhaps the sleeper cell weapon represents clear evidence of Tehran's attempts to tamper with Gulf security.
- H. The Turkish project in the region is no less threatening than the Iranian project, through its use of hard force in the presence of defensive plans or military bases in several Arab countries, after the failure of the bet that Turkey would become a member of the European Union, in a way that pushes it to turn to the Gulf countries Arab countries to monopolize wealth and influence together, and to strengthen their presence militarily. This makes it impossible for Ankara to form a party to a Sunni alliance, or an umbrella of protection for any country in the region, especially in light of its tactical rapprochement with Iran.
- I. Economic ambitions (oil and gas) represent the main weakness of the Turkish economy in energy imports, which amounted to more than 40 billion dollars in 2018, as Turkey urgently needs oil and gas, and it is the second country after China in importing gas, as it imports approximately 99 % of its need for this resource. Which was one of the main reasons for its expansion outside its national borders⁽²¹⁰⁾.

(209) *Betting on a Horse, Turkish Policy in the Gulf Crisis*, at the following link: <https://bit.Jg2Mal-3x9>.

(210) *Turkish Expansion in the Region, Engines, Restrictions and Prospects*, Emirates Policy Center, Abu Dhabi, 2020, p. 5.

- J. The strategy of Turkish expansion in the region still represents one of the pillars of the policy of Erdogan's government in its dealing with regional affairs, and there are no indications that Turkey may retreat from it in the near term, but this strategy is increasingly facing many limitations and restrictions that affect its ability to Achieving the desired gains in the foreseeable future.
- K. The researcher believes that Turkey intends to continue its expansion in the region, which has become part of its political and strategic doctrine to consolidate regional influence under the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Regional powers and the traditional state, pushing Turkey to act unilaterally when necessary.
- L. The pillars of realizing the Turkish expansion project in the region are not parallel to the ambition of the Turkish leadership, which means that Turkey may have to reconsider the limits of its regional ambition towards reducing it to parallel potential gains with certain risks.

The Palestinian cause

The Arab-Israeli conflict, at the forefront of which is the Palestinian issue, is one of the main threats to security in the region, given that the Palestinian issue is the core of the conflict and the main cause of extremism and terrorism in the region. This approach serves the interest of Israel and the interest of Palestine as well as the interest of the United States, and that Egypt put forward a six-point vision for resolving the Palestinian issue, including a complete freeze of settlements, and for the international community to present the form of the final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, activating the negotiation path to build confidence, and that Jerusalem Al-Sharqiya is part of the occupied Palestinian territories, with a time frame for negotiations, and the United States of America is interested in the Syrian and Lebanese tracks as part of the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a basis for completing the peace process and regional stability⁽²¹¹⁾In addition to the initiative of the late, God Almighty, the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, which was called the Arab Initiative, whose goal is the establishment of an internationally recognized Palestinian state on the borders of (1967) with Jerusalem as its capital, the return of Palestinian refugees and the complete withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights, which is offset by Israeli intransigence and continuity In building settlements, in addition to working to Judaize Jerusalem, and stipulating the recognition of the Jewishness of the Israeli state.

(211) Elias Farhat, *The Political Conflict in the Middle East - Aspect and Strategy*, Middle Affairs, Issue 147, p. 36.

Syrian crisis

- A. The Syrian crisis, which has been going on since 2011 and until now (2018), constitutes a point of clash between several regional and international systems. In the end, to solve the crisis, but with external assistance (Russia / Iran), after the Arab League failed to solve it at the Arab level through Arab initiatives and the mission of observers, then the Russian–Chinese veto, which stood in front of any international unification to put pressure on the Syrian regime.
- B. The armed clashes between the opposition and government forces caused heavy losses among civilians, and the spread of terrorist and extremist groups in the Arab region as a result of the Syrian conflict, and their arrival in neighboring countries. Despite the semi-positive atmosphere that accompanied the (Venice, Astana) conferences, the actual settlement It has not been clear until now (2018) due to regional and international interests that are still in conflict to a large extent. The Syrian regime still rejects the idea of leaving or activating the texts for the formation of a transitional governing body, with strong military support from (Russia and Iran), as for the opposition, the complications It is almost larger and more influential in its position on the settlement, which calls for a political solution in accordance with UN Resolution (2254).⁽²¹²⁾
- C. In short, the Syrian crisis can be described as a deep political and security crisis, caused by the frustration that afflicted large sectors of the Syrian people, looking forward to political reform and respect for human rights. This frustration resulted from the absence of a (political solution) and the excessive repression carried out by the regime. Syrian opposition forces, which led to the transformation of the peaceful popular uprising that began in March 2011, against repression and corruption into a violent military confrontation between the government on the one hand, and armed opposition groups, and then terrorist organizations and groups on the other, which poses a threat to neighboring countries in the region⁽²¹³⁾The Gulf Cooperation Council affirms its firm position regarding the necessity of preserving Syria's unity, stability and safety, and supports any talks between opposition forces and the Syrian regime in order to reach a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.

(212) Security Council Resolution No. 2254 of December 18, 2015 regarding a ceasefire and a political settlement of the situation in Syria, a road map to end the conflict, Security Council website / 2015 Resolutions.

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015>

(213) Abdulaziz Al-Sharafi, *Syria: The Way to Stop the Bleeding*, Al-Watan Egyptian Newspaper, Issue 1217, Cairo, August 29, 2015, p. 6.

- D. sees the researcher After the Syrian regime army, with the support of Russian forces and Iranian-backed militias, took control of about 89 percent of the territory of Syria and is on its way to take control of Idlib, the major countries are on the verge of finalizing the agreement on the peace settlement that the United States of America linked to reconstruction as a condition for being in it.

Yemen crisis

Yemen is an essential part of the general fabric of the Arabian Peninsula, as it is linked to the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States at the historical, ethnic and national levels, which gives it great importance for the Gulf countries on several levels:

- A. **the strategic level** We find Yemen overlooking the wide shores of the Red Bahrain and the Arabs, and it supervises their entrances at Bab al-Mandeb, and the Gulf of Aden, which is the entrance to the Indian Ocean.
- B. **security level** It is not possible to separate the security of Yemen from the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries that interact with Yemen through influence and influence.
- C. **the economic level** Although Yemen is a country with limited resources, it contains promising investment opportunities and human potentials that the GCC countries can benefit from.

The effects of the accelerated emergence of the Houthis in the Yemeni political scene after the year 2011, a lot of attention, whether at the level of the region or the world, and the political presence of the Houthis and their control over the joints of the Yemeni state since September 21, 2014 has been linked to the relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and with Iran's attempt to deny the extent of the Houthis' connection with it, the visit Which was carried out by a delegation of the Houthis and their supporters to Iran after the fall of Sanaa under the control of the Houthis, with military assistance from the former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, has confirmed the relationship from that visit and the previous developments, and the consequent results, which raised unprecedented concern in the region The Arab countries, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which led the Yemeni President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi to formally request the Gulf Cooperation Council countries for military intervention, which led to the launch of the military operations "Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope." Against the putschists in Yemen to save the country from the grip of Iran.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the United Nations has played a key role in supporting the political transition in Yemen. In 2011 AD, most notably, the Transfer Authority was established, and the previous president was replaced by his deputy, and early presidential elections were conducted, leading to the formation of the Government of National Dialogue and Cooperation. This process culminated in the adoption of a new constitution on 25 January 2014, based on a national document, which was unanimously approved by most of the Yemeni political forces and components, or through Security Council resolutions starting with Resolution No. 2014, which emphasized the Gulf initiative as a basis for a settlement, and the end of the decision No. 2216, which supported the intervention of the Arab League in Yemen.⁽²¹⁴⁾

Qatar crisis⁽²¹⁵⁾

- A. The Qatari crisis that the Gulf Cooperation Council is experiencing is one of the worst crises that the Gulf Cooperation Council has experienced since its founding in 1981. This crisis erupted on June 5, 2017, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Republic of Egypt announced Al-Arabiya, to immediately cut off their relations with the State of Qatar and close the air, sea and land space, and later published a joint list of those linked to militants, and the list included 49 people and 12 organizations and groups supported by the State of Qatar. Which stipulated that the State of Qatar stop provocative media coverage and stop supporting extremist Islamic groups, as Doha found certain ways to circumvent the agreement, which was stated by Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir.
- B. The other reason for the crisis is the Qatar News Agency broadcasting statements by the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim, in which he criticized what he called “anti-Iranian sentiments.” However, Qatari officials quickly denied these statements, accusing the official Qatar News Agency of penetrating the official Qatar News Agency despite the Emir of Qatar calling the President Iranian Hassan Rouhani.
- C. The Qatari government has denied all justified accusations that these countries want to place Qatar under guardianship and that it is a violation of the sovereignty of the Qatari state. However, it was supportive of all efforts to contain the crisis with the Gulf countries. Gulf cooperation conditions for ending the crisis by the Qatari

(214) Khaled Ahmed Al Ramah, *Political Dialogue in Yemen and the Path to Consensus*, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 24, 2014.

(215) Kholoud Muhammad Khamis, *the Qatar-Gulf crisis to where? Reading in the regional and international scenes*, Future Center for Strategic Studies, October 14, 2017.

government expelling the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas movement from Qatar, as well as not leaving the same row of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries against Iran, and the most important accusations against the State of Qatar are as follows:

- a. Qatar's fueling of internal conflicts.
 - b. Its support for terrorist organizations.
 - c. Harboring those wanted for justice.
 - d. Its support for Iran's policies in the region.
- D. Turkey did not stand idly by regarding what is happening in the region of the Arab Gulf states, so it had to have a clear role on the scene of events, as the Turkish Parliament approved a law to deploy Turkish army forces in a Turkish military base in the State of Qatar, and Iran also announced through Its official television said that the Islamic Republic of Iran called on Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other regional countries to resolve their differences by peaceful means and that any escalation would not help resolve the crisis in the Middle East.

see researcher In light of the positions of the international and regional parties and the crisis of confidence between the countries of the Quartet Alliance and Qatar, it is likely that it will not be possible to reach a solution soon, and it will take longer than expected as a result of the divergence of the positions and accounts of the parties to the crisis, in addition to the keenness of some regional and international parties to continue without escalation or Decided because this situation may advance its interests.

Influential regional security and military changes:

The Turkish role in the Red Sea

- A. Turkey entered strongly into the line of conflict and security and military competition on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced during his visit to Sudan (December 2017) the approval of his Sudanese counterpart Omar al-Bashir, to grant Ankara the strategic "Suakin Island" on the Red Sea, and after Months after Turkey opened its largest military base in Somalia (September 2017), Turkish moves competed with the Israeli, Iranian and Chinese military and security penetration in the region, which casts a shadow over security in the Red Sea, through which about 12% of the global trade volume passes through the Suez Canal. Sudan is the island of "Suakin" for Turkey, to impose its sovereignty and to play an

increasing security and military role in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab region and the Horn of Africa⁽²¹⁶⁾.

- B. Suakin Island is located in the north-east of Sudan, on the western coast of the Red Sea, at an altitude of 66 meters above sea level, about 642 km from the capital Khartoum and 54 km from the city of Port Sudan, and its area is estimated at 20 km². And the port of Suakin is the oldest in Sudan, and it is mostly used to transport passengers and goods to the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, and it is the second port of Sudan after Port Sudan, which is 60 km to the north of it, and it is considered a meeting point between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and a strategic location from a military point of view due to its proximity From Yemen and Eritrea⁽²¹⁷⁾.
- C. Erdogan's African tours during the two years (2016, 2017) were aimed at deepening the "strategic partnership" with Africa to develop relations with it. Erdogan visited Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Chad and Tunisia, in the context of a strategy to expand Turkish influence in Africa and promote penetration into the continent.
- D. Turkey started the policy of openness to the African continent in 1998, and gained momentum with the declaration of Turkey as a strategic partner by the African Union in 2008, in addition to holding the Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in the same year in Istanbul, to enter Turkey general 2013AD as a player Basic In the African Partnership Policy, and depend Policy openness Turkish On Africa On The principle of "equal partnership and mutual interest", and succeeded This is amazing Politics to make rapid progress in a many fields, Including the volume of trade and dialogue mechanisms the politician and activities educational and economic investments.
- E. The Turkish security interest in the African continent stems from several important considerations, some of which are related to securing the huge Turkish economic, trade and investment relations on the continent, while others are related to the Turkish diplomatic strategy related to obtaining the support of the countries of the continent in international forums, in addition to an internal

(216) *Turkey enters the arena of conflict over the security of the Red Sea*, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Cairo, Issue 4946, December 28, 2017.

<http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=567790&IssueID=4551>

(217) The Free Encyclopedia, Wikipedia, *International Information Network (Internet)*, entry date May 15, 2018.

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B3%D on allD8%A7%D{3%D{6>

logistical intelligence dimension , related to drying up the sources of the anti-Turkish President Erdogan group, which has a large extension in the African continent, where the Turkish political leadership realized that it had passed a good stage of economic growth, stability of the political climate and military strength internally, and that it needed new mechanisms related to the information security aspect. and intelligence in its strategic external environment, especially in the continent of Africa. ⁽²¹⁸⁾

- F. The economic, military and security factors represent the basis for the Turkish moves towards the brown continent, especially Sudan and the Horn of Africa, to secure its economic interests and investments, and to open a promising market for its products.

Iran's nuclear field:

- A. The Iranian nuclear program, which was kept secret for many years until it was revealed by the Iranian opposition in approximately 2002, which prompted Tehran to open channels for dialogue and negotiations with the great powers in the world, and these negotiations continued until an agreement was reached between Iran and a group (5+1) in 2015, which are the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in addition to Germany, in order to lift the sanctions imposed on Tehran in exchange for allowing international monitoring of its nuclear program, and if we consider that Iran's nuclear program is not for purely peaceful purposes as Iran claims, According to many data , mmm no doubt Its main motive is to produce nuclear weapons, which is its ambition to Exporting its revolutionary project, expanding and dominating the region, and establishing itself as the first force in this troubled region , In addition to exporting its internal problems and avoid Deferred domestic benefits to guarantee continuation The ruling regime in Tehran , Report indicates The Pentagon issued in 2010 on the ability of Iran Military, until the most important options The strategy of the Iranian regime is its nuclear program and keeping the door open to the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. ⁽²¹⁹⁾
- B. The reality indicates that this agreement caused concern among most of the active forces in the regional system of the Middle East region when the

(218) *Why Turkey is Set to Open Military Base in Somalia?*, Sputnik News, January 21, 2016. <https://sputniknews.com/military/201601211033517458-turkey-military-base-somalia/>

(219) US Department of Defense, "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," April 2010

agreement was signed and it intensified with the start of its activation, as these forces consider that Iran is the biggest winner if not the only winner from its activation, it has won politically recognition Explicitly from the great and major powers that it has become a nuclear power, in accordance with Article VIII of the agreement, which allows it to enter world markets as a producer of nuclear materials⁽²²⁰⁾, and this is what Iranian President Hassan Rouhani emphasized that the nuclear agreement is an achievement that counts as a political, technical and legal victory for Iran.⁽²²¹⁾

- C. Iran's insistence on possessing nuclear capabilities as a primary goal that increases its position at the regional and international levels, and gives it confidence and boldness in dealing with Western powers, especially the United States of America.⁽²²²⁾ And many members of the ruling elite in Iran believe that the nuclear program and the struggle with the West for it represents one of the ways to revive the revolutionary enthusiasm in light of its invigoration of the component of nationalism. Maintaining such a conflict is the reason for the regime's existence and supports its unity and cohesion.⁽²²³⁾
- D. There is another perspective for Iran's keenness to possess nuclear technology, which is to provide alternative sources of oil energy, which contribute to supporting industrial and economic development, as well as giving it a technical dimension that is unique to the region, increasing its position in the region and allowing it to export this technology at a future stage.

Restructuring the Iranian army forces:

- A. The strategy of advanced defense and asymmetric warfare constituted interim successes for Iran in avoiding the direct threat on its borders, and the experience gained about the performance of the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian regular army forces, and the losses suffered by the army forces participating in

(220) Mostafa Kamel, *International and Regional Changes and Their Effects*, Nasser Military Academy Lectures, Cairo, 2017.

(221) Manal Al-Rini, *The Impact of the Nuclear Agreement on Iranian Politics*, International Political Journal, Al-Ahram, No. 202, Cairo, 2015, pp. 136-137.

(222) Shahram Chobin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, Arab House for Science and Publishing, translated by Bassam Shiha, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 2007, p. 36.

(223) *Iranian Ambitions at the Regional Level*, Research Center for Strategic Studies of the Armed Forces, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, May 2007, p. 37.

the Syrian battles, gave the Revolutionary Guards a justification to reduce the deliberate performance of the regular forces and their lack of readiness.

- B. The ground forces of the Iranian army announced the completion of their restructuring plan, a plan that took three years to implement. It aims to transform the ground forces into small, fast-moving units with a short chain of command system. According to this plan, the Ground Forces Command announced that the Increasing the number of combat military bases from five to twelve, and assigning combat and intelligence tasks to these combat bases, under the direct supervision of the Military District Command and in accordance with the new structure.
- C. The number of the ground force of the Iranian army is more than 350 thousand fighters, including (130) thousand regular fighters (220 thousand conscripts, compulsory service for two years, which represents more than 50% of the Iranian military force).⁽²²⁴⁾.

Foreign military presence:

- A. The foreign military presence is considered one of the main influences that indicate the existence of vital and very important interests, especially the countries whose forces are stationed in fixed bases. That presence in the region, and perhaps this presence justified the non-participation of any force in the presence on the land of the Arabian Gulf, and it formulated an international legitimacy for this presence through security agreements with far-reaching reach with the Arab Gulf states (each country separately).⁽²²⁵⁾
- B. The foreign military presence in the Arab Gulf region (the American in particular) began simultaneously after the invasion and liberation of the State of Kuwait, and that vital region was exposed to the Iraqi threat and the growing Iranian threat since the Iranian revolution in 1979 until now, and the Western presence has progressed from the stage of facilities, to the stage of storing weapons and equipment , to the stage of full existence within the framework of a stable strategic alliance, albeit marred by some crises, whether during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, or the Iranian nuclear agreement, which angered the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and considered it an American-Iranian

(224) Kazari Mizan news, *Nerdiaci changes*, 3rd floor, Sal Ajeer, accessed on December 30, 2020 AD: <https://2u.pw/trxwu>.

(225) Abdullah Fadl Al-Shehri, Ph.D. Thesis, *Towards a National Strategy for Confronting Crises in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2012, p. 46.

rapprochement at their expense, which the US denied. The United States of America later, and that US-Gulf relationship supported the position of the administration of US President Trump, who considered that the stability of the Arab Gulf region is among the constants of US national security at present. ⁽²²⁶⁾

- C. Statistics show the presence of more than 29.5 thousand foreign military personnel in the GCC states, most of them are American elements, and they are present in the countries (UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait) in varying proportions, in addition to about 22 thousand other American elements on board aircraft carriers. and other marine vessels in the waters of the Arabian Gulf, for a total of 50,000 foreign elements⁽²²⁷⁾, in the following military bases:

Al Udeid Air Base in the Qatari capital, Doha, which houses the US Central Command's combat air operations center, and an armed group affiliated with the British Royal Air Force) for the United States of America.

Juffair Naval Base, which is located southeast of the Bahraini capital, Manama, is where the leadership of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet is based, and since 1993 has become the general headquarters of the naval forces of the US Central Command for the Central Region, in addition to bombers, tactical fighters and refueling aircraft stationed at Sheikh Isa Air Base, and in Port Salman In Bahrain there is a British naval base, where the British forces returned to the Kingdom of Bahrain in November 2015 after leaving it in 1971, and announced that the goal of the new base is to support the stability of the Arabian Gulf, through a permanent presence of British forces in the region.

The Doha Camp base in the State of Kuwait, which is the most important military base in the State of Kuwait, located 60 km from the border with Iraq, and where the central command of the US-Kuwaiti army forces, the Joint Task Force, and members of the American 3rd Division (Infantry) are considered the base of the Doha Camp The main base and logistics center for the US Army in the Middle East, and Kuwait also includes several other camps (Ali Al-Salem Air Base, which includes the US Air Force No. 386, in addition to Camp Arifjan, and Virginia Training Camp) ⁽²²⁸⁾.

(226) Muhammad Qashqosh, *The Foreign Military Presence in Qatar and Gulf Security: A Military Reading Qatar is not besieged and Turkey and Iran will not enter a war in the Gulf*, Opinions on the Gulf, No. 121, 2017.

(227) *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*. Arnold Wolfers. Political Science Quarterly, Vol.67, No.4 (Dec.2015), pp. 481-502

(228) *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*. Arnold Wolfers. Political Science Quarterly, Ibid, pp. 481-502.

Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, where there is the American Air Division No. 380, and there is a large warship in the port of (Jebel Ali), in addition to the ports of Zayed and Rashid, which are ready to receive American ships on their docks, in addition to French forces in Abu Dhabi and a base New French at Al Dhafra Airport

D. Turkish military presence

a. Turkish military base in Qatar

Which is the first Turkish military base in the Middle East The establishment of which was signed between the two countries in 2014, and implementation will start in April 2016, under a cooperation agreement in the military field. It provides for the development of Qatari military institutions, raising their efficiency and combat capabilities, in addition to the deployment of Turkish military forces and equipment on Qatari soil, which happened after the Quartet crisis (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt) with the State of Qatar in June 2017, for its support for some extremist groups in conflict countries. Regional and within the four countries, this crisis accelerated the Qatari-Turkish military alliance, as Turkey stationed its military forces inside the State of Qatar The aim is to support the current Qatari regime in conjunction with this crisis.⁽²²⁹⁾

b. Turkish military base in Somalia

Which is the second Turkish base externally after Turkey established its military base in Qatar, and this base was established in Mogadishu under a military agreement concluded between the two countries in December 2012, through which Turkey pledged to participate in the rehabilitation of the Somali army, and in September 2017, Somali President Mohamed Abdullah Farmajo inaugurated the base The Turkish military base in Somalia, which he described as the largest Turkish military base in the world, where the cost of the Turkish military base is about 50 million dollars, and this base is located in East Africa on the Indian Ocean, overlooking the Gulf of Aden and two kilometres from Mogadishu, and has an area of about 4 km². The base includes three military educational schools, in which about 1,500

(229) Muhammad Qashqosh, *The Foreign Military Presence in Qatar and Gulf Security: A Military Reading Qatar is not besieged and Turkey and Iran will not enter a war in the Gulf*, a reference previously mentioned.

soldiers are trained, and the number can rise to more than 10,000 trained soldiers.⁽²³⁰⁾ And in December 2017, the graduation of the first batch of Somali officers⁽²³¹⁾.

To put the Turkish army ahead in the strategic Gulf of Aden, and for Ankara to join major capitals with military bases in the Horn of Africa, especially Djibouti, in light of Turkey's worsening relations with a number of Arab countries, NATO countries and the European Union, and Djibouti hosts five bases for the United States of America and France. China, Japan and Germany, and Saudi Arabia is seeking to establish a base in Djibouti, reflecting the struggle for military influence at the entrance to the Red Sea.

- c. In mid-2016, Turkey sent hundreds of Turkish soldiers to a military base in northern Iraq, under an agreement between Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, which led to strained relations between the Iraqi federal government and Turkey.
- d. These accelerating moves of the Turkish state to strengthen its military presence in the Middle East and Africa indicate a real desire on the part of Turkey to further deploy its soldiers in some countries of the region, to be close to the existing and potential conflict areas, as this Turkish military presence enhances Ankara's influence after the escalation of the dispute With the European Community, in addition to the tense Turkish relations with many influential and major countries in the Arab region, in addition to this, the opening of a market for Turkish arms in Africa.

Political organizations and armed militias:

- A. During the past years, a new variable has emerged in the Middle East and the Arab Gulf region, which is the danger of the emergence of (political organizations and armed militias), which is no longer just a possible scenario, but has become a reality that expands and we live in, as terrorist organizations and armed groups have emerged that have taken Islam as a banner, and from The establishment of an Islamic

(230) Ahmed Kamel Al-Bahbri, *Dimensions of the Suakin Island Agreement between Turkey and Sudan*, International Politics Magazine, December 28, 2017

(231) *Graduation of the first batch of Somali officers from the Turkish military base in Mogadishu*, Turk Press, December 23, 2017. <https://www.turkpress.co/node/43425>

state is a pretext, and violence and terrorism are means such as Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in the Levant and Iraq (ISIS), Al-Nusra Front in Syria, and other terrorist organizations and other armed groups, which heralds a new regional and international phenomenon.⁽²³²⁾

- B. The weakness and disintegration of the Arab countries, the fragility of the international system, and the support and financing of some regional countries for terrorism contributed to the emergence of these jihadist organizations and armed militias, and made them a wide arena for foreign interventions by the regional neighboring countries, as the Islamic State (ISIS) organization that began its role in Iraq is Its activity extended to Syria and then to the rest of the world, and it committed many terrorist operations, as the first organization to establish (a jihadist state) in June 2014, followed by similar states that tried to emulate this model after confirming its achievements on the ground, as well as attempts to establish an emirate in Sinai.⁽²³³⁾
- C. The Regional Scene Political movements have a new role in the Middle East, and they have entered the strategic calculations of the countries of the region as one of the new challenges and threats.⁽²³⁴⁾, and dangerous The new actors are being employed in the context of the current regional polarization, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries fear the growing role of radical and extremist forces that serve the goals of regional and international parties at the expense of Gulf and Arab interests, and at the head of these movements supported by Iran comes (Lebanese Hezbollah), which is the cornerstone In the regional game, as we saw in the Lebanese scene and one of the headlines of the conflict in the Syrian scene, and its branch in Iraq and Kuwait (Kuwaiti Hezbollah), which is involved in the so-called Abdali cell, as well as the Houthi party in Yemen, and the Muslim Brotherhood terrorist group.
- D. Political movements, the movement (Hamas) comes as a non-state actor and affects the Palestinian position and the capacity of the Palestinian negotiator, then comes the organizations of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Caliphate State (ISIS) and other organizations, such as human rights organizations, environmental protection, and

(232) Malik Awad, *After the Disintegration, Is the Middle East Expired*, International Political Journal, Strategic Transformations Supplement, Issue 203, Cairo, January 2016, p. 6.

(233) Dalia Rushdy, *The Structure of Risk, Reading in the Prospects of the Spread of Jihadist Statelets*, Al-Siyasah Al-Dawliyah Journal, Strategic Transformations Supplement, No. 203, Cairo, January 2016, pp. 32, 33.

(234) Muhammad Abu Rumman, *The New Actors and the Rules of the Regional Game*, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 168, April 2007, p. 85.

humanitarian intervention, as the environment of actors The new ones help create fertile ground for the growth of extremism and violence and the deterioration of the security situation, which is reflected in development⁽²³⁵⁾.

- E. see the researcher The regional climate represented by the weakness of the regional and international systems, and the problem of faltering collective security, after the wave of revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring 2011, and the exploitation of this by some regional states that sponsor terrorism with support and funding, paved the way for the emergence of political organizations and armed terrorist militias and their transformation into jihadist mini-states.

Shiite political tide in the region:

- A. Since the eighties of the twentieth century, the Shiites began to align themselves with Shiite political organizations and movements at different degrees and levels, and there is agreement on two hadiths that had a decisive impact on the emergence of the Shiite political movement: the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the policy that it followed The United States of America in Iraq, which has taken on a sectarian dimension, and some studies indicate the regional repercussions of the Shiite revival in Iraq, where Shiites began to join Shiite political movements at different degrees and levels, especially as the Iranian revolution tended to threaten the Sunni regimes.
- B. Pushing some countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, especially Saudi Arabia, to confront the Shiite tide and confirm the Sunni identity in the Arab world, especially since the Iranian regime has adopted a policy of exporting the revolution, starting with the geographical neighboring countries in the GCC countries (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait), and some Arab countries The other (Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria) in which there are Shiite gatherings that could threaten the security and stability in those countries, and perhaps the events that took place in Awamiya in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, and within the Kingdom of Bahrain of events of chaos and intimidation of citizens and the targeting of security men, confirms the seriousness of it. ⁽²³⁶⁾.

(235) Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed, *New Actors on the World Politics Stage*, International Politics Magazine, Al-Ahram, Issue 200, Cairo 2017, pp. 91-93.

(236) Political Agendas, *Shi'a Movement in the Region*, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Issue 4217, Cairo, December 31, 2015, pg 7.

Cyber war and social networks:

- A. A new concept of power and modern patterns of threat emerged through the so-called cyberspace war and social networks, and the new concept of conflict became the dimensions of competition and technological interdependence, and the state's ability to protect the information infrastructure, and the form and patterns of conflict in the information age were linked to knowledge, and technical and competitive conflict became About ideas and creativity dominates international relations.
- B. One of the new variables for the Arab countries in general and the Gulf Cooperation Council of course is the relationship between security and technology, and the emergence of the information society, so information has become a new strategic resource for economic growth. Economic competition, terrorist networks, and organized crime, and the new concept of power in international relations has taken the form of economic competition, knowledge economy, market acquisition, cyber and network wars have emerged, and new risks have emerged as a result of the use of communication and information technology in the work of weapons of mass destruction. A new form of terrorism is nuclear and electronic terrorism, and the fear of nuclear technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups.⁽²³⁷⁾
- C. Social networks and the virtual community appeared, where new members are recruited through the Internet , and mail electronic , as well as the appearance number old from aliens from Europe (ISIS) in a Iraq and Syria , Than Confirms Recruit groups terrorist for the internet in its operations terrorist and informational and psychological , as I became Networks Social and sites communication social a tool from tools packing political and the crowd social and pressure the politician that you do peoples against Organized judgment and became The space electronic within accounts Countries The strategy⁽²³⁸⁾.
- D. Several countries in the world began to focus on developing cyberspace warfare capabilities, and in addition to the United States of America, which is the most advanced in this new field of war, there are other countries that have skilled cyberspace warfare units, such as Russia and China, and there what Between twenty

(237) Adel Abdel Sadiq, *Electronic Terrorism and Power in International Relations. New Challenges*, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, No. 180, April, 2010, pp. 102, 103.

(238) Muhammad Abu Rumman, *Al-Qaeda and the Internet*, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, No. 180, April 2010, pp. 88-89.

and thirty armies in the world have significant capabilities in the field of space warfare. The cyber war focuses on the use of information technologies and the Internet as a weapon of war. Most of the actual traditional wars in the future will be accompanied by cyber space wars, and there will even be other stand-alone cyber space wars, and possessing the capabilities of cyber space war can change the balance of global military forces ⁽²³⁹⁾.

Affecting regional economic variables:

- A. The achievement of progress and prosperity in any country depends to a large extent on the economic capabilities that this country possesses and the ability to properly utilize these capabilities. Many countries have suffered from economic problems and challenges, especially in recent years, in light of the new economic changes and the new world order.
- B. The global economic changes in previous decades gave strength to the capitalist system, especially to the eight industrialized countries, which made them practice monopolistic policies, led by the United States of America, enabling them to use economic tools in the Middle East through controlling markets and oil, transferring technology to the region and linking the economies of the region. The countries of the region are denominated in US dollars, and the United States, in cooperation with the leaders of the Group of Twenty, is seeking to support partnership and cooperation in order to reform international financial institutions, support the international capitalist system, and maintain economic stimulus programs until economic recovery is achieved. It is natural that the United States will seek more economic cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the increase in American investments and the expansion of market control space in the countries of the region, and the attraction of Gulf capital in addition to the continuation of the Partnership for Development program.
- C. The Arab Gulf region is considered one of the most heavily militarized regions in the Middle East in terms of the total value of military spending, and the Gulf

(239) Robert Nick, Richard, *Cyber Wars, The Next Threat to National Security and How to Deal with it*, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2018, p. 50.

Cooperation Council countries are among the most spending countries, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came in third place in the world in military spending for the year 2016, after the United States American and China⁽²⁴⁰⁾ This situation is mainly related to the continuation of many armed conflicts, foremost of which is the inflamed situation in (Iraq, Yemen and Syria).

- D. The phenomenon of money laundering has become the most important invisible threat to the regional economic stability in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The phenomenon includes a group of activities that take place away from state agencies and are not recorded in the national income accounts, and these activities represent a source of dirty money whose owners are trying to launder at some stage. The phenomenon has recently spread with the spread and diffusion of criminal activities such as (drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, bribery, illegal commissions, fraud, commercial fraud, counterfeiting money) and others, which are carried out with large amounts of money, and on Despite the lack of accurate data on the extent of the phenomenon, the spread of the money laundering phenomenon has a severe impact on the economy of the GCC countries.

Influential regional social and cultural variables

- A. Iran has always been based on its cultural heritage, and it places the priority of its Persian civilization when dealing with the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab countries, and this trend has created a civil conflict between Arab and Persian nationalism, which leads to a permanent social threat between Iranian society on the one hand and the societies On the other hand, the Iranian moves among the Shiite circles of the Arab countries in general, and the Arab Gulf countries in particular, aim to try to attract them to serve its ambitious political projects in the region, such as the attempt to establish a Shiite crescent that includes Shiites in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, in addition to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, in an attempt to encircle the GCC states from all directions, especially Saudi Arabia, under the pretext of Iran protecting Shiites anywhere in the world, while reviving the Safavid project in Iraq.

(240) Stockholm Peace Research Institute, *International Information Network (Internet)*, Cairo, December 2017.

- B. The attempt to divide (Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Libya) into mini-states on ethnic or sectarian bases leads to an increase in social alienation in the Arab region, and the emergence of new non-Arab entities of affiliation and identity, as they are calculated from the dissolution of the Arab identity of some Arab countries, because they realize that the goal is not limited to Not only these countries, but also targets other neighboring Arab countries, including the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and it is considered a variable and a direct threat to the security of the region.

4.4. Conclusions

Saudi national security is based on a set of pillars and foundations that represent the constants of the Saudi society, and highlights the privacy of the Saudi state. In this sense, the responsibility of the people and the government.

Saudi national security means all the policies and measures taken by the Kingdom in order to achieve the following elements:

- A. Protecting the entity and survival of the nation by taking the necessary measures and procedures to secure it and preserve its sovereignty.
- B. Achieving the comprehensive development of the nation in order to achieve the welfare of the citizen.
- C. Achieving prosperity by adopting the necessary policies for the independence of human and economic resources and capabilities

Pillars of Saudi National Security

It is based on a royal, hereditary political system for the Al Saud family, and the king and ministers represent the executive authority, along with a Shura Council that represents the country's legislative authority and an independent judicial system. patriotism, and transcend strife.

Saudi national security is an activity carried out by specialized Saudi institutions and plays two important roles in building society, one of which is to prevent threats, whether internal or external, to which the state or the political system itself may be exposed. Within the framework of Islamic Sharia as an approach and legislation.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia suffers from international and regional changes, challenges and threats to its security, political, economic and social stability, the repercussions

of weak security coordination between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Iran, and the difference in positions between the two parties regarding the regional arrangements to be agreed upon and necessary to ensure the security of the Arab Gulf.

The speed, intensity, and accumulation of the interactions of international and regional variables greatly affect national security, especially with regard to the development component in all fields to provide means of prosperity and well-being for the Gulf citizen, and to establish distinguished relations with other countries at all levels.

The American occupation of Iraq and its handing over to Iran led to Iraq's exit from the regional balance equation and the increase of the strategic imbalance in the region in favor of (Israel) on the one hand, and in favor of (Iran) on the other hand, at the expense of the Arab regional powers, and to the imposition of security burdens on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The American presence in the Persian Gulf region and the strategic maritime ports around the region enabled it to tighten the measures to limit Iran's armaments on the one hand, and support Israel on the other hand, making the United States of America the main actor to maintain regional security, and to impose the American vision of security arrangements, and the balance became linked American unilateralism in the region, which puts obstacles in the way of achieving a regional security system between the regional parties in the Arabian Gulf

In implementing its plans and sustaining its existence, Israel relies on the pivotal and essential American alliance, in addition to supporting pressure groups and organizations in the United States of America, for the purpose of influencing foreign policy, especially with regard to the Middle East.

The regional repercussions of the Yemeni crisis increase the climate of instability in the region, in addition to the internationalization of the crisis and allowing foreign powers to intervene in Yemen and its impact on Gulf and Arab national security.

The Gulf-Qatari crisis is a crisis revealing the fragility of Gulf security, but these negative developments in the Gulf political scene are not, in and of themselves, sufficient for the end of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is currently composed of six countries, until it becomes a council of five members, that is, for the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Without Qatar temporarily, the Gulf Cooperation Council will continue to exist as an effective and continuous political and security system.

The foreign military presence led to the strategic exposure of the Arab Gulf region, and thus the Gulf political decision became restricted, and the limits of political and strategic maneuvering of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia always take into account the impact of this

presence, as it imposed a new model in the balance of power in the region, in which roles are distributed according to its interests.

The nuclear agreement will not prevent the continuation of the threat from the Iranian nuclear program in light of the Iranian regime maintaining some of its nuclear capabilities, such as facilities and the enrichment cycle, other than secret nuclear sites, where Tehran has obtained international recognition and Western acknowledgment that it is a peaceful nuclear state, through which it can with its expertise. and capabilities to possess nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDED STRATEGY AND THE USE OF THE SOFT POWERS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN THE REGION FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL SECURITY

General

The formulation of the national strategy is not an easy thing, as it is not built out of thin air. There are many factors that make the formulation process a complex and intertwined matter. It is necessary to put executive steps to build policies, plans and programs related to the use of state resources and put them in their right place upon implementation in order to reach the achievement of goals and objectives. Nationalism, from this point of view, building a national strategy focuses on the ability of the strategic planner to employ and develop the state's resources to serve its national goals.

The national strategy is built after a very clear definition of the supreme national and a precise definition of the national goals by which the national strategy is achieved, that is, it is the guide to choosing successful methods according to the available resources, for this it was important first to determine each of the national goals and objectives (national interests), and to set priorities for achieving them. Otherwise, it will lose its value.

The time range for achieving the national goals must be determined, meaning that the formulation of the national strategy should include three-time frames, the short, medium and long term. The resources are planned to enter the second phase, and the development plan for the resources has been completed and its objectives have been achieved, in addition to the need for a proper assessment of the challenges and threats in order to be able to predict the international or regional external environmental factors.

The critical stage comes and means setting policies and steps for the appropriate programs to become The national strategy is comprehensive, and requires that Presence Strategies customization for every Of which its goals, must from Draw strategy political and another Economic and social and military and cultural And so, with Coordinate These strategies With some of them some, Find out how the joint efforts will be coordinated between those

Strategies to achieve its goals, from which it is achieved integration for strategy overall and access to the Objectives Desired nationalism.

Strategic planning allows some countries with limited resources to formulate a strategy in the form of five-year plans or more that have their acceptable and reasonable interim objectives commensurate with the international and regional environment conditions surrounding the country with the use of available capabilities and resources. Resources that do not exist at the present time, but over a period of time during which the resources will be developed and the ambitions of development of the resources can be reached, and then that strategy is actually feasible.

The concept of soft power, given its relative newness, is one of the widely used and widespread concepts in the analysis of foreign policies, which is related to the concept's contribution to deepening the understanding of the nature of power and its development in international relations, and drawing attention to its dimensions. Its actors, issues, institutions, and patterns of interactions make the relative importance of soft power increasing compared to the traditional elements of hard power, with the growing necessity of integrating soft dimensions into the practices of hard power itself.

Despite the prevalence and spread of the use of the concept of soft power at all academic, official and informal levels, the definition of the concept and its basic dimensions remains the subject of multiple interpretations that narrow its scope at times, to the extent that it is almost limited to some cultural resources of a persuasive or entertaining nature, and expands its scope at other times. It includes all tools and interactions of a cooperative nature, including the use of economic, and sometimes military, tools and mechanisms in their non-conflict forms, such as military aid, training programs, joint maneuvers, and others. And an analysis of its dimensions, which seems to be a double need in the Arab context, given the lack of Arab studies that dealt with the concept of soft power.²⁴¹

Building the comprehensive national strategy is the outcome of all the main factors, namely the supreme national goal, national goals and interests, the importance and priority of the goals, the time range for each stage, capabilities and capabilities, and the environment surrounding appropriate policies and programs.

It is clear how accurate and complex the construction and formulation of the national strategy is, which is an interactive process overlapping steps at the end of which crystallize and determine the supreme policies.

(241) Joseph S., Tay, *Soft Power as a Means of Success in International Politics*, translated by Muhammad Tawfiq Al-Bajarmi, Al-Obeikan, Riyadh, 2015, p. 30.

The fifth chapter is divided into three subchapters and a summary as follows:

- 5.1 Soft powers and their role in achieving national security for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- 5.2 Recommended strategy and the use of soft powers in the economy, as well as the political and military security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- 5.3 The proposed strategy for the use of soft power in the economic, social and cultural fields
- 5.4 Summary

5.1. Soft powers and their role in achieving national security for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The term soft power appeared for the first time in the book of the political scientist and former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Joseph Nye in 1990 AD, which was titled *The Changing Nature of American Politics*, and he defined it as the force of attraction to be attractive to others, not to put them on your side by coercion and the use of weapons or out of money.⁽²⁴²⁾

Soft power, without exaggeration, is a national security issue. If it is taken care of and strengthened, the state will be able to balance its hard and soft powers. The Kingdom possesses all the ingredients, civilization, history, culture, identity, location, content, talents, capabilities and capabilities. Therefore, developing a clear strategy for its soft power will be a real, great and sustainable investment.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an integrated state in all the meanings of the word, with the capabilities, capabilities, and class and human resources that it possesses, in addition to its geographical location, rich history, ancient civilizations, stunning scenery, different atmospheres, diverse cultures, young people with multiple skills and experiences, and leadership of the present that combines ambition, enthusiasm, passion and vision of young people. For the future mixed with experience, wisdom and lessons from the past, what the Kingdom needs only is a clear and comprehensive strategic plan for its soft power that puts it

(242) Nidal Safi, *The concept of soft power, how it originated, and what are the conditions for its development*, Cairo, 2015, p. 5.

in its natural place, and so that the work is institutional, the approach is strategic, the objectives, it is possible to implement several initiatives to achieve impact, influence, goal and goal.

Soft power means the availability of energy and material and moral capabilities and employing them to defeat the opponent by a set of attractive soft means that do not have violence or coercion. Soft power also depends mainly on the media, culture, art, literature, education, etc., as well as on the level of culture in order to achieve an attractive image for countries to achieve their interests.⁽²⁴³⁾

Soft power is called soft power because it changes the decisions of countries without wars and pushes opponents to surrender to soft powers peacefully. It pushes lightly and presses gently without any weapons to direct feelings and thoughts, life, destiny, interest, reform, media, ideas, beliefs, principles and goals without cruelty and without notice towards its interests and goals. With cunning and malice, soft power moves.

As usual for concepts that enjoy a great deal of spread and circulation in different contexts, the concept of soft power is characterized by a great deal of fluidity in its definitions, as it is sometimes limited to cultural and recreational attractions and at other times it expands to include various forms of power, including economic and military, and to address the problems that It is generated by this relativity and extreme fluidity in defining soft power.

In essence, the concept of soft power is based on a traditional idea based on the distinction between three main sources of power: military power or violence, economic power, money or wealth, and cultural power or intellectual power (meaning knowledge, power of persuasion, power of mind control, or attraction).

The researcher defined soft power as the ability of the actor to influence the perceptions, preferences, accounts and behaviors of others, depending more on non-material resources related to framing, persuasion and attraction mechanisms, whether in a legal way that attracts others, or independently that manipulates their interests or threatens them with negative framing with the actor's immunity in the face of submission to such These mechanisms, especially independence ones, and this definition adopts the criterion of softness / morale of resources mainly without completely negating the possibilities of benefiting from the effects of some hard / physical economic and military resources, and employment patterns are not limited to cooperative images, but extend to include the most conflicting dimensions of the employment of intangible resources.

(243) Ali Muhammad Al-Hajj, *Soft War and Theoretical and Applied Foundations*, Islamic Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2015, p. 10.

Soft power, then, depends on gaining influence through persuasion and enticement, providing the elements of progress and advancement, and presenting an attractive model that tempts others to follow suit and imitate it, while hard (physical) power depends on imposing influence through armed force and physical punishments, and its use in most cases may result in a lot of destruction. Destruction and delay, soft power, in other words, is the ability to create incentives to encourage the establishment of networks of cooperative relations that benefit its parties, regardless of the criteria of relative gains or benefits for each party, which may differ for one party from the other. It is a win-win relationship between two or more parties in a peaceful context that produces abundance for all in the overall effects arising from it.⁽²⁴⁴⁾

Because of its nature that differs from hard (physical) power, soft power depends more on components that differ from those on which hard power depends. The use of soft power no longer requires reliance on governments and official institutions, but rather on non-governmental bodies and institutions such as civil society organizations, multinational companies and even individuals. The election of Emmanuel Macron in France led to the rise of his country in 2017 to the top of the soft power table Globally, while the United States fell to third place due to the election of Donald Trump, there is no doubt that the slogan of Trump's election campaign is "America First". He left a bad image of the United States abroad, and this image was confirmed when Trump announced his country's exit from the Paris Climate Treaty. Also, the removal of President Dilma Rousseff from the presidency in Brazil in 2016 led to the decline of Brazil's position on the global soft power table, dropping to the 29th place. (compared to 23rd place before Rousseff was impeached)⁽²⁴⁵⁾.

Modern communication technology has helped individuals break down the geographical barriers that existed between them and the ability to communicate, and thus networks, acquaintance rooms and conversations arose between individuals from different countries and geographic regions, and then the awareness of individuals has become formed away from the official media that is devoted in one way or another. The influence of official institutions, regardless of what was said about the independence of traditional media institutions, and thus individuals have a more important role in influencing others' view of local policies in their countries. And his policy.

Traditional institutions remain part of the components of soft power in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of performance, not in terms of size or wealth. Culture, sports and

(244) Joseph Nye, *Soft Power*, Obeikan Library, Riyadh, 2007, p. 20.

(245) Sherif Darwish Al-Labban, Ahmed Musa Badawy, *Sources of Soft Power and Egypt's Place in the World*, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, 2018, <http://www.acrseg.org/40678>, entry date 7/26/2019.

public relations with other societies, including organizing festivals, exhibitions and competitions, encouraging innovation and invention, studies and advanced technological applications. An important part of the success of Iran's negotiations with major countries, for example, is due to the "diplomatic skill", which helped to reach an agreement It guarantees Iran's right to continue its nuclear program with the exception of its military component related to the production of a nuclear weapon, while other countries such as Libya and Syria were forced to surrender in the first round and abandoned their programs to produce advanced weapons almost without negotiations.

Soft power sources include historical components, such as history and Pharaonic civilization in the case of Egypt, and similar ones in countries such as Greece, China and India. Among the sources of soft power are geographic components and natural gifts such as location, as is the case in Egypt, which is located at the crossroads of global trade routes between East and West. And like the picturesque sunny beaches on its shores overlooking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

The sources of soft power are divided between human qualitative components such as skill and the tendency to get acquainted with others and mix with them, and between institutional qualitative components, and between technological components, cultural components, historical components, and natural components. Political, military, industrial and technological espionage are among the sources of soft power.⁽²⁴⁶⁾

The use of soft power generally requires patience and communication in planning and execution, not interruption; Because of the nature of soft power sources, obtaining the results of their use or employment needs a longer time, and in this case, the quality of the administration or policy and the nature of the executive procedures to obtain influence from the use of soft power sources govern the productivity of the use of soft power sources. As for the hard power, the Its use to impose influence does not need the long-term, but it is achieved or fails immediately after employing and using the sources of hard power in the short term. Wars may take days or even years, but in most cases it ends with clear and open material results, in contrast to the use of soft power that Its results appear only through time and through slow accumulations. If the conditions of patience, communication and sustainability are not met, the use of soft power sources fails to achieve the desired goals.

Joseph Nye coined the definition of "soft power," but I believe that Nye benefited greatly from the writings of George Kennan (1904-2005), who laid the foundations for the

(246) Ibrahim Nawar, *Sources of Soft Power and Egypt's Place in the World*, Arab Center for Research and Studies, 2018, <http://www.acrseg.org/40678>, entry date 27/7/2019.

policy of containment against the Soviet Union after World War II, and quickly realized the strength of restrictions on the use of military force after the first nuclear war in history. Kennan realized that the use of force against the Soviet Union, which also possessed nuclear weapons, could lead to the destruction of the world, and therefore, instead advocated the use of "total political war" against the Soviet Union and focus on striking the "political ideology" that On the basis of it the Soviet Union, and then Kennan laid the first building block for the strategy of shifting from relying on hard power to relying on soft power, and the beginning of the Cold War depended on establishing a unifying relationship or creating a similarity and match between "communism"⁽²⁴⁷⁾.

Joseph Nye's writings played an important role in the development of confrontational weapons using soft power sources in recent years after the fall of the political system in the Soviet Union and in the countries of the socialist camp.

In his book, *The Future of Power* (2011), Nye presented details of two of the largest and deepest changes that afflict the global system and power structures in the countries of the world due to the transformations accompanying the era of knowledge and technological innovation. These changes should lead to a reconsideration of the concept of power and the map Distribution of power in the world, and Nye concluded that the axis of power is currently witnessing a transition from west to east power shift and is also witnessing at the same time a profound change in the nature of the distribution of power from concentration to diffusion; Which transfers power from its traditional centers in governmental institutions to non-governmental units, which enshrines a new aspect of globalization, as those forces that erode the role of the traditional nation state and reduce its strength both internally and externally multiply.

The study of soft power is surrounded by various difficulties, the most serious of which is the difficulty of measurement, in contrast to traditional physical power, which is easy to measure with measurable physical indicators. Hence, the realization of the components of soft power as a comparative concept depends on the soundness of measuring its various indicators. Soft power in the (Global Soft Power) report is one of the best that has been achieved so far in this regard. The report divides soft power indicators into two different groups in terms of the nature of each of them, and in terms of how they are measured:

(247) Joseph Nye, *Soft Power, The Means of Success in International Politics*, translated by Muhammad Tawfiq Al-Buhairi, Obeikan, Riyadh, 2007, p. 40.

The first group They are objective components with a relative weight of 70% on the general index of soft power, and they include: Government, Digital, Culture, Enterprise, Engagement, and Education.

NS- the second group It is a moral component that is estimated based on a survey of the opinions of experts in each field, and its relative weight on the general index of soft power is 30%. It includes: Moral components based on opinions and surveys (the relative weight is 30%) and it includes: cuisine, national dishes, Cuisine and products Tech Products, Culture, Luxury Goods, Foreign Policy, and Liveability.

The nature of soft power:⁽²⁴⁸⁾

- A. It not only embodies the power of governments, but also the power of their people, which holds the countries responsible for creating good governments in organization, management, decision and people, as well as the responsibility of the peoples to strive relentlessly towards cultural development in the fields of higher and popular culture.
- B. The attractiveness of the model in soft power requires the state that its policy be attractive and persuasive in the fields of internal and foreign policies, and this means that unilateral and unpopular policies will not be welcome for those who want to possess high-impact soft power.
- C. It is not a blind force, despite it being intangible, because obtaining it is consistent with understanding the nature of the changes taking place in the international environment, in order to adapt to these variables and prepare to compete with its influential units, in order to achieve the desired results for the state in a smart way.
- D. Weakness, outwardly and in essence, is not acceptable, because the weak, as they claim, militarily and economically, will be forced by soft power, and whoever wants to win in a highly complex, competitive and dynamic international world must be strong, not only with his apparent hard power, but also in substance through his possession of an acceptable system of government, and a culture Motivational, valid policies, technological progress and influential institutions.
- E. Effective use of this force helps contain destructive ideological tendencies, extremist movements, and aggressive states by virtue of the international will that truly desire

(248) Khaled Aliwi, *The Role of Soft Power in Reshaping the Middle East*, University of Karbala, Center for Strategic Studies, Iraq, 2018, p. 10.

to achieve international peace and security, and the opposite is completely true when they are misused or when they are possessed of their resources.

The most prominent features and characteristics of soft power:

- A. A dynamic and unstable concept that is subject to changing times and different places, and the diversity of civilized and cultural environments, as well as the disparity of states and societies in strength, capabilities and capabilities.
- B. Organized and planned efforts on scientific grounds and not random, improvisational work.
- C. Soft power is characterized by being a tight institutional work and not an individual effort that requires the concerted efforts of both sectors, the government sector, the private sector with its institutions, associations and civil organizations.
- D. Soft power requires a relatively long time to yield the desired results, but in return it is highly effective and has a well-established effect because it is based on persuasion and faith.
- E. Soft power is objectively based on ideological and intellectual elements that express religious, civilizational and cultural values.
- F. It depends to a large extent on the means of education, culture, diplomacy, communication and media, both traditional and modern.
- G. Soft power is characterized by the necessity of employing it as a single integrated system, launching a clear strategic vision, and striving to achieve a specific message.

The foundations and pillars of soft power are as follows:⁽²⁴⁹⁾

- A. The ability to form perceptions and concepts of others, and the formation of their cultures and direct their behavior.
- B. The ability to shape the political agenda of others, whether for enemies or competitors.
- C. the ability to side with the model, values and policies, and their credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of others.

(249) Rafiq Abdel Salam, *United States of America between hard power and soft power*, Industry Thought Center for Studies and Research, Beirut, 2015, p. 13.

- D. the ability to impose communication strategies with others - who calls first? and how?
- E. The ability to circulate novels and narrate the facts - the winner today is the one who wins his version of events.

It must be emphasized that soft power does not mean in any way the disappearance or disappearance of hard power tools, it depends on the situation and context. Soft power has its appropriate moment, and it works in a framework of exchange and compatibility with military and economic hard power tools. Otherwise, in this case it is synonymous with shock and impotence. Therefore, soft power changes with the change of media and tools of influence and their qualitative transformations in light of the shifts in the concept of place and geography, as it is affected by the moral capital of the state, real capital and budgets.

Soft power requirements and conditions:

Building soft power needs time that does not depend on changing a lot of ideas, norms and behaviors, and in addition to that, it needs to change some laws and legislations, and with the huge costs, but today there is no other more courageous option, and that soft power works to achieve the goals of the state's foreign policy in light of A suitable environment that makes it more successful in achieving the goals. Among those requirements and conditions are the following:⁽²⁵⁰⁾

- A. The ability to attract, and the mechanism of attraction is related to the ability to persuade, which leads to a change in the preferences of international actors after the intervention of the state using soft power tools.
- B. The presence of sources of hard power next to the sources of soft power are intangible, as owning resources of hard power is in itself one of the mechanisms of attraction and persuasion.
- C. Marketing ideas, policies, values and cultures in various ways and means.
- D. Gaining credibility and confidence from the targeted parties and actors.
- E. Taking into account the interests and preferences of the target countries, whether the governing committee and decision makers, or the general public and public opinion.

Saudi soft power has played various roles in Saudi life, especially in its integration with the Kingdom's policies in various fields, and in the face of Iranian challenges based on doctrinal foundations, these soft powers should have an active role.

(250) Naftiya Muhammad, *Soft Power in International Relations*, University of Martyr Hammat El Wadi, Algeria, 2017, p. 47.

Mechanisms and determinants of basic effectiveness for building soft power in various fields:

- A. The field of spreading language and culture, using the following tools and mechanisms:
 - a. Institutional character through cultural centers, schools and universities.
 - b. Employing popular culture to attract interest in language.
 - c. Inclusion of activities for all age and educational levels before university, university, and after university.
 - d. Move within the framework of international or regional organizations or associations in a way that makes the dissemination of the language wider and more diverse in its dimensions.
- B. The field of educational, scientific and technical cooperation:
 - a. Attention to communication between universities and research institutions.
 - b. Creating joint scientific and research networks.
 - c. Transfer programs for researchers, students and university professors.
 - d. Supporting the infrastructure of local universities and financing educational programs inside and outside the country.
 - e. Attract students from other countries to learn in state universities.
 - f. Introducing attractive new educational programs.
 - g. Work to unify or approximate educational systems, assessment systems and standards through agreements, technical assistance, and grants.
 - h. Establishing joint universities, developing dual or joint degree programs.
 - i. Facilitating travel procedures and visas for research and educational purposes.
- C. Development of commercial relations:
 - a. Updating networks linking local businessmen abroad.
 - b. Granting of credits for exports.
 - c. Revitalizing the role of embassies in advancing trade negotiations between countries.
 - d. Strengthening partnership programs between the public and private sectors.
 - e. Training businessmen and entrepreneurs in other countries.

- f. Improving the business climate in the country and in partner countries and reforming regulatory frameworks.
 - g. Providing incentives for internal investment.
 - h. Adopting programs to develop the private business sector.
 - i. Develop programs to attract skilled manpower.
- D. the field of public diplomacy:⁽²⁵¹⁾
- a. Development Institutions to coordinate building relations with organizations not governmental in other countries.
 - b. Encourage and support local NGOs.
 - c. Developing a legal framework and economic mechanisms to stimulate ties with the Diaspora and Diaspora in the countries in which they are located.
 - d. Establishing crisis and relief centers to help citizens and foreigners in crisis and disaster sites.
 - e. Programs and activities to strengthen civil society and its developmental role in other countries.
 - f. Revitalizing the role of countries in hosting international conferences.
 - g. Support civil society organizations and the media in spreading the values of democracy.
- E. The field of international development assistance: ⁽²⁵²⁾
- a. Infrastructure projects financing.
 - b. Financing educational programs and grants and developing educational institutions.
 - c. Providing loans to purchase national products.
 - d. Providing easy loans.
 - e. Contribute to building the capacities of national institutions and bodies.
 - f. Representing the interests of developing countries in international organizations.

(251) Ali Jalal Moawad, *The Concept of Soft Power and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Center for Strategic Studies, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2019, p. 50.

(252) Andreyshlepovetal, "A Systemization of the Best Soft Power (relatives, international organizations research journal 9, no. 2 (2014)204-243.

Saudi soft power

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys an abundance of soft power sources with excellent resources, and it also has many diverse means and tools, and resources and resources mean the availability of the components of power and their causes, while the means or tools mean the ways of using this power, and the ability to employ it, and the concept of soft power includes both The two sides are the side of possessing the reasons for power, and the side of employing these reasons to control the will and actions of others. Humanitarian, development and relief aid, for example, is one of the sources and resources of soft power, while its tools and means are represented in the institutions that provide them, and the media that publicizes them.²⁵³⁾

Sources of soft power for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has sources of soft power and its excellent resources vary between moral and material sources. The most important soft power sources are as follows:

A. Islamic creedal wealth

It is the origin of the sources, and its greatest resource is this soft power, and on top of that is the doctrine of special monotheism, because it is the original origin of the religion of Islam - Sunni - embraced by the vast majority of Muslims, or what has been termed to call them the people of the Sunnah and the group, and it is the origin from which many sources are generated. The additional soft power, such as the application of the provisions of Islamic Sharia and the establishment and announcement of the rites of Islam, from a legal judiciary, the Board of Grievances, a commission for the promotion of good and the prevention of evil, and attention to legal education and the Book of God Almighty, and the Sunnah of His Prophet Muhammad □ And the Islamic call at home and abroad and the honor to serve the Two Holy Mosques, and take care of its guests from the pilgrims and Umrah pilgrims. Such multiple Islamic sources enrich the soft power of the Kingdom, and support its supremacy in the face of the growing Iranian role and its challenges, especially as it sets out to achieve its goals against the Kingdom, from hostile sectarian ideological premises. The Kingdom is the cradle of the final message, the source of the religion of Islam, the base of the first Islamic state, and the source of its

(253) Al-Qahtani, Misfir bin Dhafir Ayedh, *The Strategy for Employing Soft Power to Consolidate Hard Power*, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2010, pg. 60.

victorious conquests. This unique historical wealth also constitutes a source of Saudi soft power.

B. the dominant value system

Values are a measure of patterns of behavior and behavior, and a criterion for judging them as good or bad, and because they are generally derived from the Islamic religion in the Kingdom, whether they are moral, social, economic, political or other values, they are a source of its soft power, for its role in attracting greater popular support for its policies and decisions. Internally, this popular support is also reflected in its soft power externally.

C. Homogeneity among the population of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Ethnically, religiously, culturally, linguistically and sectically, except for a small minority, this is a positive source, compared to other countries that suffer from differences in these characteristics between members of their societies, to Saudi soft power supporting its role locally and internationally. The Saudi people have common cultural traditions and characteristics, which make the people of the Kingdom influenced by the idea of loyalty Because they grew one land, and the unity of their history.⁽²⁵⁴⁾

D. Open Councils Policy

It is also called the open door policy, and it is one of the unique features of the system of government in the Kingdom. The open council is the place (the procedure) where leaders and officials in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia meet with the people. It is a mechanism for periodic communication, and direct meeting face to face between individuals, citizens and others. And the official, as stipulated in the Basic Law of Governance Article 43 of the Kingdom's Constitution. The King's Council and the Crown Prince's Council are open to every citizen and everyone who has a complaint or a grievance, and every individual has the right to address the public authorities regarding the affairs presented to him from the Basic Law of Governance. The aim of the councils is to keep citizens and leaders close to each other, where the pulse is expressed The heart of the citizen and his problem in this open meeting, which is available to

(254) Al-Qahtani, Misfir bin Dhafir Ayedh, *The Strategy of Employing Soft Power to Consolidate Hard Power*, previous reference, p. 79.

anyone who wishes to attend, and that the council is one of the pillars of the Saudi regime.⁽²⁵⁵⁾

E. International weight and the breadth of international relations

This is because the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is characterized by the constants based on Islamic solidarity, peaceful coexistence, global stability, and support for the rights and assistance of minorities, as well as religious and cultural values.⁽²⁵⁶⁾

F. Adopting the call for internal and external dialogue by providing an appropriate and supportive environment for national dialogue between members and groups of society and strengthening the role of civil society institutions in order to achieve justice, equality and freedom of expression within the framework of Islamic Sharia. Represented by the efforts of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, which culminated in the establishment of a global dialogue between followers of religions, civilizations and cultures, which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 2008, and this was practically embodied in the opening of a center for dialogue between followers of religions and cultures in the Austrian capital Vienna in November 2012.

G. at the international level

The Kingdom's call for dialogue between followers of religions and civilizations represented by the efforts of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, which culminated in the establishment of the global dialogue between followers of religions, civilizations and cultures approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 2008, and its scientific embodiment that was inaugurated in the Austrian capital Vienna in November 2012, which is the King's Center Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz International for dialogue between followers of religions and cultures.

Material sources of soft power for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

A. The presence of the Two Holy Mosques and the careful attention to their affairs in terms of expansions, services, and facilitation of ways for their visitors, represents a flowing source of soft power, especially with the annual increase in the number of pilgrims, in addition to visitors and pilgrims throughout the year.

(255) Al Saud, 2000, pg. 160.

(256) Al-Hamoudi, Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad bin Musa, *Saudi diplomacy and ceremonies and their comparison with some Arab countries*, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah Al-Mukarramah 2010, p. 20.

- B. An important source of energy globally, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occupies the first place in the world in the export of petroleum and its reserves, and the fifth in the reserves of natural gas, and the tenth in its production. That is why the Kingdom is one of the most important members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the most influential in influencing the prices of this strategic global commodity, which supports its soft power at various regional and international levels.⁽²⁵⁷⁾.
- C. Financial and economic strength The Kingdom is a global economic power, as the Kingdom's total output amounted to 711 billion dollars in 2018, according to the World Bank database. Therefore, the Kingdom is the only Arab country to participate in the G20 Summit, which supports its soft power internationally.⁽²⁵⁸⁾
- D. Humanitarian financial and material aid, whether in the form of non-refundable grants or soft loans, as the Kingdom is one of the largest donor countries in the world, as its relative aid proposed by the United Nations to donor countries exceeded 7% of GDP.⁽²⁵⁹⁾
- E. The attractiveness of the labor market in the Kingdom. This attraction is expressed by the presence of a large number of foreign communities working in the Kingdom from various countries of the world.

Soft power tools and tools for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

There are many of these means and tools that can be categorized into the following categories:

- A. Islamic advocacy means, the most prominent of which are:
 - a) King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Noble Qur'an, its translations and recordings, and its distribution throughout the year in various countries of the world.
 - b) Preparing preachers for da'wah in different countries of the world. Their number reached 1153 in 1429, spread over 29 countries in different continents.
 - c) There are 28 advocacy offices abroad, distributed over 26 countries.⁽²⁶⁰⁾.

(257) Ministry of Petroleum, *Mineral Resources*: www.mapm.gav.sa

(258) www.data.worldbank.org.

(259) Department of Statistics and Information, *Millennium Development Goals*; www.cdsi.gav.sa.

(260) Ministry of Islamic Affairs, *Endowments, Call and Guidance*, annual report for the fiscal year 1433, 1434 AH, p. 20.

- d) Cooperative offices for advocacy, guidance and awareness of communities at home, which number more than 300 offices in various parts of the country.
- e) The advocacy role played by the imams of mosques and Friday preachers in the mosques spread throughout the Kingdom, in addition to the individual advocacy efforts.
- f) Hajj and Umrah visits.

B. Official media and cultural media

The Kingdom has many official and cultural media, including: ⁽²⁶¹⁾

- a) Saudi Press Agency (SPA).
- b) TV channels.
- c) Saudi Radios.
- d) Local newspapers and periodicals, 316 newspapers and periodicals.
- e) International exhibitions and books.
- f) websites.

C. political and diplomatic means

Including embassies and its attachés, holding conferences, exchanging delegations and official visits, in addition to the Kingdom's hosting of many Arab, Islamic, regional and international organizations such as the Muslim World League, the Supreme Council of Mosques, the Islamic Relief Organization, the headquarters of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and others.

D. economic means

The most important of which are local development lending institutions, such as agricultural, industrial, real estate and human resources development funds, and at the level of external support, such as the Saudi Fund for Development and the Islamic Bank, and participation in many regional and international institutions and banks, as well as government companies and the private sector.

E. educational aids

There are many of these methods:

- a) Schools, institutes and universities in different stages of education.
- b) Institutes and educational centers abroad.
- c) The Islamic University of Medina.

(261) The annual report of the Ministry of Culture and Information for the year 1433-1434 AH, p. 20.

d) Saudi students studying abroad.

F. Means of relief and humanitarian work

Many official and civil institutions at home and abroad do this. As for relief work abroad, there are official campaigns to collect donations in times of crises and disasters that occupy some Muslims, in addition to many Saudi institutions such as the Muslim World League, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the World Symposium Muslim youth and others.

G. Means of volunteer and community work

Such as voluntary and cooperative institutions and civil society organizations such as the Human Rights Association and Commission. ⁽²⁶²⁾

The role of soft power in achieving the proposed Saudi strategy:⁽²⁶³⁾

Saudi soft power is vitally linked to the strategy adopted by the Saudi state, and stems from the future vision that it aspires to and which in turn is inspired by the origins of the Salafist Islamic reform call on which the Saudi state has been based since its inception, following the famous preacher's agreement that was between the two Imams Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, and Muhammad bin Saud, may God Almighty have mercy on them, and there is no doubt that a good helper in defining the features of the Saudi strategy and revealing the components that characterize it are represented in the texts of the Basic Law of Governance, issued in 1412 AH, which is considered the status of the constitution in the state.

The components of the Saudi strategy and its future vision that express its soft powers, by reviewing the texts of the articles of the Saudi Basic Law of Governance that are of interest to the study, as follows:

A. Islamic ideological strategy

The Islamic faith is clearly evident in many of the texts of the articles included in the Basic Law of Governance, including what the first article stipulates that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic state with complete sovereignty, its religion is Islam, and its constitution is the Book of God Almighty and the Sunnah of His Messenger. Its language is Arabic, and its capital is Riyadh.²⁶⁴ This article states that the state is Islamic and that there is no constitution for it except the Book of its Lord and the Sunnah of its Prophet. That is why this system was called the

(262) *The Annual Statistical Report of the Ministry of Social Affairs*, Riyadh 1432, 1433 AH, p. 229.

(263) Sultan bin Fahd bin Abdullah, *Strategic Perceptions of Saudi Soft Power in the Face of Iranian Challenges*, Naif University for Security Sciences, Riyadh 2014, p. 30.

(264) *The Basic Law of Governance*, 1412 AH, p. 2.

Basic System of Governance, and it was not called the Constitution like all other countries of the world. Or make it just a call to return to Islam only, or in terms of celebrating the language of the Noble Qur'an, or confirming belonging to the Arab element, which is the subject of Islam and the starting point for its first call.

Governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on justice, consultation and equality in accordance with Islamic law. The state protects human rights according to Islamic law, emphasizing the commitment of the king of the country to work with them and his responsibility to implement them.

B. A global advocacy strategy

The state protects the belief of Islam, implements its law, enjoins good and forbids evil, and performs the duty of calling to God. Calling to God with wisdom and good exhortation, and therefore arguing is better as commanded by the Almighty, without resorting to sowing sedition and creating revolutions and disturbances in other countries and other disruptive revolutionary methods.

C. A peaceful defensive strategy

sound obviously in a role entrusted with troops armed as well Citizen's duty Saudi Generally , And who represented in a protection This is amazing creed and defense About Sanctuaries, Society and Country , from Subject 33 from constitution The kingdom , On that create Country forces armed and processed from Yes Defense About creed , And the two sacred places the honorable The society and the nation, as stipulated in Article 34 of the Constitution that the defense About the Islamic faith, society and the homeland is the duty of every citizen.

D. A unitary strategy for the Islamic nation

This is embodied in the Kingdom's historical approach and its keenness on unity of word, achieving solidarity among its sisters from Arab and Islamic countries, and strengthening its relations with friendly countries. This is what was emphasized in Article (39) related to the media, which stipulates that the media, publishing and all means of expression shall abide by the good word and the state's regulations, and contribute to educating the nation and supporting its unity, and prohibiting what leads to sedition or division or what affects the security of the state and its public relations, as is embodied This is practically with regard to serving the sons of the nation and its peoples by honoring the service of the Two Holy Mosques, and providing security, safety and good care for its guests from the sons of the Islamic nation, and the state also builds and serves the Two Holy Mosques and provides

security and care for those who are going to them, in a way that enables them to perform Hajj, Umrah and visit with ease. It is this spirit that has given and continues to give the Kingdom a clear preferential advantage over other countries, which has led to the perpetuation of stability and preserved the fabric of the internal community and external respect.

It is clear from the components of the Saudi strategy that it is inspired by the origins of the reformist call and its teachings. It is a doctrinal strategy with a global message that seeks to achieve its future vision, which is inspired by the specifics of this call, which is embodied in spreading Islam, as it was in its first era, by establishing pure monotheism and calling for it. With wisdom and good exhortation, and argument in a way that is best, as required by the advocacy method, which it followed as a way to convey its message, and on this basis, the Kingdom defined its vision of foreign policy as one of the countries of the Islamic nation that arose mainly to carry the banner of calling to God, then God honored it by serving his house and excommunicated his Prophet - God made her so honorable.

Accordingly, this call and its teachings represent the basis and logic of Saudi soft power, in its various forms and means, with which it can be said that Saudi soft power is nothing but an expression of the forces of attraction and attraction inherent in the religion of Islam itself, represented in the reform call and its directives, with all that it enjoys. Of the features and characteristics that are unique and distinctive, and ensure his superiority in the arenas Awareness soft, and fields wars intellectual and conflicts Streptococcus According to the perspective The strategic.

The quadripartite analysis of the Saudi soft power system in the face of Iranian challenges:

Prepare This is amazing The tool is one of the most important strategic tools for analyzing the general situation for the state for strength soft from During Specify elements Power and weakness interior and opportunities and threats existing in a The environment external surrounding out⁽²⁶⁵⁾.

1. Analysis of the internal environment of Saudi soft power:

Strengths in the internal environment of Saudi soft power (the pluses):

- a. Distinguishing the reformist call.

(265) Yassin, Saad Ghaleb, *Strategic Management*, Dar Al-Yazuri, Amman, Jordan, 2002, p. 105.

- b. The presence of the Two Holy Mosques, where millions of Muslims frequent them throughout the year.
- c. financial strength The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys tremendous economic power.
- d. Foreign and Humanitarian Aid The Kingdom provides generous financial and material assistance to many countries in the developing world.
- e. The moderate policy of the Kingdom The Kingdom enjoys a prominent position among the members of the international community, for its production of moderate policies based on the values of mediation and moderation, the call for peace and the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, and its keenness in its international relations for mutual benefit, not harming others and other lofty human values , bonus For its active role in many regional and international organizations and gatherings, What is an element of strength and a positive factor added to the soft power of the Kingdom.

Weaknesses in the internal environment of Saudi soft power (negatives):

- A. The specific employment of the reform call: This is due to the fierce attack on the Kingdom and its reformist call, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, which led to a noticeable decline in advocacy activities, as a result of the closure of many of its institutions and centers. Thus, avoiding focusing on this call in the media discourse was a win for the other, and a preference to go along with it at its expense, which constitutes the most important aspects of weakness that the kingdom's soft power suffers from, as it represents a systematic defect that affects the basis that You should start with it.
- B. Negative exploitation of the Hajj season: Iran's attempts to exploit and politicize the Hajj season constitute one of the most important challenges facing Saudi soft power, and this stems from the importance of the ritual itself, its place and time. □ Hence, the Saudi state, which is based on the principles of the reformist call, cannot allow any deviation from this legal rule, and the controls and conditions it contains, at a time when Iran insists on politicizing this ritual and obliterating its legal features with innovations and innovations that violate the sanctity of place and the sanctity of time. In the service of its policies and to promote its revolutionary model, through

the rallies declaring innocence from polytheism and polytheists, and by imposing the concept of politicizing the Hajj, Iran seeks to achieve goals, the most important of which are:

- a. Spreading Shiism among the pilgrims.
- b. Reducing Saudi efforts to spread the correct Islamic faith.
- c. disturbing security and spreading chaos in the two Holy Mosques.
- d. Propaganda for the radical revolutionary regime and its aggressive policies. Iran is trying to continue the gradual pressure while raising the ceiling of demands according to the principle of take and demand to reach their goal by internationalizing the Two Holy Mosques.

C. The negative role of the Shiite minority

This is what this minority and its revolutionary organizations are doing from riot And destabilize the security and provoke For the majority of citizens and incitement against the country, Although they appear with different names and various formations, they are all just names for one name, mostly run by one command, striving for a common purpose, but political shrewdness Identity with reality imposes its apparent diversity and differentiation, and plays roles, even if they seem incompatible between the politician, the jurist and the terrorist. However, it is in fact one system and the exchange of integrated roles has become Reports Shiite, You find her way Easily to me Publishing in a Western media, With reliance she alone that represent Interface the real for Saudi Arabia Nor It hides the consequent weakening of Saudi soft power and the curtailment of its leadership role.²⁶⁶⁾

D. The shortcomings of the media and their limited role:

The media is considered one of the most important tools of soft power in terms of the strength of its influence and its ability to penetrate borders and barriers, or in terms of relying on it as a necessary means to activate other soft powers and spread their desired effects. Perhaps this media shortcoming appears in many aspects, most notably that the Kingdom does not have There is only one news agency in comparison to the nine agencies and news, and the Saudi radio broadcasts only in the languages prevailing in the Islamic world for only three hours. Before the Iranian soft war against Saudi Arabia, while the seriousness of the situation requires the allocation of media outlets directed in the various languages prevailing in Islamic

(266) Shehadeh and Al Kiswani, *The Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Contemporary Teams in the World*, Madbouly Library 2009, Cairo, 2009, p. 86.

countries, especially the Persian language, to confront the challenges of the Iranian regime, and its directed media tools in Arabic, foremost of which is radio transmission. And the multiple Arabic-speaking satellite channels, which vary between news and religious channels, in addition to the weakness of Saudi channels and radio, even religious ones, in terms of offering and the absence or at least scarcity of programs dedicated to facing such challenges, which constitutes a severe weakness factor that the force suffers from. Saudi soft.

- E. Lack of a strategic plan for soft power: that over there many from powers soft Saudi Arabia leading in a situation plans The strategy and bios On gift it, like education and call for example, not that What is meant? Here lack Power soft Saudi Arabia to plan strategy Inclusive eat it different its sources and its means as a system one integrated , go off from Vision specific and seek to achieve goals common , as clear of criticism directed for one from most important tools This is amazing Power represented by channels Arab satellite Especially , and in preface Saudi Arabia naturally , for her interest have fun and entertainment on account Business Avenue And it despite diffusion quantitative But that There is weakness and fragility in the content and expresses an absent or absent Arab media reality, politically, economically, religiously and scientifically, and this meaning is embodied in a remarkable embodiment for Saudi TV channels in the multiplicity of sports channels to six channels only.⁽²⁶⁷⁾ .

2. Analysis of the external environment of Saudi soft power:

Opportunities and advantages in the external environment:

- A. Weakness of the structure upon which saturation is based:

The building upon which saturation is based is represented in a campaign of fundamentals and branches that do not stand up to arguments and textual and rational proofs, on top of which are the Imamate, the infallibility, the Mahdism, the exaggeration in the imams, the wrongdoing, and the slander against the honorable Companions - with the exception of a few that do not exceed the fingers, piety, the reference of imitation, expiation of the violator, the five, the pleasure and others, which was detailed and clarified, based on their approved references in the author decreed on the origins of the Twelver Imami Shi'ism sect)⁽²⁶⁸⁾ .

(267) Al-Bakri, 2009, p. 383.

(268) Al-Qafari, Nasser bin Abdullah bin Ali, *the issue of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites*, Dar Taiba for Publishing and Distribution, Riyadh 2010, p. 20.

B. Wide dental depth:

The large number of Sunnis, which exceeds one billion, represents a human strategic depth in favor of Saudi soft power. Then it can be calculated one Opportunities available that Manage employ it in a Confrontation Iranian challenges.

C. The growing global need for Saudi oil:

The Kingdom is the most important and largest coverage country in the world at all, in terms of reserves, production, exports and refining energy, and this is one of the most important opportunities available in the external environment that can be invested to increase the effectiveness of Saudi soft power.

D. Iran's current international isolation:

Iran suffers from severe international isolation and faces debilitating economic sanctions, which constitutes one of the opportunities that can be invested in increasing the effectiveness of Saudi soft power towards it, and exerting more pressure on it. , to force her On scaling her ambitions , and reduce its rush to export its revolution.

E. The disharmony of the components of Iranian society:

Iranian society is characterized by ethnic heterogeneity and extreme cultural diversity, due to the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and sectarian plurality that characterizes the population map in Iran. Officially recognized, the majority of the Iranian people are Shiites and the rest are Sunnis.

F. The attractiveness of the Saudi labor market:

This attraction appears in the huge numbers of foreign communities in the Kingdom, which exceed 9 million people, where it is possible to influence them through the affirmation of fair regulations and legislation that guarantee their rights and establish good dealing with them, which is an addition to Saudi soft power, whether in the case of residence of these individuals or when return to their countries.

Threats (negatives) to the external environment of Saudi soft power:

A. Campaigns to distort the reformist call and accuse it of blasphemy and terrorism

The deviant groups do not make these unjust accusations to distort the reformist call under the name of Wahhabism only, but on the side of Iran and the Shiites in general, some Western powers aspiring to dominate the Islamic world. The region, and the greatest awareness of it in exposing its tricks and the danger it poses to Islam and Muslims.

- B. Attempting to isolate the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from its Islamic milieu
By showing the reformist call as if it were a new, innovated sect, hostile to other sects, and blaming the nation's sons as infidels.
- C. Iranian employment of Islamic discourse
Iran employs religious rhetoric and raising Islamic slogans to achieve many goals, the most prominent of which is employing this to tickle feelings and attract hearts towards the Wali al-Faqih regime, win support for its policies, and dazzle it with its revolutionary Shiite ideology that seeks alone to defend the nation and duel with global powers, support liberation and liberation movements, and support The states of resistance and resistance, with what that permeates, exposing the Arab moderation states - all of which are Sunni - and throwing them into surrender and slavery, the Shiites of the Sunnis by polishing the role of the Shiites in the region and their state sponsor Iran, as well as establishing a mythical image in the Sunni imagination of the Shiite resistance hero, the guardian of the jurist at the level global leadership.
- D. Shiite minorities rally behind Iran in its soft conquest of the Islamic world
This is done by coordinating joint efforts to spread Shiism, as evidenced by the feverish Shiite activity in the African continent by Iraqi, Lebanese and Gulf sides, in addition to Iran⁽²⁶⁹⁾, as well as the great interest that the Iranian and Shiite parties attach to spreading Shiism and promoting the Iranian model through education in its various stages. Such a joint Shiite soft invasion represents a serious threat to Saudi soft power in the African continent, as it faces its ilk in many places as well, because of its consequences Corrupting the beliefs of the Muslim peoples and transforming them from supporters of the state of monotheism and the Sunnah to its equivalent, and then limiting the Kingdom's role abroad and competing with it in its traditional places of influence in Islamic countries.
- E. The expansion of the Shiite crescent and the attempt to encircle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Iran seeks to strengthen the Shiite crescent that extends from its lands through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon - the Fertile Crescent and later expand to include the Arabian Peninsula and all the Arab Gulf states and Yemen and to defend this

(269) Al-Matrafi and others, p. 30.

crescent, even if by direct intervention as in the current Syrian case, and in order to complete the construction of this crescent. With all its components, Iran seeks to overcome the most important obstacles that stand in the way of achieving this ambitious expansion, by trying to win Egypt, the major Sunni state, to its side or at least work to neutralize it or occupy it to isolate it from its Arab surroundings, in addition to trying to besiege the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And he strangled it with a triple Shiite cordon that wrapped around it from Iraq to the north, and the Shiites of the Gulf region, especially Bahrain to the east, and Yemen to the south.

5.2. Recommended strategy and the use of soft powers in the economy, as well as the political and military security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Countries are concerned with the national strategic planning process, which is the process through which strategic analysis and strategic choice are determined, and they are also interested in identifying alternatives and aiming to find interrelationship between the interim strategic goals and other short-term goals, as well as the interdependence between legislation and strategic policies in order to achieve integration among all parties. Which makes all efforts are directed in a certain direction, which is to achieve the specified goals in the best way and at the best cost, which leads to raising the general level of the state.

Advantages of strategic planning:

- a) The state, along with the national strategy, becomes an initiative, and thus there is more effectiveness that is formed as a result of the presence of the initiative element.
- b) NS- The strategy works to achieve control over the fate of the state and its interests at the same time.
- c) It provides a greater opportunity for the ability to lead matters and understand the activities within the country.
- d) Dr - It also helps to manage conflicts and achieve international competition.
- e) It helps build competitive capabilities at the global level.
- f) And - The strategy prevents the practice of any activities contrary to or against the public interests.
- g) Make all international activities and interests a result of achieving strategic interests and related challenges and issues.

- h) NS- Strategic planning works to achieve a comprehensive renaissance that always seeks to bring about fundamental changes and work to achieve the largest goals.

The national strategy is a set of rules and principles that are related to a specific field, and help the individuals associated with it to make appropriate decisions based on a set of accurate plans, which depend on developing the right strategies to reach results, and it is also known as the actions and methods that seek to achieve the planned goals, taking into account all the factors that affect the possibility of its occurrence, or its actual application, so it is important to be careful to adjust the strategies used in the event that they are not suitable for the real events associated with them and so as not to affect the course of achieving the goals in a correct manner. ⁽²⁷⁰⁾

There are a set of objectives that the national strategy is keen to implement, namely:

- a) Find out the current status of the business that will work on implement it and get to know On all Elements its constituent.
- b) NS- Determine all the tools and means that will be used to implement the work.
- c) Understand the pros and cons of working with the strategy.
- d) Dr - Take advantage of the pros and cons of working related to the strategy.
- e) Availability of the appropriate conditions and environment for the implementation of the strategy.

And - Taking into account the appropriateness of all the factors surrounding the strategy with the nature of the tasks that you will perform, which leads to achieving the desired results of the work.

The national strategy is based on the following principles:

- a) Setting all the goals that will be achieved, and it is considered the first principle of the strategy.
- b) NS- Ensure that the strategy is flexible, that is, that it is easy to implement in the work environment.
- c) The strategy is one of the supporting means for the administrative planning function.
- d) Dr - The strategy must be comprehensive and integrated, meaning that it does not omit any part of the plan that will be implemented.

The general framework of any strategy consists of a number of basic elements:

(270) Rahma Ahmed Sayed, *The Role of Strategic Thought Centers in Making Egyptian Public Policies*, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, Cairo, 2020, p. 3.

- a) Situation Which Seeking The strategy to me face him that He was conflict or conflict or crisis or Problem. etc, Nor Doubt in a that Specify elements Situation accurately driving to me Specify Resources and capabilities, Policies and tools necessary To face that Situation As well as About Specify Bezel realistic Objectives to be achieved
- b) NS- The ultimate goals required, and this is related to the necessity Specify System from priorities, Do not confuse goals ICs self nature Tactical, national goals related nature The strategy for the state
- c) Resources and capabilities the list and latent that Could use in a way Access to me Objectives and level Preparation This is amazing Resources and capabilities to become in a possible use to achieve Maximum Returning Maybe
- d) Dr - plans and The policies, programmes, tools and means that will be employed and the mechanism of appropriateness and coordination between them to prevent contradictions on the one hand, and maximize capabilities, on the other hand.

The strategy in a framework relations International meaning mass Means overall driving Processes political and economic and military and security and cultural and social according to Imagine specific interest national , and strategy by this the meaning not room private for the military alone,⁽²⁷¹⁾ she is judging its extension to me Different fields life (political, and economic, and social) concerns Different specialists and scientists Politics and economy and the meeting and men The strategy, and all This is amazing Dimensions gradient when man The strategy in the premise One his purpose preparation to use Power military Available from Yes Defense About The national interest.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently facing many challenges and threats that impede the march of progress and development in all fields, especially political and security, highlighted by many of the changes that have emerged recently at the local, regional and international levels, so it is necessary to develop strategies to confront those and threats that work to unify efforts strategy in those areas to deal with them from the standpoint of strategic thinking, by following the following steps:⁽²⁷²⁾

a) Defining Saudi national goals

When developing the strategy, it is necessary to start defining the national goals that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve in the light of national interests at all

(271) Alaa Abu Amer, *Apparent Relationships: Phenomenon and Science*, aforementioned reference, p. 183.

(272) Abdulaziz Turki Al-Farm, *the variables of the contemporary world order and their political implications, on the security of the Arabian Gulf*, a master's thesis, Riyadh, Naif University for Security Sciences, 2015, p. 161.

local, regional and international levels, taking into account the latest developments and current events that require modifications that may in some situations be essential to the proposed strategy, so it is important The formulation of this strategy in a flexible manner that allows making corrections on it whenever the situation requires that or moving to alternative strategies, especially after the Arab Gulf region has become a strategic weight in the Middle East region, which in turn has made it the focus of attention of major international powers and actors in the global system.

b) NS- Prioritizing the implementation of strategic goals

After the strategic objectives are set and formulated and entered into the implementation phase, taking into account the principle of priority by calculating the relative importance and determining the relative weight of each goal in light of the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to identify the objectives that must be started.

c) The capabilities available to achieve strategic objectives

All available capabilities required to achieve the goals are developed and identified in the light of two axes:

i. physical capabilities

It is represented in the resources available from the vast geographical area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its strategic location and the mineral and oil resources it contains, and the identification of suitable areas for air and sea navigation, as well as identifying the capabilities and capabilities available to the Kingdom to achieve the strategic objectives set.

ii. human potential

It is represented in the leaders, their level of qualification and training, and their ability to achieve the objectives stipulated in the strategy.

d) Dr - Define the institutional framework for implementing the strategy⁽²⁷³⁾

In this step, the institutions that may participate in the implementation of the strategy are identified, as there are many institutions in various fields (political, security, military, economic, social, and cultural), in order to ensure that there is no overlap in the competencies as the conflict in the competencies leads to the failure to achieve the objectives Optimally, when implementing one of the strategy's mechanisms, one of the ministries or agencies may specialize in it from an administrative point of

(273) Abdulaziz Turki Al-Farm, previous reference, p. 163.

view and another from a technical point of view, in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of implementation.

e) Consolidation of strategic efforts

It is necessary to find contact links between all national institutions in various fields (political, military, security, economic and social), in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that would achieve the integration of strategies developed by each institution or entity in all fields to ensure the maximum possible benefit from the work programs established.

f) Taking into account local, regional and international changes

It is necessary to identify all the variables surrounding the Arab Gulf region at various levels and fields, and to predict the future challenges facing the implementation of the strategy, with the need to take into account the principle of flexibility when deciding policies and executive mechanisms, and to develop strategic alternatives that are valid for implementation when one of the challenges that may hinder implementation appears.

The process of developing the strategy must be included in determining the final state that it aims to achieve from behind, which in turn is defined as the objective of this strategy. Accordingly, the final goal that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seeks to achieve is to ensure the achievement of its national and regional security, the achievement of its vital interests, and the maximization of its regional and international status. Preserving its sanctities and Islamic heritage, and creating a regional region characterized by stability and peace.

The proposed strategy consists of engaging and activating all soft power tools in the Kingdom (political, security, military, economic, social, cultural) by cooperating and supporting each other to achieve national security. At the global, regional and internal levels, the determinants require a conscious study and at the same time an awareness of the areas it includes, and the strategy stems from certain pillars in which the foundations on which this strategy depends to achieve the goals it aspires to, the means necessary to achieve them, the time frame in which it is carried out, the geographical area that it contains, and the extent Which this strategy affects on a local or global scale.

Suggested general strategic objectives: ⁽²⁷⁴⁾

- A. Immunizing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against all dangers represented by international threats such as external aggression, international terrorism, and dangerous transnational organized criminal activities.
- B. Increasing sustainable economic growth.
- C. Maintaining a high level of human development.
- D. Vitality and the ability to recover from risks and awareness and management of various crises.
- E. Strengthening the international standing of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- F. Contribution and effective presence in addressing many crises and issues related to international peace and security.

The time range of the proposed strategy:

The proposed strategy will be implemented for a period of fifteen years, through five-year plans, reviewed every five years, according to a specific mechanism, including the ministers submitting studies and special reports on joint work. , as take over Committees Main and sub In all the different areas working within the framework of Council The Ministers shall present an actual evaluation of the joint activities included in this strategy. To be last review in a the year the ninth from its application To determine features the job Subscriber member states.

The proposed strategy in the political field:

Description of the proposed strategy in the political field:

A strategy that is based on arranging Saudi and Arab political relations and includes reforming and developing Saudi political institutions, achieving Saudi political awareness and political development, and applying the foundations of good governance in all political systems through the rule of law and social justice, consolidating the concept of citizenship, and protecting the freedoms and rights of the Saudi citizen within the framework of the Arab and Islamic identity. Preserving the internal national unity in all of the Kingdom, and preparing the Arab internal environment and immunizing it against the attempts of external polarization of any of the political forces, as it is the basic basis for confronting any threats, whether regional or international, facing the Arab Gulf region.

The general objectives of the proposed strategy in the political field:

(274) *National and Regional Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries*, Bahrain Center for Strategic, International and Energy Studies, Manama, 2012, p. 20.

- a) Establishing a just peace in the region, through achieving stability based on regional balances. and what Lead to me Investigation Security National and Arab and the removal of threats and external interference
- b) Building regional confidence and dealing with the current global system with a balanced degree of transparency, and reducing the restrictions imposed on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- c) Maintaining stability and respect for the law and spreading political awareness among members of Saudi society.
- d) Achieving rapprochement and unity of political orientation and consensus in visions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and supporting cooperation and coordination among them, in a way that enables the Kingdom to influence the circles of its vital field.
- e) Preserving the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a cohesive regional unit.
- f) That political action be based on a balance between national and national interests.
- g) That the principle of peace is the strategic option for resolving all conflicts, threats, challenges and regional problems.
- h) Saudi/Arab cooperation and coordination, in order to activate the Arab role in resolving the issues of the Arab region, and limit the internationalization of those issues and the interference of regional and international powers.
- i) Active participation in resolving the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supporting the unity of the Arab ranks and ending the state of division and polarization that exists among the Arab countries.
- j) Work to ensure the interests and objectives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The pillars of the proposed strategy in the political field:

- a) The stability of the regime, the unity of belief, and the coherence of the demographic structure.
- b) Reform in the political field that the region is currently witnessing is a pillar on which the Saudi political will rests in building the proposed strategy to confront and confront the restrictions imposed by the contemporary world order.
- c) The national will of the ruling elite and members of the people and the cohesion that is taking place in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the aim of preserving the existing situation and preparing to confront the growing capabilities of non-Arab regional states to take over the formulation of the region's policies.

- d) Confirmation of the independence of national sovereignty and respect for international law and international legitimacy.
- e) Considering the Arab identity and the moderate Islamic values and teachings of the Gulf regimes as a platform for action in the political field.
- f) The distinguished relationship of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the political and economic fields at the Arab and Islamic levels.
- g) Strong ties and distinguished relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the major active powers by virtue of common interests and goals.
- h) The active role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in international forums such as the United Nations and in regional organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States.
- i) The geopolitical situation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the facts of history and the current reality, which indicates the importance of the Kingdom from the political perspective.

The determinants of the proposed strategy in the political field:

- a) Foreign direct presence in the Arab Gulf region.
- b) The instability of the regional security system in the Arab Gulf region, and the threats and unrest with neighboring countries.
- c) The growing phenomenon of terrorism and extremist groups.
- d) Strategic imbalance in favor of non-Arab powers in the region.
- e) Iran's nuclear program.
- f) Tensions in some countries of the Saudi periphery (Iraq – Yemen – Lebanon – Syria).
- g) Interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom by some regional powers.
- h) Belief in the legitimate right of self-defense for the countries of the region and the protection of national interests, while refusing to resort to force as the only tool for implementing foreign policy.
- i) Weakness of the Arab system and Arab / Arab differences.
- j) The American support for Israel, and its adoption of the policy of double standards in its relations with Israel and the Arab countries, with the deepening of the imbalance between them in favor of Israel.
- k) The absence of a collective security system and international legitimacy within the framework of the United Nations in favor of the principles and foundations that the United States seeks to impose.

- l) The difficulty of cooperating with all regional organizations of which Iran is a member, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
- m) The large numbers of expatriate workers present in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their influence in shaping the policy of the Kingdom.
- n) The Shiite minorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (citizens with all rights) and their tendencies towards some regional powers.
- o) Differing political views in dealing with the challenges and threats facing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and differing opinions. Each country exerts its political and diplomatic efforts to achieve its own interests.

The priorities of the proposed strategy in the political field:

- a) Stable strategic relations with neighboring countries within the scope of their regional surroundings.
- b) Balanced relations with the major influential powers.
- c) Supporting the efforts of the United Nations towards maintaining international peace and security and supporting it in confronting the phenomenon of international terrorism.
- d) Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Middle East.

Implementation policies for the proposed strategy in the political field:

a) In the field of internal organizational construction:

Deepening the concept of the political upbringing of the Saudi citizen in line with contemporary political changes.

Activating the role of official political institutions, by expanding the powers of legislative parliamentary institutions, and developing their monitoring tools over the performance of the government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Seeking to achieve a balance between the legislative and executive authorities to ensure the achievement of democratic performance.

The trend towards issuing legislation and laws that support human rights, and establishing councils to protect those rights.

Building and activating civil society institutions and coordinating between them within the Kingdom to ensure popular cohesion among Saudi society.

Developing the election experience at the level of local councils, within the framework of an effective electoral system that guarantees integrity, and makes the local level an effective base for the performance of the political system as a whole.

b) at the regional level:

Employing foreign policy tools, and finding a comprehensive vision of how to develop the regional role to confront Iranian regional challenges and threats, and unify policies related to containing problems and differences between the countries of the region.

Demanding that the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East be freed of weapons of mass destruction, declaring the region a denuclearized zone, including Israel, and warning of the danger of the Iranian nuclear program on the security, economic, stability and development conditions.

Participation in supporting, reforming and developing the League of Arab States and its institutions as a symbol of Arab national identity, and the only official political framework that maintains Arab cooperation.

Intensifying the political and diplomatic activity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in general and the countries of the Cooperation Council in particular in order to unify their policies, positions and vision towards political issues of direct impact.

Active participation in all regional conferences, and putting forward a unified vision through political coordination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to ensure a good investment of those conferences, in the direction of supporting political interests.

Implementing an effective and active foreign policy at the regional and international levels through increasing strategic cooperation with Arab and Islamic countries, and coordinating common political positions.

Establishing good relations with strategic neighboring countries through a policy of dialogue and cooperation, coordinating positions and creating a network of strategic interests in order to cooperate in confronting the phenomenon of international terrorism.

Increasing the political influence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in its vital field, and its presence in all dialogues related to the future of the Arab Gulf region and regional arrangements, so as not to neglect its interests.

Focusing on protecting Yemen's internal security and stability, committing to implementing the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue conference and completing the implementation of the Gulf initiative.

Preserving the Arab identity and unity of Iraq, contributing to building its national institutions, and dissolving militias affiliated with parties and clans loyal to external forces (Iran).

c) at the international level:

Department of Foreign Political Affairs with diplomatic acumen and skill that achieves Saudi interests and emphasizes the important Saudi role on the international map.

Diversifying the circles of Saudi strategic relations with the major active powers, and employing them to advance international efforts to resolve the region's crises by peaceful means, in order to secure the flow of oil, so that the security of energy and resources becomes a scope of joint cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the major active powers.

Attention to political coordination between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to create a unified political decision through cooperation between their diplomatic missions, to find a representative of the GCC countries in the countries and international organizations of strategic importance, which have major interests in the region.

Exploiting the tendency of the Russian Federation towards restoring its position and influence in the global system and building strategic relations with it, to support Saudi and Arab causes.

Activating the agreements signed between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the European Union to support the Saudi position on Arab, regional and international issues, and investing in the Saudi-European dialogue, especially through the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to include all the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Political openness to the major Asian powers (such as China, Japan, and India), whose strategic interests are linked to the Arab Gulf region.

Building distinguished relations with international labor organizations and human rights organizations.

Intensifying Saudi diplomatic efforts in order to establish balanced international relations with major countries, especially the United States of America and Europe, in order to alleviate Western pressures and malicious campaigns against Muslims.

Activating the role of embassies and attachés of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia abroad to spread the correct and moderate belief in the Islamic religion and to discuss issues of Islamic minorities with those countries where Muslims are present and to show this in the various media to serve their cause and gain their support.

Expanding relief and charitable work, helping the afflicted, and fulfilling their needs of clothing, medicine, and the necessities of life.

Stages of implementing the proposed strategy in the political field:

a) The first stage: Short term (five years):

- i. Focus on following the necessary policies to ensure internal political stability in the country Kingdom Saudi Arabia.
- ii. Carrying out political reform processes in line with the internal conditions of the Kingdom and the degree of its social and cultural development.
- iii. Presenting the proposed strategy in the political field at the popular and official levels for discussion and expressing opinions and proposals regarding it, so that the national political consensus around it is achieved.
- iv. Taking confidence-building measures at the levels that the proposed strategy deals with at the regional and global levels, in order to support the effectiveness of political moves for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- v. Taking serious and effective steps in order to unify visions towards the most important political issues in the priorities of political action for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Especially with regard to future relations with Iran, and security arrangements within the Arab region.
- vi. Consolidation of diplomatic efforts for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program and demanding that the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East be freed of weapons of mass destruction.
- vii. Supporting Arab integration policies in all fields, ending Arab disputes and reunifying the Arab ranks.
- viii. Intensifying Saudi efforts to combat extremist terrorist organizations.

b) The second stage: the medium term (up to ten years):

- i. Review what has been accomplished in the short term and complete what has not been achieved.
- ii. Establishing a permanent political coordination council in the Kingdom to coordinate and unify common policies and interests.
- iii. Achieving convergence, unity of direction and compatibility in all different fields.

- iv. Completing political reform, developing parliamentary and people's councils, and conducting continuous evaluation and development of political experiences in line with comprehensive development goals.
 - v. Continuing the political movement in order to build a regional security system that achieves the interests of all regional parties, without the tendencies of hegemony and the extension of influence in the region.
 - vi. Completing all necessary policies to eradicate the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism, eliminating all causes that led to the spread of sectarian ideology and sectarian conflicts, and returning the Kingdom to a state of stability to support sustainable development efforts.
 - vii. Activating the effective presence in the Organization of the Islamic Conference and implementing programs related to the dialogue between Islam and the West and the dialogue of civilizations to support and support Gulf and Arab issues in the region.
- c) The third stage: the long term (up to fifteen years):
- i. Review what has been accomplished in the medium term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - ii. Work to reach a high degree of internal democratic political performance in order to achieve a democratic model for the Kingdom.
 - iii. Increasing Saudi political influence to support Arab political cooperation in the face of political threats and challenges.
 - iv. Developing Saudi relations, and its role in all international and regional organizations and global forums that are concerned with world issues and forums that discuss environmental issues, climate changes, energy security, terrorism and organized crimes.
 - v. Complete the deepening of the strategy towards broader and deeper areas (political, security) in order to achieve the presence and political bloc of the Gulf Arab through the League of Arab States.

Cooperation mechanisms to achieve the proposed strategy in the political field:

- a) A mechanism that builds on the strategic importance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

This mechanism is determined by the geostrategic situation, the natural resources on its land and its enormous economic capabilities, as well as the

presence of Islamic sanctities and the Qibla of Muslims around the world. And exploiting its strategic location and geographical unity to unify the political movement towards issues affecting its vital interests

b) A mechanism that builds on the political capacity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Proceeding from the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is independent and sovereign countries, and it is a member of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Organization of Non-Aligned Countries, and some of them participate in many regional and global gatherings, and have proven their effectiveness at the regional and global levels. Cooperation for the Arab Gulf States) and their economic capabilities and natural resources support their political ability.

c) A mechanism based on adhering to the Arab system and activating it:

The importance of this mechanism stems from the fact that the Kingdom, although it is a unified bloc, cannot historically, geographically, demographically or ideologically separate from the Arab system. The main ones that must be achieved through clear and specific mechanisms, the most important of which are:

- i. Supporting the capacity of the League of Arab States, and actively contributing to its development and reforming its institutions in a way that supports the Arab political position through (Arab summits, conferences of Arab foreign ministers, conferences of Arab permanent delegates in the League of Arab States, joint Arab committees).
- ii. Effective cooperation in finding solutions to many Arab problems, especially those facing the Gulf march in various fields.
- iii. Confronting the trends of Saudi/Arab isolation, polarization and disintegration that the global system is trying to practice in the region under the name (the New Middle East).

d) A mechanism based on economic capacity This ability stems from the natural resources and their returns to the Kingdom. And that is through Gulf investments and funds in building strong economic relations that are used to achieve political goals and support Saudi interests. And activating the economic capacity of the Kingdom in influencing its regional and global surroundings, Exploitation of oil wealth as a pressure card in order to achieve Gulf and Arab interests.

The proposed strategy in the security and military field

Description of the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

An advanced military strategy that keeps pace with the revolution of military technologies and technologies and strategies of modern wars, and is comprehensive for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Active defense that allows the possibility of pre-intervention to thwart the intentions of aggression against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while developing the Peninsula Shield forces with a size and military capabilities that suit potential threats and seek to achieve strategic balance, and interest in a Saudi nuclear program for peaceful purposes.

The general objectives of the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) Preserving national security and securing it against security threats and challenges that may destabilize its security and stability internally and externally.
- b) Protection of vital interests at home and abroad.
- c) Work to achieve self-insurance to reduce the foreign military presence in the region.
- d) Supporting joint military and security policies.
- e) Seeking to achieve strategic integration between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the neighboring countries.
- f) Reviving security and military cooperation with Arab countries.
- g) Supporting the means of Saudi military and security cooperation with all major active powers.
- h) Continuing to develop, modernize and train the armed forces and security services of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to allow them to confront any external aggression.
- i) Developing and developing military and security capabilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- j) Achieving Saudi defense integration, while diversifying the sources of armament, east and west.
- k) Equipping theaters of operations and command and control systems.
- l) Supporting joint military and security policies and building a balanced regional Gulf security system with the localization of military technology.
- m) Unifying all policies and efforts to combat the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism.

- n) Developing security awareness, raising the efficiency of security services, and enhancing cooperation and coordination to face regional challenges and risks.
- o) Strengthening regional and international cooperation in the fight against crime.

The pillars of the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) The strength of the internal security services, and their possession of modern and advanced information systems.
- b) Effective coordination between all sectors and branches of the Gulf security services.
- c) Advanced armament systems, acquisition of modern technical weapons, and diversification of armament sources for the armed forces.
- d) The ability to move to fill the strategic void, or to face direct or indirect threats on different strategic directions.
- e) Strategic military alliances with major and active countries in the global system.
- f) Sharing the geopolitical characteristics and vital interests, and the similarity of threats to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Determinants of the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) The limited manpower in the Kingdom imposes restrictions on the Gulf military and security organizations and formations.
- b) The expansion of operations theaters and the requirements for their preparation of special quantities and types of weapons and equipment impose financial burdens.
- c) Foreign military presence in the Arab Gulf region.
- d) The presence of a nuclear power in the region (Israel) and another power that seeks to possess a nuclear power (Iran).
- e) Imbalance of the balance of power in the Arab Gulf region in favor of Iran.
- f) Commitment to the joint Arab defense agreement concluded by the League of Arab States.
- g) Strengthening strategic cooperation relations between the United States of America and Israel has enabled it to gain qualitative, quantitative, and technical security and military superiority, obtaining the latest weapons and technology systems, and depriving Arab countries.
- h) Iranian development in the field of military industries.
- i) The imbalance of military capabilities in the Arab Gulf region and the Middle East in favor of the regional neighbors.

- j) Iran's continued occupation of the UAE islands impedes cooperation at the regional level to achieve the security strategy in the Arab Gulf region.
- k) The selective ban on armaments and military sales practiced by the major industrialized countries on the Arab countries.
- l) The emergence of unconventional current and future threats that are difficult to anticipate.

The priorities of the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) Joint coordination to develop and develop self-military capabilities.
- b) Activating joint military and security cooperation policies and mechanisms.
- c) Increasing the size of the armed forces, developing their armament and mobilizing plans.

Executive policies for the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) In the field of preparing the armed forces:
 - i. Increasing the numbers of armed forces personnel in proportion to the size of its geographical area and the importance of its location.
 - ii. Study the requirements of the armed forces in light of the development resulting from the strategies of modern wars.
 - iii. Focusing on training, joint exercises and developing the combat efficiency of the armed forces.
 - iv. Providing all capabilities that would raise the combat and logistical readiness, while preparing comparative studies with other forces in the region.
 - v. Focusing on developing the air force and air defense and owning joint command and control systems and the ballistic missile system to compensate for the shortage of manpower.
 - vi. Developing plans for recruitment and general mobilization to increase the size of the armed forces.
- b) In the field of cooperation with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council:
 - i. Activating the tasks of the Joint Defense Council responsible for setting the main lines of future strategies, to be a platform for the work of the joint military command.
 - ii. The importance of unifying and coordinating the orientations of the military and security policies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

- iii. Cooperation with developed countries and major international companies in the transfer and localization of technology and the establishment of joint military factories in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
 - iv. Determining the main threat trends to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, designing potential scenarios for each crisis separately, as well as informing the political and military leaders in the GCC countries of the dimensions of the surrounding risks and threats.
 - v. Develop the Peninsula Shield Joint Forces, raise their efficiency, develop their armament, and reorganize them in proportion to the tasks they will be entrusted with, and the Joint Military Command undertake the task of supervising their training, organization, methods of mobilization, assigning and advancing them in the direction of the threat, and establishing advanced command centers in potential threat areas at the level of the Gulf region.
 - vi. Cooperation within the framework of joint non-conventional armament programs, as long as neighboring countries continue to threaten to possess these weapons.
 - vii. Formulation of a joint Gulf combat doctrine in line with modern strategies, the most important of which is identifying opponents and arranging them according to the priorities of dealing with them.
 - viii. Develop security policies that achieve the interests of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the informational, intellectual and procedural levels.
- c) In the field of international cooperation:
- i. Benefiting from the joint defense agreements and strategic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the major active powers, in supporting and developing the armed forces and the Gulf security services.
 - ii. Forging strategic relations with major powers, enabling the armed forces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to obtain all their requirements without restrictions or conditions.
 - iii. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has benefited from advanced military technology in all countries, diversified sources of armament, and supported cooperation with it in the field of information systems, command and control, communications, intelligence and satellites.
 - iv. Exchanging information and experiences with all countries, especially in the field of terrorism, organized crime and money laundering.

- v. Striving for the major powers to support the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in building peaceful nuclear programs.

Stages of implementing the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

- a) The first stage Short term (five years):
 - i. Reassessment of the military situation.
 - ii. Continuing to follow up on building, developing and arming the armed forces.
 - iii. Implementation of continuous studies of balance calculations and determining the areas required militarily to confront the imbalance, especially in the field of ballistic missiles.
 - iv. Raising the efficiency of training and security capabilities and exchanging information and experiences.
 - v. Developing command and control systems in accordance with modern military strategies.
- b) The second phase: Medium term (up to ten years):
 - i. Review what has been accomplished in the short term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - ii. Completing the plans for the military construction of the armed forces at the national level.
 - iii. Organizing the military gatherings of the countries of the region according to the proposed strategy.
 - iv. Continuing to develop the Peninsula Shield forces in order to build an integrated Gulf force whose size is commensurate with the security requirements and the surrounding threats.
 - v. Enhancing the capabilities of the security services of the GCC states with modern and advanced technologies, and continuing to develop the security performance of the internal security elements.
 - vi. to equip theaters Processes On level Countries Area Gulf Arabi and connect it in the theater Arabi
- c) third level: Long term (up to fifteen years):
 - i. Review what has been accomplished in the medium term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - ii. Achieving a balanced regional security system that achieves stability in the Gulf region.

- iii. Achieving a military balance to suit the threats, challenges and hostilities directed at the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
- iv. Transfer and localization of military technology in cooperation with major countries, and the establishment of a base for Gulf military industries.
- v. Establishment of a peaceful nuclear program.
- vi. Reducing the foreign military presence in the Arab region.

Mechanisms of cooperation to achieve the proposed strategy in the security and military field:

A. A mechanism that stems from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to achieve national security

This mechanism aims to possess the freedom of Saudi decision on its territory, remove threats from its national sphere, and build a capacity to address these threats in the event that they affect Gulf security without interference from any foreign powers, while working to replace existing security alliances and agreements, and activate the joint Arab defense agreement. And the development of the joint Peninsula Shield forces.

B. A mechanism that builds on the comprehensive capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

And this mechanism must be reformulated, so that it is based on the capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a whole to influence, and therefore the unity of thought and goal and the end of inter-conflicts, and the convergence of views in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered a basis for building this mechanism.

C. A mechanism based on the perspective of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Towards a foreign presence

The policy and orientations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are severely affected by this foreign presence, and in order for the United States of America to ensure survival, it must intervene in the policies of the Gulf countries, and control their orientations, in a manner that ensures the stability of this presence, and the foreign presence drains the economies of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With the increase in military spending, and the foreign presence may ignite the actions of the national resistance, which will be accused of being terrorist acts, and lead to increasing accusations of continuing terrorism on the territory of the Kingdom.

D. A mechanism based on activating the Gulf system

This mechanism must be developed by developing a comprehensive vision between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and linking it to the security of the Arab Gulf region.⁽²⁷⁵⁾

except for Iran

They must have a role in the Gulf security, by exploiting the strategic relations between the GCC countries and other influential countries such as (Egypt, Pakistan, India) to support this mechanism, as they are one of the most important points of interest for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries because of their effective influence on the security of the Gulf The Arab, where we find the issue of historical relations, Islamic identity and Arab identity as a balanced political identity in each of the Arab Gulf states and Egypt, and its effective role in defending the security of the Arab Gulf within the framework of its Arab role in general and Arab national security in particular, and in view of the Pakistani neighbor and his association with the Gulf states Arab relations with multiple relations, and considering it a strategic ally, and within the game of regional balance that aims to prevent the Iranians from monopolizing the region, and any failure and instability opens the way for the Iranian Shiite incursion into it, and consequently the expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence, which is reflected in the negative impact on the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan has played a balancing role with Iran in the Arab Gulf region since the seventies, and its weight has increased with the growing Iranian threats against the Arab Gulf states in the eighties, and it has continued to develop the relationship and with it the numbers of trade and employment have increased, and while energy security remains a vital factor, India currently wants to expand its influence and influence. In the Arab Gulf region, this broad view of Indian security emerged out of necessity, ambition and opportunity. India's desire to play a leading role and contribute to the stability of the region coincides with its rise as a major regional power with aspirations far beyond its geographical borders. In light of India's view of the Gulf region and South Asia, And

(275) **Gulf Ocean Countries** The neighboring countries of the Arabian Gulf, and they have the ability to influence Gulf security and overall Arab security, and they are divided into two circles:

(a) first circle They are the Arab or Middle Eastern countries that influence the security of the Gulf, including: Egypt as a major Arab country in the Arab system, and the Gulf countries participate in the security of the Red Sea, and the Arab Mashreq countries (.Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine) as countries bearing responsibility for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

(b) second circle These are the countries that are geographically and historically linked to the Gulf region, and exchange interests with it and whose security is affected or their security affects the security of the Gulf, including: India as a direct neighbor responsible for coordinating with the Gulf countries for the security of the Arabian Sea, and Pakistan as an influential Islamic country, and the countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, as countries participating in The tasks of securing the Red Sea.

Central Asia as interacting and strategically interconnected regions, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia must exchange India with a position commensurate with this theory.

And it continued to develop the relationship and with it the numbers of trade and employment increased, and while energy security remains a vital factor, India currently wants to expand its influence and influence in the Arab Gulf region, and this expanded perspective of Indian security emerged out of necessity, ambition and opportunity. With its rise as a major regional power with aspirations beyond its geographical borders, and in light of India's view of the Gulf region, South Asia, and Central Asia as interacting and strategically interconnected regions, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia must exchange India for a position commensurate with this theory.

India's desire to play a leading role and contribute to the stability of the region coincides with its rise as a major regional power with aspirations far beyond its geographical borders. In light of India's view of the Gulf region, South Asia, and Central Asia as interacting and strategically interconnected regions, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia must exchange India with a position commensurate with these the theory.

E. A mechanism that builds on the development of Saudi relations in the security field

This is through Saudi coordination towards all regional security issues through the League of Arab States or the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, with the need to rearrange the Gulf security system among the Arab countries, and to activate joint Arab defense agreements against internal and external threats and challenges, as well as the development of the Peninsula Shield forces. In order to become the main forces in the defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the establishment of a Gulf national security forum, in order to deal with security issues, this forum is established as an institutional framework under the umbrella of (the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf), in which representatives from the Gulf and Arab countries, and strategic experts participate. , and specialists from universities and research centers in meetings and dialogues, during which the discussion takes place without restrictions.

F. A mechanism that builds on the military capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

This mechanism includes all the available capabilities, in addition to the capabilities added by Arab or international support in accordance with the agreements concluded in this regard, taking into account the reconsideration of the size of the armed forces and their organizations, so that they are commensurate with future tasks and sources of threat, the most important of which is determined to fill the void in the region Achieving defense integration, this requires a comprehensive review of the military construction

systems, and taking the experiences of others to overcome the weakness in human capacity and not to use it in achieving Qatari security, by imposing a system of forced conscription and qualifying the appropriate numbers for general mobilization, and opening the way for the owners of military expertise and competencies from Retirees, and the adoption of the military education subject within the school curricula, and this mechanism will become highly effective if it is applied in achieving distinguished Saudi capabilities.

G. Mechanism stems from the perspective of military doctrine

The military doctrine and its principles and methods are the main influence in determining the nature and dimensions of potential armed conflicts (identifying the main enemy). , Military political goals, preparation of the armed forces, foundations of state preparation for war, Management Resources defensive), the has evolved Saudi military doctrines are necessary to keep pace with the overall development of building military capabilities , And to face the escalating threats in the region.

H. A mechanism based on the joint defense agreement of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council

Which provided for security cooperation and joint collective defense against any aggression against any of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the shift from the stage of military cooperation that lasted two decades to the stage of joint defense among the GCC states, and raising their self and collective capabilities to achieve the highest level of coordination for the concept of defense and giving importance to establishing and developing a base for the military industry, encouraging the private sector to invest in this field, as well as the unified military command for planning and managing joint military operations and supporting and strengthening the defense capabilities of countries The Council and its interests, as well as joint exercises and exercises, and the cooperation belt project to connect centers operations forces air and network Defense air Gulf automatic, project Telecommunications the believer to relate forces armed in a Countries the Council network Secure connections, and more.

I. A mechanism built on the Peninsula Shield forces:

It is one of the advantages that the countries of the Arab Gulf region have without any other countries at the Arab level, as the presence of joint military forces for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council is considered one of the important foundations for the establishment of a joint defense system, aimed at providing effective collective defense security to protect the GCC countries and defend their independence and protecting their

capabilities and gains, despite the deficiencies surrounding these forces, as the organizational structures of the forces are limited, and the balance between the size of the participation of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries is weak, as most of them are from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the reason for the weak participation is due to the weak capabilities of most of the GCC countries, and their need to achieve security Qatar, and thus affects the retention of its national forces within its territory, and on the other hand, there are efforts to develop the capabilities of the joint Peninsula Shield forces, in proportion to the changes in the security environment and the sources and types of challenges, risks and threats that may face the GCC countries, and to reorganize their formation, structure, and size.

Expand its participation in joint exercises and maneuvers to increase its combat effectiveness to ensure the full implementation of the tasks of strengthening and support for the national armed forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and the exchange of military and technological expertise, information and training. Bahrain called it (the Al-Fateh maneuver), and after the decision to form the Peninsula Shield Force, it then proceeded to conduct several joint tactical exercises under the name (Peninsula Shield) maneuvers. Where the first Gulf bilateral military exercise was carried out on July 4, 1975, between the Saudi Armed Forces and the Bahrain Defense Force, and it was called (The Al-Fateh Maneuver). Where the first Gulf bilateral military exercise was carried out on July 4, 1975, between the Saudi Armed Forces and the Bahrain Defense Force, and it was called (The Al-Fateh Maneuver).

J. A mechanism based on a comprehensive security strategy

It is a general framework for the security cooperation of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and the exchange of information in the field of combating extremism, terrorism and drug crimes and economic crimes, and in area Border guards, coast guards and marine rescue

K. A mechanism based on qualitative change in defense and security agreements:

With some major countries, and countries Other Arabic, within A joint defense system instead of a foreign military presence

L. A mechanism based on periodic meetings

To work teams, military committees, meetings of the Supreme Military Committee and the Joint Defense Council among the Gulf Cooperation Council states to discuss the best ways to achieve integration among the GCC states for the joint defense strategy.

5.3. The proposed strategy for the use of soft power in the economic, social and cultural fields

The importance of the economic factor in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is determined, as it is one of the main factors on which the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf was founded in 1981 as a regional institutional entity in the face of external conditions represented by radical changes in global economic relations, which resulted in the transfer of oil sovereignty from companies and major consumer countries. To the producers, the Arab Gulf region has emerged in this context as a major station for the increasing global demands of vital oil wealth.

The strategy in the economic field in general, is considered one of the most important pillars that cannot be dispensed with to activate other strategies, and therefore it distinguishes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and preserves its own capabilities, and aims to achieve Saudi economic integration.

The proposed strategy in the economic field:

Description of the proposed strategy in the economic field:

It is a flexible, realistic strategy, based on scientific planning, and depends on the capabilities available to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and takes into account the regional and global changes in the field of economic globalization. Human development in the Kingdom, and the preparation of the technological and informational infrastructure necessary to establish a knowledge economy.

The general objectives of the proposed strategy in the economic field:

- a) Upgrading the economy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by making full use of all available possibilities to achieve the maximum possible economic return.
- b) Achieving a unified economic bloc that achieves a qualitative leap in the Kingdom's economies, contributes to building knowledge economies, and improves bargaining power with major economic entities.
- c) Transforming the Saudi economy from a rentier economy to a diversified productive economy, activating the role of the private sector, and increasing its investments.
- d) Diversification of the industrial base, and focusing on the strategic economic sectors that enjoy comparative advantages and are eligible for competition,

within the framework of preparing the necessary infrastructure to diversify the industrial base.

- e) Activating the role of the private sector in the process of economic integration to reach full economic unity.
- f) Building a scientific and technological base, and expanding the use of information and communication technology to support the Saudi economy, and this is done within the framework of attention to research centers, and increasing the allocations for funding scientific research.
- g) Exchange of information and coordination regarding the oil industry (such as exploration, extraction, refining, transportation, and oil-related industries).
- h) Adopting an advanced concept to achieve economic integration based on the completion of joint economic achievements.
- i) Raising the standard of living of the Saudi citizen through a methodological approach (self-development, active and effective integration) within the framework of the global economic system.
- j) Develop training programs to develop human resources, rehabilitate and train Saudi manpower, and set future plans to replace foreign workers.
- k) Develop a long-term future economic vision (2030).
- l) Exploiting the length of the sea coasts and land borders to establish sea ports and ports that would encourage foreign investment and reduce the cost of transportation.

The pillars of the proposed strategy in the economic field:

- a) The economic achievements made during the course of development and joint economic work.
- b) The importance of oil and natural gas in supporting the economy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- c) Presence A developed infrastructure in the Kingdom of road networks, various means of transportation, ports, airports, and communications, which are necessary for economic integration.
- d) The activity of the private sector, and its dependence on a group of businessmen, who have new and advanced ideas and visions for economic management, with huge financial reserves that can be employed towards diversifying production bases.

- e) Geographical and strategic characteristics related to the geographical location, coasts and waterways important to the movement of trade, and a young population structure that enables Kingdom Saudi Arabia If it is rehabilitated for a qualitative economic boom in the future.
- f) A strong economic entity and huge oil wealth, in addition to the relations of businessmen with the global financial and business community.
- g) Legislation and laws that stimulate and attract investment and development in Kingdom Saudi Arabia It fits the market system, freedom of competition, and attention to overall quality.
- h) The distinguished relationship of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the Arab and Islamic levels in the economic field.

The determinants of the proposed strategy in the economic field:

- a) It is still monolithic, despite the direction of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to diversify it.
- b) Global financial crises and their repercussions on the Saudi economy.
- c) Economic blocs, globalization, multinational companies and their capabilities to sweep foreign markets.
- d) Fluctuations in oil prices, and their impact on economic development plans in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
- e) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is highly dependent on expatriate manpower.
- f) Limited human development programs, and weak scientific and technological research and studies.
- g) Increasing the intensity of international economic competition in attracting foreign capital and investment, especially in the stages of economic stagnation.
- h) Economic legislations and old commercial regulations that need updating to settle international economic disputes.
- i) The inability of the private sector to lead the development process and qualify the trained national competencies.
- j) The international trade agreement does not include the oil and petrochemical industry.

The priorities of the proposed strategy in the economic field:

- a. Making amendments and enacting legislation in Kingdom Saudi Arabia In line with economic developments, and focus on strategic economic sectors that enjoy competitive advantages.
- b. Supporting the participation of the private sector in economic activities, and creating a competitive environment for its importance in achieving industrial development.
- c. Providing investments to prepare the necessary infrastructure to support Saudi economic integration (road networks – ports – airports – communications – technology).
- d. Adopting industrial development plans and programs that enable it to establish many advanced industries in record periods of time.
- e. Activating the role of the private sector in the process of economic integration.
- f. Studying changes in the global capitalist economy and applying policies that fit the economy Kingdom Saudi Arabia Which increases its contribution to the global economy.
- g. Qualified Saudi human development and the related development of education, training centers, studies and research in the economic field.

Executive policies for the proposed strategy in the economic field:

A. In the field of strategic economic sectors:

1. oil sector:

- a) Continuing consultation within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to maintain the stability of oil prices, which takes into account the interests of the producing countries within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
- b) Supporting the participation of the private sector in petroleum projects, and providing investment incentives to contribute to exploration, production, development and geological surveys.
- c) Joint cooperation and coordination to reduce oil production costs.
- d) Working to achieve high value from petroleum products, especially in the manufacturing industries (petrochemicals, polymers, plastics and fertilizers).

2. Industrial sector:

- a) Providing all the requirements and ingredients necessary for the success of the industrial sector, including a legislative and legal environment, financial resources, and the use of global expertise, to support national development.
- b) Increasing investment in the industrial sector, transferring modern technology to improve the quality of industrial production, and supporting its competitiveness in foreign markets.
- c) Building industrial cities with joint Saudi investments, and exploiting Saudi-Arab economic cooperation.
- d) Developing the mining investment system to attract investors, expanding the participation of the private sector, and developing, qualifying and increasing Saudi labor in this field.
- e) Exchanging experiences and joint programs in the field of human resource development, preparing technical cadres in the industrial sector, expanding industrial research centers and setting ways to localize technology and transfer global expertise.
- f) Providing a network of information and an advanced database that includes an investment map for industrial projects in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

3. Commercial sector:

- a) Increasing the volume of intra-regional trade between the Kingdom, Arab countries, and global economic blocs.
- b) Take the necessary policies to increase the percentage of the commercial sector's contribution to the GDP.
- c) Creating networks of cooperation between Saudi businessmen and businessmen in all countries of the world, through unions and chambers of commerce and industry in the Kingdom.
- d) Effective participation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in economic forums, and benefit from their recommendations, to create a common ground for political understanding between the regional parties in the region.
- e) Activating the activities of the joint higher committees between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries on the one hand, and the major economic countries and benefiting from the experiences of the Economic and Social

Council of the League of Arab States, and international unions in the field of advanced economic management.

- f) Establishing major joint marketing companies to promote Saudi products to compete in global markets.
- g) Expanding the base of non-oil commodity production in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to avoid the repercussions of fluctuating oil prices, and support the Kingdom's budgets from non-oil revenues.

B. In the field of economic development:

Developing the Saudi market, and focusing on the concept of Saudi economic citizenship as an important entry point in achieving economic integration, developing joint investments, facilitating the transfer of capital, and the movement of goods and services.

Stimulating the absorptive capacities of projects, and supporting medium and small projects.

Accelerate the implementation of the program approved for the establishment of the monetary union and the access to a single Gulf currency, as if issued, it will support the economies of all the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and increase the commercial negotiating power with the rest of the world, as it will contribute to eliminating risks related to the exchange rates of Gulf currencies. Solving the problems of inter-trade and deepening the concept of a single market, and it will make banking and financial transactions in banking institutions considerations that facilitate all Gulf investors and their counterparts in the countries of the world, and the unified currency will be one of the sources of economic blocs in the world.

Developing methods of economic negotiations between the Kingdom and other economic blocs with regard to lifting restrictions on Saudi products in the markets of those blocs and obtaining preferential benefits in trade, investment and technology transfer.

Establishing a Gulf economic court to settle disputes that arise between companies and investors away from the slow procedures of litigation and traditional dispute resolution, which will help to double the volume of economic exchange and support joint investments, and contribute to the development of the legislative structure of the Saudi economy sector.

Cooperation mechanisms to achieve the proposed strategy in the economic field:

- A. A mechanism that builds on banks and the banking sector, and the volume of financial reserves in central banks and sovereign funds, and it is an important mechanism in revitalizing national economies and supporting strategic projects through credit facilities.
- B. NS- A mechanism based on the establishment of (a commission, a committee, a higher council) for research, development and sponsorship of researchers, linked to industrial and technological research centers, and industrial cities Including Saudi Arabia By increasing funding for scientific research.
- C. A mechanism adopted through the development and development of Saudi human resources, and in this context, a higher council for human resources development can be formed, and the necessary programs to be rehabilitated, and to develop visions to overcome the problems of the demographic structure in the Saudi labor market, and to confront the increase in the numbers of expatriate workers.
- D. Tracking mechanism of joint economic achievements:
 - a. Gulf joint institutions.
 - b. Gulf Customs Union.
 - c. Strengthening the rules of Gulf economic citizenship.
 - d. The Gulf Common Market (Ministerial Committees - Financial Cooperation Committee).
 - e. Agricultural and water cooperation committees.

Mechanisms of the proposed strategic economic move:

- A. The proposed strategic move with the United States of America:
 - a) Work to transfer and localize advanced technology from the United States of America, especially in areas that benefit the Saudi economic community, encourage the establishment of free zones based on preferential benefits, and support Gulf technology and research centers with American expertise.
 - b) Continuing to attend international economic conferences and meetings, to study the future US and global economic conditions, which provides Saudi economists with the necessary information to take appropriate economic policies with the global economic conditions and business structure.
 - c) Encouraging communication and partnership between the Saudi private sector and the American private sector and offering mega projects to American investors.

- d) Develop an illustrated map of Saudi investments in the United States of America and determine the most appropriate method for investing Saudi money in it.
 - e) Preparing for international conferences to present investment opportunities in the Saudi economic community and to show strengths such as low taxes, ease of company registration and granting residencies to investors, to raise trade exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America.
- B. The proposed strategic move with the European Union:
- a) Strengthening the partnership between the European Chambers of Commerce and their counterparts in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with regard to facilitating the implementation of free trade and not imposing new taxes on energy in order to increase Saudi exports to the European Union to correct the trade balance between the two parties.
 - b) Searching for available opportunities in the field of industrial technology and extensive European experiences in the fields of modern technology.
 - c) Take advantage of the lower prices of investment goods, intermediate goods and production requirements than the European Union, which leads to an increase in the competitiveness of Saudi goods.
 - d) Acquisition of new markets, and expansion of the base of participation in the markets of the European Union.
 - e) Benefiting from the accession of Eastern European countries to the European Union, which gives it a huge market for Saudi products.
- C. The proposed strategic move with China:
- a) Activating trade exchange with China and strengthening relations with Chinese chambers of commerce and businessmen.
 - b) Expanding investment opportunities for Chinese companies specialized in oil exploration, especially in light of the fact that the Arab Gulf region is the largest oil exporter to China.
 - c) Establishing joint industrial zones with China to be on Saudi territory to transfer Chinese experience and technology in support of the industrial and commercial sectors in the Kingdom.
 - d) Encouraging and continuing the mutual visits of Saudi and Chinese delegations, to study Saudi investment opportunities in China, and to create Chinese

investment opportunities in the Kingdom, through joint studies and continuous bilateral economic cooperation.

- e) Employing political relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and China in the economic aspect, and exchanging benefits between them through exporting oil to China in exchange for obtaining Chinese industrial technology.

D. The proposed strategic move with the Russian Federation

- a) Benefiting from Russian expertise in the field of natural gas in particular, transferring Russian expertise in this field to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and establishing giant projects to extract and liquefy natural gas with Russian expertise.
- b) Correcting the balance of trade exchange between the Kingdom and the Russian Federation through coordination with the Russian Export and Import Bank and between the Kingdom to increase investments between them.
- c) Investing Russia's trend towards the Arab Gulf region in the economic field by expanding the base of industrial and commercial participation.

Stages of implementing the proposed economic strategy:

1. The first stage: the short term (five years):
 - a) Reassessment of the economic situation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
 - b) Continuing in the policies of economic and financial reform and transformation, from a rentier economy to a productive economy, and activating financial and banking control tools.
 - c) Achieving balanced development, to address the poor distribution of population and development.
 - d) Studying the impact of financial crises on the Saudi economy, and setting an agenda to activate the Saudi economy in order to confront these crises.
 - e) Completing the stages of issuing the unified Saudi currency and benefiting from the Saudi market and the monetary union in building joint Saudi projects.
 - f) Continuing cooperation in the Kingdom with regard to supporting the private sector and promoting joint Saudi citizenship.
2. The second stage: the medium term (ten years):
 - a) Review what has been accomplished in the short term and complete what has not been achieved.

- b) Completion of plans and economic institutions, especially financial and economic institutions.
 - c) Increasing the proportion of non-oil revenues in the GDP in application of the policy of economic diversification and the multiplicity of production sources.
 - d) Making the most of the common market to attract investments, build joint projects, and support medium and small projects.
 - e) Establishing an economic court to settle disputes between companies and investors, which will activate the volume of economic exchange and revitalize the common market.
3. The third stage: the long term (up to fifteen years):
- a) Review what has been achieved in the medium term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - b) Achieving sustainable development through diversifying the economic base, promoting directing oil revenues towards investing in sustainable productive assets that contribute to diversifying the economic base as well as enhancing the capabilities of the national human element.
 - c) Developing and employing human resources.
 - d) sustainability of natural resources.
 - e) Achieving balanced development between the regions of the Kingdom to achieve development among them.
 - f) Enhancing the competitiveness of the national economy.
 - g) Establishing economic support based on knowledge.
 - h) Arab regional integration by pushing the process of joint Gulf action towards reaching the highest possible levels of economic integration among the GCC system.

The proposed strategy in the social field:

Description of the proposed strategy in the social field:

An advanced strategy, based on trust between regimes and their people, and integrated with the comprehensive Arab strategy and is inseparable from it. It emphasizes the stability of internal conditions and democratic participation in political decision-making. It has also been achieved in building an integrated Saudi society that seeks development through human development in a scientific manner.

The general objectives of the proposed strategy in the social field:

- a. Building cultural and social concepts that focus on the role of the Saudi citizen in building world civilization and opening broad horizons of vision instead of being closed in on old historical concepts.
- b. Developing and strengthening national unity and consolidating the Arab and Islamic identity.
- c. Building a Saudi society in which loyalty and belonging to its Arab and Islamic identity is consolidated, and interdependence is achieved to be a single popular base that represents a strong shield for attempts to threaten national unity.
- d. Developing the Saudi society in all fields, in order to build a developed society that deals with the global knowledge society and information technology, and faces various social challenges and achieve popular participation in the development of society in the future.
- e. Comprehensive social care for the family and children, and the eradication of poverty and illiteracy.
- f. Paying attention to all the vocabulary of the Saudi citizen, such as health, education, training, identity, affiliation, loyalty, environment, authenticity and contemporary.

The pillars of the proposed strategy in the social field:

- a. Consolidation of the Arab Gulf identity.
- b. Preserving Arab and Islamic values and principles.
- c. Equality, justice, and equal opportunities for all Saudi citizens without discrimination based on religion, race, gender or ideology.
- d. Develop national loyalty in Kingdom Saudi Arabia.
- e. National unity and social cohesion.
- f. Social institutions (educational / educational).
- g. Civil society organizations working in the social field.
- h. Taking care of the Arabic language and its vocabulary as the main element for preserving the Gulf, Arab and Islamic culture and identity.

- i. Developing the capabilities of the Gulf citizen and nurturing him to confront the phenomenon of intellectual invasion, as it is the cornerstone of building Gulf societies.

Determinants of the proposed strategy in the social field:

A. Internal and regional determinants:

- a. The limited role of civil society institutions.
- b. Weakness of democratic culture in popular circles, and the persistence of Clan loyalties and tribal control.
- c. The weak level of performance of social and religious institutions, and their inability to achieve real social development that keeps pace with the development of the times.
- d. The knowledge and technical gap between the Kingdom and the developed world countries.
- e. Increasing the proportion of expatriate workers in Saudi society and its social impact.
- f. Fear of social change on the structure of the Saudi regime.
- g. Increasing unemployment rates and the issue of employment, due to the low volume of investments and the increase in the outputs of the educational system.
- h. The weakness of the public education systems in the Kingdom, which still depend in most of them on traditional educational methods and skills, away from modern education that depends on thinking and creativity.

B. Global environment determinants:

- a. Globalization and its multiple effects through technology, the communications revolution, cyberspace and social networking sites, through the promotion of Western cultures, customs and social values.
- b. Social and cultural chaos in the world and its constant quest to invade other cultures.
- c. The phenomenon of religious extremism, the rise of Western accusations of Islam and its link to terrorism in the Arab region.
- d. Imposing the reform agenda in line with the Western model, in terms of thought, behavior, values, and approaches to human rights and democratization.

- e. The American Western endeavor to build democratic systems in the Arab countries according to the Western vision, which threatens the disintegration of the internal fabric and national solidarity.

The priorities of the proposed strategy in the social field:

- a. Developing and strengthening Saudi national unity.
- b. Building a Saudi society in which loyalty and belonging to its Arab and Islamic identity are firmly established.
- c. Achieving interdependence between the Gulf peoples to be a single popular base.

Implementation policies for the proposed strategy in the social field:

- a. Preserving national unity and social cohesion and expanding popular participation in the Kingdom Saudi Arabia.
- b. Issuing legislation regulating the work of civil society institutions in the field of social welfare in Kingdom Saudi Arabia.
- c. Confronting tribal and sectarian strife and religious and sectarian fanaticism, through targeted awareness, and affirmation of the solidity of social cohesion so as not to be attracted by the deviant religious and secular extremist groups.
- d. Attention to activating the role of social, educational and educational institutions within Kingdom Saudi Arabia.
- e. Activating the role of Saudi society in building and industrializing the nation's civilization through national dialogue conferences and civil society institutions and associations.
- f. Improving social services for the Saudi citizen such as (education, health, housing) and other social services.
- g. Expansion of social security for the Saudi citizen and his family in cases of emergency, sickness, disability and old age, and encouragement to do charitable works under the supervision of government charitable institutions.
- h. Paying attention to and supporting social research centers and raising their budget to study and diagnose the social problems that society suffers from in a scientific manner, study the recommendations of these centers and benefit from them as much as possible.
- i. Educating parents about the care and upbringing of their children, the correct social upbringing, and the adoption of sound educational methods that enable

them to have the correct upbringing, so that the children become intellectually, psychologically and behaviorally valid models.

- j. Preserving the Saudi societal system by organizing media campaigns directed at the Saudi citizen that would strengthen the societal concepts stemming from Islamic Sharia to consolidate them within the Saudi society.
- k. Activating the role of civil society and joint Saudi institutions in supporting social policies, and the role of educational and religious institutions in spreading the correct faith and sound social upbringing that raises generations with moderate and sound thinking in order to dry up the sources of extremism and terrorism.
- l. Develop executive plans and programs necessary in the Saudi society to correct the misconceptions promoted by the deviant and extremist thinkers and the owners of erroneous secular ideas through organizing programs and seminars.
- m. Develop studies and policies to address the issue of expatriate workers and gradually replace them with citizens, and thus the issue of unemployment can be addressed.
- n. Developing tools and methods of popular diplomacy through sports, cultural and artistic activities and conducting mutual visits by delegations and students in order to establish interconnected social sectors.

Stages of implementing the proposed strategy in the social field:

1. The first stage: Short term (five years):
 - a. Completing the policies related to achieving Saudi citizenship.
 - b. Implementation of social reform programs and methods of family health care.
 - c. Activating Saudi joint policies in eradicating poverty and unemployment, combating drugs, organized crime and money laundering.
 - d. Complete the development of the education system and programs to eradicate illiteracy.
 - e. Intensifying the talk shows that present and address the problems of the Saudi citizen.
 - f. Coordination between social research centers to address extremism and terrorism.
2. The second phase: Medium term (ten years):

- a. Review what has been accomplished in the short term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - b. Expanding the establishment of civil society organizations in the social field.
 - c. Treatment of the negatives resulting from the application of the Saudi citizenship agreement.
 - d. Continuing to consolidate the knowledge society and human development.
3. third level: Long term (fifteen years):
- a. Review what has been achieved in the medium term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - b. Developing the proposed strategy according to regional and global variables.
 - c. Completing the lines of social, educational and health reform.
 - d. Building a Saudi society away from extremism, violence and deviant thought.

Mechanisms of cooperation to achieve the proposed strategy in the social field:

A. A mechanism that stems from the inherited Saudi values

This mechanism is considered the most important in achieving cooperation between the groups of Saudi society, as it achieves loyalty and belonging, and exerts effort in order for the country and the system to remain at the top of its activities, and security and safety are achieved by the help of its children. And constantly reminding them, and real practices that make the Saudi citizen feel his value in his homeland and his responsibility to participate.

B. A mechanism that stems from Saudi economic capacity

This mechanism may actually be achieved, but it needs rationalization, organization and coordination in order to achieve Saudi human development.

C. A mechanism that stems from the political capacity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

a. On the external level

By activating and unifying diplomatic work to achieve human development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and encouraging immigrant Saudi minds to join the human development tracks at the Saudi and Gulf levels.

b. On the internal level

By activating the capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, accelerating the reform processes and spreading democracy, and the motivating factors for citizens in the Kingdom to adopt this mechanism with a full sense of responsibility.

c. Mechanism stems from military ability

This mechanism is based on the close relationship between the human capacity in its fields, and the military capacity and its effectiveness, in any country in the world.

d. Mechanism stems from periodic meetings:

Meetings for working groups and committees. The highest level in the social field in the Kingdom (Minister of Social Affairs, the Higher Committee for Environmental Protection, the Joint Committee on Youth and Sports, Exhibitions and Folk Arts).

The proposed strategy for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the cultural field:

Description of the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

A strategy to advance the Saudi citizen culturally, and qualify him to deal with all the requirements of the times while preserving the Arab and Islamic civilizational and cultural heritage, and dealing with the cultures of the world with awareness and mutual respect, that establishes difference as a fact, and moves away from fanaticism or deviation, and integrates into cultural globalization, through an influential cultural and media ability In others to spread authentic Arab and Islamic values, confront any transgressions, and ensure that cultural dangers do not penetrate into the Gulf society, in order to achieve building strong societies capable of facing any external threats.

The general objectives of the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

- a. Preserving the Arab and Islamic culture and consolidating it among the Saudi citizen.
- b. Enriching the personality of the Saudi citizen by enhancing his awareness of his faith, freedom, dignity and belonging.
- c. Emphasizing that the Arabic language is the main component of the personality of the Saudi citizen, and a commitment to it in all fields of education and culture.
- d. Upgrading the Saudi citizen and bringing him to the appropriate degree to deal with the requirements of the age in all its scientific and technological dimensions.
- e. Strengthening Saudi cultural unity.
- f. Developing the cultural exchange formula, as it is an element of interdependence within the same region and an element of rapprochement and cooperation with other cultures.

- g. Activating the role of civil society institutions, especially cultural institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- h. Developing various media, adopting a unified media policy and a moderate media discourse that serves social development issues, while encouraging the intellectual and cultural creativity of the Saudi citizen.

The pillars of the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

- a. The literary support achieved for the vocabulary and mechanisms of Arab culture within the Saudi society provides appropriate conditions for confronting non-Arab cultures and social customs.
- b. The principle of dialogue based on mutual respect and tolerance towards all cultures.
- c. Saudi interest in cultural investment in general and providing the necessary capabilities.
- d. Monitoring the cultural reality to know the foreign cultures and how they interact with the original culture.
- e. To highlight the Arab culture as one of the influential global cultures capable of participating in supporting the world's march for the better.
- f. The emergence of the private sector and civil society institutions as active and influential elements in the societies of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
- g. Setting preventive cultural models against undesirable cultures and encouraging and spreading the Arab-Islamic culture.

The determinants of the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

- a. Weak performance of cultural and media institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- b. Threatening the cultural identity of peoples through the so-called globalization and cultural invasion.
- c. Expatriate labor (domestic workers) and its cultural repercussions within Saudi society.
- d. Weak democratic culture and promotion of extremist ideology.
- e. The Kingdom has reached development levels that make it need advanced cultural roles and activities.
- f. The development of information and communication technology in the world, the growth of cultural challenges, and the linkage of the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia to a set of international laws and legislations necessitated it to expand the horizons of communication with the other in a more effective manner.

The priorities of the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

- a. Preserving and consolidating the Arab and Islamic culture among the Saudi citizen.
- b. Developing the media, adopting a unified media policy and a moderate media discourse.
- c. Strengthening cultural unity in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Implementation policies for the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

- a. Emphasizing the cultural identity and consolidating it among the Saudi society.
- b. Raising the level of education and developing the educational process in all its dimensions to suit contemporary transformations, building a scientific base capable of facing the challenges of the times, and building a society with a high culture and a broad awareness of the challenges and threats surrounding it.
- c. Develop necessary and practical policies to combat illiteracy and the spread of ignorance in society, in cooperation between government institutions and civil society institutions.
- d. Establishing controls on publishing houses and libraries to ensure that they do not publish materials that promote destructive and extremist religious ideas that contradict Islamic and Arab values and principles.
- e. Introducing the culture of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia outside its borders through the cultural presence of the GCC countries at the global level.
- f. Organizing media campaigns that contribute to fortifying the internal Gulf front, and external campaigns that address the dangers of the media and what the organizations aim at in terms of terrorism, extremism and distortion of the image of Arabs and Muslims.
- g. Preparing cultural and media programs that reflect the authenticity and civilization of the Gulf and its contribution to human activity through international and cultural forums such as UNESCO and other international and regional cultural organizations.
- h. Establishing a database that serves as a cultural observatory specialized in collecting cultural production in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and important

information that serves researchers and providing reports on the activities of the cultural movement on a regular basis.

- i. Establishing advanced cultural centers to nurture and highlight the talents and creativity of the child.
- j. Organizing cultural and intellectual activities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which various cultural and intellectual experiences are presented.
- k. Holding international conferences and cultural and intellectual seminars and inviting international scholars and thinkers to give lectures and take the initiative to support and participate in them effectively.

Stages of implementing the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

1. The first stage: Short term (five years):
 - a) The development of various media devices, and the Saudi media and religious discourse.
 - b) Focusing on the Arab-Islamic identity at all levels of education.
 - c) The participation of media institutions in highlighting the cultural movement in its various forms.
 - d) Strengthening partnership with the private sector to contribute to supporting Saudi culture.
 - e) Establishing a knowledge society through the development of education and cultural research centers.
2. The second phase: Medium term (up to ten years) :
 - a) Review what has been accomplished in the short term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - b) Activating legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and developing laws related to the cultural field and intellectual property rights.
 - c) Completing the advanced educational policies to achieve the knowledge society.
 - d) Implementation of procedures for unifying curricula in schools, institutes, colleges and graduate studies.
3. third level: Long term (fifteen years) :
 - a) Review what has been achieved in the medium term and complete what has not been achieved.
 - b) Expansion and development of the Saudi infrastructure for cultural outputs (public libraries, theaters, cinemas, museums, publishing houses).

- c) Establishment of cultural research centers and interest in cultural tourism in the Kingdom.
- d) Increasing the number of universities and specialized institutes, in line with the Kingdom's population growth.

Cooperation mechanisms to achieve the proposed strategy in the cultural field:

A. The mechanism stems from the political capacity of Saudi Arabia

By activating and unifying diplomatic and cultural work, and supporting cultural and media ties between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the outside world.

B. A mechanism that stems from the economic capacity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

This mechanism is actually realised, but it needs organizing, coordinating and allocating budgets to educate the world about the tolerance of the Islamic religion, and to spread Arab and Islamic culture on the world level.

C. A mechanism that stems from the media capacity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

The Kingdom adopts an open media policy, and allows citizens to own satellite channels in addition to the official channels, which led to the Kingdom being the pioneer in the participation of private media in the field of Arab media.

Committees and other media:

- a. Joint Program Production Corporation for the Arab Gulf States.
- b. Newspapers, printing and publishing houses, research centers and national studies.
- c. The Permanent Committee of Antiquities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- d. The periodic meetings of the Gulf Press Federation.
- e. Committees and the charter of Saudi media cooperation, and its development.
- f. Radio, television and cultural organizations in the Kingdom.

The researcher sees that cooperation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should take place in an atmosphere of trust and respect for sovereignty while recognizing the borders between them as immutable, opposing any use of force or any interference in the internal affairs of others as an optimal solution to differences and working to establish their relations on the basis of dialogue and understanding, creating Channels of cooperation between the countries of the region in various political, economic, social and cultural fields, and the preservation of the environment and energy, in a manner that creates trust and mutual confidence, and in a manner that achieves the success and continuity of development programs, while building a system of security cooperation between the countries of the region without any foreign interference.

5.4. Summary

The issue of security is one of the central issues in the field of humanities in general and political sciences in particular, and this concept has received great attention during the last two decades due to the important transformations that most countries have known, whether at their internal level or in their relations with each other. The Cold War affected many specific variables of the shape of the international system, as well as the arrangement of forces in it, and this was reflected on the national security of countries, and security threats were no longer confined to the military side only, but rather the political, economic, cultural and societal threats became more present.

National security remained the undisputed primary goal of states, and as a result of the complexity of conflicts, the exacerbation of security threats and their interdependence at the regional and international levels, the concept of collective security emerged, in the realization of states that their national security does not stand behind their geographical borders, but extends to the whole of their region and even to other regions of the world, Thus, three main levels of security in its comprehensive concept emerged:

- a) National Security (national).
- b) NS- Regional security.
- c) International (global) security.

Security is formulated according to four pillars:

- a) Awareness of threats, both external and internal.
- b) Drawing a strategy for the development of the state's forces and the need for a secure launch.
- c) Providing the ability to confront internal and external threats by building an armed force capable of confronting and confronting.
- d) Preparing scenarios and taking action to confront the threats that are commensurate with them and gradually escalate with the escalation of threats, whether externally or internally.

The Saudi national security stems from the principle of preserving the considered interests in accordance with the basic constants, in addition to a set of measures taken to preserve the security of the Kingdom and the entity in the present and the future, taking into account the available capabilities.

Saudi national security occupies a central position in the political and military strategic thinking for several considerations, including:

- a) Saudi national security is the centerpiece of the Kingdom's foreign policy from the logic of its concept of security and protection.
- b) The Arab Gulf region and the Arab region in general are engaged in a fateful struggle against the forces that want to dominate and covet their wealth.
- c) The Kingdom's strategies were launched in various fields based on the security strategy mainly in order to achieve its goals in its various fields.

The regional security of the Arab Gulf cannot be viewed in isolation from the Arab national security because the Arab Gulf and its regional system are part of the Arab regional system in its broader framework and is linked to, affected by, and affected by it, negatively or positively, and hence the difficulty if not the impossibility of disengaging between them.

Saudi national security is one of the important pillars upon which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends in maintaining its independence and security according to its circumstances and characteristics.

The concept of Saudi security is focused on protecting their societies and systems and preserving their wealth, and it is not separated from Arab national security. The concepts and political visions about its content differ according to the different parties that influence it, past and present, which agree that it proceeds from what achieves their interests, and because these interests differ, the concept differs.

The interest in the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is due to the geostrategic importance it enjoys, which it acquires from its ruling and controlling a number of the most important waterways of growing importance for international trade and security.

The American vision for the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, even if its tools and policies change, its goals seem fixed, foremost among which is maintaining oil supplies to it and its allies, and preventing the emergence of any regional power that threatens its interests.

The European vision for the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on many determinants, the most important of which are securing oil supplies (energy security), maintaining stability and security in the region, and confronting the internal sources of threat facing the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while recognizing the distinguished position of the United States of America in the region. and its strong influence on its countries.

According to the Iranian concept of the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the external interference or the Western presence in the region represents the main threat to the security of the Kingdom.

Among the most prominent regional challenges to security in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the following:

- a) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- b) Iranian armament to obtain nuclear energy for military uses.
- c) The presence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal in the Middle East.
- d) The Arab-Israeli conflict.
- e) Terrorism and terrorist movements such as Hezbollah, the Quds Force, the Fatimid Brigade and the Iraqi Hezbollah.
- f) The division and disintegration of the so-called Arab Spring countries and reaching the level of a failed state.
- g) The intervention of the mullahs' regime in Iran in the internal affairs of countries.

The most prominent political security challenges for the national state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

- a) Iranian interference in internal affairs.
- b) Sectarian and ethnic strife among the groups of Saudi society.
- c) Domestic and foreign-backed terrorism, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
- d) The loss of the identity of political culture.
- e) Extremism and the emergence of sectarian parties and extremist movements.

The possible scenarios for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are as follows:

- a) Continuing to maintain the status quo of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
- b) Seeking to activate the Gulf union proposal.
- c) Change through the split or abolition of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
- d) Developing the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf into a broader regional grouping.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently facing many challenges and threats that impede the march of progress and development in all fields, especially political and security, highlighted by many of the changes that have emerged recently at the local, regional and

international levels. Therefore, it is necessary to develop strategies to confront these challenges and threats.

The proposed strategy in the political field

It is a strategy based on arranging Gulf and Arab political relations and includes reforming and developing Saudi political institutions, achieving political awareness and political development, applying the foundations of good governance in all political systems through the rule of law and social justice, consolidating the concept of citizenship, and protecting the freedoms and rights of the Saudi citizen within the framework of the Arab and Islamic identity. Maintaining internal national unity in all parts of the Kingdom.

The proposed strategy in the field of security and military

It is a comprehensive military strategy that keeps pace with the revolution of military technologies and technologies and strategies of modern wars. It is comprehensive, and is considered part of the Arab strategy. It is flexible and able to understand the nature of conflicts in the region, take into account ways to address sudden hostilities, and provide military capabilities that fit potential threats.

The proposed strategy in the economic field

It is a flexible, realistic strategy, based on scientific planning, and depends on the capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and takes into account the regional and global changes in the field of economic globalization. This strategy tends to support the areas of security, whether at the political or social level, and to achieve and finance human development programs.

The proposed strategy in the social field

It is a developed strategy, based on trust, and integrated with the comprehensive Arab strategy and inseparable from it. It aims to achieve the greatest levels of security in Saudi society in particular, and Arab society in general. It emphasizes the stability of internal conditions and democratic participation in political decision-making. An integrated Saudi society that seeks to develop through human development in a scientific manner.

The proposed strategy in the cultural field

It is a strategy to advance the Saudi citizen culturally, and qualify him to deal with all the requirements of the times while preserving the Arab and Islamic civilizational and cultural heritage, and dealing with the cultures of the world with awareness and mutual respect, that establishes difference as a fact, and avoids fanaticism or deviation, and integrates into cultural globalization, through a cultural and media ability Influencing others to spread authentic Arab and Islamic values.

The time periods for achieving the proposed strategy:

- A. The stage of gathering forces, formulating a strategy, and building confidence (the short term is five years).
- B. The stage of fully realizing the areas of the strategy (medium term up to ten years).
- C. The stage of stabilizing the strategy and activating its mechanisms (the long term is fifteen years).

CONCLUSION

The issue of security is one of the central issues in the field of humanities in general and political sciences in particular, and this concept has received great attention during the last two decades due to the important transformations that most countries have known, whether at their internal level or in their relations with each other. The Cold War affected many specific variables of the shape of the international system, as well as the arrangement of forces in it, and this was reflected on the national security of countries, and security threats were no longer confined to the military side only, but rather the political, economic, cultural and societal threats became more present.

National security remained the undisputed primary goal of states, and as a result of the complexity of conflicts, the exacerbation of security threats and their interdependence at the regional and international levels, the concept of collective security emerged, in the realization of states that their national security does not stand behind their geographical borders, but extends to the whole of their region and even to other regions of the world, Thus, three main levels of security in its comprehensive concept emerged:

- a) National Security (national).
- b) NS- Regional security.
- c) International (global) security.

Security is formulated according to four pillars:

- a) Awareness of threats, both external and internal.
- b) Drawing a strategy for the development of the state's forces and the need for a secure launch.
- c) Providing the ability to confront internal and external threats by building an armed force capable of confronting and confronting.
- d) Preparing scenarios and acting to confront the threats that are commensurate with them and gradually escalate with the escalation of threats, whether externally or internally.

The Saudi national security stems from the principle of preserving the considered interests in accordance with the basic constants, in addition to a set of measures taken to preserve the security of the Kingdom and the entity in the present and the future, considering the available capabilities.

Saudi national security occupies a central position in the political and military strategic thinking for several considerations, including:

- a) Saudi national security is the centerpiece of the Kingdom's foreign policy from the logic of its concept of security and protection.
- b) The Arab Gulf region and the Arab region in general are engaged in a fateful struggle against the forces that want to dominate and covet their wealth.
- c) The Kingdom's strategies were launched in various fields based on the security strategy mainly in order to achieve its goals in its various fields.

The regional security of the Arab Gulf cannot be viewed in isolation from the Arab national security because the Arab Gulf and its regional system are part of the Arab regional system in its broader framework. It is linked to, affected by, and affected by it, negatively or positively, and hence the difficulty if not the impossibility of disengaging between them.

Saudi national security is one of the important pillars upon which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia depends in maintaining its independence and security according to its circumstances and characteristics.

The concept of Saudi security is focused on protecting their societies and systems and preserving their wealth, and it is not separated from Arab national security. The concepts and political visions about its content differ according to the different parties that influence it, past and present, which agree that it proceeds from what achieves their interests, and because these interests differ, the concept differs.

The interest in the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is due to the geostrategic importance it enjoys, which it acquires from its ruling and controlling a number of the most important waterways of growing importance for international trade and security.

The American vision for the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, even if its tools and policies change, its goals seem fixed, foremost among which is maintaining oil supplies to it and its allies, and preventing the emergence of any regional power that threatens its interests.

The European vision for the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on many determinants, the most important of which are securing oil supplies (energy security), maintaining stability and security in the region. Also, confronting the internal sources of threat facing the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, while recognizing the distinguished position of the United States of America in the region and its strong influence on its countries.

According to the Iranian concept of the security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the external interference or the Western presence in the region represents the main threat to the security of the Kingdom.

Among the most prominent regional challenges to security in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the following:

- a) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- b) Iranian armament to obtain nuclear energy for military uses.
- c) The presence of the Israeli nuclear arsenal in the Middle East.
- d) The Arab-Israeli conflict.
- e) Terrorism and terrorist movements such as Hezbollah, the Quds Force, the Fatimid Brigade and the Iraqi Hezbollah.
- f) The division and disintegration of the so-called Arab Spring countries and reaching the level of a failed state.
- g) The intervention of the mullahs' regime in Iran in the internal affairs of countries.

The most prominent political security challenges for the national state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

- a) Iranian interference in internal affairs.
- b) Sectarian and ethnic strife among the groups of Saudi society.
- c) Domestic and foreign-backed terrorism, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
- d) The loss of the identity of political culture.
- e) Extremism and the emergence of sectarian parties and extremist movements.

The possible scenarios for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are as follows:

- a) Continuing to maintain the status quo of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
- b) Seeking to activate the Gulf union proposal.
- c) Change through the split or abolition of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.
- d) Developing the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf into a broader regional grouping.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is currently facing many challenges and threats that impede the march of progress and development in all fields, especially political and security, highlighted by many of the changes that have emerged recently at the local, regional and international levels. Therefore, it is necessary to develop strategies to confront these challenges and threats.

The proposed strategy in the political field

It is a strategy based on arranging Gulf and Arab political relations and includes reforming and developing Saudi political institutions, achieving political awareness and political development. Moreover, applying the foundations of good governance in all political systems through the rule of law and social justice, consolidating the concept of citizenship, and protecting the freedoms and rights of the Saudi citizen. This comes within the framework of the Arab and Islamic identity. Maintaining internal national unity in all parts of the Kingdom.

The proposed strategy in the field of security and military

It is a comprehensive military strategy that keeps pace with the revolution of military technologies and technologies and strategies of modern wars. It is comprehensive, and is considered part of the Arab strategy. It is flexible and able to understand the nature of conflicts in the region, consider ways to address sudden hostilities, and provide military capabilities that fit potential threats.

The proposed strategy in the economic field

It is a flexible, realistic strategy, based on scientific planning, and depends on the capabilities of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and considers the regional and global changes in the field of economic globalization. This strategy tends to support the areas of security, whether at the political or social level, and to achieve and finance human development programs.

The proposed strategy in the social field

It is a developed strategy, based on trust, and integrated with the comprehensive Arab strategy and inseparable from it. It aims to achieve the greatest levels of security in Saudi society in particular, and Arab society in general. It emphasizes the stability of internal conditions and democratic participation in political decision-making. An integrated Saudi society that seeks to develop through human development in a scientific manner.

The proposed strategy in the cultural field

It is a strategy to advance the Saudi citizen culturally, and qualify him to deal with all the requirements of the times while preserving the Arab and Islamic civilizational and cultural heritage, and dealing with the cultures of the world with awareness and mutual respect. That establishes difference as a fact, and avoids fanaticism or deviation, and integrates into cultural globalization, through a cultural and media ability Influencing others to spread authentic Arab and Islamic values.

The time periods for achieving the proposed strategy:

- a) The stage of gathering forces, formulating a strategy, and building confidence (the short term is five years).
- b) The stage of fully realizing the areas of the strategy (medium term up to ten years).
- c) The stage of stabilizing the strategy and activating its mechanisms (the long term is fifteen years).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Establish a supreme council that would control the plans to use soft power in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Council of Ministers
- b) Timeframe for implementing the recommendation: medium-term (from 5 to 7 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: finding a way to coordinate the efforts of the Saudi soft power system.

Intensify advocacy and media programs related to the Iranian issue and Shiite expansion with local stakeholders in the targeted countries.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Call and Guidance
- b) Timeframe for implementing the recommendation: short-term (from 1 to 3 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: aligning efforts to use soft powers to confront the growing Iranian role in the region.

Intensify research and studies into the use of Saudi soft powers and the means of developing them.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Council of Ministers
- b) Time frame for implementing the recommendation: long-term (up to 15 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: confronting ideological conflicts and stemming the Shiite tide in the region.

Establish study centers and research institutions specialized in studying the Shiite issue and its Iranian connections.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Council of Ministers
- b) Time frame for implementing the recommendation: medium-term (from 5 to 7 years)

- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: determining the most successful ways to confront the Shiite tide in the region and reduce its inherent dangers.

The importance of having strong and effective media for the dissemination and transfer of the local Arab culture abroad, provided that these are characterized by diversity and suspense and are not only targeting elites in other countries.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Ministry of Information
- b) Time frame for implementing the recommendation: short-term (from 1 to 3 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: clarifying the strategic role of soft powers for the effectiveness of foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Continuing to build and develop the armed forces, as soft power alone is not sufficient to achieve the necessary deterrence; relying rather on what is known as smart power, which combines soft and hard power.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Ministry of Defense
- b) The Timeframe for implementing the recommendation: long-term (up to 15 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: countering the growing Iranian role in the region.

Involve all ministries and governmental, as well as non-governmental bodies in formulating the soft power objectives for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and evaluate the results.

- a) Body responsible for implementing the recommendation: Saudi Council of Ministers – all Saudi ministries.
- b) Time frame for implementing the recommendation: short-term (from 1 to 3 years)
- c) Benefit from implementing the recommendation: determining the sources of Saudi soft power and working to develop them.

APPENDICES

Annex (A)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

Iran's ballistic missile capabilities⁽²⁷⁶⁾

Name	Source	Type	Term (kilometer)	head weight (Kg)	original model	Operational mode
moshak 120	LOCAL	short term	120	190	scud b	in service
moshak 160	LOCAL	short term	150	190	scud b	The program has stopped
S1 S1S8	China	short term	160	190	–	in service
open 110	LOCAL	short term	200	600	600	in service
moshak 200	LOCAL	short term	200	500	scud b	The program has stopped
scud b	North Korea	short term	320	985	–	in service
Zelzal-2	LOCAL	short term	400	unknown	scud b	in service
Scud C	North Korea	short term	550	600	–	in service
meteor 3	LOCAL	mid-range	1300 - 2000	750 - 800	Nodong 1	in service
Zelzal-3	LOCAL	mid-range	1500	1000	unknown	under development
meteor 4	LOCAL	mid-range	+ 2000	1000	SS4	under development
meteor 5	LOCAL	space / intercontinental	3000 - 5000	+ 1000	Taipudong 1	under development


(276) IRAN MILITARY Power, *Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Dominance*. 2019, pp. 22-44.

Annex (B)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

The organizational structure of the Iranian armed forces ⁽²⁷⁷⁾



Supreme Leader of Iran "Wali al-Faqih"

(277) Desert fighter: link:

http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/fig03.jpg_cvt.htm

President of the Republic

The Supreme Council of Defence

1- Minister of Defense

2 - Chief of Staff

3- Chief of Staff

4- Commander of the Revolutionary Guards

The General Command of the Revolutionary Guards

Wild Force – Tactical Formations

Air Force – Air formations

Naval force – naval formations

missile forces

precaution

General Command of the Regular Armed Forces

Staff

Ground Forces Command – Tactical formations – Special Forces – Army Aviation

Naval Forces Command – Naval formations – Naval aviation

Air Force Command – Air formations – Helicopter aviation


Annex (C)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

Iranian missile ranges⁽²⁷⁸⁾

Name	Type	Range (kilometres)
Okab	short range	45
Fajr 3, 5	short range	45 - 75
zelzal	short range	100 - 400
fath 110	short range	200
meteor 1 and 2	mid-range	300 - 500
kadr 1	mid-range	1800
meteor 3	mid-range	2000
Sejjil	mid-range	2000



(278) IRAN and the changing Military Balance in the Gulf, March 26, 2019, pp. 162-261, Anthony H. Cardesman.

Annex (D)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

US bases in the Arab Gulf states ⁽²⁷⁹⁾

American military bases are spread in approximately 130 countries around the world and their number exceeds a thousand, according to some military sources. These have been established as part of the framework of what is known as "War on Terror".

These bases were set up especially during the period following the events of September 11, 2001, which resulted in the occupation of both Afghan and Iraqi lands in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Some of these bases are approximately 50 years old. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States have established 35 military bases between Poland and Pakistan, with bases in Japan, Germany and South Korea. American military bases deployed in the Arab world participated in the military operations that took place on Iraqi soil during the invasion led by the United States of America in alliance with other countries and even served allied countries linked by security agreements.

Kuwait:

Kuwait houses the camp called "Camp Doha", where the personnel of the US 3rd Infantry Division, supported by a certain number of personnel from the US Air Force, are stationed. This camp also houses all the equipment and weapons for these troops, including M-1A12 tanks and M-2A2 armored vehicles, apart from helicopters. Staff includes assault units and more than 80 fighters, as well as some fast-deploying Special Forces units. This location allowed the Americans to use the Ahmad Al Jaber Air Base, Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Arifjan and Failaka Island, apart from providing facilities for Kuwait International Airport and Al Ahmadi Port.

(279) Rana Osama, *Map of the spread of US bases in the Gulf states... and the secret of "returning to Saudi Arabia"*, 2019 .Link: https://www.masrawy.com/news/news_publicaffairs/details/2019/7/21/1604866/

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

One of the important regional command centers of the US Air Force was placed on Saudi soil, inside the Prince Sultan Air Base in Riyadh. It included 5000 soldiers from the US Army and Air Force and more than 80 American fighters.

It also served as a center for coordinating information-gathering campaigns, reconnaissance and US intelligence operations in the region. However since approximately the middle of 2003, some 4,500 American soldiers have moved to the neighboring state of Qatar and only approximately 500 American soldiers remained in Saudi Arabia. This was also the end of US military presence at the Prince Sultan Air Base in Riyadh. Many American analysts attribute the redistribution of American forces and their expulsion from Saudi Arabia to two reasons:

1. Reluctance of the Saudi government towards the presence of American forces on its soil, which was evident in its refusal to provide logistical support in its war on Iraq in 2003.
2. The Palestinian issue and the Israeli domination of three million Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Roger Hardy, a Middle East analyst at the BBC, says that this step, namely withdrawing US forces from Saudi Arabia, is a strategic shift with great political and military implications. In recent years, the American forces in the Gulf region have become a symbol of the American role and influence, while many Saudis do not want the presence of American forces on their lands, making it necessary to withdraw American forces from Saudi Arabia.

Qatar:

Qatar houses the Al Udeid Air Base, which has one of the longest runways in the world and is prepared to receive more than 100 aircraft on the ground. This base is the headquarters of the 319th Air Expeditionary Group, which includes bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes, in addition to a number of tanks, military support units and large quantities of advanced military equipment and machines, which made some soldiers classify it as the largest strategic store of American weapons in the region. This presence allowed the use of the Al-Sailiya base, Snoopy Camp at Doha International Airport and Umm Saeed base for obtaining supplies.

Two Seas:

This region housed the headquarters of the US 5th Naval Fleet in Manama, with a strength of 4,200 US soldiers. These forces included a US aircraft carrier, a number of assault submarines, naval destroyers, more than 70 fighters, in addition to bombers, tactical fighters and refueling aircraft. This unit had its headquarters in Juffair and facilities at the Mina Salman and Muharraq Airport.

Sultanate of Oman:

The importance of this country for the United States results from its position as a multi-tasking center for airlift support services and the air base established here by the United States, where B1 bombers and refueling aircraft are stationed. Facilities include the Masirah Air Base, Musanah Air Base, Thumrait Air Base and Sultan Qaboos Port, which became a tourist port, as well as the facilities at Seeb International Airport and Salalah port.

UAE:

This region houses an air base and multiple warehouses for logistical support purposes, in addition to two important ports overlooking the deep waters of the Gulf, which highlights their importance for large military ships. In addition to the Al Dhafra air base, the ship fuel and maintenance station (Fujairah), the Fujairah International Airport, the Jebel Ali Port and facilities at Port Zayed and facilities at Port Rashid are also located here.

Annex (E)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

The most important provisions of the Iranian nuclear framework agreement and the major countries (5 + 1)

Issued on April 3, 2015 280(1)

The joint statement outlined the following:

Enrichment:

- Iran's enrichment capacity, enrichment level and stockpile will be limited for specified durations.
- There will be no enrichment facilities other than Natanz.
- Iran is allowed to conduct research and development on centrifuges with an agreed scope and schedule.
- Fordo, the underground enrichment center, will be converted to a "nuclear, physics and technology centre".

Reprocessing:

- The heavy water facility in Arak with help of international venture will be redesigned and modernized to "Heavy Water Research Reactor" with no weapon grade plutonium byproducts.
- The spent fuel will be exported, there will be no reprocessing.

Monitoring:

- Implementation of the modified Code 3.1 and provisional application of the Additional Protocol.
- Iran agreed IAEA procedure which enhanced access by modern technologies to clarify past and present issues.

Sanctions:

When the IAEA verifies Iran's implementation of its key nuclear commitments:

- The EU will terminate all nuclear-related economic sanctions.
- The United States will cease the application of all nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions.
- The UN Security Council will endorse this agreement with a resolution which terminates all previous nuclear-related resolutions and incorporate certain restrictive measures for a mutually agreed period of time.

The six major powers and Iran reached a framework agreement on the nuclear file after negotiations in the Swiss city of Lausanne, according to which Tehran will reduce its ability to enrich uranium in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions.

The Lausanne Agreement limits Iran's nuclear activities that will be used for peaceful purposes only, an agreement described as historic and paves the way for reaching a final agreement at the end of June under the auspices of the Security Council.

In its negotiations with the 5+1 group, Iran agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges it uses to enrich uranium from 19,000 to 6,104, and it will operate only 5,060 of them, according to a comprehensive nuclear agreement that it will sign in the future with the six major countries.

Under the framework agreement, Iran will enjoy a gradual easing of US and European economic sanctions related to the nuclear program, with its commitment to the comprehensive nuclear agreement that Iran and the six major countries are seeking to achieve by June 30, 2015, to be quickly re-imposed in the event of Tehran breaching its commitments.

While the text of the agreement indicated that the US sanctions on Iran related to terrorism, human rights violations and ballistic missiles, will remain under the future nuclear agreement, and it should be noted that the (5+1) group concerned with the Iranian nuclear issue, consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, namely the states The United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, in addition to Germany.

The following are the most important provisions of the framework agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis:

Enrichment, inspection and nuclear facilities:

- a) Reducing by two-thirds the number of centrifuges used to enrich uranium to produce a nuclear bomb, from 19,000 to 6,104 installed under the agreement, of which Iran uses only 5,060 equipment to enrich uranium.

- b) The 6104 centrifuges will be of the first generation.
- c) The enrichment rate of uranium does not exceed 3.67 % over 15 years.
- d) Reducing the enriched uranium stockpile from 10,000 kg to just 300 kg over 15 years.
- e) Putting surplus centrifuges and abandoned uranium enrichment infrastructure in storage under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, provided that they are used only as substitutes for working centrifuges.
- f) Iran has not built any new facility for the purpose of enriching uranium within 15 years.
- g) Not to use the "Fordo" facility, and not to conduct research regarding enrichment in the facility, for a period of 15 years, provided that it will be converted to peaceful uses later.
- h) Allowing Iran to enrich uranium only at the "Natanz" facility for 10 years using 5,060 first-generation centrifuges.
- i) 1,000 second-generation centrifuges were withdrawn from the "Natanz" facility and placed in warehouses under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- j) The International Atomic Energy Agency regularly monitors all Iranian nuclear sites, and the agency's inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran's nuclear program, especially uranium.
- k) Enabling the IAEA to gain access to any suspected site or any "secret" facility.
- l) Iran's agreement to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which gives the agency access to information about its nuclear program, including declared and undeclared facilities.
- m) Iran's approval of early notification of its intention to establish any new facility.
- n) Reconstruction of the Arak nuclear reactor, which runs on heavy water, in a way that plutonium cannot be produced, provided that it will later support scientific research and radioactive isotopes in peaceful nuclear production.
- o) Destroy, remove and ship the reactor's original engine that can produce large quantities of plutonium outside Iran.
- p) Iran ships spent reactor fuel out of the country for life, with a commitment not to conduct research or remanufacture on spent nuclear fuel.

- q) Iran's commitment not to build any additional heavy-water nuclear reactor for 15 years.

Sanctions:

- a) The European Union and the United States of America are suspending the sanctions, after the International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Iran has implemented all the major steps related to its nuclear program.
- b) Renewing sanctions on Iran in the event of non-compliance with the text of the agreement.
- c) All UN Security Council resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program will be lifted simultaneously with Iran's completion of addressing all major axes (enrichment, "Fordo" and "Arak" effects, and transparency).
- d) Drafting a new draft resolution in the UN Security Council related to the transfer of sensitive technology, in addition to incorporating important restrictions on conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, permitting inspection of related goods, and freezing assets through this new resolution.
- e) Re-imposing sanctions on Iran if it deviates from implementing what it has committed to.
- f) Maintaining US sanctions on Iran related to terrorism, human rights and ballistic missiles, according to the text of the agreement.

TABLES

Table No. (1)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

Stages and contexts of the spread and development of the concept of soft power⁽²⁸¹⁾

	Origins: American central	Propagation context: rise of regional powers	Undo context: warning of the erosion of soft power
historical context	End of the cold war	Information age	Return of military interactions and armed security threats in new forms
geographical range	Central Americanism: the United States and its role at the global level	Emerging regional powers and their various constituencies: China, India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey	The United States and their global role – regional powers and their various regional constituencies (particularly in the Middle East, East Asia, and Eastern Europe)
political context	American retreat: opposing the arguments of the decline of American power and confirming soft power as alternative resources and mechanisms for power	“Peaceful” rise of regional powers and their influence: soft power as resources and mechanisms that complement and mitigate the conflict nature of the ascent and reduce the possibilities of wars in the stages of power transformation	Warning of American retreat after the 2003 war and occupation of Iraq - warning of the dangers of eroding soft power and the re-militarization of interactions and their security in light of the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, the issue of Chinese influence in the South China Sea, as well as that of Turkey in Syria and the surrounding area

(281) Ali Jalal Moawad, *The Concept of Soft Power and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Center for Strategic Studies, Egypt, 2019, p. 15.

Table No. (2)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

Concept of soft power in the perspective of international relations

	Realism	Liberalism	Constructivism
Nature of the state's capacity	Multiple economic, technical, political and military sources, where the latter is the most important in the context of the anarchy in the international system and the threat to the security and survival of states	Multiple sources of tangible (especially economic power) and intangible (institutional power) with the priority of economic power	Strength is the response of society to certain standards and ideas
Use the capacity of the state	The importance of the mechanisms of physical coercion and the use of military force is acceptable and normal	Offer non-coercive alternatives, especially interdependence	Role of authority and the accumulation of interactions in the dissemination of ideas and concepts through the mechanisms of socialization internally and internationally
Position of soft power	Marginalized in the context of focusing on the physical and military dimensions of power, especially in some trends of neo-realism	Partly present in the context of a focus on institutional power and its role in framing priorities, as well as the effects of economic power in reshaping long-term preferences	More present in the context of focusing on the concepts of intellectual power and international upbringing
Soft power related concepts	Concept of political power or the power of ideology for Morgenthau and the fathers of traditional realism	Consensus strength, structural strength, institutional strength	Intellectual power, international socialization

Table No. (3)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

Main mechanisms and determinants of effectiveness
In building soft power in various fields⁽²⁸²⁾

Field	Basic tools, mechanisms and considerations
Spreading language and culture	Institutionalization through cultural centers, schools and universities. Employing popular culture to attract interest in language. Inclusion of activities for all age and educational levels: pre-university, university and post-university. Moving within the framework of international or regional organizations or associations (such as the Organization of Francophone countries) to make the scope of language dissemination policies broader and more multidimensional.
Educational, scientific and technical cooperation	Interest in communication between universities and research institutions, creating joint scientific and research networks, transfer programs for researchers, students and university professors, supporting the infrastructure of local universities and financing educational programs inside and outside the country, attracting students from other countries to learn at state universities, creating new attractive educational programs, working to unify or bring educational systems, assessment systems and standards closer together through agreements and technical assistance and give attention to certain categories such as: university workers as educational agents upon their return, establishing joint universities, developing double or joint degree programs, facilitating travel procedures and visas for research and educational purposes.
Business relationship development	Updating networks linking local businessmen with their counterparties abroad (business clusters, Internet and social networking sites), granting export credit, activating the role of embassies in promoting trade negotiations between countries, reinforcing public-private partnership programs, facilitating other countries' access to the national market and vice versa (through customs policies and granting preferential treatment),

(282) Ali Jalal Moawad, previous reference, p. 128.

	<p>training businessmen and entrepreneurs in other countries, supporting the participation of small companies in foreign exhibitions, holding exhibitions and specialized workshops in various fields, improving the business climate in the country and in partner countries, reforming regulatory frameworks, providing incentives for internal investment, adopting programs to develop the private business sector, developing programs to attract skilled manpower, facilitating travel visas for businessmen.</p>
<p>Public diplomacy</p>	<p>Developing institutions for coordination and building relationships with NGOs in other countries, encouraging and supporting local NGOs, developing a legal framework and economic mechanisms to stimulate association with the diaspora in the countries where they are located and facilitating the issuance of passports and provision of related services to them in the host countries, establishing crisis and relief centers to assist citizens and foreigners in crisis and disaster situations, introducing student and youth exchange programs, establishing language learning centers, programs and activities to reinforce civil society and its developmental role in other countries, establishing funds for this purpose, participating in and hosting youth activities in other countries, hosting and participating in international sports events, cooperation in programs to combat drug addiction and addiction among youth, joint programs to assist and rehabilitate persons with disabilities, restoring the state's role in hosting international conferences, exchange programs for future leaders (from politicians, businessmen and representatives of non-governmental organizations), supporting civil society organizations and the media in spreading democratic values.</p>
<p>International development aid</p>	<p>There are many forms to this efforts, as it may be in a bilateral or multiple framework and may also be directed to support the state as a whole or a specific region or certain parties or organizations; the most important forms are contributing to the financing of infrastructure projects, financing educational programs and grants and developing educational institutions, providing loans to purchase domestic products, providing low-interest loans, contributing to building the capacities of national institutions and bodies, representing the interests of developing countries in international organizations.</p>

Table No. (4)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

**Evaluation of the effectiveness of soft power
and its effects and outcomes in various fields⁽²⁸³⁾**

	Indicators of success/enhancement of soft power	Indicators of failure/erosion of soft power
Perceptual and value effects	Increasing the attractiveness of the country's cultural resources in the context of a belief in cultural similarity and/or cultural superiority.	Decline in the attractiveness of the country's cultural resources and/or the belief in the country's cultural backwardness.
	Increasing the attractiveness and values of the political system and the belief that it provides a model/solutions for existing problems.	The decline in the attractiveness and values of the political system and the belief that it suffers from many problems and is unable to address them.
	Increasing the belief in the legitimacy of the actor's foreign policy and its positive effects in achieving common benefits or even being altruistic (looking to increase and revitalize the actor's regional and international roles).	Reducing the belief in the legitimacy of the foreign policy of the actor or increasing the awareness of its exploitative, pragmatic (pursuit of self-interest at the expense of others) or imperialistic (pursuit of domination and domination) tendencies.
	Increased belief in the superiority of the actor's various abilities.	Increased belief that the actor's various abilities are reduced or relatively limited.
	Increasing the positive attitudes of public opinion or the elites towards enhancing any of the cooperative dimensions and effects mentioned below, or regressing the conservative or opposition trends.	Increasing negative attitudes among public opinion or elites towards any cooperative dimensions of the effects mentioned below, in exchange for growing support for conflicting tendencies.

(283) Ali Jalal Moawad, previous reference, pp. 179-183.

	Indicators of success/enhancement of soft power	Indicators of failure/erosion of soft power
Political implications	Agreements, bilateral visits and activities meant to benefit from the political experiences of the actor to build and develop institutions in the targeted countries (ministries and government departments, parliament, political parties, civil society organizations).	Absence of agreements, activities and visits, decrease in their frequency, increase or intensification of obstacles they face.
	Increasing the soft or hard legislative influence of the actors exercising soft power.	The absence of legislative influence or the ability to exercise it within the countries targeted by soft power.
	Increasing coordination and consistency with the actor's foreign policy and directions, which includes increasing consistency with the actor's voting behavior in regional and international organizations.	Absence or limited coordination and consistency with the actor's foreign policy and orientation, leading to the adoption of opposing retaliatory patterns or coordination with hostile actors or opponents of the actor within the framework of anti-soft or hard balancing mechanisms.
	Convergence of positions in negotiations and the lack (or limited extent) of raising and accommodating controversial issues.	Negotiations falter or fail on various topics with a focus on conflicting interests between the two parties or the soft power actor seeks to achieve their interests at the expense of harming other parties.
	Asking the state to intervene as a mediator and/or welcoming its declaration of readiness to intervene as a mediator, the relative success of the state in reducing the use of non-diplomatic mechanisms in managing the conflict, the relative success of the state in bringing the parties' positions together, to resolving the conflict.	Rejection of the state's intervention as a mediator or ignoring its demands in this context, the state's inability to reduce the intensity of the conflict and employing the tools of solid conflict, the state's inability to bring the parties' positions closer together, the state's inability to resolve or address the conflict.

	Indicators of success/enhancement of soft power	Indicators of failure/erosion of soft power
Economic effects	Increasing economic returns resulting from increasing the attractiveness of soft power resources (revenues from exporting cultural works, tourism revenues, returns from international student education programs ... etc.).	Declining economic returns associated with soft power resources.
	Increasing economic returns related to specific mechanisms, programs and events for tourism, sports or cultural promotion (revenues from hosting major sporting events, efforts to promote the country's brand, airlines and various products, investment promotion campaigns...etc).	Failure of the country's promotion programs, products and marketing or hosting sporting events.
	Positive change in the negotiating positions of other countries when it comes to concluding agreements that give economic preferences to the state exercising soft power and its business sector (reducing the intensity of opposition at the level of elites and public opinion).	Increasing the intensity of official and unofficial opposition to the conclusion of economic agreements that achieve the interests of the state exercising soft power.
	Steady reinforcement of economic, trade and investment relations with the countries targeted by soft powers (agreements and networks of businessmen that would open the markets of other countries for trade and investment).	Steady decline of the volume of economic, trade and investment relations; agreements and business networks are frozen or dismantled.
	Reduction or regression of punitive economic measures by countries targeted by the soft powers against the country exercising those powers.	Threatening or actually implementing denial of economic benefits or punitive economic measures.

	Indicators of success/enhancement of soft power	Indicators of failure/erosion of soft power
Security and defense effects	Reducing the negative effects of exercising hard power (success in giving international and regional legitimacy and legitimacy to the state's use of punitive military or economic hard power, reducing regional and international objections, reducing the decline in the state's popularity and attractiveness as a result of the use of military force).	Inability to achieve the required legitimacy, negative evaluation of parallel soft power practices as attempts to deceive or insufficient compensation for the perpetrator's misuse of hard power.
	Success in promoting shared orientations (with other actors, parties to conflicts) towards removing the solid security character of the various traditional conflict security issues and interactions (at the bilateral, regional or global level), including the need to develop cross-border cooperative approaches to deal with these issues, or at least offer to employ other, non-military, non-punitive mechanisms for processing.	Increasing the tendency of other actors to give a solid security nature to controversial or conflicting issues of interest or the intervention of the actor exercising soft power.
	Reinforcing the state's alliances and/or its leadership role within the framework of alliances with other states.	Collapse of state alliances / increasing difficulty and costs of pushing allies to carry out their responsibilities and the constant need to employ pressure and threats or pledge economic return.
	Reducing the intensity of conflict security interactions (ranging from warnings and threats of military action and sanctions, training and demonstration of power activities and mobilizing forces, to supporting armed groups within the country, military attacks or even occupation of all or parts of their territory) and increasing cooperative security interactions (security cooperation agreements, maneuvers and training, joint military alliances, arms deals, joint military projects, grants and military aid...).	Increasing the intensity of conflicting interactions in terms of security and the decline of cooperative security interactions.

MAPS

Map No. (1)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

Geographical location of Iran⁽²⁸⁴⁾




(284) Google World website, 2020,
http://www.worldmapfinder.com/Map_Earth.php?ID=/Ar/Asia/Iran

Map No. (2)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

Iranian nuclear facilities⁽²⁸⁵⁾



(285) International Atomic Energy Agency, p. 30.

Map No. (3)

Issued with a PhD thesis
The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront
the growing Iranian regional role

Shiite security belt⁽²⁸⁶⁾



(286) Charmaine, *The Shiite Security Crescent*, The Middle East Shuffle, 2015. <http://midleatshuffle.com>.

Map No. (4)

Issued with a PhD thesis

The proposed strategy for using the soft powers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to confront the growing Iranian regional role

Occupied UAE islands⁽²⁸⁷⁾



(287) <https://www.newsofbahrain.com/bahrain/67392.html>

REFERENCES

First: Arabic references

A. Books

- (1) Abu Dawood Al-Sayyid, The Rising Iranian Tide in the Arab World, Al-Obaikan Library, Riyadh, 2014.
- (2) Atlas of the Islamic World, 2000.
- (3) Amani Zahran, The awakening of the Russian bear after a deep steadfastness, Anglo-Egyptian Library, Cairo, 2014.
- (4) Amir Muhammad Haji Yousef, Iranian-Israeli Relations: Are they hostility or secret cooperation, Al-Rased Center, Tehran, 2014.
- (5) Bashir, Mohamed Morsi, The future of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through the entrance to national security and political reform, Wafed Cultural House, Publishers, Algeria, 2013.
- (6) Berry Ezde, An introduction to the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Translated by Saeed Sabbagh, Cultural House for Publishing, first edition, 2000.
- (7) Taj al-Din Jaafar al-Tai, Iran's strategy towards the Arab Gulf states, Raslan House, Damascus, 2013.
- (8) Turki Ibrahim Sultan, The Engineering of Change: The Radical Change of the Art of Management - Methodology and Application, Cairo, Dar Al Maaref, 1996.
- (9) Jamal Mazloun, Irani Eritreay Alliancey and Arab security, Yemen, 2014.
- (10) Joseph S. Nay, Soft Power as a Means of Success in International Politics, translated by Muhammad Tawfiq Al-Bajarmi, Al-Obaikan, Riyadh, 2015.
- (11) Joseph Nye, Soft Power, The Means of Success in International Politics, translated by Muhammad Tawfiq Al-Buhairi, Obeikan, Riyadh, 2007.
- (12) Hossam El Din Shehata, The Shiite Expansiony Irany Office of future studies for printing and publishing, Cairo, 2012.
- (13) Hassan Al Mutrefy, Comprehensive capabilities of Iran, Dar Al Sharq for printing, Riyadh, 2019.
- (14) Khader Mesbah Ismail, Change Management, Challenges and Strategies for Contemporary Managers, Amman, Dar Al-Hamid, 2011.

- (15) Khalaf, Jassim Muhammad, *The Arab Gulf States and the Sanctity of Their National Security in the Age of Globalization*, Kalimat Publishing and Distribution House, Kuwait, 2016.
- (16) Khair Allah Hussein Khair Allah, *Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf*, Zia Center, Kuwait, 2015.
- (17) Donia Mohsen Mahmoud Abdo, *General trends of the regional interests of Iran and the Arab region, a comparative study of Syria and Yemen*, 2016.
- (18) *Pillars of National Security*, Intellectual Security Network, Intellectual Security Library, first edition, 2013.
- (19) Salem Farhan, *Iran Exploiting Yemen, Happy Yemen*, Sana'a, 2014.
- (20) Shahram Chobin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*, Arab House for Science and Publishing, translated by Bassam Shiha, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 2007.
- (21) Shehadeh and Al Kiswani, *The Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Contemporary Teams in the World*, Madbouly Library 2009, Cairo, 2009.
- (22) Abd Rabbo Nassar, *National Security from the Iranian point of view*, Rua Publishing and Distribution House, Abu Dhabi, 2013.
- (23) Abdel Qader Mohamed Fahmy, *Political and Strategic Thought for the United States*, Al-Shorouk Publishing and Distribution House, Oman, 2014.
- (24) Abdullah Mohammed Al-Gharib *A fighter from the desert, the growing Iranian role and its impact on Arab national security*, Riyadh, 2010 edition.
- (25) Abdullah Masoud, *The Iran/Gulf conflict*, Fairouz Abady Library For publication and distribution, Riyadh, 2013.
- (26) Ali Abu Habla, *Iranian goals and interests and the forces of the comprehensive state*, Cairo, 2011.
- (27) Ali bin Hilhoul Al-Ruwaili, *The foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its impact on achieving Arab national security*, 2009 edition.
- (28) Ali Jalal Moawad, *The concept of soft power and foreign policy analysis* The Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Center for Strategic Studies, Egypt, 2019.
- (29) Ali Abdulhussain Abdullah, *The security of the Arab Gulf in light of international and regional changes*, Raslan Establishment for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Damascus, 2017.
- (30) Al-Qafari, Nasser bin Abdullah bin Ali, *The issue of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites*, Dar Taiba for Publishing and Distribution, Riyadh 2010.

- (31) Al-Luhaidan, Abdullah bin Fahd, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Terrorism*, Gina for Studies and Media, Riyadh, 1424.
- (32) Muhammad bin Humaid Al-Thaqafi, *Saudi National Security in the Age of Globalization*, 2012, p. 21.
- (33) Muhammad Suleiman Al-Zaidy, *decision makersy Iran*, Dar Al-Quds, Riyadh, 2014.
- (34) Muhammad Gharbi, *Al-Wajeez in the History of Contemporary International Relations*, Top Press, third edition, 2007.
- (35) Moeen Abdul Hakim, *Iran and reaching the stage of strategic deterrence Islamic Unity Center*, Riyadh, 2015.
- (36) Mamdouh Al-Jazi, *Iranian influence in the Arab region in light of American transformations towards the region*, Academics for Publishing and Distribution, 2014.
- (37) Nidal Safi, *The concept of soft power, how it originated, and what are the conditions for its development*, Cairo, 2015.
- (38) Naftiya Muhammad, *Soft Power in International Relations*, University of the Martyr Hammat El Wadi, Algeria, 2017.
- (39) Yassin, Saad Ghaleb, *Strategic Management*, Dar Al-Yazuri, Amman, Jordan, 2002.

B. Studies, research and scientific theses

- (1) Ahmed Abdulaziz Al-Hussan, *Prospects of the New American Strategy*, Rawabet Center for Strategic Studies, United Arab Emirates, 2015.
- (2) Ahmed Kamel Al-Khafaji, *Soft power and its role in Iranian foreign policy trends*, Faculty of Humanities, Al-Mustafa International University, 2017.
- (3) Ossama Abu Rashid, *Will the United States go for another war in the Middle East? Policy Analysis*, Doha, The Arab Center for research and study policies, October 2014.
- (4) Ashraf Mohamed Kishk, *The Chinese strategy towards the countries of Iran and the Arab Gulf: The dilemma of balancing interests and principles*, Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018.
- (5) Ashrakat Ahmed Arafat, *Egyptian Relations, Iranian from the period 2011, 2016*, the Arab Democratic Center, 2016.

- (6) National and Regional Security of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries, Bahrain Center for Strategic and International Studies, International and Energy, Manama, 2012.
- (7) PakinamSharqawy , Iran orientationy Towards Asia: Possibilities and Challenges, Middle East Papers, National Centery For Middle Eastern Studies, No. 36, Cairo, 2009.
- (8) Pakinam Al-Sharqawi, The Iranian Revolutionary Phenomenon, Master Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2012.
- (9) Tamer Badawy, Iranian expansion in Afghanistan between the US withdrawal and the available alternatives, Institute of Arab Studies, 2014.
- (10) Turkish Expansion in the Region: Engines, Constraints, and Prospects, Emirates Policy Center, Abu Dhabi, 2020.
- (11) Jassem Muhammad Hatem Al-Azzawi, Turkish-Iranian Relations after 2011, Arab Democratic Center, Berlin, Germany, 2019.
- (12) Hossam Ibrahim, American policy towards the Middle East after the nuclear agreement with Iran, the Regional Center for Studies in NS Strategy, Cairo, 2015.
- (13) Hossam El Din Shehata, The Iranian PenetrationyNSy Gulf, Abu Dhabi Center Studies, Emirates, 2014.
- (14) Al-Hamoudi, Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad bin Musa, Saudi diplomacy and ceremonies and their comparison with some Arab countries, Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah Al-Mukarramah 2010.
- (15) Khaled Ahmed Al Ramah, Political Dialogue in Yemen and the Path to Consensus, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 24, 2014.
- (16) Khaled Al-Awamleh, The Iranian Revolution and the Legitimacy of Arab Political Systems, Master Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 2013.
- (17) Khaled Aliwi, The Role of Soft Power in Reshaping the Middle East, University of Karbala, Center for Strategic Studies, Iraq, 2018.
- (18) Kholoud Muhammad Khamis, the Qatar-Gulf crisis to where? Reading in the regional and international scenes, Future Center for Strategic Studies, October 14, 2017.
- (19) Rahma Ahmed Sayed, The Role of Strategic Thought Centers in Making Egyptian Public Policies, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, Cairo, 2020.

- (20) Radwa Ahmed Abdel-Jalil, *The Iranian Strategy towards the Arab Region*, The Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic and Political Studies, Cairo, 2016.
- (21) Rafiq Abdel Salam, *United States of America between hard power and soft power*, Thought Industry Center for Studies and Research, Beirut, 2015.
- (22) Randa Moussa, *Emirati-Iranian Relations*, Barq Center for Research and Studies, Cairo, 2017.
- (23) Robert Nick, Richard, *Cyber Wars, The Next Threat to National Security and How to Deal With It*, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2018.
- (24) Riyadh bin Mohammed Al-Shehri, *a forward-looking vision for the national security of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the light of the 2030 vision*, Naif University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2018.
- (25) Zainab Hosni Ezzedine, *The Impact of Fourth Generation Wars on Arab National Security*, The Arab Democratic Center, Cairo, 2017.
- (26) Zainab Khaled Abdel Moneim El-Sayed, *The Iranian Nuclear File and the Political Future of the Middle East "2003-2016"*, Cairo, Arab Democratic Center, 2016.
- (27) Saad Mohammed bin Nami, *The new Iranian role in the Gulf*, Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Kuwait, 2015.
- (28) Sultan bin Fahd bin Abdullah, *Strategic Perceptions of Saudi Soft Power in the Face of Iranian Challenges*, Naif University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2014.
- (29) Shaher El Wazzani , *Iranian expansion, rights or greed? , Oasis Center for Security and Strategic Studies*, Kuwait, 2015.
- (30) Sherif Mabrouk, *Turkish / Iranian relations from rapprochement to competition*, Al-Ahram Center for Studies, 2014.
- (31) Al-Shaqha, Fahd Beh Muhammad, *National Security a Comprehensive Perception*, Center for Studies and Research, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2004.
- (32) Shaima Mahmoud Abdullah, *The expansion of Iranian influence in Syria (politically, economically, and militarily)*, the Arab Center for Research and Studies, Egypt, 2020.
- (33) Shaima Mahmoud Abdullah, *The Expansion of Iranian Influence in Syria*, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, Cairo, 2020.
- (34) *Iranian ambitions at the regional level*, research by the Center for Strategic Studies of the Armed Forces, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, May 2007.

- (35) Adel Amer, *The American Strategy towards the Arab World*, The Arab Institute European for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2014.
- (36) Adel Masoud, *The comprehensive forces of the state between theory and practice*, National Defense College Cairo, 2008.
- (37) Abdul Hai, Walid, *The future of Iran's regional status*, Center for Applied Studies and Foresight, Algeria, 2020.
- (38) Abdul Rahman Al-Hawari, *International Challenges and Their Implications for Arab National Security*, Nasser Higher Military Academy, National Defense College, November 2007.
- (39) Abdulaziz Turki Al-Farm, *the variables of the contemporary world order and their political repercussions, on the security of the Arabian Gulf*, a master's thesis, Riyadh, Naif University for Security Sciences, 2015.
- (40) Fadl Al-Shehri, *doctoral thesis, Towards a national strategy to confront the Fellowships in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2012.
- (41) Abdel Moneim Al-Mashat, *Iranian geopolitics and its impact*, the Arab center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2018.
- (42) Ezzat Shahro, *China and the Middle East: Features of a New Approach*, Al Jazeera Center for Political Studies reports and strategy, June 2012.
- (43) Aqeel bin Mohammed Al-Mutairi, *Iranian penetration into the Gulf*, Media Center of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Manama, 2015.
- (44) Ali Jalal Moawad, *The Concept of Soft Power and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Center for Strategic Studies, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2019.
- (45) Ali Hassan Bakeer, *The Geostrategic Dimensions of the Iranian and Turkish Policies towards Syria*, Arab Research Center, Doha, 2013.
- (46) Ali Ziyad Al-Ali, *Russian Strategy in the Arabian Gulf*, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Abu Dhabi, 2017.
- (47) Ali Salah, *The Belt and Road Project. How China Connects Its Economy to the Outside World*, Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies, Abu Dhabi, UAENS t united arab emirates, 2018.
- (48) Ali Muhammad Al-Hajj, *Soft War and Theoretical and Applied Foundations*, The Islamic Center for Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2015.

- (49) Ammar Ali Hassan, Environment and International Relations, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, theaHaram, Cairo, Issue 63, Cairo, April 2008.
- (50) Farzin Tadimi, How Iranian intervention in Yemen could drag America into war, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2016.
- (51) Fawaz Gerges, The Constant and the Changing in the Politics of the United States of America, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2014.
- (52) Victor Jervis, Iranian Missile Programs, Evolution of Strategic Objectives and Capabilities, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, May 2018.
- (53) Al-Qahtani, Misfir bin Dhafer Ayedh, the strategy of employing soft power to consolidate hard power, Naif Arab University for Security Sciences, Riyadh, 2010.
- (54) Kalim Dondash, The Iranian and Turkish Regional Position on the Syrian Revolution, Umayyah Center for Research and Strategic Studies, 2017.
- (55) Muhammad Ahmad, Reading in the Transformations of the International Strategic Environment, Political Strategic Report, International Institute for Iranian Studies, Rasanah, 2020.
- (56) Muhammad bin Saqr Al-Sulami, Iranian relations – Iraq, the International Institute for Iranian Studies.
- (57) Muhammad Hassan Al-Qadi, The Iranian Role in Yemen and Its Implications for Regional Security, Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, Riyadh, 2017.
- (58) Mohammed Abdulsalam, gray problems, Center for Strategic Studies in Palaham, 2010.
- (59) Muhammad Abd al-Salam, Gray Problems, Center for International Studies strategy in the pyramids Cairo, the Strategy, 2011.
- (60) Muhammad Abdullah Bani Hamim, Iranian Relations, Kuwaiti between continuity and change, Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, August 2017.
- (61) Mahmoud Ramadan, International Interests in the Arab Gulf Region, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 2017.
- (62) Mahmoud Mohieldin, "Manifestations and Effects of Globalization in the Economic Field", a research paper, a symposium on globalization and its effects on theaFrom the Egyptian Nationalist, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2002.
- (63) Marwa Abdel Hamid, Iran's Arms, Terrorism in the Middle East, The Egyptian Observatory for Thought and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2019.

- (64) Mostafa Kamel, International and Regional Changes and Their Effects, more lectures NSDima Nasser Al-Askari, Cairo, 2017.
- (65) Mustafa Kamal, Iranian missile capabilities and their potential impact on Gulf security, Early Warning Center, 2020.
- (66) Mansour Saeed Al-Sarhani, The Suggested Strategy for Developing Egyptian Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries in Light of International and Regional Changes, Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo, 2017.
- (67) Nasir Muhammad Al-Taweel, Yemen future after the Houthis control on Authority in Sana'a, Politics papers, Beirut, think tank for studies and research, 2015.
- (68) NajlaMakkawi, Iranian Strategy in the Arabian Gulf, Sanaa Center for Studies and Research, 2015.
- (69) Nevin Abdel Moneim Massad, Decision Making in Iran and Arab-Iranian Relations, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2002.
- (70) Hisham Bashir, The growing Iranian role in the Arab region, Arab Center for Research and Studies, Manama, 2014.
- (71) Walid Mahmoud Abdel Nasser, Regional Departments of Iranian Foreign Policy, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Strategic Pamphlets, No. 38, 2012.

C. Specialized magazines and periodicals

- (1) Ahmad Kandil, The Energy Sector in Iran, An Uncertain Future in the Light of the Nuclear Agreement, Journal of Iranian Studies, Arab Gulf Center for Iranian Studies, 2017.
- (2) Ahmed Kamel Al-Bahbri, Dimensions of the Suakin Island Agreement between Turkey and Sudan, International Politics Magazine, December 28, 2017
- (3) Ashraf Swailem, Arab security between Iran and the West, International Politics Magazine, Cairo, 2015.
- (4) Elias Farhat, The Political Conflict in the Middle East - The Side and the Strategy, Middle One, Issue 147.
- (5) Iyad Abed Wali Al-Biri, The Strategic Role in the Arab Gulf Region, A Geopolitical Study, Al-Qadisiyah Journal of Political Science, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2008.
- (6) Bin Aisha Muhammad Al-Amin, Iranian Soft Power and Lessons Learned from the Iranian Experience, Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic and Political Studies, 2015.

- (7) Hussein Ali Behairy, Regional Variables, International Politics Journal, Al-Ahram, 2014.
- (8) Hussein Aliwi, The Syrian Crisis, Regional and International Situations, Kufa Magazine, No. 17, 2013.
- (9) Hanan Kandil, China, a new model for a rising power, International Politics Journal, Cairo, Issue 173, 2008.
- (10) Khaled Al-Asma'i, Hamas raises doubts about its relations with Iran, Al-Ahram, Cairo, 2017.
- (11) Khanfar Al-Kaabi, Iranian/Turkish Relations and the Map of Influence in the Arab World, Al-Eqtisadiyah Magazine, No. (646), issued on June 24, 2012.
- (12) Dalia Rushdy, The Structure of Risk, A Reading of the Prospects for the Spread of Jihadist Statelets, Al-Siyasah Al-Dawliyah Journal, Transformations Supplement NSStrategy, Issue 203, Cairo, January 2016.
- (13) Zayan Farsi, International Institute for Iranian Studies, 2020.
- (14) Samir Ibrahim Mohamed, The impact of neo-conservative ideas on American foreign policy, International Politics magazine, Al-Ahram, 2014.
- (15) Shaher Ismail Al-Shaher, Iran and the regional restructuring of the Middle East after the events of the Arab Spring, Iranian Orbits magazine, Arab Democratic Arab Center, Berlin, Germany, 2020.
- (16) Adel Abdel Sadiq, Electronic Terrorism and Power in International Relations. New Challenges, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Issue 180, April, 2010
- (17) Abdul Rahman Al-Nuaimi, Lights on the Gulf Cooperation and Security Council, Journal of Arab Studies, Issue (8), June 2011.
- (18) Abdullah bin Mudath Al-Dosari, Iran, heir to the Persian Empire, Okaz newspaper, Riyadh, 2013.
- (19) Ali El-Din Hilal, Renewed Importance: Criticizing the Middle East Retreat Thesis, Al-Siyasah Al-Dawlaiya Journal, Cairo, No. 203, December 31, 2015.
- (20) Ali Abdel-Sadek, NATO and the Greater Middle East, International Politics, Al-Ahram, Cairo, Issue 163, January 2006.
- (21) Amr Abdel-Moaty, The Arab revolutions, their future and their impact on American politics, International Politics magazine, Al-Ahram, No. (198), October 2014.

- (22) Majid Ahmed Al-Zamili, The Balance of International Powers, The Civilized Neighborhood, Issue 3386, June 2011.
- (23) Malik Awad, After the Disintegration, Is the Middle East Expired, Al-Siyasah Al-Dawlaiya Journal, Transformations Supplement Strategy, Issue 203, Cairo, January 2016.
- (24) Defense Magazine, Al-Ahram Foundation Building, Number 269 , December 2008.
- (25) Muhammad Abu Rumman, The New Actors and the Rules of the Regional Game, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, No. 168, April 2007.
- (26) Muhammad Abu Rumman, Al-Qaeda and the Internet, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, No. 180, April 2010.
- (27) Muhammad Riyadh, Strategic Transformations, A New World, Transcending the Inevitable, Does Man Redefine Geography Issues and Its Conflicts, International Politics, Center for Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram, Cairo, Issue 200, 2015.
- (28) Muhammad Abbas Nagy, International Politics, Al-Ahram Foundation, 2013 edition.
- (29) Muhammad Ezz Al-Arab, Turkish Policy towards Iran and the Arab Gulf Countries, International Politics Magazine, Cairo, Issue 219, January 2020.
- (30) Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed, The New Actors on the World Politics Stage, International Politics Magazine, theAhram, Issue 200, Cairo 2017.
- (31) Mustafa Kemal, The Arab World and Facing the Challenges of Climate Change, International Politics, Center for International Studies, NS Strategy, Al-Ahram, Cairo, Issue 179, Cairo, January 2010.
- (32) Manal Al-Rini, The Impact of the Nuclear Agreement on Iranian Politics, International Political Journal, Al-Ahram, No. 202, Cairo, 2015.
- (33) Encyclopedia of desert fighter, sleepy Iran's roley and its impact on national securityyArabj, Riyadh, 2010 edition.
- (34) Nadia Hassan Abdullah, Arab and International Attitudes towards the Syrian Revolution, Al-Motadun Dialogue, Issue 3651, 2017.
- (35) Nourhan Al-Sheikh, a calculated alliance: Determinants of compatibility between Iran and Russia, International Politics Journal, Issue 196, Cairo, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, April 2014.
- (36) Nourhan Al-Sheikh, a calculated alliance, International Politics Magazine, Issue No. (196), 2014.

- (37) Walid Abdel Hai, Cautious Engagement: Does Politics Restrict Balance China's role in the Middle East?, International Politics magazine, issue 15 , January 2017.
- (38) William Nassar, Russia as a Great Power, The Arab Journal of Political Science, No. 20, 2008.

D. Reports, lectures and seminars

- (1) The annual statistical report of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Riyadh, 1432, 1433.
- (2) Annual Strategic Report, International Institute for Iranian Studies, (Rasanah) 2020.
- (3) The annual report of the Ministry of Culture and Information for the year 1433-1434.
- (4) Gulf security report Arabi After the Iraq War, the Diplomatic Center for International Studies and Strategy, Kuwait, Issue 8, 2004.
- (5) Iran Statistical Center, Tehran, 2020.
- (6) The Basic Law of Governance, 1412.
- (7) The Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Decree No. (1/90) dated 27/8/1412.
- (8) Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance, annual report for the fiscal year 1433/1434.

E. Newspapers

- (1) Political Agendas, Shi'a Movement in the Region, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Issue 4217, Cairo, December 31, 2015.
- (2) Turkey enters the arena of conflict over the security of the Red Sea, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Cairo, Issue 4946, December 28, 2017.
- (3) Hussam Swailem Political decision-making in Iran and the approach to crisis management. The Arab Center for Research and Studies, Politics, Egypt, 2013.
- (4) Abdulaziz Al-Sharafi, Syria: The Way to Stop the Bleeding, Al-Watan Egyptian Newspaper, Issue 1217, Cairo, August 29, 2015.
- (5) Abdullah Al-Qaba, Saudi Foreign Policy, Riyadh, first edition, 2009.
- (6) Ali bin Helhoul Al-Ruwaili, Saudi National Security, Strategic Perspectives with a Future Vision, Riyadh, 2010.
- (7) Muhammad Al-Salami, A reading of the political rapprochement between Iran and Turkey, Iranian affairs, 2015.
- (8) Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad, A Reading in the Future of Iranian-Pakistani Relations, Al-Wasat Newspaper, Bahrain, No. (559), 2004.

- (9) Muhammad Qashqosh, The Foreign Military Presence in Qatar and Gulf Security: A Military Reading Qatar is not besieged and Turkey and Iran will not enter a war in the Gulf, Opinions on the Gulf, Issue 1212017.
- (10) Hassan Hussein, Mr. Shoukry, The Beginning of the End for the European Union, Al-Akhbar Newspaper, No. (20035) for the year 65, Cairo, on June 21, 2606.
- (11) Nashwa Hofy, Cyberspace and the Israeli Army's Strategy, Al-Watan Egyptian Newspaper, Issue 1233, Cairo, September 14, 2015.
- (12) Nawar Muhammad Rabie Al-Khairy, The Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union, the path of relations and the limits of areas of cooperation, International Studies, No. (40).

Secondly: Foreign references

- (1) Andreyshelepovetal, "A Systemization of the Best Soft Power (reatices, international organisations research journal 9, no. 2 (2014).
- (2) IRAN and the changing Military Balance in the Gulf, March 26, 2019, Anthony H. Cardesman.
- (3) IRAN Military Power Ensuring Regime Survival and securing Reginal Dominance 2019.
- (4) JRAN MILITARY Power Ensuring Regime Surival and Securing Dominance. 2019.
- (5) Julian Reynolds, Julian Fode, Political Geography of the International Monetary Fund Latin America Europe, Research Centres, (Working Paper, 2007).
- (6) National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. Arnold Wolfers. Political Science Quarterly, Vol.67, No.4.(Dec.2015).
- (7) Paul, Bairoch. Economy and World History: Myths and Paradoxes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. United States of America. (1993).
- (8) Serge Raynal, Project Management "Strategic Approach to Change" 3, 1st edition.
- (9) US Department of Defense, "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," April 2010.

Third: International Information Network (Internet)

- (1) Facts about the Arab region United Nations Development Program in the Arab States, 2021,
link: <https://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/ar/home/regioninfo.html#>

- (2) Ahmed Helou, Central Asian countries or the Five States Studies and Research, Army Journal, Issue (329), Lebanon, 2012, link: <https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/>
- (3) Persian Empire 2017, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Empire)
- (4) Iranian revolution 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_revolution)
- (5) Geopolitics, 2020, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geopolitics)
- (6) Arab countries in the Persian Gulf 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_countries_in_the_Persian_Gulf)
- (7) TheShah, 2020, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheShah)
- (8) TheShiites, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheShiites)
- (9) Soft Power, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soft_Power)
- (10) What is pragmatics, definition, clarification and opinions, 2016, link: <https://www.lazemtefham.com/2016/02/what-is-pragmatism-definition.html>
- (11) Amira Abdawi, Irregular War: A New Challenge for Regular Armies, Journal of Legal and Political Sciences, Issue (11), 2020. Link:
- (12) Exporting the Revolution, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exporting_the_Revolution)
- (13) Sustainable Development, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_Development)
- (14) Jawad Saleh Mahdi Al-Nomani, TA geographical assessment of the Iraqi National Security Strategy for the year 2007-2010, 2020.
Link: <https://almerja.com/reading.php?idm=139699>
- (15) Iranian Revolutionary Guards, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolutionary_Guards)
- (16) Right of Veto, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_Veto)
- (17) Twelver Shi'a, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelver_Shi'a)
- (18) Horn of Africa, link: <https://www.marefa.org/>
- (19) A regional power, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_regional_power)
- (20) Arab Nationalism, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Nationalism),
<https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/article/133819>
- (21) Military training, 2017, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_training)
- (22) The Sadrist Movement, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sadrist_Movement)
- (23) Arab Spring Revolutions, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring_Revolutions)
- (24) Justice and Development Party (Turkey), 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice_and_Development_Party_(Turkey))
- (25) Military alliance, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_alliance)
- (26) Diplomacy, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomacy)
- (27) Middle East, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East)
- (28) Ballistic missile, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ballistic_missile)

- (29) Solid Power, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (30) Cooperation Council for countries Gulf Arabic, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (31) Militia, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (32) Hisham Shaaban, Islamic Theocracy, Believers Without Borders for Studies and Research, 2021.
- (33) Wilayat al-Faqih, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
<https://www.mominoun.com/articles/7390>
- (34) Political Islam, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (35) Asymmetric War, 2010, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (36) Hezbollah, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (37) Houthis, 2015, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (38) The let Money logistical 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (39) Alawites (sect), 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (40) Smart Power, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (41) Majd Khader, Defining National Security, topic, 2016. Link: <https://mawdoo3.com/>
- (42) Exporting the Revolution, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (43) A Fighter from the Desert, Foundations and Principles of National Security, 2021, link: http://www.moqatil.com/openshare/Behoth/Askria6/OsosAmnWat/sec21.doc_cvt.htm
- (44) European Union 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (45) Definition of the National Strategy, Al-Morsal, 2019, the link:
- (46) ISIS, 2021, link: <https://p.dw.com/p/1DsIR>
- (47) The Fourth Generation of Wars, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (48) One Belt One Road, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (49) NATO, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (50) Silk Road, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (51) Globalization, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (52) Money Laundering, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
- (53) Virtual community, 2021, link: [/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki)
<https://www.almrsal.com/post/873419>
- (54) Ghada Halayka, The Concept of Strategic Planning, 2018, link: [/ https://mawdoo3.com](https://mawdoo3.com)

- (55) Scientific Research Portal, Descriptive method in scientific research:
<https://www.sciegate.com/blog=>
- (56) Analytical approach, on scholarship in academic studies and consulting, 2017. Link:
<https://mobt3ath.com/dets.php?page=506&title=>
- (57) Madahi Muhammad, lectures on the scientific research methodology scale. Link:
<http://fecg.univ-bouira.dz/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/>
- (58) The deductive approach, the code of human resource management. Link:
https://grhumaines.blogspot.com/2018/09/blog-post_24.html
- (59) The growing Iranian role in the Arab region, Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert.
Link:
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec09.doc_cvt.htm
- (60) Iranian/Saudi Relations, Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert. Link:
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec04.doc_cvt.htm
- (61) Iranian-Kuwaiti Relations between Continuity and Change, Center for Studies and Research, 2017. Link: <https://rasanah-iiis.org/>
- (62) Nasr Muhammad Ali, Iranian Strategy in the Middle East, Future Center for Strategic Studies, 2015. Link: <https://www.mcsr.net/news101>
- (63) Ibrahim Al-Minshawi, Dimensions and Implications, Iranian Influence in Lebanon,
link: <http://www.ocrseg.org/140010>
- (64) The impact of the Iranian role on Egyptian national security, Encyclopedia of a Desert Fighter. Link:
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec11.doc_cvt.htm
- (65) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert, p. 6. Link:
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec11.doc_cvt.htm
- (66) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert. Link:
http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec12.doc_cvt.htm
- (67) General Authority for Statistics website, on 25/11/2020. Statsgov.sa
- (68) Encyclopedia of a fighter from the desert.
Link: http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Askria6/OsosAmnWat/sec13.doc_cvt.htm
- (69) Ramez Salah Abdulelah Al-Shishi, The impact of the BRICS bloc on American hegemony Faculty of Politics and Economics, Suez University, Arab Democratic Center, 2021, p. 1. Link: <https://democraticac.de/?p=74738>

- (70) Amira Rashid, Reducing Opportunities and Growing Problems and Challenges, Opinions on the Gulf, Gulf Research Center, Issue (123), 2017. Link: https://araa.sa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4238:2017-09-24-11-20-53&catid=3249&Itemid=172
- (71) Island Center for Studies, Abd Rabbo's resignation Mansour Hadi, the risks and alternatives, Assessment of position, dated January 28, 2015. Link: <http://studies.aljazeera.net/positionestimate/2015/01/2015128103150929915>
- (72) Mohammed Abbas Nagy, new balances: repercussions on regional potential to American withdraw from the region, the Arab Research Center and Studies, March 11, 2015. Link: <http://www.acrseg.org/12282>
- (73) Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy, Issued on: October 13, 2017. Link: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy/>
- (74) Izzat Saeed Al-Sayed, Russian Politics and Middle East Security... Between Terrorism and Iran, International Politics Magazine, August 30, 2015: Link: <http://www.siyassa.org.eg/NewsQ/5466.aspx>
- (75) Review of Military Exchanges between China and Arab Countries, November 1, 2010, People's Daily website: <http://arabic.people.com.cn/31660/7184029.html>
- (76) Nazi beauty, Its secrets and ways to name it. These are North Korea's missiles, 2017. Link: <https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2017/08/29/>
- (77) Betting on a Horse, Turkish Policy in the Gulf Crisis, on the following link: <https://bit.ly/2Mal-3x9>.
- (78) Security Council Resolution No. 2254 of December 18, 2015 regarding a ceasefire and a political settlement of the situation in Syria, a road map to end the conflict, Security Council website / 2015 Resolutions.
Link: <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015>
- (79) Kazari Mizan news, Nerdyace changes, 3rd floor, Sal Ajeer, dated December 30, 2020: <https://2u.pw/trxwu>.
- (80) Graduation of the first batch of Somali officers from the Turkish military base in Mogadishu, Turk Press, December 23, 2017. Link: <https://www.turkpress.co/node/43425>
- (81) Stockholm Peace Research Institute, Network international information (The NS Internet) Cairo, December 2017.

- (82) Sherif Darwish Al-Labban, Ahmed Moussa Badawy, Sources of Soft Power and Egypt's Place in the World, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, 2018. Link: <http://www.acrseg.org/40678> Entry date 07/26/2019.
- (83) Ibrahim Nawar, Sources of Soft Power and Egypt's Place in the World, The Arab Center for Research and Studies, 2018, Link: <http://www.acrseg.org/40678> Entry date 27/7/2019.
- (84) Ministry of Petroleum, Mineral Resources: Link: [www.mapm.gav, sa](http://www.mapm.gav.sa)
- (85) Department of Statistics and Information, Millennium Development Goals; Link: www.cdsi.gav.sa.
- (86) Desertfighter:link:http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/fig03.jpg_cvt.htm
- (87) Beirut Center for Middle Eastern Studies: link <http://www.beirutme.com>
- (88) Russian news agency /(RT) <http://arabic.rt.com>.
- (89) GoogleWorld, 2020.
Link:http://www.worldmapfinder.com/Map_Earth.php?ID=/Ar/Asia/Iran
- (90) Charmaine, The Shiite Security Crescent, Elusive Middle East website, Link: 2015.<http://midleatshuffle.com>
- (91) Iyad Al-Zamili, The Iranians between the Mother of Power Theory and the Visit to Karbala, accessed the website 11/20/2020.
- (92) Mamoun Abu Amer, Iranian Missile Program, Arab Policy Forum, Palestine, 2018. Link:<http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=567790&IssueID=4551>
- (93) http://www.moqatel.com/openshare/Behoth/Siasia2/DoorIrani/sec07.doc_cvt.htm
- (94) Why Turkey is Set to Open Military Base in Somalia?, Sputnik News, January 21, 2016.<https://sputniknews.com/military/201601211033517458-turkey-military-base-somalia/>
- (95) www.data.worldbank.org.