

SUMMARY

The subject of this doctoral dissertation is the security environment of the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance in the face of Russian Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The Russian Federation, in its foreign policy, uses the tools of realism theory, especially the power potential to oppose NATO's conventional superiority in Central and Eastern Europe. A particular role in this potential has been attributed to multi-domain A2/AD capabilities, stationed, among others, in the western strategic direction. Their location is directly related to the Kremlin's recognized principle of *animus dominandi* – an innate desire for domination in close proximity. There is, therefore, a close relationship between this aspiration and Russia's specific indexing of national security challenges and threats and constructing countermeasures, which include: (1) developing the ability to neutralize the conventional advantage of NATO forces; (2) strengthening the strike potential and defensive infrastructure against the strengthening NATO force parity on the eastern flank of NATO; (3) expanding hybrid operations; (4) maintaining superiority in deterrence potential.

The aim of the research presented in this dissertation was to present an analysis of Russian A2/AD capabilities in the context of challenges and threats to the security architecture of NATO's eastern flank. Research in this area covered the analysis of the Russian and NATO approach in terms of building adequate forces and means, calibrated within the framework of multi-domain operational guidelines. In utilitarian terms, the dissertation aimed to present the concept of strengthening NATO's eastern flank in the context of challenges and threats generated by the A2/AD capabilities of the Russian Federation.

In the course of the conducted work, it was shown that Russia, using A2/AD capabilities, can undermine the Euro-Atlantic security architecture in political and military terms. This issue becomes particularly important in the context of the results obtained regarding allied deterrence and defense policies in the face of identified threats. The countries of NATO's eastern flank, together with the potential of other Alliance members gathered in the region - by 2021 did not have adequate capabilities to break through Russian A2/AD. The process of accelerating the equalization of capability parities only took place in 2022. Its continuation will require the determination of all NATO members in setting goals and tasks to ensure a multi-domain approach that neutralizes the threat of Russian expansionism.